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ABSTRACT
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND URBAN RENEWAL
IN NORFOLK, 1950-1959
Forrest R. (Hap) White
Old Dominion University, 1991
Director: Dr. Maurice Berube
Although a number of scholars have examined the
impact that the U. S. Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of
Education decision had upon local school policies, there is
a paucity of research on what repercussions that decision
may have had upon a broad range of other related municipal
issues.

This historical case study explores the effect

that opposition to court ordered school integration had
upon the placement of school buildings and urban renewal
projects in one Southern city, Norfolk, Virginia, where
there was strong reason to believe that the municipal
powers of school plant planning, redevelopment, and city
planning were deliberately used to forestall court-ordered
school integration.

Census tract data, capital budget

documents, school board minutes, planning papers, and con
temporary newspaper accounts were used in combination with
interviews with decision-makers, municipal officials, and
newspaper reporters to write a history of school desegre
gation and urban renewal in Norfolk during the period both
immediately before and after the Brown decision.
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According to the research, the leadership in Norfolk,
as well as in other Southern cities, made a concerted
effort to plan for the demise of segregation, and that this
preparation took place in three phases: an attempt before
the Brown decision to make Black school facilities more
nearly equal to those of whites, a quiet reassessment
period following B r own, in which limited school desegrega
tion seemed possible, and a frantic effort to massively
resist by relying upon the urban renewal powers of the city
to delay or negate the authority of the federal courts.
Although Norfolk, which before Brown had pockets of
Black population spread throughout the city, appeared to
use its urban renewal powers to move from segregation de
jure to segregation de facto by tearing down mixed race,
transition neighborhoods, closing or demolishing affected
schools, and carefully dividing the city into single race
school zones.

In addition, the city shifted to reliance

upon tiny "vest pocket" schools and the careful placement
of public facilities to create racially distinct school
districts.

Shortly after the Brown decision, Norfolk

launched in several major new and highly speculative
redevelopment projects that tore down the homes of close to
ten percent of the city's population, including the Black
plaintiffs in its school desegregation suit.

In spite of

these efforts, Norfolk served as the chief battleground
upon which the fate of "interposition" and Massive
Resistance (to school desegregation) Plan was decided.
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INTRODUCTION
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
Although the United States Supreme Court's decision in
the Brown v. Board of Education cases sent shock waves of
protest across most of the Deep South, only the extent of
the decree actually came as a surprise to most of those who
were charged with the planning and leadership of Southern
cities.

That some sort of decision from the Court over

ruling at least a portion of the South's elaborate system of
segregated education was a foregone conclusion among many in
leadership roles; clearly the "separate but equal"
facilities maintained by communities, particularly those in
the rural areas, were so far from equivalent that only the
most callous court could disregard the distinction.
Moreover, desegregation had already begun in the nation's
military, interstate transportation, public accommodation,
and recreational facilities, either through administrative
action or legal intervention, and it was hard to imagine
that a nation that had so recently committed itself to
fighting wars overseas to avert repression would allow its
own public schools to remain as the last bastion of racial
subjugation at home.
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The main thesis of this work is that the individuals
charged with the leadership and management of Southern
cities had ample time, plenty of opportunity, and strong
motivation to plan for the demise of school segregation in
their community, that this planning process began well
before the Brown v. Board of Education cases were ever
decided, and that it grew increasingly intense as the
prospect of court-ordered integration became more and more a
reality.

Moreover, this research theorizes that these

leaders took deliberate steps to use all of the powers at
their disposal, including both the more obvious control over
school plant planning, educational administration, and
student attendance, as well as a full range of redevelop
ment, city planning, code enforcement, and urban renewal
activities to delay and otherwise forestall court-ordered
school desegregation in their community.

The study focuses

on the link between school desegregation and urban renewal
activities in one community, Norfolk, Virginia, that most
nearly fits the hypothesized variables.
Since 1938 the National Association for the Advance
ment of Colored People (N.A.A.C.P.) had advanced a wither
ing legal attack on the peculiar practices that provided the
basis for maintaining segregated schools.

Although their

assault was aimed at discrimination in graduate education,
the intent of their approach was clearly to amass an
irrefutable body of precedent that would lead to a court
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decision striking down once and for all the logic that
separate schools could be equal in American society.

In

Gaines v. Missouri (1938) the Supreme Court struck down the
argument that a government could avoid the responsibility to
maintain a (law) school for Blacks when it preserved one
exclusively for whites.1

Even though Missouri helped to

send its Black law students to schools in other states, the
logic of the N.A.A.C.P. was convincing to the nine lawyers
who sat in judgement as justices on the Court: they under
stood that there were certain powerful advantages associated
with attending a law school in the state where one intended
to practice.

In Sweatt v. Painter,2 the Court decided that

the makeshift law school provided for Blacks by the state of
Texas to avoid the Gaines precedent could not provide equal
educational experience for Blacks.

Again the lawyers on the

court were sympathetic to the argument that a law school
that lacked an adequate law library, a distinguished
faculty, and many of the other trappings of a quality legal
education was clearly inferior, and therefore unequal.

In

McLaurin v. Oklahoma, the Court found that separate
treatment of Blacks, even when they were allowed to attend
the same school as whites, was also unconstitutional

^-Robert A. Leflar, "Law of the Land: The Courts and the
Schools," chap. in Don Shoemaker, e d . , "With All Deliberate
Speed," (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 1.
2Oliver Brown, et al v. Board of Education of Topeka,
Shawnee County, Kansas,, et a l . , as reprinted in Race
Relations Law Reporter 1: 1 (February, 1956), p. 8.
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discrimination.

In the case, the plaintiff had been forced

to sit in the hall outside of his classes, had limited
access to the library, and had been subjected to other
degrading treatments designed to limit his contact with his
fellow (white) students.3
Thus, knowledgeable Southerners knew that the United
States Supreme Court would have to follow these same
precedents if it were faced with similar circumstances in
public education, i.e., the absence of any facility for
Blacks, separate facilities for Blacks that could be shown
to be clearly inadequate or inferior, or instances of
separate and degrading treatment for Black students.

Four

of the five cases accepted by the Court in its 1952 session
were designed to do precisely that:
1.

In the title case, Oliver Brown, et al. v. Board of

Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, et a l . , the
Court was presented with the appeal of a Black elementary
student who lived in a mixed race area.

Although Topeka had

integrated its secondary schools, Linda Brown was forced to
ride a bus across town to the Black elementary school, while
whites in her area walked to the nearby neighborhood school.
The N.A.A.C.P. contended that in light of the McLaurin
precedent, such separate treatment was degrading, and thus
contrary to constitutional guarantees of equal treatment.

3Robert A. Leflar, op c i t ., p. 2
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2. In the Virginia case, Davis, et al. v. the County
School Board of Prince Edward County, the county did not
provide a senior high school for Blacks pupils.

Since those

Black students who wished to attend high school were bused
to another county, the N.A.A.C.P. contended that, in line
with the Gaines and Sweatt v. Painter decisions, such an
arrangement was separate and unequal treatment in terms of
the physical plant provided, the curriculum, and the
extensive transportation required to access the facility.4
3. In Briggs v. Ell i o t , the N.A.A.C.P.

lawyers argued

that the physical facilities for Blacks in Clarendon County,
South Carolina, were inferior to those provided for whites.
The case was designed to follow the Sweatt v. Painter
precedent:

the Black schools in the county were older hand-

me-downs from the white community, and many lacked play
grounds, ball fields, cafeterias, libraries, auditoriums,
and other facilities present in the newer (white) schools.
In addition, this case featured a whole new realm of social
psychological research that pointed to the low self-esteem
of the Black children who attended these inferior schools.
4. To support the N.A.A.C.P.'s contention in Gebhart
v. Belton, university researchers in Delaware amassed a
large body of literature to show that Black schools in that
state were inferior to white ones in terms of pupil-teacher

4Milton Finklestein, Hon. Jawn A. Sandifer, Elfreda
Wright, Minorities:
U.S.A. (New York:
Globe Books, 1971).
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ratios, teacher training, extracurricular activities,
supplies, school materials, library books, and other
curricular and instructional support qualities.

The

plaintiffs hoped to play on the Sweatt v. Painter decision
and promote a finding that separate instructional programs,
even in otherwise similar physical facilities, could be
shown to be inferior, and thus contrary to the equal
protection provisions of the U. S. Constitution.
5.

The fifth case, which challenged the validity of

federal statutes requiring segregation in Washington, D. C.,
had only limited application to other public school systems,
since the schools in the nation's capital came more directly
under the financial and operational control of the U. S.
Congress than anywhere else in the country.5
The fact that the cases were first heard in the fall
of 1952, re-argued during the 1953 session of the Court, and
finally decided on May 17, 1954, gave the South plenty of
time to prepare for the eventuality of an adverse ruling.
Once decided, the Court held a second hearing on enforcement
in April,

1955,e and it was not until May 31, 1955, almost

three years after the initial cases had been accepted for
review, that the Supreme Court issued its implementing

sLeflar, op cit. , p. 3; Brown v. B o a r d , op cit.,
pp. 5-7;
Walter G. Stephan, "A brief Historical Overview of
School Desegregation,” chap. in Stephan and Joe R. Feagin,
eds., School Desegregation:
Past, Present, and Future (New
York:
Plenum Press, 1980), pp. 11-17.
6Leflar, pp. 3-4.
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decree requiring desegregation "with all deliberate speed."
Even then, in mandating that school districts make a "prompt
and reasonable start towards full compliance," the Court
recognized that a "transition period" would be necessary
before such compliance could be achieved.

Nevertheless, the

justices indicated that lower courts could "consider prob
lems related to administration, arising from the physical
condition of the school plant, the school transportation
system, personnel, revision of school districts and
attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of
determining admission to public schools on a nonracial
basis" if these tended to promote separate and unequal
treatment of students to maintain segregated schools.7
Although most Southern leaders expected to lose the
Prince Edward County (no equal facilities), Clarendon, South
Carolina (unequal facilities), and Delaware (unequal treat
ment) cases, where the quantifiable differences between
Black and white schools could be remedied short of desegre
gation, the defeat in Brown proved to be the most trouble
some, since it could only be remediated by school integra
tion.

Even if the South were to build literally hundreds of

new and largely unneeded schools, it still might have to
integrate some buildings in order to comply with the Brown
dictate that similarly situated students not recive separate
treatment just to maintain racial separation.

Nevertheless,

7Brown v. Board, p. 11.
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the Brown precedent, because it focused on the long cross
town bus ride, cut to the core of what many urban Southern
leaders, both Black and white, felt was most unjust about
the separate but equal system of Black and white education
that had evolved in most of their cities.®
The most immediate effect of the Brown decision was to
strike down the laws requiring segregated schools (i.e., de
jure segregation) in seventeen states (Texas, Oklahoma,
Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
Georgia, Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina, Tennessee,
Kentucky, Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware)
and permitted in four others (Kansas, Arizona, New Mexico,
and Wyoming).9

Although the focus of the court decisions

was upon state laws requiring segregation, the obvious
impact would be felt more directly in the local schools of
thousands of communities across the Deep South and Border
States of the Confederacy.

The decision, however, left in1

tact the kind of separate race schools found most often in
the cities of the North, West, and Midwest, where the
segregation, although not absolute, was due to the
individual's choice of neighborhood and place of residence,
i.e., de facto segregation.

Thus, substantially equal

sPretlow Darden, former Mayor of Norfolk, interview by
author, Tape recording, Norfolk, 13 August 1975; and Francis
Crenshaw, former member of the Norfolk School Board, interview
by author, Tape recording, Norfolk, 7 February 1991.
9Southern School News, 3 September 1954.
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schools that served separate race neighborhoods were still
permitted by the Court; only the particular circumstance
presented by Linda Brown, a Black living closer to a white
school than a Black one, was initially found unconstitu
tional.

At least one major study of integration in 24

Northern, Western, and Midwest cities found that even in the
areas of the country that had already desegregated, most
schools could be clearly designated as single race institu
tions, and that a large percentage of children living under
the rules of de facto segregation actually went to school
with very few members of the opposite race.
Thus, most communities could comply with the dictates
of the Court with only a minimum of integration, and most
schools could continue as essentially single race schools
except in the few areas of each city where there were mixed
race neighborhoods, transition areas, or where two racially
distinct areas would have to be served by the same school.
Even then, the cities that had already desegregated had
evolved an elaborate system of gerrymandered school
districts, liberal transfer policies, "schools of choice,"
staggered enrollment procedures, in-school segregation by
tracking, and other quasi-legal devices to avoid larger
scale integration or to ensure that whites would not have to
attend predominantly Black schools.10

10Robin M. Williams and Margaret W. Ryan, eds., Schools
in Transition: Community Experiences in Desegregation (Chapel
Hill, N.C.:
University of North Carolina Press, 1954),
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This careful distinction between continued segrega
tion by place of residence and court-ordered integration was
one of the chief reasons that the Brown decree was met with
only mild reaction in most areas of the Border States where
there was a relatively small Black population, and where it
was for the most part concentrated in a large, central, and
over crowded section of the downtown, and only occasionally
in small scattered settlements in other parts of the city.
This distinction meant that the Northern model of de facto
segregation could be adopted without undue hardship, except
in those few cities of the Border South that had very large
concentrations of Black population, a history of racial
strife, or vast social class distinctions between their
Black and white or ethnic citizens.x:L
The prospect of large-scale race-mixing in the public
schools had Southern leaders more concerned than any other
aspect of the Brown precedent.

Indeed, several years before

the Supreme Court actually rendered its call for desegrega
tion, Southern newspapers openly speculated about the magni
tude of the reaction that would follow an adverse ruling:
A decision of the Supreme Court that would
provide for the admission of Negro students to
public schools in areas where they would
constitute a large proportion or a majority of
the students might be the worst thing, rather
than the best, that could happen in race

pp. 45, 57, 102, 240, 242, and 443.
X1lbid., p. 40 and pp. 80 -110.
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relations where people of both races were not
ready for such changes.
The law is a living
instrumentality, and if society must live under
it, [then] the law must also live with
society.12
For this reason, a number of localities in the Border
States, especially the larger cities, began almost immedi
ately to take steps to comply with the dictates of the
Court, while there was no integration at all in the eight
states of the Deep South where Blacks comprised 22% or more
of the population (Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North
Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Virginia)
until they were pushed to the wall by the courts.13
There, the racial mores were more firmly rooted, and racial
separation more firmly entrenched, especially in those areas
with the highest percentage of Black population, a figure
that could run as high as 70% to 80% in some of the rural
counties.

In these communities, desegregation meant not

just the transfer of large numbers of Blacks to previously
all-white schools, a situation that was rare even in the
areas of the country that had already desegregated; it also
would require assignment of whites to Black schools, a
practice that was almost unheard of almost anywhere else in

12Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 December 1952.
13Southern School N e w s , September 1956; Southern School
N e w s , September 1957; and W. D. Workman, Jr., "The Deep
South," chap. in Don Shoemaker, op cit., p. 89.
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the world.14

This difference was largely responsible for

the violent reaction to the Court's decree.15
Although Blacks and whites lived and worked in greater
proximity to one another in the South, the history of the
region presaged a more violent reaction to an adverse Court
ruling than elsewhere in the country.

It was here that

slavery had flourished and its abolition been most strongly
resisted; and the area's strong state's rights philosophy,
adopted as much for racial considerations as any other
cause, meant that the authority of the Court was sure to be
challenged.

Southern leaders had every right to fear that

the repercussions from an adverse ruling in the Brown case
might cause deep disruptions in their way of life, their
political stability, and their economic rejuvenation.

Be

cause of the sad history of slavery, interracial inter
actions had evolved from a master-slave relationship, a
situation that was vastly different than in Northern and
Midwestern cities, where Blacks were but one more immigrant
group.

Southern leaders pointed to several strong demo

graphic differences between the races that made the assign
ment of whites to Black schools politically impossible.
Although most of these distinctions evolved because of the
condition of servitude and severe discrimination under which
Blacks suffered, nevertheless whites expressed some legiti

14Williams and Ryan, op cit.
1SW. D. Workman, op c i t . , p. 89.
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mate concerns about the vast differences that existed
between the two populations, even in the urban areas, in
health and sanitation, especially the much higher venereal
disease rate among Blacks; home environment, that included
both social class distinctions and such indicators of pover
ty as higher incidence of unemployment, public dependency,
and single parent families; morality, indicated by higher
rates of illegitimacy, incarceration, and teenage pregnancy;
and lower intellectual development, measured by lower read
ing scores, more illiteracy, and higher drop-out rates.xs
Although a substantial body of evidence has been c o m 
piled about those communities that complied immediately with
the dictates of the Court either voluntarily or under
pressure from the courts, the history of desegregation in
the Deep South during the period immediately after the Brown
decision takes place almost exclusively in the chambers of
the various state legislatures, and not in the local school
systems that were most directly threatened by the decision.
Thus the story of desegregation in the Urban South between
1954 and 1960 has been told in the hundreds of communities
in the Border States that complied (Baltimore, St. Louis,
Topeka, Washington, Chattanooga, Clinton (Tennessee),
Louisville, Wilmington, and Little Rock,1-'7 but the record

XSW. D. Workman, Jr., op c i t . , pp. 89 -90.
^ R o b e r t L. Crain, et al. , The Politics of School
Desegregation:
Comparative Case Studies of Community
Structure and Policy-Making (Chicago:
Aldine Press, 1968);
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during this period is largely missing in the cities of the
Deep South that resisted.

There the focus has been so

completely upon the legislative maneuvering of the states or
the legal precedents of the federal courts that the actions
of the school boards, city councils, planning commissions,
housing authorities, and others charged with the responsi
bility for planning and leading the cities have been largely
ignored.

If the history of desegregation in these cities

has been written, it has concentrated upon events that
occurred after the schools were ordered by the courts to
integrate, and not upon what the cities did to prepare for
that eventuality during the substantial period of time, at
least a decade in most communities, that they had to make
arrangements for the demise of de jure segregation.

Even

then, the focus has been so completely upon desegregation
suits and school board actions that the larger context of
local governmental action is missing.
One hypothesis of this research is that local offi
cials responded to the threat of court-ordered desegregation
in the same manner as their counterparts in state capitals
and the Congress, and used every means at their disposal to
frustrate, delay, or defuse the impact of school desegrega-

Southern School N e w s , June, 1956; Southern School N e w s ,
3 September 1954; Jeffrey A. Raffel, The Politics of School
Desegregation:
The Metropolitan Remedy in Delaware
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980); and Ray Rist,
Desegregated Schools: Appraisals of the American Experience
(New York:
Academic Press, 1979).
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tion in their community.

Clearly they were as cognizant of

the threat posed by desegregation as their colleagues in the
state legislatures--the N.A.A.C.P. legal defense team
lawyers began filing court challenges all across the nation
shortly after Brown3-B— and the local electorate was making
the same kinds of demands as the state-wide constituencies.
And certainly local officials were as adept as their
brethren in the legislatures in using the powers at their
disposal to frustrate and circumvent the dictates of the
courts.

Even so, however, most of the case studies of local

school desegregation controversies in the Deep South do not
begin until almost a decade3-9 or two20 later.

The

record of school
desegregation both before the Brown1 1
•
decision and between the decree and its implementation is so
blank that one major history of school desegregation covers
the entire period between 1954 and 1962 in less than a
page;23- another accomplishes it in six.22

What happened

3-8Lino A. Gragila, "From Prohibiting Segregation to
Requiring Integration, chap. in Walter G. Stephan and Joe R.
Feagin, eds., School Desegregation:
Past. Present, and
Future, (New York:
Plenum Press, 1980), pp. 69-96.
19Robert L. Crain, op cit.
2°Charles V. Willie and Susan L. Greenblatt, Community
Politics and Educational Change:
Ten School Systems Under
Court Order (New York:
Longman, Inc., 1981).
23-George R. Metcalf, From Little Rock to Boston:
The
History of School Desegregation (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
Press, 1983), p. 3.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

16

in the intervening years is largely unknown, although cities
and school boards in the Deep South appeared to have both
motive and opportunity to move the segregated status of
their school systems from de lure to de facto, and possible
to hypothesize that they took the same kinds of actions then
that they would take a decade later to preserve that status.
Only the historical record is missing.
Any attempt to hypothesize a concerted local response
to the threat of court-ordered desegregation would have to
imply several stages of reaction:
1.

An Attempt to Make Separate "Equal," 1950-1955.

Since most Southern leaders were aware of both the legal
effort to end school desegregation and the various prece
dents involved,23 one thesis of this research is that many
urban school systems made a concerted attempt to build new
school facilities for Blacks and correct deficiencies in
both funding and facilities that might have existed.
Several Southern states adopted this approach during the
period between 1950, when the threat of court-ordered
integration first became apparent, and 1955, when the exact
nature and intent of the U. S. Supreme Court and the various
federal district courts became known.

In 1953, Mississippi,

22Walter G. Stephan, "A Brief Historical Overview of
School Desegregation," chap. in Stephan and Feagin, op c i t . ,
p. 3.
23Sam Ervin,Jr., "The Case for Segregation," Look,
3 April 1956 (v. 20, no. 7), pp. 32-33.
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in "anticipation of the U. S. Supreme Court's desegregation
decision" created a "foundation plan to preserve segregation
on a voluntary basis through [building] equal school facili
ties."24

Georgia and South Carolina both began school

equalization programs in 1951,25 while Louisiana,25 and
Oklahoma27 waited until after the initial Brown decision
(1954) before providing massive new funding for school
construction targeted to improving Black schools.

In most

cases, these efforts were begun with new taxing authority,
new (sales) taxes, popular referendums and other measures
that indicated strong public (white) support for building
new schools and upgrading the dilapidated school facilities
used by Blacks.

The states obviously had their eye on the

N.A.A.C.P victories in higher education, because their
attention was on more than just the physical facilities of
the schools.

Everywhere the states felt a new urgency to

provide additional funding, facilities, curriculum support,
textbooks, and increased teacher salaries for their Black
schools.

Mississippi increased its appropriations so that

25% more per pupil was allocated for Blacks than whites;23
salary scales for Black teachers all across the South

1Southern School N e w s , July 1956.
'W. D. Workman, Jr., p. 92.
‘Southern School News, 3 March 1955.
’Southern School N e w s , 4 May 1955.
'Southern School N e w s , 6 December 1956
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suddenly shot up; and Alabama and Virginia found that Black
teachers were actually paid more than whites (because of
greater seniority and more advanced degrees).29
Thus, one logical extension of this finding is the
hypothesis that this effort to create equal but separate
schools had its counterpart on the local scene as well, and
that during the period that the Brown cases were actually
being decided, local school boards and communities turned
their own attention to improving Black education:

to

building new schools; providing playgrounds, cafeterias,
auditoriums, libraries, and other facilities to existing
facilities; and increasing teacher salaries and spending for
textbooks, supplies, training, and other measurable support
items as away to ensure that segregation would continue even
if such "separate" facilities were required to be truly
"equal," the expected decree from the Court.
2. A Transition Period, 1955-1956:
Hostility.

from Calmness to

Initially the states reacted calmly, even going

so far as to indicate some intent to comply with the Supreme
Court's decision, but this "Wait and See" attitude was
quickly followed by open hostility and defiance when the
courts began to move to enforce the Brown mandate.

From

school boards and political leaders all across the South the
message was first that they could "handle" desegregation

29Workman, p. 93.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

19

without doing irreparable harm to public education,30 but
soon the states became involved in order to take away any
authority local officials might have had to comply.

In

Virginia, for instance, the governor's attempt at moderation
through local action (the Gray Plan) quickly gave way to
more defiant measures,31 and soon states were enacting a
bastion of legal measures to insure that local schools would
stay segregated.
Those areas in the Border States that attempted com
pliance with the Court's decree at the outset (i.e., St.
Louis, Washington, Baltimore, Tennessee, and Delaware),
began to experience an unexpected level of racial tur
moil32 that gave cause for concern to moderates in the
Deep South.

Hostility first to the Brown decision, and

later to the Supreme Court began to grow as Southerners
realized that they would receive very little, if any,
transition period in their own community.

The N.A.A.C.P.

kept up its legal pressures, and soon suits were being filed
all across the South.33

In addition, other segregated

institutions, such as state parks, city recreation

3QSouthern School N e w s , 3 September 1954.
31James W. Eley, Jr., The Crisis of Conservative
Virginia:
The Byrd Organization and the Politics of Massive
Resistance, Twentieth-Century America Series, (Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 1976), pp.
36-37.
32Southern School N e w s , 4 November 1954.
33Lino A. Gragila, "From Prohibiting Segregation to
Requiring Integration," op cit.
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facilities, and public transportation34 were being ordered
by federal courts to desegregate, and both the intent and
authority of the judiciary to enforce its integration orders
were becoming clearer.
At the local level this "Wait and See" attitude
probably had its most obvious impact upon school building
programs, and a number of communities may have delayed new
projects until they could better discern the impact of the
courts' decisions.

This situation at least appears to be

prevalent at the state level:

by 1956 Mississippi was

reporting that only a third of its counties had actually
complied with the plan to "equalize" Black schools;35
Arkansas experienced similar delays in its own districts
immediately after the Brown decision;36 and Virginia
newspapers indicated that "there was no longer any great
pressure on local officials . . .

to continue the special

and costly attention to Negro school building programs."3'
7
One logical extension of this finding is the hypothesis that
once communities began again to build schools in the period
following Brown, the dictates of that decision were critical
in determining the location and size of new buildings.
Communities probably abandoned sites under consideration if

34Southern School N e w s , 7 April 1955.
35Southern School N e w s , July 1956.
36Southern School N e w s , 1 December 1954.
^ Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 13 October 1954.
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they were found to be too close to racial dividing lines,
and turned instead to new locations that could continue to
carry a single race designation.
Although many Southern leaders felt at first that
Blacks in their community would be content with equal
facilities, their attitude changed when they saw local
Blacks aligned with the N.A.A.C.P. efforts to desegregate
schools through the courts.

At first Southerners tended to

blame this change on "outsiders,"33 and even to see it as
a "communist plot,"39 an inclination that parallels the
experience of several Northern and Mid-western cities where
there was opposition from the white community to school
desegregation.40

Just as in the cities that had already

desegregated, race relations in a number of communities in
the Deep South began to deteriorate as whites saw that their
own local Blacks leaders had abandoned the call for equali
ty, and were pushing instead for school desegregation.41
This growing feeling of animosity between the races probably
had other outlets in the politics and civic life of most
communities, so that the coming crisis over school desegre
gation colored almost every aspect of racial dialogue.
Moreover, those few local school boards that did persist in

33Southern School N e w s , 6 January 1955.
39James W. Ely, Jr., op c i t ., p. 31.
4°Williams and Ryan, op c i t . , p. 237.
41Southern School News. January 1955.
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their efforts to keep harmony between the races soon found
themselves isolated by both the Black and white
communities.42
3. Overt Attempts to Move from de jure to de facto
Segregation, 1956-1960.

The hostility to the U. S. Supreme

Court, B r own, the N.A.A.C.P., and forced school desegrega
tion began to find a number of outlets at the state level.
Beginning in November, 1955, state legislatures all across
the South began to turn to "interposition"— a long lost
constitutional interpretation that compels states to "inter
pose" their own authority in order to protect their citizens
from unjust actions of the federal government— as the answer
to continuing segregation.

The idea was especially promoted

by James J. Kilpatrick, editor of the Richmond News Leader,
and swept across the rhetoric of Southern politicians, even
in the Border States that had already begun desegregation.
Within 18 months after Kilpatrick began to promote
interposition as a valid legal doctrine, all eight of the
states of the Deep South had passed formal interposition
resolutions and a package of laws designed to use the police
powers of their state to enforce segregated schools.43
addition to the anti-N.A.A.C.P.

In

laws that were enacted in

most of the Deep South states, eight states passed pupil
placement laws designed to block transfers between white and

42Southern School N e w s , June 1956.
43W. D. Workman, Jr., p. 97.
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black schools, six states authorized the closing of public
schools under the threat of integration, four states pro
vided financial aid to students who attended private schools
to escape court-ordered desegregation, and most weakened
their laws on compulsory attendance, teacher salaries,
transportation, term of teacher contracts, and the like.44
Each of these laws was an attempt to delay desegregation by
forcing the courts to peel away a layer of state government
that had been interposed between the local schools and the
courts.

In addition to state authorities, the logic of

interposition was at the heart of the Southern Manifesto
signed by 100 Southern Senators and Congressmen; the
Manifesto proclaimed that "integration was contrary to
established law," and professed that government officials
had a duty to resist integration "with every legal means" at
their disposal.45

Thus, one logical assumption is that

local officials also attempted in their own way to "inter
pose" the authority of their own level of government between
the courts and the schools.

As the smoke from the political

rhetoric began to clear at the state level, the focus ap
pears to have shifted to localities, because they possessed
a number of exclusive powers in the administration of public
schools that could be useful in delaying even the most

44Patrick E. McCauley, "Be It Enacted," chap. in Don
Shoemaker, e d . , "With All Deliberate Speed." op c i t . , p. 132.
45Walter G. Stephan, op cit., p. 12.
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aggressive court:

foremost among these was the power to

actually assign pupils to schools.

The editors of Southern

School News indicated that seven states were investigating
the potential of creative use of pupil assignment authority
as a way to deter integration.
Authorities in school administration are of
the opinion that the power to assign individual
pupils to particular schools is an inherent one,
essential to the efficient operation of the
schools . . . . It is not necessary that a child
be assigned to the school most conveniently
located for his attendance . . . . Legal pre
cedents supporting school boards' pupil assign
ment powers . . . uphold the authority of school
boards to assign pupils on the basis of factors
relevant to education and the efficient
administration of the school system.45
Southern legal scholars also seized upon the assign
ment of school attendance zones as an administrative local
power that was corollary to the actual assignment of indi
vidual students.

Several factors, other than the race of

the students, could be used to support the creation of
school attendance zones:

the distance from home to school,

the maximum utilization of school space, transportation
considerations, topographical barriers, and the conformity
of institutions
fers).4-7

(in order to prevent frequent trans

One study of integration in Northern and Mid

46Southern School N e w s , February 1957.
^ " R e p o r t of the Subcommittee on Zoning,” New York
Board of Education, 14 December 1956, reprinted in Race
Relations Law Reporter 1: 5 (October 1956), p. 847.
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western cities found a distinct pattern of drawing attend
ance zones to fit the racial characteristics of the neigh
borhoods, rather than just the geographic proximity to the
school.4®

One logical assumption is that Southern school

officials became just as adept at blocking desegregation
with this technique as their Northern counterparts were in
limiting integration.

The city of Charlottesville, for

instance, when faced with court-ordered desegregation,
divided itself into six elementary school zones; the lines
of one zone were so carefully drawn that they included
almost all of the Black students who had applied to go to
previously all-white schools.49
Courts were also not disposed to dispute the power of
local school boards to locate and build schools, even when
the placement of the building had the same effect, because
of prevailing housing patterns in the community, as desig
nating the building as a "white" or "Black" school.

This

was the practice in several Northern cities with substan
tial Black populations, and it was able to withstand
judicial review even when the evidence indicated that the
choice of a particular school location was dictated more by
the desire to limit integration than sound pedagogical con
siderations :

4SWilliams and Ryan, op c i t . ,

p. 57.

49Southern School News, September 1958.
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The fact that in a given area a school is
populated almost exclusively by the children of
a given race is not of itself evidence of
discrimination . . . [thus] the choice of
school sites is a permissible exercise of
administrative discretion.50
Not only was the careful location of school buildings
to minimize integration accepted by the courts, it was a
course strongly urged by Richmond News Leader editor James
J. Kilpatrick, who was fast becoming the chief spokesman of
Southern defiance to the Court.

In an editorial just a few

days (May 20, 1954) after the U. S. Supreme Court's initial
decision in the Brown case, and before any real enforcement
effort was expected, Kilpatrick opined that:
A great part of the problem, especially in
the cities, could be handled by the relocation
of school buildings and the gerrymandering of
enrollment lines.
Not only was such a course urged, at least one
researcher has found strong evidence to suggest that the
Richmond School Board, under the leadership of Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., who was later to sit on the U. S. Supreme
Court, built several new schools in Black neighborhoods in
accordance with this effort to forestall desegregation
efforts.51

5°Shannon Marguerite Henry v. Walter Godsell, et a l . ,
U. S. District Court, Michigan, 12 August 1958, No. 14,769,
reprinted in Race Relations Law Reporter 3: 5 (October 1958),
pp. 914-916.
51James W. Eley, Jr. op c i t . , pp. 36, 134.
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In addition to the placement of the building, the
determination of the size of the building and the number of
students to be served was also an undisputed administrative
authority of local boards.

So also was the ability to shift

or realign the attendance zone of a school threatened by
court-ordered integration so that its racial designation was
dramatically changed.

This strategy was applied success

fully in Newport News, when Thomas Jefferson, the city's
newest elementary school, was threatened with court-ordered
integration.

At the opening of the 1955-56 school year,

parents of ten Black students tried to enroll their
children.

Within a week the School Board voted to shift the

attendance zone, and turn the school over to the Black
community rather than integrate it.

The federal judge

(Walter Hoffman) refused to intervene, ruling that even the
post hoc assignment of attendance zones was a permissible
administrative authority of local school boards.52
Thus, although almost every school board in the South
was focusing, because of the particular precedent set in the
Brown case, upon the proximity of Blacks students to nearby
white schools,53 a realization was growing that the boards
were not powerless before the courts.

Legal scholars were

careful to point out that:

52Southern School N e w s , October 1955.
53Southern School News, August 1957.
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The Constitution, in other words, does not
require integration.
It merely forbids dis
crimination.
It does not forbid such dis
crimination as occurs as a result of voluntary
action [such as choice of residence, neighbor
hood, city, etc.].54
One other assumption is that local governments, just
like their school boards, were also willing to use every
legal means at their disposal to delay or deter the threat
of school desegregation.

The single power most directly

related to public education was the authority to control the
finances of the school system.

Especially in Virginia, a

state with dependent school districts, education relied
heavily upon the revenue support of local governments;
evidence suggests that several of these municipalities used
their power of the purse during the desegregation crisis to
intimidate the Black community and manipulate the local
school board.

The state enacted a special funds cut off law

that allowed localities to appropriate school funds on a
month to month, instead of an annual, basis, and a number of
rural counties relied upon this authority to indicate their
willingness to close down public schools threatened with
court-ordered desegregation.55
In addition to the powers to finance and administer
public schools, which included the authority to assign
students, draw attendance zones, locate and construct

54Southern School N e w s , August 1956.
5SSouthern School News, 6 July 1955.
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buildings,

local governments had the considerable powers of

urban renewal— redevelopment, city planning, zoning, code
enforcement, and economic development— at their disposal.
Although the historical record offers very little direct
evidence that these powers were used to forestall school
integration, the director of the federal Housing and Home
Finance Agency (HHFA) has indicated that a number of
Southern cities used urban renewal powers to break up
integrated low-income neighborhoods in order to achieve de
facto segregation:
Where, in a few Southern cities, there had
been a protest against this, a compromise was
sometimes reached involving proposed re-use for
other than residential purposes.
Thus a slum
formerly housing both Negro and white families
was proposed as the location for industry or a
public institution.
Urban renewal too often
seemed to be an instrument for wiping out
racially integrated living.56
Thus, if applied judiciously, urban renewal authority
could be made to complement other local efforts to forestall
court-ordered desegregation.

In fact, many of the municipal

powers of urban renewal parallel the powers of school boards
to creatively administer their own authority in order to
replace de jure with de facto segregation, only the unit of
measurement changes:

instead of schools, one is altering

5SRobert C. Weaver, "The Urban Complex," chap. in Jewel
Bellush and Murray Hausknecht, eds., Urban Renewal: People,
Politics, and Planning (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday,
1967), p. 94.
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neighborhoods.

For instance, since topographical barriers

were a valid consideration when assigning school attendance
zones, acquisition of additional land under the urban
renewal powers of a city for parks, playgrounds, state
colleges, industrial parks, or other public purposes could
be used to place legal topographical barriers between
neighborhoods, and thus preserve the racial character of the
schools that served those neighborhoods, in spite of the
fact that some Blacks may have lived closer to a white
school.

Similarly, the placement of an interstate highway,

one of the strategies used in Mobile, Alabama, could be used
to divide neighborhoods and school attendance zones into
racially distinct areas.57

Some evidence exists that

these techniques were used in other cities outside of the
Deep South.

One major study of school integration found

that St. Louis and Baltimore may have used a combination of
natural geographic barriers and selective redevelopment to
keep Blacks confined to racially distinct school attendance
zones.58
Similarly, just as they could tear down or close
schools directly threatened by court-ordered integration and
rebuild new schools in areas where the racial composition
was more clearly defined, cities may have used their powers
of redevelopment, as Robert Weaver has charged, to tear down

57Willie and Greenblatt, op c i t . , p. 189.
5BRobert L. Crain, et a l . , op c i t . , pp. 15, 72-73.
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mixed race or transition areas where the racial composition
of neighborhood schools would have been equally mixed.59
Parallel to the power to size the school to the capacity of
the neighborhood in order to keep its racial identity, is
the authority, through redevelopment, to adjust the size of
the neighborhood to meet the racial designation of the
school.

Also, just as school boards could alter attendance

zones, cities could change their own size through merger and
annexation, and thus alter the pattern of school attendance.
v>

When Newport News was faced with court-ordered desegregation
in 1958, for instance, the city merged with Warwick County,
and the resultant ripple effect on school attendance zones
allowed it to successfully delay integration for another
year.so

Richmond also used this strategy effectively, and

at least one study has indicated that its efforts to annex
surrounding counties was motivated largely by racial and
school desegregation considerations.61
Thus, local governments had at their disposal a much
larger arsenal of powers than even the states that could be
"interposed" between the courts and the schools in order to
forestall court-ordered school desegregation.

Evidence also

suggests that some, if not all, of these powers of urban
renewal and school plant planning were used in some cities

59Robert C. Weaver, op cit.
s°Southern School N e w s , January 1959.
6XWillie and Greenblatt, op c i t ., pp. 231-232.
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to achieve de facto segregation as a replacement for de jure
systems.

Unfortunately, the state of school desegregation

research is such that, except for isolated incidents that
may be the exception, rather than the rule, insufficient
evidence exists to determine just how far cities in the Deep
South were willing to go in applying these powers in their
effort to forestall integration.

If the rhetoric of their

counterparts in the U. S. Congress and state legislatures is
to be believed, however, some assumption may be made that
local officials were willing to use every lawful means at
their disposal to prevent integration, and to this end the
extensive arsenal of school administrative, planning,
redevelopment, and urban renewal powers were used to carve
out racially distinct school districts and attendance zones.
Certainly plaintiffs in a number of school desegrega
tion suits have charged that cities used their various urban
renewal powers deliberately to create segregated neighbor
hoods, strictly enforce well defined color barriers, isolate
Black populations, relocate integrated schools, and other
wise frustrate efforts to desegregate.62

Their claim has

been in part supported by demographic researchers63 and

62Karl Taeuber, "Desegregation of Public School
Districts:
Persistence and Change," Phi Delta Kappan 72: 1,
(September, 1990), pp 18-24.
63Gary Orfield, "Ghettoization and Its Alternatives,"
chap. in Paul E. Peterson, e d . , The New Urban Reality
(Washington, D. C.:
Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 161196.
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other social scientists,64 but they have chosen to blame
school boards, rather than redevelopment authorities,
planning commissions, or city councils, for efforts to
replace de jure with de facto segregation.

Educational

authorities, however, have largely overlooked these charges,
and chosen to focus instead on the political implications of
school board decisions only when they were finally faced
with a court order to desegregate, an approach that ignores
the fact that most communities had at least a decade to
prepare for the demise of de jure segregation.

For this

reason, the actions of school boards, as well as those of
other political and municipal leaders, during the period
just before and after the Brown decision have remained
largely unrecognized.

In fact, the focus on school board

actions so late in the controversy has leant credence to the
school-board-as-villain theory in a number of communities,
when the truth may be that school boards were merely being
dragged along in the planning, redevelopment, and housing
activities of other local authorities; that is, that the
placement of schools and drawing of new attendance zones was
the last act in a far more elaborate plot to replace de jure
with de facto segregation— a drama in which Southern school
boards may have really played only a minor role.

Thus,

64Karl Taueber, "Residence and Race: 1619 to 2019," chap.
in Winston A. Van Horne, e d . , R a c e : Twentieth Century
Dilemmas— Twenty-First
Century
Prognoses
(Milwaukee:
University of Wisconsin, 1989).
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partly because the. previous educational histories of the
period focused so exclusively upon the events surrounding
the actions of school boards only when they were finally
implementing a court decision, they may have ignored the
other cast of characters— the interplay of activity with
other municipal agencies that may be involved— and also
missed the first few acts of the school desegregation drama.
In fact, one further assumption is that cities used
their urban renewal powers more often to forestall school
desegregation in the 1950s than in the 1960s, the decade for
which some documentation exists.

Not only was the motiva

tion perhaps stronger in the 1950s, because of the
prevalence of the interposition doctrine, the courts and
community groups would exercise less scrutiny of actions
that bore the imprint of racial planning, partly because up
to that point all planning in the Deep South, and most of
the rest of the nation as well, was designed to support the
"separate but equal" doctrine in housing and "neighborhoods
of choice" concepts that were legally permissible for
several years after Brown.65

Moreover, even without the

school desegregation controversy, the decade of the 1950s
would have been challenging enough for the school boards and
municipal leaders of the Urban South.

The mass migration of

Blacks that had taken place earlier from the rural South to

65Heywood, et al. v. Public Housing Administration,
135 F. Supp 217, reprinted in Race Relations Law
Reporter 1: 2 (April, 1956), p. 347.
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Northern cities shifted after World War II to include the
major Southern urban centers.

Most of the older cities of

the South did not have a central ghetto or Black district
like their Northern counterparts; instead almost every
white, middle-class neighborhood had a small concentration
of Blacks living nearby from which its domestic workers were
drawn.66

Since both the housing and the schools were

strictly segregated in accordance with state laws, the
burden of maintaining separate race schools was placed
almost exclusively upon Black children, who, because of the
dispersal of their neighborhoods, had to be bused across
town to achieve racially separate schools.

Yet this was

exactly the situation outlawed in the Brown case— Linda
Brown was being bused past the white schools in
Topeka,Kansas67— and it was the circumstance most directly
under attack by N.A.A.C.P. lawyers.66
The changing pattern of Black migration was not,
however, the only force defining the need for urban renewal.
The military build up that had taken place during World War
II continued through the Korean conflict and on into the
Cold War era, placing enormous pressures on Sunbelt cities
to plan and build for the influx of population and indus

66Karl E. and Alma F. Taueber, Negroes in Cities:
Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Change (Chicago:
Aldine Publishing, 1965), pp. 23-122.
^ Southern School N e w s , September 1958.
6SWalter G. Stephan, op c i t . , p. 13.
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tries.

Veterans returning from the war and their "baby

boom" offspring began to place their own demand for more
housing, schools, shopping centers, and public services.

In

short, the 1950s was a decade of shifting population,
housing, and land use policies, especially in the Urban
South, and it was here that the tools of redevelopment, land
use planning, school planning, and urban renewal really came
of age.®9
In light of the enormous controversy surrounding
school desegregation late in the decade, one reasonable
speculation is that these same tools may have been just as
easily applied to prevent certain land uses, especially
those related to integrated school districts, as they were
to promote others more acceptable to school and municipal
leaders.

The mammoth building boom that was going on in

schools and houses could just as easily have been directed
to preserve racially identifiable districts as to advance
the other goals of community planning, but the record is
either missing or unclear.

Even so, in the Urban South

there was both opportunity, in the shifting patterns of
school attendance zones and housing that were taking place
any way, and motive, in the effort to preserve a segregated
society, to hypothesize that the powers of urban renewal
were used to preserve segregated schools as much as

69Carl Abbott, The New Urban America:
Growth and
Politics in Sunbelt Cities (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1981).
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possible.

The older cities of the South also experienced an

urgency of situation— Blacks living in closer proximity to
white schools than their own— that added impetus to their
motive.

One prediction based upon these assumptions is that

the level of official efforts to replace de jure with de
facto segregation is directly proportional to three
predictor variables:

(1) the extent of opposition to court-

ordered integration, a relative constant across the entire
South;

(2) the urgency of the situation, a measure of Black

housing dispersion and potentially mixed-race schools as
well as the immediacy of a court order to integrate the
schools; and (3) ample opportunity in large scale planning,
redevelopment, and urban renewal efforts.

It is assumed

that where these three variables were present to a large
degree, new schools, highways, redevelopment projects, and
other public initiatives were undertaken in part to achieve
racially segregated school districts, i.e., to move from de
jure to de facto segregation with all deliberate speed.
Part of the purpose of this work is to test the theory
of a link between efforts to preserve school segregation
and urban renewal activities by examining one community,
Norfolk, with both strong motive and ample opportunity to
apply the powers of local government to oppose court-ordered
desegregation.

In short, this effort will attempt to show

that the placement of new school buildings, redevelopment
projects, and major public facilities, both immediately
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before and after B r o w n , was designed in part to delay or
deter the threat of court-ordered school integration.

Thus,

this work, although largely an urban history of Norfolk
during the 1950s, will attempt to fill in a major gap in
school desegregation research on the decade.
When educational authorities have seriously looked at
efforts to desegregate public schools, they have chosen
either the "white flight" scenario advanced by James
Coleman70 and David Armor71 or the more benign explana
tion of Orfield's economic choices,72 Charles Willie and
Susan Greenblatt's "tipping theory,"73 the "avoidance"
theory of Cataldo, Giles, and Gatlan.74

Most of the

research supporting these propositions comes from the
1960s,75 however, and ignores any exploration of the

70James S. Coleman, Sara P. Kelly, and John A. Moore,
Trends in School Segregation, 1968-1973 (Washington, D.C.:
Urban Institute, 1975).
71David J. Armor, "White Flight and the Future of School
Desegregation," chap. in Walter G. Stephan and Joe R. Feagin,
eds., School Desegregation:
Past, Present, and Future,
(New York:
Plenum Press, 1980), pp. 187-225.
72Gary Orfield, "School Segregation and Residential
Segregation," chap. in Stephan and Feagin, School Desegre
gation:
Past, Present, and Future, op c i t . , pp. 231-244.
73Charles V. Willie and Susan L. Greenblatt, Community
Politics and Educational Change:
Ten School Systems Under
Court Order, op cit.
74Everett F. Cataldo, Michael W. Giles, and Douglas S.
Gatlin, School Desegregation Policy:
Compliance, Avoidance,
and the Metropolitan Remedy (Lexington, Mass.:
D. C. Heath
and Company, 1978).
7BJames S. Coleman, et al . , op cit.
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charges that school boards or other municipal authorities
took deliberate efforts to replace de jure with de facto
segregation before that time.
Thus, not only does a serious gap exist in the study
of school desegregation efforts between the time Brown was
contemplated and actually implemented, there is also a
compelling need for a more complete analysis of the inter
play between school desegregation, city planning, redevelop
ment, school plant planning, and urban renewal efforts.

The

current study proposes to fill that gap by focusing on one
city where there was both ample opportunity and strong
motive to hypothesize such a link.
Norfolk turns out to be a remarkable city for such a
study:

not only did it face an historic school desegrega

tion controversy late in the decade that led to the closing
of its previously all-white junior and senior high schools,
it also gained national recognition as one of the cities
that was most proficient in the use of the powers of
redevelopment, land use planning, and urban renewal.

In

fact, by the end of the decade Norfolk had bulldozed more
acres, demolished more homes, and erected more public
housing units (per capita population) than almost any other
city in the nation.7S

Thus, only two events make the

history of Norfolk remarkable during this era— the ferocity

7sJean L. Stinchcombe, Reform and Reaction:
City
Politics in Toledo (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing,
1968), p. 134.
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of its attack upon urban blight, and the tenacity of its
resistance to school integration; that they may be
inexorably linked should come as no surprise.
Not only was Norfolk the first city in the nation to
qualify for federal urban renewal assistance, its initial
redevelopment project was used by the rest of the nation as
a model of careful and humanitarian planning considera
tions.7'7

Like other cities in the Urban South, it faced

tremendous pressures to build new schools, housing, and
public facilities during the population boom of the 1950s.
Even so, shortly after the implications of the Brown deci
sion became clear, Norfolk launched into a new phase of both
school construction and redevelopment that closed or
demolished a dozen schools and the homes of 20,000 people—
almost 10% of the city's population— and cleared more than
800 acres in and around the downtown area, giving it the
appearance of one of the war-ravaged cities of Eastern
Europe.78

Even though the city had some really antiquated

schools, the buildings closed or demolished were not the
worst in the city; in fact many took on new life as
administrative offices, textbook depositories, or mainten
ance facilities.

Similarly, although the city had substan

77"Federal Slum Clearance Gets Its First Full Scale
Tryout in Norfolk, Va.," Architectural F o rum, May 1950,
pp. 134-138.
78John C. Scmidt, "Norfolk: A City Remakes Itself,"
Baltimore, March 1969, reprinted by the Norfolk Redevelopment
and Housing Authority.
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tial slum properties, the areas that were demolished did not
for the most part consist of the most dilapidated housing in
the city; instead they were largely the environs of the
white working c l ass, complete with modern plumbing and
central heat, in a spite of the fact that the city was still
combating pit privies, community outhouses, and tar paper
shacks.

Norfolk in 1950 fit the pattern of most of the

other older urban centers in the South, i.e., there were
pockets of Black population scattered all across the city;
by 1960, however, this arrangement had changed,79 and
these mixed-race or transition areas appear to have either
been the focus of redevelopment efforts or else were served
by new "vest pocket" schools sized to maintain separate but
equal facilities.
Although the story in Norfolk may be more compelling
than elsewhere, it is not thought to be unique; instead
Norfolk was selected precisely because its extensive use of
the powers of urban renewal and its historic school desegre
gation conflict make just such a revelatory case study
possible.

Motive is difficult, if not impossible, to infer

from a single or even a string of isolated actions, but in
Norfolk the trail is extensive enough to make such implica
tions possible.
Even though the "motive" behind such actions may be
difficult to determine in ex post facto research, one may

79Taueber and Taueber, op c i t ., pp. 35-96.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

42

still closely examine the elements that lay behind Norfolk’s
school plant decisions and its major phases of redevelop
ment.

Jean Stinchcombe, in her classic study of redevelop

ment in Toledo and other cities, points to the four elements
that are necessary to carry out such an extensive urban
redevelopment program:

strong political leadership, clarity

and continuity of direction, administrative competence, and
strong community support.

Although she concludes that these

are almost never present for a sustained period in cities
with a counci1-manager form of government, a footnote points
to Norfolk as an exception, a deviant case with extensive
redevelopment activity.80
Because Norfolk appears so different in this regard,
some other unifying element may have been present that was
more powerful than the usual mix of politics and civic pride
which helped this city overcome the limitations normally
inherent in its form of government, and united both its
citizenry and its political leadership behind a dramatic
course of redevelopment activity.

This dissertation

hypothesizes that fear of school desegregation in Norfolk
was a motivating force behind the city's sudden shift in
school operations and the second phase of its redevelopment
activities; and that, in Norfolk, the effort to preserve
segregated schools provided the power to overcome a frag
mented political structure, divided priorities over future

8°Jean L. Stinchcombe, op c i t ., pp. 129-150.
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direction, shifts in administrative leadership, and apathe
tic community support.
The research for this study relies upon a variety of
primary source materials:

census tract data on the racial

mix and condition of the housing in the redeveloped neigh
borhoods were used to explore the motive for their demoli
tion; school board memoranda, legal briefs, planning docu
ments, capital project budgets, and newspaper clippings have
been examined in an effort to determine the attendance
zones, population served, location, and date of demolition
of the school buildings effected by redevelopment.

Second

ary sources include books, journals, and articles from the
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, Ledger- Dispatch, and Journal and
Guide newspapers.
As a historical case study, the research probes the
line between purely historical and case study research,
especially applying the accepted methodology of critical
case or exemplary case study research.sx

When the project

was first envisioned (1974), a number of the principle sub
jects involved in the various planning and redevelopment
decisions were still alive, and interviews were conducted at
that time as part of a larger oral history approach.
the most part, the interviews were not really helpful:

For
like

Watergate witnesses, the subjects either developed a

81See Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research:
Design and
Methods, Revised Edition (Newbury Park, Calif.:
Sage
Publications, 1989), pp. 47, 113, 139.
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selective memory of controversial decisions or else sought
to smooth over any potential controversy with bland plati
tudes.

Because many of the individuals are now deceased,

interviews with several groups of secondary actors were also
utilized. One such group included individuals in the bureau
cratic, as opposed to the political structure, of planning
and administration.

By and large these persons are younger

than the principles, and therefore more likely to be alive.
The drawback in relying too completely upon this group is
that although they were more willing to reveal the influence
of certain groups and individuals behind major decisions
with which they were involved, they tended to see the city
from a very selective view, that focused just upon school
issues, city planning, code enforcement, or redevelopment
decisions, for instance, without placing these in the larger
context of just what motivated these decisions.

For this

reason, a second group of primary observers was developed
from the newspaper reporters and editors who covered the
various events of the era.

These individuals also tended to

be younger than the primary actors, but unlike the other
secondary players, they were trained to see events both in
detail and to place them in the larger context by analyzing
trends, transitions, trade-offs, and trivialities.

Several

former reporters confirmed the wisdom of this approach by
observing that newspapermen of this era earned their reputa
tion by "how much they knew but didn't tell."
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The project focused upon the link between school
desegregation and the planning, politics, and redevelopment
in the city of Norfolk from 1950 to 1959.

Redevelopment and

planning decisions were studied by examining what types of
projects or public policies were planned, who proposed or
opposed them, when they were advanced, and why— i.e., an
assessment of their impact, both intended and actual, by
looking at the target group or location.

Educational deci

sions were examined chiefly in the context of the location
of new schools and the relationship between site selection
and the city's larger planning and redevelopment processes.
A second and related approach has been to more close
ly examine the relationship between these issues— desegrega
tion, planning and redevelopment— and the various groups
struggling for power.

To this end, Robert Dahl's issues

approach was applied to discern the various different types
of power in the community, and especially who had the power
to make certain decisions.

In studying political, educa

tional, and redevelopment decisions in New Haven, Dahl found
that politicians tended to focus their efforts on the
political arena, the city's big businessmen dominated
redevelopment and planning decisions, and educational policy
was left largely to middle-class community leaders who had
little interest in either redevelopment or politics.32

S2Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, Conn.:
University Press, 1961).
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One thesis of the current research project is that
while the focus of these different leadership groups may
vary, a single compelling community controversy,

like school

desegregation may cut across all levels of decision-making.
In the midst of such a controversy, the approach of these
various groups will differ, even when they are faced with
the same problem:

politicians make political decisions,

even on issues related to redevelopment policy or the
location of school buildings; businessmen support economic
ends so ardently that they will abandon even the most
tightly held personal philosophy (i.e., segregation) to
protect economic growth; civic leaders look to the potential
for impact upon their own constituency; and social activists
seek to enhance their own agenda.

Although their motives

may be different, a single unifying fear or compelling issue
may be powerful enough to build a consensus for dramatic
action even among these very different and disparate groups.
The initial stage of the research was conducted by
utilizing the extensive local history collection at the
Sargeant Memorial Room in the Kirn Memorial Library in
Downtown Norfolk.

Clip files are maintained in relative

chronological order by topics (i.e.,"School Construction 1,"
Government and Politics, Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing
Authority), location (i.e., Patrick Henry Elementary School,
Atlantic City, Broad Creek Village) and by biographical
entries.

Back copies of the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot,
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Ledqer-Dispatch, and Journal and Guide newspapers were then
reviewed during the time frame of major events, court deci
sions, project announcements, budget statements, municipal
elections, or other transition points for background
articles, editorials, letters to the editor, and contrasting
opinions.

In addition to these largely secondary sources, a

few other depositories of primary source material still
exist.

Minutes of crucial school board meetings and

documents held by the City of Norfolk, such as back copies
of master plans, consultants reports, capital projects
budgets, and the like were helpful in identifying key
school, planning, and municipal actions under study.
Historical materials held by the Norfolk Redevelopment and
Housing Authority were also reviewed.

The Archive Section

of the Old Dominion University Library has the private
papers of a few individuals or groups, including those
collected for this work (i.e., the Norfolk Committee for
Public Schools).
Once an extensive review of the written source mate
rial was complete, the research moved into an oral history
phase that concentrated upon developing taped interviews
with both the remaining living principals and key secondary
participants.

At this point in the research a more complete

operational definition of both the "who" and the "what"
under study was formulated in order to develop probing
questions that would be used to explore the "how."

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

48

Interviews on a related topic were conducted earlier (in
1975) with the last remaining councilmen, planning commis
sioners, and housing authority commissioners, several of
whom are now deceased.

Only one city councilman and one

school board member from the era were still alive for
interview.

The current study continued to follow that

earlier format:

each person was asked leading questions

about their role in the events and decisions of the city, as
well as their relationship with and perception of other key
individuals, groups, or projects that took place during the
period.

Interviewees were not asked about the existence of

a "power structure," as in Floyd Hunter's research,83 but
rather queried as to who actually made certain decisions
about selected projects or policy directions familiar to the
interviewee.

Each individual was interviewed in his own

home or office, and the tape recorder was placed on the
least obtrusive setting (i.e., remote or battery power,
condenser or directional mike) in order to reduce the
subject's anxiety.

After a few introductory questions to

reconfirm the subject's formal role in the events, each
person was asked to give his impression of the era as a
means to set an informal tone for the interview.

In order

to reduce the interjection of bias on the part of the
interviewer, each of the subjects was afforded a full

S3Floyd W. Hunter, Community Power Structure, (Chapel
Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1953).
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opportunity to tell his own story without interruptions or
unnecessary prodding.

At the conclusion of this portion of

the interview, each subject was asked a few issue specific
questions related to his particular role or area of
expertise, his impression of other competing power groups,
and his conclusion as to who actually made certain community
decisions of which he might have been aware.
The "what" includes the location of new school
buildings, such as Tidewater Park, Roberts Park, Young Park,
Titustown, Coronado, and Rosemont; the panoply of events
surrounding the school crisis of 1958-1959; the development
of major planning and redevelopment projects, such as
Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority Project One, the
master plan for the central business district, the highway
plan, the placement of the public library and other
community facilities, and redevelopment projects for the
Atlantic City, Downtown, Broad Creek, Lamberts Point, and
Brambleton sections of the city; and major innovations in
municipal policy, such as the development of building,
zoning, housing, and health codes, as well as their relative
enforcement or the selectivity of enforcement.
The major risk in any such undertaking is that the
historian, or his readers, will apply the moral perspective
of the 1990s to judge events that happened more than three
decades ago.

Not only is this wrong, this judgement is

unfair to the individuals who were forced to make critical
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decisions in a difficult age.

To say that events herein

described are controversial is an understatement.

Emotions

were strong and key issues were hotly debated, albeit behind
closed doors; unless we are free as students of the era to
perceive and analyze events without injecting the biases of
our own time, the field of serious local history will be
abandoned to "puff pieces" and promotional tracts that sani
tize the past in order to promote investment in the present.
The advantage of historical perspective— hindsight— is
a crucial element to examining the events of any era, and
enables a more complete analysis of the context, events,
issues, motivations, and the various approaches to desegre
gation, redevelopment, planning and related issues in the
pre- and post-Brown eras than was possible through con
temporaneous studies, single issue treatises, or works from
the period immediately following the era.

Nevertheless, any

approach would be unfair to the citizens of the 1950s if it
required them to share the same advantage of our own more
modern perspective in order to get fair treatment in a
history of their own period.

The public officials herein

depicted were responding to tremendous public pressure to
use whatever means were legal and appropriate to protect
what was seen as an important element in their daily lives.
That they enjoyed the overwhelming support of their consti
tuencies in these undertakings is evident in the voting
patterns of the era.

In a democratic society we must be
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prepared to accept the fact that powerful and principled
elected leaders will do everything in their authority to
respond to such a mandate without condemning in any way
their actions.

This is above all else a story of power—

power that was abused only when the moral standards and
historical hindsight of the 1990s are inappropriately
applied.
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PROLOGUE

NORFOLK BEFO RE 1 9 5 0

Four sailors with a barmaid in tow steamed out into
Granby Street and launched into a chorus of "Roll Out The
Barrel."

A single car cut out of traffic and pulled to the

curb, jubilantly sounding its horn over their slurred rendi
tion of the chorus.

This mild commotion on an otherwise

still August afternoon stirred onlookers from their shaded
refuge in the shops and storefronts that lined the street; a
few quick words were exchanged, and the news flashed through
the gathering crowd.

Other cars began sounding their horns

in salute, and soon a blaring procession of automobiles was
inching its way past the swelling throng.

The taverns along

Beer Barrel Row began closing their doors as their patrons
rushed to join the melee in the street.

The "Roll-Out-The-

Barrel" boys had by now picked up a chorus line of converts
that was snake-dancing arm in arm through the stalled traf
fic.

Streamers of toilet paper drifted down from the offi

ces above, the opening salvos in a furious fusillade of
impromptu confetti that belied the constraints of wartime
rationing.

The merrymakers who danced in the streets below

were the precursors of one of the most raucous, brawling,
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celebrations in Norfolk's history.

The day was Tuesday,

August 14, 1945— V-J Day— and the radio had just signaled
the end of World War II.

Not since Patrick Henry's army of

patriots had burned this Tory stronghold to the ground had
the nation's domestic military forces had such a grand night
on the town.

One solemn sailor surveyed the jubilant commo

tion that surrounded him and summed up the frequent lament
of his colleagues, "Of all the damned places to be when this
thing happened, we had to be in Norfolk."1
The following day dawned quietly for the city; half of
its population were nursing their worst hangover of modern
times.

The other half— Norfolk's more permanent residents

— faced an even grimmer morning after.

The city's streets

were empty, its shops, banks and government offices having
been closed for a day of prayer and thanksgiving.

Gone were

the sailors, the shipyard workers, the snake dancers, the
blaring automobiles, and the drunken carousers of the night
before; even the taverns and the bawdy houses of Beer Barrel
Row were closed for the day.

Here and there the white Dixie

cup of a sailor's cap bobbed among the flotsam of confetti
and other jetsam of the celebration.

A handful of bleary-

eyed strangers still ruled this empty roost from perches
tucked away well off the beaten path.2

To Norfolk's more

permanent residents this panorama of desertion served as a

^Norfolk. Virginian-Pilot, 15 August 1945.
2Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 16 August 1945.
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grim reminder of what the city would be like without its
Navy; while the war was raging overseas they had thought
only of tolerating this domestic military invasion until
they could reclaim the city as their own— the city had given
little thought to really making a "home" for its transient
population.

Now that the war was officially over, however,

the thought of empty streets and the fleet's departure
struck the community to the core, rousing it from its civic
stupor and infusing it with a thirst for fresh leadership
and new direction.
Control of city hall had long been in the hands of
the city's professional politicians, a group that had always
shown tremendous willingness to run the show without
external interference.

The "Prieur Machine," as the local

affiliate of the statewide (Harry F . ) Byrd Organization was
called, was run by Clerk of Courts William "Billy" Prieur.
Time and circumstances over the course of the Depression and
the war years had combined to make the Prieur Machine far
more powerful than either the perks of office or the
patronage of political organization would have indicated.
Since they were powerless to influence the delibera
tions at city hall, and unwilling to risk the ire of the
Organization that controlled so many jobs in a hard strapped
economy, Norfolk's business and financial leaders turned
their attention instead during the Depression to a more
receptive arena, the sphere of civic involvement.

Not only
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did they achieve great success in these endeavors, well
separated from the political operations of the city, they
also forged key alliances and learned to build a community
coalition of their own that would one day rival the more
entrenched political operatives.

Through the Community

Chest and a number of related charities, the businessmen
worked tirelessly to relieve the suffering of their fellow
citizens; through the National Recovery Administration and
its volunteer successor, the Emergency Relief Commission,
they learned to rely on federal support in this effort.
Through their own Citizens Crime Commission they studied the
harsh economic impact that slums had, not only upon the cost
of city services, but also upon the lives of their
inhabitants.
The war years had brought incredible hardships to the
citizens and great turmoil to city government.

Norfolk

experienced a tremendous period of growth at the start of
the war, and its population would double, even triple on the
weekends, as thousands of sailors, soldiers, and shipyard
workers descended upon the downtown area for leave on the
town.

This put an enormous strain upon both the city's

municipal services and its aging housing stock; the politi
cians were so reluctant to provide even essential municipal
services for these new, more "temporary," residents that the
Navy Department had to step in to build schools, parks,
playgrounds, recreation areas, highways, utilities, and a
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host of other projects.

The businessmen forged their own

alliance with the Navy, and, acting as the Norfolk Housing
Authority, built thousands of new housing units for the
servicemen.
The first postwar problems, however, began to appear
almost immediately as the specter of closed stores and empty
streets served as a grim reminder of the fact that, in
peacetime, Norfolk would again have to stand on its own
financial feet:

no longer would the Navy be willing to foot

the bill for some much-needed and long overdue municipal
improvement.

That prospect so frightened city hall that the

City Council called for a cutback in planned improvement
projects and current levels of service.3

This proved to be

the final straw for Norfolk's business establishment:

they

had endured the national vilification of the city in the
media and halls of Congress for its sordid nightlife, but
they would not now stand for a self-imposed recession.

Area

businessmen knew that the city could not maintain its posi
tion in the world of trade by depending solely upon merchant
shipping and local industries; Norfolk needed the Navy, now
more than ever, and local merchants turned their efforts
furiously into remaking the city into a place where the Navy
would want to stay, rather than remain known infamously as
the world's worst liberty port.

The subsequent uproar of

3Marvin W. Schlegel, Conscripted City: Norfolk In World
War II (Norfolk: Norfolk War History Commission, 1951),
p. 361.
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merchants and businessmen over proposed municipal cutbacks
prompted a dramatic.turn of events.

The powder keg of civic

unrest was finally ignited.
Almost as suddenly as the tides of war began to
recede, a new wave of community pride and civic boosterism
rose to take its p l a c e .

The war years that had witnessed a

dramatic upsurge in citizen activity to accommodate and
alleviate the bombardment of Navy personnel4 now gave way
to a new direction in civic involvement.

The civic leaders

who had gone all out to beef up the wartime charities to
serve the new, transient population were not now content to
rest.

The club ladies who had knocked themselves out to

provide wholesome entertainment for "the boys" were no
longer content to sit at home.

The volunteers who had

staffed the bandage brigades and peopled the U.S.O.'s were
looking for a new cause.

The transient residents who had

poured into the city during the war years were now almost as
established as the old-timers; they would not tolerate a
cutback in the very services and facilities designed to meet
their needs.

Thus, all of these diverse elements— the

civic, the business, the volunteer, and the transient
communities— had a hand in forcing the issue of Norfolk's
postwar renewal out into the open; all of them urged a
dramatic reversal of municipal policy.

4Theodore A. Curtin, A Marriage of Convenience: Norfolk
and the N a v y , masters thesis (Norfolk:
Old Dominion
University, 1969), pp. 148-149, 130-138.

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

58

Another issue seethed beneath the surface of this
desire for change.

During the war crime had become big

business in the city.

Gamblers, prostitutes, racketeers,

and bootleggers had invaded the area— as they invariably do
to all boom towns— to cater to the more salacious desires of
sailors out on leave and shipyard workers out on the town.
Norfolk's finest citizens began to feel that too many of
these mobsters and racketeers controlled city hall,
replacing their own more legitimate voice with bribes and
payoffs.

The blatancy with which the city's "other element"

conducted its gruesome activities shocked and enraged the
citizenry; it was no wonder that such conduct was the talk
of the town, and an open link between the gangsters and the
politicians was widely suspected.5

The citizenry had been

long-suffering of all sorts of war-time carpetbaggers and
entrepreneurs, but the prospect that these gangsters and
racketeers would continue to control the city's fate in
peacetime now became too great a burden to bear, and thus
the closing months of 1945 became the winter of discontent
for many Norfolk residents.
Political conformity had bred a closed society in
Norfolk— afraid to accept outsiders, new ideas, or even
dissension among its provincial little community.

The

city's close proximity to the Navy and government workers

5Pretlow Darden,
confirming sources.

13

August

1975,

op

cit., and
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during World War 11 had boon a positive force that had done
much to erase that stagnation.

In many ways the war years

had been a bitter experience--the crowding, the incon
venience, the crime, and the hcdonism--for both the hometowners and the sailors alike, but in the end, it had opened
the minds of many Norfolkians to a world beyond their own
parochial realm, and many more had found an important
mission in ministering to strangers from all parts of
America.

Norfolk had opened its doors to the Navy slowly,

cautiously, and even grudgingly, but: now a fear was growing
that those doors, once closed, would remain shuttered
forever.
The next few months would witness some remarkable
changes for a city overly conditioned to accept the narrow
scope and dreary conformity of its venerable political
leaders.

The citizenry that had so recently focused its

full attention upon fighting despots overseas would suddenly
turn its efforts towards resisting a more home grown version
of totalitarianism.

The hometown folks who had so recently

despised the visiting sailors as an army of occupation would
suddenly turn to welcome them instead as economic liberat
ors.

That bleak specter of closed stores and empty streets

in Norfolk's downtown commercial district would prompt a
fondness for the profligacy and crowded jubilation of
sailor's revelry, and that longing would in turn provide the
public mandate for a remarkable chain of events that would
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sweep this once seedy little, backwater, port into the
forefront of a national municipal reform movement, bringing
as well an era of unheralded progress and prosperity.
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CHAPTER ONE
PLANNING THE NEW NORFOLK
When bulldozers ripped into the wall of a house in the
700 block of Smith Street on December 11, 1951, they marked
both a new beginning and a crumbling end.

At long last the

city was moving from the quiet haunts of its earlier infamy
into the spotlight of national attention.

The house that

first shuddered, shook, and then crumbled that wintry
morning marked the beginning of the first federally financed
slum clearance project in the country.1

The event marked

as well the passing of a very special style of government in
Norfolk, and served as both the legacy and the tombstone of
the final retreat of a progressive reform movement in the
city.
Those first bulldozers were riding the crest of a wave
of civic pride and boosterism that would jettison the city
to the forefront of the Age of Redevelopment before it
surged, and then dissipated against the shoreline of the
future.

The muffled applause of the gloved dignitaries who

had gathered to witness this miracle of modern government
faded as the bulldozers tore through the sagging structure.

xNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 July 1961.
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In their eyes the memories of yesteryear were giving way to
a dynamic new effort to rebuild the shining metropolis of
the future.

Those first bulldozers were the most dramatic

and tangible evidence that the dreams of an indolent age
were at last on their way to becoming a reality.
That first house stood as well as a sad omen of what
would come.

As the small crowd that attends such functions

gathered, crewmen bound the house in chains and clamped them
to the bulldozer designated for the job.

At the appointed

moment, the machine started and lurched forward, dragging
its chains through the underpinnings of the structure.

The

house shook, but did not fall2— a remarkable augury of
blight's resistance to eradication.

As if to prophesy the

unseen forces of the future that would chart the city's
course--as if to warn of invisible props that braced
Norfolk's progress— the house still stood, its under
pinnings completely destroyed.

Embarrassed crewmen re

attached their chains to a more elevated point, expectant
dignitaries and reporters chatted idly by, news photo
graphers reloaded for a second shot, and history paused
momentarily in the making.

The second time the bulldozers

lurched, the chain took hold, and the frame collapsed in a
shower of crumbling plaster, rotting boards, billowing dust,
and scattering functionaries.

2Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 12 December 1951.
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Norfolk was irreversibly embarking upon a bold, new
venture, but it was more than just a fervent desire to erase
the memories of an unpleasant past that had put the city in
the vanguard of urban renewal.

It was more than just the

aimless longing for the golden dream of "A New Norfolk;"
more than just the fulfillment of campaign promises.
Norfolk had reached this pinnacle of regeneration because a
specific group of men had possessed the courage to not just
dream, but to act.

Theirs was a bold vision, and it was

shared by men and women all across the country, but the
difference in Norfolk was that they were just the sort of
individuals who could make that aspiration a reality.

All

were committed to the cause, and all were conditioned to
success.

They had made their reputations, both business and

civic, by overcoming long odds; they knew how to gamble for
high stakes, but, more importantly, they knew how to win.
The men that sparked Norfolk's redevelopment were business
men who wielded the personal power and prestige to overcome
almost any opposition and drag the city into nearly any
venture.

Certainly the fine points of that redevelopment—

the stakes, the expense, the delay, the social costs, and
the human suffering— were as misunderstood by the general
public of Norfolk as in any city in the country, but it was
here that the city's leading citizens put their reputations
on the line behind renewal.

And that made all the

difference.
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The city-manager type of reform government was
designed to be a "businessman's rule."

The system was

intended to take the power out of the hands of the political
hacks and give it to the true leaders of the community, and
then back them up with the technical and professional
expertise necessary to make the very best decision for the
community.

City government, the theory went, had become too

complex, its myriad services so vast, its management so
technical, and its planning too vital to be left to
amateurs.

That was the ideal, but in far too many

city-manager cities, the power had merely passed from one
group of parochials to another.

In most cities the real

leaders, the real opinion-makers, had lost interest in
municipal affairs; the result of their abdication was that a
group of small businessmen and petty interests took over
instead--a group that was still businessmen, but only second
rate ones; they were capable only of dreaming small dreams,
and often failed to comprehend the bigger picture.

In most

cities the directorship of the taxpayers' multi-million
dollar municipal corporation had settled into the grasp of
people scarcely off the assembly line— foremen, at best, who
could only hold the machinery of government on course until
the real leaders with vision returned to take control of the
enterprise.
In Norfolk, however, a peculiar set of circumstances
had befallen the city and was forcing a different sort of
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leader to the top.

The little men had so bungled the pre

rogatives of power that the first team had been forced out
of their board rooms and counting houses to take over.

At

the close of World War I it was clear that Norfolk was in
danger of folding altogether in the hands of the "small men"
who ran most other cities; the lure of wartime profiteering,
the power to control the expansion of municipal services,
and the opportunity to promote political or parochial
interests had been too much for them.

The transfusion of

new leadership that was taking place in Norfolk's reform
movement came from the bluest blood in the city.

At last

the real corporate minds hoped to take over the directorship
of city government.

They understood management on a large

scale, and they knew that even if they could promote
themselves to the city's board of directors, that they could
not fulfill their aspirations for the city alone; just as in
their own private enterprises, they would need an army of
specialists, planners, and consultants to plot and carry out
their vision.

Nevertheless, they dreamed big dreams, but

they also possessed the dynamism, the energy, and the
wherewithal to carry them out.
Even so, any move to snatch control of the city from
the political organization that had ruled it for decades
would be no mean accomplishment, especially in a Virginia
election system that used every conceivable means, including
the poll tax and early registration deadlines, to keep the
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voting population small and manageable.

In fact, when the

frustrations of the city's business and civic leaders first
began to surface and take on a political bent in the winter
of 1945, the poll books for the June election had already
been closed, thereby precluding any effort to register new
voters who shared their hope of reform.3

It was the stormy

resignation following the war of Norfolk's usually staid
city manager in "a violent temper" over the Council's pro
posed cut back of essential city services'1 that proved to
be the culminating event.

The resignation, and the

manager's parting blast at machine politics, took the
community by surprise, especially since he was just a few
months away from becoming eligible for a substantial
retirement pension.5

Talk at a testimonial dinner hastily

arranged in his honor by the business community soon turned
to a political agenda.

At first the businessmen sought an

audience with Organization chieftain Billy Prieur, hoping to
convince him of the need for a change in the leadership at
city hall,6 but when these efforts at appeasement proved
futile, the People's Ticket of Richard D. Cooke, Pretlow
Darden, and John Twohy was born.

3Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 June 1946.
^Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 June 1946.
5Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch,

21 February 1946.

sPretlow Darden and Vernon Gornto, campaign manager for
the People's Ticket of 1946, interview by author, Tape
recording, Norfolk, 17 August 1975.
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The men that now proposed to take control of Norfolk
had two undeniable loci of power:
other civic.

the one financial and the

These were not the ordinary group of downtown

merchants hoping to harness municipal spending to keep the
central business district alive.

There was not a single

retailer in the lot; instead they were the heavyweights of
the area's business community:

bankers, realtors, brokers,

builders, corporate attorneys, and building supply whole
salers— they had more than just a personal interest in
Norfolk's rebirth and redevelopment, they had a financial
stake in it.

They were more than just the area's top

businessmen, however, they were the foremost representatives
of the city's civic pride and community spirit.

Time and

time again the city's charities had turned to these men
during the Depression and war years because they not only
knew how to get things done, they knew how to unite the
citizenry in the process.
Although it was left to corporate attorney Richard D.
Cooke, automobile dealer Pretlow Darden (younger brother of
Virginia's popular wartime governor), and concrete magnate
John Twohy to carry their standard, this was a group effort
that found almost every substantial business and civic
leader in the city aligned against one of the most power
ful, well financed, and experienced local political
organizations in the state; failure meant great risk and
personal sacrifice for all who participated in this palace
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coup.

All had benefitted from their alliance with the Byrd

Organization in the past, and now had much to lose if the
selective enforcement, special treatment, and red tape of
municipal government were suddenly turned against them.

All

relied too heavily in their business and corporate ventures
on the rapid processing of building permits, legal docu
ments, inspections, and applications not to fear a
significant threat of intimidation if their venture were to
fail.

Once committed, they had no intent of not succeeding,

and they threw themselves into the selfless work of the
political campaign with the same vigor, skill, and
determination evident in their civic and corporate
achievements.

It proved to be a hotly contested race— "the

hottest political campaign in Norfolk's history."7
The "Silkstocking Ticket," as the Cooke-Darden-Twohy
group was immediately labeled in the hardball oratory of the
Prieur Organization stalwarts, hoisted the "Time For A
Change" standard and ran carefully against the lackluster
record of the wartime Council.

They were determined to run

as three conservative businessmen who had close ties of
their own to the statewide Byrd Organization, thereby
avoiding the appearance at least of challenging Prieur
directly.

It was a clever strategy, but it meant they had

to both out do the existing administration in conservative
rhetoric and out organize the Prieur Machine on its home

7Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 12 June 1946.
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turf.

As part of that effort, they pledged not to seek

re-election, thereby hoping to convince the traditional
Organization voter that they only meant to revitalize
Norfolk's governmental structure, not found another
political dynasty.
Fortunately the People's Ticket had both the personal
credibility and the backing to pull off one of the most
dramatic upsets in the otherwise closed conformity of
Virginia's political arena.

Their election by a better than

2-to-l margin in the largest voter turnout the city had ever
witnessed, gave them a mandate to bring progressive
government to Norfolk.8

As if to seal their pledge of

"business-like government, free from political influence and
control,"9 their first order of business was to set about
hiring the "best city manager money can buy . . . not to get
the best would be money wasted."10

They turned quickly to

Charles A. Harrell, past president of the International City
Manager's Association.

In addition to having a strong

national reputation for long-range planning and careful
administration, Harrell had grown up in Norfolk and had
started his career in its service.

Even though he left

BNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 12 June 1946.
9"Things For Which We Stand:
Vote
'The People's
Ticket,'" a political handbill, undated (June, 1946), Sergeant
Memorial
Collection, Kirn Public Library, Norfolk.
xoPretlow Darden.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

70

Norfolk when political favoritism blocked his path at
home,11 he had maintained close ties to the area.

Even

so, it was the Council's promise not to interfere in his
administration, not the money or the home town connection,
that proved successful in luring him away from his post in
Schenectady, New York.12
Harrell set busily about the task of rebuilding
Norfolk's tarnished national image and cleaning its squalid
municipal house.

There was a sense of urgency in the

actions of the Silkstocking administration:

years later

former People's Councilman and later Mayor Pretlow Darden
would remark, "We knew what we had to do, and we knew
[because of the promise not to succeed ourselves] we were
only there for four short years; so we did it."13

As part

of the campaign promise to bring "sound and efficient
administration" to city hall,14 the People's Council gave
Harrell free reign to bring in an army of professionals and
consultants to help chart the city's rebirth, and Harrell
skillfully involved as many of the city's crucial business
and civic leaders as possible in a new hierarchy of
appointed boards and commissions that further removed the
functionaries at city hall from the decision-making process.

1:LNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 4 June 1950.
12Pretlow Darden.
13Pretlow Darden.
14"Things For Which We Stand," op c i t .
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The task of municipal house cleaning, however, ran
into some serious opposition, especially from the well
entrenched forces in the Public Safety (Police and Fire)
Department.

A fortuitous event, however, helped to break

the back of the Organization in this arena as well.

A young

captain of detectives, Claude "Bubba" Staylor, who later
served as both chief of police and a city councilman, took
the initiative when the Organization's police chief was out
of town to raid Norfolk's "protected" gambling and numbers
rackets.

The raid sent off howls of protest, especially

when the police chief quickly returned to drop the charges
against several of what the newspaper was willing to label
as the city's "most notorious gangsters"15 for lack of
evidence, while more than a hundred of their customers
languished in jail.16

The blatant partiality of this

treatment, and the fact that Staylor had uncovered evidence
of bribes and payoffs to more than half the force, helped to
unravel a comprehensive scheme of corruption in city
government.

A blue ribbon grand jury appointed from the

city's business and civic elite used its charge to
investigate the charges as an opportunity to bring down both
the protected rackets and the police hierarchy.17

The

15Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 December 1948.
16Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 4 December 1948.
17Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 March 1949.
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Silkstocking Takeover was thus complete, and the Organiza
tion's grip on City Hall was at last broken.
City Manager C. A. Harrell was not one to delay once
he had achieved the circumstances conducive to action.

The

scandal in the police department and the publicity generated
by its subsequent investigation had given him the mandate
for reform that he sought; skillfully he shifted people at
city hall to promote his professionals to a larger grasp of
power.

Although many of the experts who had descended upon

the city returned quickly to their previous haunts in indus
try, commerce, and academia, they left behind the blueprints
for progress in their voluminous charts, statistics, and
analyses.

Harrell conspired to shift as much of the burden

of charting municipal expansion as he could from the offices
in city hall to the volunteer boards and commissions that
established the policies.

He knew well that the work of

these boards would outlast the electoral mandate of the
People's Council; and attracting top notch men and women to
these posts would be the most enduring legacy of the
Silkstocking Takeover.

The People's Council exercised such

a strong personal pull that they acted as a magnet to
attract others of similar talent from industry, commerce,
the arts, the professions, and the charities into volunteer
service to the city.

By staffing these independent boards

and commissions with his own professional advisors and then
feeding them the reports of the hired consultants, Harrell
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knew that he could broaden his mandate of progress beyond
the limitations of the work force at city hall.
The roster of the postwar City Council, Redevelopment
and Housing Authority, and the Planning Commission read like
a listing of local Community Fund chairmen, charitable bene
factors, First Citizen Award winners, and civic head-liners
— just the type of individuals who so rarely get personally
involved in running the day to day operations of municipal
enterprises.

The men who had been forced to take over the

rebirth and redevelopment of Norfolk were the true opinion
leaders in the community.

They had the power, the prestige,

and the respect to personally dispense with the types of
objections that hamstrung so many similar dreams of rebirth
across the country.3-8
Harrell's plan worked better than anyone could have
expected.

Not a single community leader ever refused the

Council's call to volunteer service,3-8 and the city's
boards and commissions began calling for new ventures that
would have been unthinkable just a few years earlier.
Norfolk's citizens soon began to discern the fruits of their
labor:

a municipal airport, water treatment plant, modern

bus system, a bridge-tunnel link to Portsmouth, new connect
ing links to the downtown, and a host of other new highway

xaFor a more complete analysis of this point, see
Jean L. Stinchcombe, Reform and Reaction:
City Politics in
Toledo (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, 1958), pp 129-150.
18Pretlow Darden.
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and municipal ventures.

Only a portion of Harrell's program

was cast in concrete; the rest was set in careful planning
and legislation.

As part of the city's new housekeeping

system, Harrell advocated a vast upgrading of the municipal
statutes regarding property.

The business and civic leaders

who peopled the various volunteer boards and commissions
took the lead in recommending revamped zoning ordinances,
new building codes, stronger health and safety ordinances,
and one of the nation's first minimum housing codes.20

It

was such an ambitious program that it would never have
passed without their support.

The new ordinances would

effect more than 40% of the city's existing housing stock
(based upon 1940 Census data), and had the recommendations
come from bureaucrats, instead of established community
leaders, the public would quickly have suspected that
partisan motives or the type of selective enforcement that
characterized the wartime Council were involved.

Yet here

were Norfolk's First Citizens, the leaders of its various
charities, financial institutions, real estate firms,
industries, and business enterprises calling for an
uplifting that began with their own boot-straps.
The Norfolk Housing Authority, born of the Navy's need
for wartime dwellings, had been among the first commissions
to catch the spirit of rebirth.

The Authority was deter

mined not to die out with the end of the war effort; it knew

2°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 July 1961.
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how much the city still had to accomplish in order to pro
vide adequate housing for its citizens.

"Redevelopment" was

added to its title for the first time at the close of the
war, and now the new Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing
Authority began to revise its calling.

Instead of just

serving as the Navy's link to additional housing, the
N.R.H.A. hoped to provide the means to eliminate much of the
city's crime- and disease-infested slums.21
formulate a plan that included two phases:

It began to
the first

entailed the renovation of more than 1,000 wartime housing
units to accommodate civilian public housing tenants; the
second phase included an aggressive proposal to build 1,890
more public housing units in order to clear the path for
slum removal.

The Authority's sales pitch was accompanied

by the release of a graphic pictorial publication, This Is
I t , designed to sell both the human and the economic ele
ments of the plan.

The Authority did not mince its words,

the booklet was clearly designed to sell public housing as
the essential first step to the rebirth of the rest of the
city:
A 1937 study showed that the city was
spending $5 for every $1 collected from real
estate taxes and other income from five slum
areas.
Public housing cuts these service costs
to a minimum.
Public housing reduces the
subsidy that taxpayers contribute every year to
perpetuate Nineteenth Century hovels which

21Theodore A. Curtin,
"A Marriage of Convenience:
Norfolk and the Navy," 1917-1967, o p c i t . , p. 140.
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injure the value of nearby property, impede the
city's growth, and threaten the whole population
with crime and disease . . . . The citizens of
Norfolk will not, we believe, be satisfied with
anything less than the complete elimination of
every unfit dwelling in the city.
Year by year,
house by house, the reconstruction must go on
until the combined efforts of the Norfolk
Redevelopment and Housing Authority and private
builders enable every family to enjoy a decent
h o m e .2 2
It was an argument skillfully designed to appeal to
the business and civic leaders that the commissioners felt
comprised their natural constituency; indeed, even under the
wartime administration of the Prieur Organization, the
Housing Authority had been the sole prerogative of the
business and civic elite that now constituted the Silkstocking Takeover.

Now that the People's Ticket was in

power, the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority
became the showpiece of the new administration.

All five

commissioners were the very pillars of the city's new
businessmen's elite:

Charles L. Kaufman was a prestigious

corporation lawyer who had strong connections with several
of the city's leading financial institutions; Thomas N.
Wilcox, a partner in Mayor Richard Cooke's law firm, had
similar corporate credentials; David L. Pender was the
president of the Southgate Brokerage Company and the
240-store chain of the Pender Grocery Company (later called
Colonial Stores); C. W. Grandy was an investment banker who

22Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority, This Is It
(Norfolk:
N.R.H.A., 1946), pp. 30, 47-48.
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also ran his own cotton brokerage; and James E. Etheridge
was the president of one of the largest residential and
commercial real estate firms in the area.

Two earlier

commissioners who had been important in the formulation of
the Authority's present aspirations represented this same
corporate elite:

Louis H. Windholz had been chairman of the

Norfolk and Southern Railway Company, the Baltimore Steam
Packet Company, the Seaboard Airline Railway, and numerous
other transportation and shipping concerns; George H. Lewis
had served as a director of the Virginia Electric and Power
Company (Virginia Power), Pender Grocery Stores, the Hampton
Roads Maritime Exchange, and several other ventures.23
These men, by virtue of the very extensive civic and
charity work, had gathered a constituency that was far
larger than just the business elite they seemed so
adequately to represent.

Of the seven commissioners who had

helped to formulate the Authority's postwar program, five
had headed the Community Fund, four had been named First
Citizen, three had served on Colonel Borland's 1937 Citizens
Crime Conference, and all seven had actively studied the
dreadful conditions of Norfolk's aging housing stock (the
1940 Census revealed that more than 40% of the housing units

23Community Builders of Norfolk, Virginia (Norfolk:
Community Builders, Inc., 1942); The History of Lower
Tidewater, Virginia, vol. Ill:
Family and Personal History
(New York:
Lewis Historical Publishing Co., Inc., 1954);
Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority, This Is I t ,
op ci t . , p. 10.
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in Norfolk were dilapidated or lacked adequate plumbing and
sanitary facilities).

All had hung their heads in shame

when Nathan Straus, a top federal housing official who was
rounding out his tour of 137 cities, remarked of Norfolk's
blight, "I have travelled all over the United States, from
one end to the other, but I have never seen anything as bad
as this."24

The epidemic warnings of Public Health

Director John M. Huff also helped to promote their efforts
to convert the Navy's wartime housing from military to
civilian use as public housing for the city's poor;25 and
each of the seven knew well that the unsafe health and
sanitary conditions posed a very great danger to all the
citizens of Norfolk.26
It was more, however, than just shame; it was more
than just crime, taxes, property values, health, and housing
conditions that motivated these men.

All had lived through

a most peculiar period in the history of Norfolk's growth:
the crisis proportions of wartime conscription had strangely
welded the entire citizenry into an active and cohesive
civic force.27

As members of the wartime Housing Author

ity, they had seen how quickly the people of Norfolk could

24Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 July 1961.
25 Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 November 1948.
26Thomas J. Wertenbaker, Norfolk:
Historic Southern
Port, (Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 1962), p. 370.
27Marvin W. Schlegel, Conscripted City:
World War I I , op cit.

Norfolk in
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respond to alleviate the most intolerable hardships.

The

sense of shared emergency had made the city vibrant and
alive; it had carried over into a post war boom that was
unique for the city; it had provided the impetus for the
reform movement that was the first tenet of their faith; and
finally, it had awakened the citizens to the fact that for a
community united, all things were possible.

If they could

once more promote the sense of shared emergency, once more
strike the vein of civic shame that prompted action, then,
the commissioners believed, they could translate these
forces into a renewed impetus for growth in general and a
personal mandate for redevelopment and public housing in
specific.

Theirs was an ambitious plan, and the commission

ers knew that citizen support was essential to its adoption.
A series of timely events, however, helped to
underscore the need for public housing, careful community
planning, and quick municipal action.

The Brambleton

section of the city had for some time been convulsed with
racial turmoil when several Blacks sought to defy the
community's strict standard of segregated housing.

During

the war years the vast influx of families into the city had
put a premium on housing space in the few small areas of the
city reserved for Blacks.

More than half of the Black

families in the city had been forced to either take in
borders or double up, just as in the white community, but in
the Black neighborhoods, this meant two or more families
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living in a one- or two-room apartment.

There had been

almost no private housing built for Blacks in more than a
decade and a half, and Brambleton appeared as the ideal site
for Black expansion.

Brambleton was a small (1,100 homes)

white community that was bounded on two sides by Black
developments, and on the other two sides by industrial
properties and the Elizabeth River.

Once the first few

Black families began to push across Corprew Avenue, the
traditional dividing line between the Black and white
communities, whites responded with attacks, threats, broken
windows, and minor acts of vandalism.23

After a series of

stormy Council sessions, an interracial committee was
appointed to study the situation.

The Council had hoped

that the issue would die without further incident, and that
some way would be found to guarantee "the separation of
white and Negro homes in the area,"29 but Norfolk's award
winning Black newspaper, the Journal and Guide, refused to
let the issue drop.

The aggressive attack of the editors

helped to convince the white community that further
incidents would occur unless something was done:
It cannot be emphasized too strongly, and it
is worth repeating again and again, that the
housing situation affecting Norfolk's Negro
citizens is not only acute, but desperate,
while, by a fair comparison, no such problem
faces the white population.

2SNorfolk Journal and Guide, 8 June 1946.
29Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 1 June 1946.
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The housing predicament with which this
community is confronted cannot be resolved by
the simple expedient of viewing it as a racial
matter.
It is based upon an elementary human
need and its amelioration must be on this basis
a l one.
It is an age-old story of the law of supply
and demand . . . . Norfolk's Negro population
has grown by some 25,000 in the last few years,
but little new housing has emerged to shelter
this population increase . . . while, on the
other hand, construction of new white units has
been over 5,000.
Even assuming that private capital were
available and homes [for Blacks] could be built,
under present restrictive conditions, where
could the necessary land be found?30
The Black and white communities remained at logger
heads, and the interracial committee appointed by the
Council failed to devise a new color line in the Brambleton
area.

Nor did the turmoil cease with the first few incur

sions; the breakdown of time-honored color lines began to
affect other blocks in the Brambleton section.

The situa

tion failed to stabilize, and soon whole neighborhoods were
in flight.

The Journal and Guide continued to intimate that

further incidents would occur unless the white community
began to take some drastic measures to provide housing units
for Blacks.

The fact that the Journal and Guide's veiled

threats of racial turmoil were reprinted for the white
community in the Virginian-Pilot helped to build the
momentum for some sort of intervening public action— some

3°Norfolk Journal and Guide, 1 June 1946.
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step that would alleviate the housing crisis in the Black
community, yet also work to preserve the separate status of
white neighborhoods.

Thus, the Authority's push for public

housing struck a core of need recognized by both the Black
and white communities, and public support for the proposal
began to build rapidly.
By 1948 a solid consensus in the community had been
achieved:

for two years the Norfolk Redevelopment and

Housing Authority (N.R.H.A.) had been angling for official
endorsement of its slum removal program; during that time
the events in Brambleton and its surrounding neighborhoods
had been simmering; the public had listened to Public Health
Director Dr. John Huff warn of the epidemic dangers of crime
and contagion in the city's slums; and opinion in the Black
community had coalesced around the single, dominant theme of
their housing crisis.

The City Council was at last ready to

take official action, but the nature of their commitment
was, as yet, still undiscernible.

The Council was quick,

however, to agree upon two points; first, the city faced a
"critical shortage of housing meeting the minimum health
standards in Negro and some low-income white areas," and
second, that "this condition is a matter of concern to all
other Norfolk residents, regardless of their own pleasant
living surroundings."31

For ten years Norfolk's councils

had agreed that it was "time to do something," the situation

31Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 28 November 1948.
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was "acute," the housing shortage was "serious,"32 so the
debate this time focused upon what official actions, short
of encouraging private developers to enter the normally
unprofitable low-income housing market— a step that earlier
councils had repeatedly taken without success— could be
taken to officially alleviate the crisis.

One councilman

recommended that the city "should be among the first in
line"— those words would prove prophetic— for new federal
redevelopment funds then under Congressional considera
tion.33

The suggestion touched such a core of response

that the Council, already straddled with heavy commitments
to an aggressive array of capital improvements, was ready to
embark upon "a pure gamble:"34

it approved an additional

$25,000 appropriation to the N.R.H.A. for the purpose of
further studying the prospects of slum removal.

Thus the

Authority was charged with the responsibility to develop a
plan for urban renewal and public housing even before such a
program was either legally or financially feasible!
The Council's gamble for federal funding was not an
idle gesture to ameliorate an increasingly exacerbating
situation; it was a carefully calculated risk.

The

Depression and World War II had left the core of many of the
nation's cities in a condition comparable to Norfolk's; it

32Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 4 December 1938.
33Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 28 November 1948.
34Pretlow Darden.
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seemed only a matter of time before Congress cleared the way
for such action.

Norfolk, however, had every intention of

leaping into the national limelight as the first municipal
ity to embark upon a program of redevelopment; grabbing the
headlines of urban renewal seemed the city's best oppor
tunity to shake its sleazy wartime reputation and focus
national attention instead upon all phases of its postwar
renaissance.
quotient:

Publicity, however, was only one-half of the

Norfolk, more than any other city its size, had

seen clearly how federal funds could provide the needed
transfusion for massive community expansion.

For almost a

decade the Organization Council had refused to embark upon
any municipal project or extend any public service unless
the Navy dangled the carrot of federal funding as an
incentive.

Federal funds had aided in the construction of

more than 3,400 dwellings, had upgraded numerous municipal
facilities, including schools, parks, playgrounds, highways,
recreational centers, water and sewer projects; had poured
millions of dollars into the area's economy;35 and had
helped, with both these new facilities and the multiplier
effect of federal investment, to immeasurably increase the
standard of living for all the citizens of Tidewater.35
The Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority had
already sought to allay fears that its actions would be

3STheodore A. Curtain, op. c i t .
35N.R.H.A., This is I t , p. 8.
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competing with the private market by challenging the city's
builders to begin their own redevelopment programs.

This Is

I t , the Authority's official promotional tract, recalled
earlier objections to its plans, and sought graphically to
explain how the city could embark upon a mammoth rebuilding
effort, even under existing legislation, and not expend any
local funds.

The commissioners knew first hand that federal

funds had provided the impetus for the city's dramatic
economic expansion over the past decade; all five commis
sioners were experiencing, along with the rest of the city's
business establishment, the fruits of a local economic boom
that had been financed largely with federal support, and
there was really very little doubt that Norfolk would once
again be in line for federal dollars as soon as new funds
for housing and renewal became available.
The Authority hired planning consultant Charles K.
Agle to study Norfolk's downtown slums and develop a master
plan for a major urban renewal project.

His report was a

shock even for native residents who had long known that
housing conditions in the area around the downtown were
deplorable.

Methodically he studied block by block, hovel

by hovel, to reach his conclusions:

"large scale redevelop

ment is the only chance the city ever has had to accomplish
a drastic modernization of its heart."37

Map after map,

37"Federal Slum Clearance Gets Its First Full Scale
Tryout in Norfolk, Va.," Architectural Forum, May, 1950,
p. 137.
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table after table, showed the same concentration of irre
versible blight choking the central business district:
blocks where every structure needed major repairs, where
almost all of the houses dated back to the Nineteenth
Century, where there were 13 or more fires over a two-year
period, where there were 17 or more arrests in the previous
months, and where there was a heavy concentration of
tuberculosis.33

As in many other cities, the streets of

Norfolk's downtown area were the direct descendants of cow
paths and carriage ways upon which a gridiron street pattern
had been imposed.39

All of the major highways that linked

commuters to the downtown ceased a mile short of the central
business district, discharging their traffic into a complex
maze of back alleys and clogged feeder roads.40

The City

Planning Commission found that:
. . . many streets were less than fifty-feet in
right-of-way width, and all were inadequate,
even for single family neighborhoods . . . . not
only are they inadequate for moving traffic, but
they are [also] an economic liability . . . .
some business decentralization is inevitable.
However, if effective means are taken to
increase accessibility, ease of movement and
parking facilities in the central business

3SNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 July 1961.
39Architectural Forum, op c i t . , p. 135.
4°E. T. Beall, George W. Price, and Donald R. Locke,
"Face Lifting For Better Urban Living," Norfolk, XII:
1
(February, 1950), p. 7.
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district, values can be stabilized and excessive
decentralization of business can be avoided.41
The Agle Report was a sobering eye-opener in other
respects.

In addition to just reporting the slum conditions

that cried out for renewal, it attempted as well to chart
all of the potential obstacles to successful redevelopment.
It was in this regard that many citizens found the report
shocking.

Few individuals realized how very profitable slum

properties— even in an area as blighted as Norfolk's central
ghetto— could be to its owners, and some of the city's
finest families were shown to have heavy investments in slum
housing.

The report showed that even under rent control, an

average slum dwelling assessed at $400 in total value could
achieve contract rents of $142 a year per room, out of which
very little besides the $10.80 per year real estate tax bill
had to be paid for maintenance and upkeep.

One example,

pointed to as typical of the inflated value of slum housing,
sheltered 32 families in a rickety, wood frame building that
had only four sinks and four toilets; it brought in $4,500 a
year in rent and paid out only $98 in taxes.42

A complex

called the Tidewater Apartments proved an even more notor
ious example of slum profiteering:

there were 152 single

room units that netted the owners $23,400 a year in rent;

4XCity Planning Commission, Major Highway P l a n , Part I,
Major Highways and Collector Streets (Norfolk, 1950),
pp. 15, 5.
42Architectural Forum, pp. 136-137.
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the only facilities for cooking, cleaning, washing, drink
ing, and sanitation were six cold water privies consisting
of a single faucet and toilet.

The total tax bill for the

complex was less than $600 a year43— a highly profitable
investment.
Thus Norfolk was compelled by a number of powerful
motivators to become the first city in the nation to qualify
for federal funds the following June, when President Truman
signed the U. S. Housing Act of 1949.

The act granted

municipalities both the legal authority and the necessary
funding support to buy up such properties.

Before the act

was passed, the city could rely upon its powers of eminent
domain to purchase private property only if were to be
reused for "public" purposes, such as land for schools,
highways, and parks, but additional public investment in
such a deteriorating neighborhood would have been foolish.
Before this new power of redevelopment passed to cities,
nothing in the municipal arsenal would permit cities to buy
up private property, tear it down, and then resell it to
other private residential, commercial, or industrial
developers— the essence of urban renewal.

The act empowered

cities to buy up large quantities of slum housing for a
fair" price— roughly 60% above their assessed value, or less
than two year's rent on most buildings— and to acquire the

43Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 July 1961.
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rest through condemnation proceedings.44

The Agle Report

had predicted that "the future of Norfolk for the rest of
its history will be fixed by the action of the next ten
years;"45 it might just as well have added that the
enabling legislation and supporting federal funding would be
the city's only real chance to have much of a future at all.
At last assured of both federal funding and community
support, the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority
forged ahead with its program— the first urban renewal
initiative in the country.

N.R.H.A. Project One— the

businessman's baby that had been so carefully nurtured along
by the city's power elite— bore a striking resemblance to
the blustery, full-speed-ahead approach of its sires:

it

proposed to bulldoze 120 acres of blighted land to make way
for broad highways, light industries, new commercial
districts, civic improvements, schools, playgrounds, and a
giant convention hotel.

It also bore the mark of City

Manager C. A. Harrell's balanced approach of careful
planning and community concern:

almost all of the 1,800

families uprooted by the bulldozers would be relocated in
modern, sanitary public housing units, and many would
eventually move back into their own neighborhood, once it
had been rebuilt at public expense.
legitimacy of the undertaking:

44Architectural F o rum, p.

No one doubted the

the slum properties cleared

137.

45Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 July 1961.
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represented some of the most squalid, festering hovels in
the nation;46 the municipal projects undertaken were those
seen as most essential to salvaging the central business
district; and the land cleared for renewal was seen as the
most critical for restoring the city's flagging real estate
tax base.

Before demolition even began, however, the

Authority rushed to completion several hundred new public
housing units on vacant land in order to absorb the first
wave of redevelopment refugees.47

Each time the bull

dozers poised to bite off another chunk of blighted land,
the N.R.H.A. rushed to completion new housing projects to
absorb its relocated residents.

Indeed, this was all part

of the careful, humanistic approach of the Silkstocking
Takeover that promised "to alleviate as much as possible the
hardships which are the by-products of such a project."43
Partly because this was the first redevelopment
project in the nation, and Norfolk was aware that the rest
of the nation was watching, and partly because the city had
been so long prepared for this endeavor, N.R.H.A. Project
One was a masterfully planned and conceived undertaking;
certainly it was one of the most studied proposals ever
advanced by a municipality.

Ever since the Citizens Crime

4SNorfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority,
(Norfolk: N.R.H.A., 1957), pp. 5-6.

Report

47Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 August 1950.
48Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 August 1951.
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Conference of 1937 exposed the financial and human cost of
slum life, the city's business elite had dreamed of downtown
renewal.

The Authority's own study in 1946 (This Is I t ) and

the 1949 Agle Report had added depth and dimension to the
vision.

It took five years to complete N.R.H.A. Project

One, but the enormity of its carefully planned success was
apparent to all.
for everyone:

In the end, the project offered something

broad new thorough-fares provided downtown

merchants with their first really modern link to the rest of
the area; a new light industrial zone on Tidewater Drive was
attracting so many new private investments that it was
prompting as own multi-million dollar construction boom;49
new businesses were already moving into the redeveloped
commercial areas; backers of a major new convention hotel
(the Holiday Inn Waterside) were examining a corner site in
the project;50 and the former residents of some of the
city's most dilapidated dwellings were able to reclaim their
old neighborhoods, now completely rebuilt as planned
communities.

More importantly, the whole community was

caught up in the feeling of pride and boom psychology that
accompanies such a dynamic undertaking, and the spin-off
effects could be seen in hundreds of other unrelated
expansions, investments, rehabilitations, and storefront

49Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 March 1956.
5°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 July 1961.
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modernizations.51

Urban renewal proved to be a spark that

kindled the area's entire business community to action, and
Norfolk raced to blot out the memories of its sordid past.
A more complete description of the size and scope of
N.R.H.A. Project One is necessary in order to fully compre
hend its full impact.

The project included one 80-acre

section that is bounded by Virginia Beach Boulevard on the
north, Lincoln Street on the east, Brambleton Avenue on the
south, and Monticello Avenue on the west; it then extended
east along Brambleton Avenue to include a broad strip
surrounding Tidewater Drive— roughly 127 acres.

New York's

Stuyvesant Town was the biggest housing project then in
existence, but it was a little more than one-third the size
of N.R.H.A. Project One; New York had 40 times the popula
tion of Norfolk in 1950, but less than twice the slum clear
ance acreage contained in Norfolk's undertaking.52

Land

acquisition cost $5.7 million, of which the federal govern
ment paid two-thirds ($3.8 million).

Norfolk's $1.9 million

share was not a cash loss, because it was worked off in land
set aside to build a new school, recreation center, fire and
police station, utility lines, and street improvements for
which the city would have had to pay anyhow.

The project

generated an additional $18 million in public expenditures

51George J. Hebert, "Downtown Norfolk:
Commercial and
Municipal Progress," Norfolk, XXI: 1 (February, 1950), p. 10.
52Architectural Forum, p. 132.
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generated an additional $18 million in public expenditures
— more than half of which came form the state or federal
government for public housing and highway improvements— and
$15.6 million in private construction.53

The total cost

to the federal government for building the 3,000 public
housing units planned by the N.R.H.A. commissioners was
close to $30 million34— a sizeable multiplier in any
economy.
The business leaders who sired N.R.H.A. Project One
saw redevelopment as more than just a means to eradicate
blight, relieve deprivation, and cure downtown traffic
congestion; they were focusing as well on a more serious
situation that struck deep at their own sense of financial
security.

Norfolk had too many of its economic eggs tied up

in one basket; its huge naval installations made the city
essentially a one-industry town55--an enterprise that was
virtually exempt from real estate, personal property, and
other local tax assessments.

After World War I Norfolk paid

a heavy price for this over reliance when disarmament left
the nation with a one-ocean navy that, after the outbreak of

33Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority, Report to
the City Council (Norfolk:
N.R.H.A., 1974), p. 46;
Architectural Forum, p. 132; Ira R. Hanna, "The Growth of the
Norfolk
Naval
Air
Station
and
the
Norfolk-Portsmouth
Metropolitan Area Economy in the Twentieth Century," masters
thesis (Norfolk:
Old Dominion University, 1967), p. 92.
54Architectural Forum, p. 132.
53Architectural Forum, p. 134.
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the West Coast.56

A brief inspection of the waterfront

gave ample evidence of the fact that coastwise shipping—
once the economic staple of the area— had been almost
completely absorbed by rail and trucking facilities; other
than shipbuilding and coal export, the city had no other
private industry of any magnitude,57 and, in fact, suffer
ed a severe shortage of available industrial land.

A few

million dollars clipped off of a naval appropriation by an
errant congressional committee could well send the area into
an economic tailspin.
Since the end of the war the city's economic leaders
had given serious attention to attracting new business as a
hedge against such congressional capriciousness,Bs but had
achieved little success.

City Manager Harrell had already

recommended an aggressive plan of annexation or, he warned,
"the city would die by inches,"59 but annexation under the
present state of Virginia politics was both a cos'tly and a
risky proposition, although one to which Norfolk was deeply
committed.

Even with the prospect of acquiring vacant land

through annexation, however, the city's business leaders

56Thomas van Wertenbaker, Norfolk Historic Southern
Port (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1962).
S7Charles K. Agle, A Master Plan for the Central
Business and Financial District (Norfolk, 1956), p. 79.
S8Architectural F o r u m , p. 134.
59C. A. Harrell, The Norfolk Story:
1948, (Norfolk, 1948), p. 9.

Annual Report for
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still had to face the harsh reality that Norfolk could not
hope to serve as a major industrial hub simply because it
lacked a cheap source of power.60

A plan to attract light

industry into newly developed sites close to the heart of
the area's financial and commercial district— a scarce
commodity in any community— was Norfolk's only hope for a
competitive alternative.

For this reason, a major

redevelopment project that entailed massive clearing of land
close to the downtown, was seen as the one best hope for the
area's continued financial success.

More than a third of

the land cleared in N.R.H.A. Project One was thus dedicated
to developing prime industrial and commercial sites with
both rail and major highway access.61

The catch was that

in order to be able to provide new land for these kinds of
critical business and industrial uses, the majority of the
land cleared under redevelopment powers had to be
"residential" in nature.

Federal law at the time also

mandated that the majority of the land must continue a resi
dential use.

Thus cities, like Norfolk, could clear a slum,

but they had to balance residential, industrial,
commercial,and public uses in the type of carefully planned
undertaking exemplified by N.R.H.A. Project One.62

60Architectural Forum, p. 135.
61Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 16 April 1952.
62Housing and Home Finance Agency, A Guide to Slum
Clearance and Urban Development (Washington, D.C., 1950).
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Finally, N.R.H.A. Project One was successful at alle
viating a part of the housing shortage for poor Blacks.
Not only did it create 3,000 new public housing units,®3
it proposed to split these between the project site and
newly acquired vacant land on the outskirts of the downtown.
This was in keeping with the housing pattern in the rest of
Norfolk at the time:

Black neighborhoods were spread across

the city instead of concentrated in a single downtown
district, as in most Northern cities.64

Since only 1,800

families would be moved out of the project area during
demolition65 (and 3,000 units were being built), this
represented a significant net gain in housing for Blacks.
The fact that the new Black housing area would be carefully
isolated by broad new thoroughfares (i.e., Virginia Beach
Boulevard on the north, St. Paul's Boulevard on the west,
Brambleton Avenue on the south, and Tidewater Drive on the
east) also was a plus for the white community fearful of
encroachments into white housing areas.

In addition, a

new recreation center, fire station, police precint
station,66 and the first elementary school (Young Park)

6Architectural Fo r u m , p . 132.
64Karl E. Taueber and Alma Taueber, Negroes in Cities:
Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Change. (Chicago:
Aldine Publishing Co., 1965), pp. 35-96.
SSN.R.H.A., Report, 1957, op cit.
66N.R.H.A., Report to the City Council, 1974, op cit. ,
p. 46.
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built for Black students67 (the others were hand-me-downs
from the white community, a standard practice in the South)
were included as part of the project.

By designating the

new school, park, and recreational facilities for use by
Blacks (under the practice of the day), the city hoped to
relieve some of the pressure to integrate white facilities
in adjoining neighborhoods.66
City Manager C. A. Harrell also saw redevelopment as a
panacea for many of the city's other municipal needs as
well.

Throughout his tenure as city manager, Harrell placed

a strong emphasis on neighborhood needs:

upgrading schools

and residential streets, decentralizing police and fire
facilities, building parks, playground, recreation areas,
and community centers.

N.R.H.A. Project One bears the

imprint of his careful community planning as well.

Besides

meeting the obvious commuter transportation needs of the
area by building two additional highway approaches to the
downtown, the project represented the city's first full
attempt to create a planned public community for its Black
residents.

Although surrounded by the updated highway

system, Young Park, a 752-unit public housing project (named
for P. Bernard Young, Sr., founder of the Journal and Guide,
Norfolk's distinguished Black newspaper) would be built upon

^ Norfolk Journal and Guide, 19 April 1958.
66Sam J. Ervin, Jr., "The Case for Segregation," Look,
April 3, 1956 (vol. XX, 7), pp. 32 and 33.
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a neighborhood street concept that would make it virtually
inaccessible to through traffic.

Population density would

be reduced from the pre-redevelopment levels of 50 families
per acre to only 20.

In addition, the phased development of

the project was designed so that every family would have a
place to go as the project gained momentum69— a goal that
in reality was far easier to work out on paper than in
practice, especially since a number of families and single
individuals were ineligible for public housing.
As part of his concept of professional community
planning, City Manager Harrell was taking active steps to
prevent future slums from occurring in the ring of older
middle-class housing which separated the downtown area from
the newer postwar subdivisions on the outskirts of the city.
Roughly one-third of the city's housing could be described
as in danger of slipping from relatively good housing for
its era into the dilapidated state that precedes a full
fledged slum70— all of it in this middle-class ring that
included all or portions of the city's first streetcar and
automobile suburbs— Ghent, East Ghent, Lamberts Point, Park
Place, Colonial Place, Riverview, Highland Park, West
Highland Park, Fairmont Park, Ballentine Place, Lafayette
Residence Park, Winona, Villa Heights, Brambleton, Chester
field Heights, Atlantic City, and the soon to be annexed

69Architectural F o r u m , p. 134.
70Architectural F o r u m , p. 136.
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sections of Ingleside, Estabrook, Norview, and Coronado.
The tremendous influx of people attracted to the Tidewater
area during the war— Norfolk's population increased by 48%
or almost 70,000 people between 1940 and 19507:L— placed a
premium upon existing houses, and many of the homes in these
areas either took in borders or were cut up into multifamily dwelling units.

The transient nature of this new

renting population and the inadequacy of many of the
remodeling jobs left deteriorated dwellings in even the
finest neighborhoods.
The major weapon in Harrell's arsenal against blight
was the newly formulated minimum housing code, which was
scheduled to go into effect on January 1, 1954.

Housing

codes were still a relatively new concept at the time that
Walter Hoffman (later, a federal judge) and his committee of
lawyers and building officials put together one for Norfolk;
in fact, less than a dozen other cities across the nation
had begun experimentation with code enforcement as a way to
prevent blight.

Housing codes provide "livability stand

ards" for dwellings, rather than concentrate on the more
limited coverage afforded by fire, building, and health
codes.

Examples of provisions in Norfolk's new code

included:

at least one window per room, running water

inside the building, a flush toilet connected to a sewer

7:LU. S. Bureau of the Census, U. S. Census of Population,
1950, vol. II, Characteristics of the Population, Part 46,
Virginia, Chapter B (Washington, D.C., 1952), pp. 26-27.
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(but not necessarily inside the dwelling), adequate means of
garbage disposal, and a safe form of central heating with a
flue to the outside of the building— none of them extra
vagant standards by any measure, but they did represent a
distinct improvement over the conditions that existed in
many semi-blighted areas.

The Norfolk code writers were

obviously setting their standards on the low side of "livability," because they realized that strong enforcement would
be the key to its effectiveness as a slum deterrent.72

As

a tribute to the wisdom of the code writers, almost 2,500
dwellings were rehabilitated during the first two years of
the code's operation; only 173 buildings were vacated as a
result of enforcement activities, and most of these were
re-occupied later after completion of the required reno
vations.73
The small crowd of dignitaries and city officials who
gathered outside the hovel at 755 Smith Street that wintry
morning in 1951 had come to cheer the revitalized spirit of
a New Norfolk as much to applaud the singular event they
were witnessing.

The New Norfolk was as blustery, bold, and

bullish as it sires in the city's business establishment; it
was as compassionate and humane as the civic leaders and
charity workers who presided at its birth; it was as level
headed, pragmatic, and professional as the planners,

72Architectural F o rum, pp. 136-137.
73Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 October 1956.
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designers, and consultants who fussed over its infant
developments; and finally, it was as careful, concise, and
well directed as the city manager who tutored it.

In elect

ing the Silkstocking Ticket, the voters had opted for a
change from the cautious, humdrum course plotted by the
wartime Council; they got more than for which they had
bargained.

In 1946 the people had been swept up in the

vision of a New Norfolk, sleek and shining in the shimmering
sunlight; by 1951 they were witnessing the bricks and
mortar, the concrete, steel and glass, of its realization.
A revitalized redevelopment and housing authority was
plotting eradication of the city's blight; a new port
authority was bent on reclaiming the glory of its past; new
zoning laws and subdivision laws regulations extended the
promise of orderly expansion; annexation initiatives held
out the assurance of continued growth; revamped health,
housing, fire, and building codes served as an omnipresent
guard against future deterioration; a massive capital
improvements program was rapidly solving the physical needs
for more schools, water, sewage, street lighting, traffic
control, and transportation facilities; construction was
already underway on a new bridge-tunnel link and a modern
airport terminal; extended highway access promised an end to
the city's isolation;74 and everywhere there was evidence

74C. A.
Harrell, "Norfolk— A Progress Report," Norfolk
XII: 2 (Autumn, 1950), pp. 9-14.
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that the citizens themselves had caught the spirit of these
ventures and were embarking on their own fix up, expansion,
rebuilding, and modernization campaigns in thousands of
smaller endeavors.
For many, Redevelopment Project One represented the
highwater mark of the city's effort not just to tear down
the old and build the new, but to do it with such style and
vision that it would capture the attention of the nation,
and thereby erase some of the taint of its earlier infamy.
It marked a sharp contrast between the foot-dragging of the
wartime Council and the foot-racing of the Silkstocking
administration.

Buoyed of spirit, restored of confidence,

and optimistic once again in outlook, Norfolk's citizens
were finally prepared to face the future without trepida
tion.
Redevelopment Project One represented as well a
remarkable diversity of personalities, a fortuitous display
of insight, and a timely turn of events:
1.

Charles L. Kaufman and the other citizen elites

that served as commissioners of the Norfolk Redevelopment
and Housing Authority had first envisioned the dream of
renewal in the days of Colonel Borland's 1937 Citizen's
Crime Conference; they had nurtured that dream through the
war years as the Norfolk Housing Authority; they had revived
it in the post-war era when their mission shifted from
planning military accommodations to managing public housing
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units; and they had lobbied the Silkstocking Council for a
risky advance to solidify their plans for redevelopment.

At

long last they were able to step back with pride and watch
the transformation of the N.R.H.A. from the ugly duckling of
public largesse to the single, domineering force in the
city's renewal renaissance. Throughout this decade and a
half, the seven men who had served as commissioners never
wavered from what they saw was the mission of their
organization, and they had the perseverance to see it come
about.
The seven commissioners were the true giants of the
city's business and civic establishment; they possessed
enough status and personal power in the community to over
come all opposition to redevelopment, and that was no mean
task.

Profiteering from Norfolk's blight and over charging

its poorest residents were as widespread among its slumlords
and a certain segment of its real estate community as any
where in the nation;75 in many instances the profits were
collected by families and individuals that had almost
parallel standing in the community.

But the commissioners

of the N.R.H.A. had the sheer force of commercial and
financial persuasion to stare down opposition from even
these well connected property owners.

Their standing in the

community was so high that they were able to launch the city
boldly and irrevocably into what was in most of the other

75Architectural Forum, p. 137.
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council-manager cities of the nation a torturous and easily
side-tracked course.-76
2.

The People's Ticket of Pretlow Darden, Richard

Cooke, and John Twohy, in combination with a loose voting
alignment with independent Councilman Rives Worsham,-7-7
possessed much the same kind of community power and
prestige.

By ripping political control of city hall from

the grasp of the Prieur Organization, they restored faith in
municipal government— a step that was necessary before any
progressive measure could be taken with citizen support.
The people of Norfolk would never have stood for the imposi
tions provided by the revamped building, fire, health and
minimum housing codes if they had feared indifferent or
selective enforcement for political gain; they would not
have stood for either the cost or the inconvenience posed by
massive municipal construction initiatives if they had
doubted the motives behind such improvements; neither would
they have had granted their government the power to acquire
and destroy private property in preparation for the eventual
resale to other private investors— the real teeth in the
redevelopment process— if either end of urban renewal had
been controlled by ring politicians.

-76For a more complete explanation of this point, see
Jean L. Stinchcombe, Reform and Reaction:
City Politics in
Toledo (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing, 1968),
pp. 129-150.
■^Pretlow Darden.
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The People's Ticket maintained dignity and devotion to
principle in spite of the controversy that raged about them.
Nobody doubted their motives or questioned either their
integrity or their purpose, but a group that embarks on so
many unparalleled municipal endeavors must inevitably make
enemies and provoke opposition.

The Council chambers rever

berated with the hubbub of both civic support and fierce
opposition throughout the brief tenure of the People's
administration, but the Council plunged onward despite the
controversy, always careful to explain each step of the
undertaking to those who would follow.

This was the true

mark of their partisan independence, for no political group
could have long endured the intensity of the public debate,
the level of criticism, or the unpredictability of popular
support posed by each new initiative.

Nevertheless, the

People's group had the courage to persevere and risk being
judged only by their accomplishments.
3.

City Manager C. A. Harrell was the right man at the

right time to carry out the initiatives of the People's
administration.

He represented absolute incorruptibility

and professionalism at a time in which both were sorely
needed at city hall.

Twenty years after his reign as

manager, Norfolk was still completing the final phases of
the ambitious program he had set forth.

More than any other

single individual, Harrell understood the true potential for
municipal planning and government.

He was responsible for
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snatching control over the operation of city government from
the grasp of short-sighted governmental functionaries and
then tutoring both citizens and municipal workers alike on
what could be accomplished.

His was a vision of greatness

for city government that would be hard to forget, even long
after he had passed from the local scene.

Harrell brought

the best technical and professional minds in the county to
study the city's problems and to help chart its growth;
many of them decided to stay on and lend a hand in achieving
the realities promised in their reports.

Harrell made

Norfolk City Hall one of the most desirable locations in the
country for aspiring public servants:

not only was the city

continually at the forefront the newly developing fields of
municipal planning, urban renewal, and code enforcement, the
People's administration promised that these new powers would
be used exclusively for municipal service, free from the
taint of political interference or partisan purpose that was
apparently so prevalent elsewhere.

Harrell dared to empower

the citizens— both the dynamos of its civic and business
elite and the sparkplugs of its neighborhood leagues— to
help plan and promote municipal endeavors.

He inspired the

best from his own employees and was able once again to
restore a sense of pride and accomplishment to city offices.
Harrell's vision, backed up by the proposals of numerous
citizen groups and consultants, provided Norfolk with the
basis for a Master Plan for city growth and development— a
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step that put it almost two years ahead of other areas in
the competition for federal urban renewal dollars.

Other

writers have bemoaned the lack of unity and leadership that
plagues most council-manager cities and precludes for the
most part decisive action; thanks to City Manager C. A.
Harrell and his close connection and cooperation with the
People's Council and its corporate elite, Norfolk suffered
no such disability.

In fact, Norfolk, because it had such

leadership, thrived in the area of urban renewal where most
other council-manager cities failed:

it was precisely

because it had truly achieved such a professional and non
partisan atmosphere that such action was possible.

Most

other council-manager cities, because politics was mixed in
with their administration, failed to achieve the level of
consensus that was possible to sustain such activities— a
level of unanimity that was ordinarily only possible in the
highly partisan strong mayor cities.7s
4.

Lawrence M. Cox, the executive director of the

Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority, headed a
promising young staff of planners and designers who moved
quickly to seize their opportunity before the momentum for
progress dissipated.

"Hustling young Larry Cox," as he was

described by one trade magazine,79 was ambitious and
demanding enough to get quick results.

The Authority's

7Ssee Jean L. Stinchcombe, op cit.
79Architectural Forum, p. 136.
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program for relocation, as well as the total design for
N.R.H.A. Project One, set a standard for the rest of the
nation.

Cox had been head of the N.R.H.A. almost from its

founding, and over the years, especially during the hectic
war years, had developed a capable staff that was both loyal
to him and fully committed to redevelopment.

Close

collaboration between Cox, the N.R.H.A. Commissioners, the
City Council, and the business community helped to push
N.R.H.A. Project One off of the drawing boards and into
reality.
5.

The support of Norfolk's two major daily news

papers, the morning Virginian-Pilot and the evening LedgerDispatch (later the Ledger-Star after a merger with the
Portsmouth Star), was instrumental in advancing both the
cause of the Silkstocking movement and the accomplishments
of its administration.

The two papers, although fierce

competitors, were owned and published by the same family
group; together they served as the spokesmen for the city's
business elite, and the accolades of triumph from the
newspapers for the latest ground breaking or achievement
frequently sounded brassier than any possible press release.
The support of the papers, especially the more progressive
Virginian-Pilot was critical to the People's efforts to win
election, maintain momentum through the police scandal, and
promote its program of redevelopment, code enforcement, and
bonded indebtedness.

Reporters for both papers were
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insiders to both the events and the intrigue at city hall,
and this access to the decision-makers, as well as the fact
that a reporter in this era kept a fixed beat for years,
gave them a stake in protecting their sources.

In those

days a reporter's reputation depended as much upon "what he
knew and didn't tell as it did upon what he knew."so
6.

The spirit of adventure and self-sacrifice that

prevailed among Norfolk's citizenry helped enormously in
clearing the hurdles inherent in redevelopment.

The

People's Ticket had been elected in 1946 with an over
whelming mandate for progress, and the citizens waited
patiently through the initial stages of planning and
development.

Seizing control of city government took more,

however, than winning a single election, yet the citizens
did not lose faith even during the darkest hours of the
police scandal— an event which could have easily wrecked all
hope of progressive active in most administrations; in
Norfolk, instead, it helped to assure success.

The citizens

were prepared for action, and they watched patiently as each
new step unfolded.

Norfolk's growth in population during

the war year had been enormous, and municipal services had
suffered greatly under this additional burden, but the
people never lost faith that City Manager Harrell and the

BORobert H. Mason, former editor of the Norfolk
Virginian-Pilot, interview by author, Tape recording, Norfolk,
27 September 1979.
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Silkstocking Council would eventually catch up to this level
of growth with their own ambitious program of expanded
municipal services.
Other
found their

cities that were similar to Norfolk in many ways
own plans for growth and redevelopment stymied

because their own citizens lacked either the vision or the
spirit of sacrifice to participate in progress; not so with
Norfolk.

Redevelopment, especially of the magnitude that

had been planned, called for enormous personal hardships
from many individuals, especially from those who could least
afford to suffer more, and yet they bore their discomfort,
and for the most part, bore it in silence.

The People's

government and its attendant push for progress truly
represented the efforts of a rejuvenated body politic;

the

bulldozers that ripped through the sagging walls of the
first Smith

Street structure and the adjacent areas in

N.R.H.A. Project One represented

the high point in the

momentary blaze of glory that characterized the Silkstocking
Takeover.
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CHAPTER TWO
PREMONITIONS OF CRISIS
N.R.H.A. Project One would take more than five years
to complete, but even before the bulldozers ripped through
that first house on Smith Street, the men who had charted
the meteoric rise of Norfolk's corporate stock had already
retreated back to the plushness of their board rooms and
counting houses.

The individuals who had so carefully

planned and nourished its inception were already fading from
the scene.

Each new ground breaking or ribbon cutting

ceremony marked the passing of the old order:

the planning

phase was over, and now it was time for the builders.
The Silkstocking Takeover had run into a snag:

as

part of its promise to clean up city government and make it
more responsive, the People's Ticket of Cooke, Darden, and
Twohy had promised not to seek a second term; now the very
events that served as tributes to their triumph stood as
well as a tombstone to their passing.

The Silkstocking

Ticket was unable to propagate successors.

The spirit of

renaissance and reform that had vaulted it to victory had by
1950 dissipated, and then dissolved completely.
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At first, as their term drew to a close, the reform
movement sought to find others who would carry their
banner,1 but the sense of shared emergency that had pro
pelled their postwar successes was giving way to an "Era of
Good Feeling."2

The business and civic leaders who had

been drawn to the city's rescue now began to answer other
callings; no one was willing to take again the risk they had
earlier dared and openly oppose the Prieur Organization.
The sense of urgency and shared emergency that had brought
the reformers to power had passed; the Outs had become the
Ins in the type of political perversity that always hastens
the doom of such reform movements; dramatic change had
become altogether too commonplace in Norfolk; and the extra
ordinary, the unusual, had become all too customary.

Busi

ness was booming, and the citizens were no longer forced to
turn to the corporate community to avert certain financial
ruin.

Local prosperity, aided by the Cold War state of

military readiness, had lulled the citizens into false sense
of overall contentment, fully prepared to count their bless
ings in the privacy of their own homes, untouched by and
undemanding of municipal government.
When their search for successors came up dry, the
stalwarts of the People's group again sought an audience
with Organization chieftain Billy Prieur, hoping to find

xPretlow Darden.
2Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 July 1961.
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some middle ground that would continue their legacy of
progress within the more limited confines of machine
politics.

Finding compromise candidates was no easy matter,

especially because Prieur would not agree to anyone who had
played even the slightest role in the Silkstocking Takeover.
Eventually the political negotiators were able to agree upon
one man who emerged at the top of everyone's list of
potential contenders.3

W. Fred Duckworth was an ideal

choice to head the Harmony Ticket that would emerge from
these backroom discussions:

as a relative newcomer to

Norfolk from small-town North Carolina, he had no close
financial, civic, or strong connections with the Silkstocking crowd.

On the other hand, he possessed the type of

outstanding managerial skills necessary to head up Norfolk's
complex municipal organization.

Duckworth had been brought

to the area in 1936 by the Ford Motor Company to manage its
South Norfolk plant, one of the few major industrial
concerns in the area not directly owned by the People's
reformers.

Several years later he left that position to

manage the area's War Production Board, a post that expanded
his circle of community contacts.

After the war he opened

up Cavalier Ford, his own car dealership,4 a project that
received heavy financial backing from some of the Silkstocking group.

Even though he was not a Norfolkian by

3Pretlow Darden.
4Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 July 1961.
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either birth or heritage, the People's group was favorably
impressed by his managerial acumen, his impressive array of
skills, and the extent of his commitment to his adopted
city.5
The People's group were not as pleased with Duck
worth' s two running mates, both of whom were chosen less for
their accomplishments than because nobody could find solid
grounds to scratch them from the list.

N. B. Etheridge, an

independent garage owner, was a political unknown without
any apparent ties to either the Organization or the Silkstocking crowd.

Lawrence C. Page had served on the City

Council just before the war, but had shown the good sense to
excuse himself from office before being branded for its
wartime failures.

Although a real estate broker by pro

fession, he had no close ties to the powerhouses of the
People's group, and since he had also run as a Republican
for the U. S. Senate against Organization scion Harry F.
Byrd, Sr.,® he was obviously no longer closely associated
with Prieur's crowd.

For the People's forces, the Harmony

Ticket of Duckworth, Page and Etheridge represented a
marriage of necessity, rather than a bond of trust between
these two disparate political groups.7

5Pretlow Darden and Robert W. Mason.
®Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 June 1942; and 14 June
1950.
7Pretlow Darden.
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Shortly after the bulldozers ripped through the wall
of that first house on Smith Street, City Manager C. A.
Harrell, the one man who more than any other had been
responsible for the rebirth and rejuvenation of Norfolk,
departed to accept a similar position in San Antonio, Texas.
At the time, the most common explanation for his departure
was that he and Duckworth, the new mayor, had clashed
bitterly over who would run the show at city hall.3

The

city could not endure two chief administrators pulling in
opposite directions, and Duckworth, with his "bulldozer
drive and directness," was bent on running the city from the
mayor's office, a marked contrast to the free-wheeling
independence granted Harrell under the People's reign.9
For his part, Harrell had indicated for years that he would
resign his position before violating his strict professional
creed of independence from partisan considerations;10

the

arrival of Duckworth and the Harmony Ticket, however, meant
that the Organization was again advancing a foothold in city
hall.

When Harrell left, with him went all hope of con

tinuing the municipal reform brought about by the People's
group; shortly thereafter his police chief and a number of
other key administrators instrumental in carrying out his

8Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 July 1961.
9Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 4 July 1975.
10Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 4 June 1950.
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program also departed with indications that they had been
fired by the new Council.x:L
Mayor W. Fred Duckworth was the perfect man to step in
now and fill the gap in leadership left by Harrell's
departure:

he offered a continuation of the progress and

prosperity without necessitating any further decision or
dissension on the part of the citizens.

He was an extra

ordinarily able leader, and if the decorum of democracy was
somewhat abridged under his tutelage, the voters did not
seem to mind very much.

The Planning Stage had passed, the

Builder had taken over, and the people approved unquestioningly the fruits of his labor, giving credit equally to the
Planners and the Builder alike.

Duckworth was above all

else a bricks-and-mortar man, and he presided daily over the
construction of the New Norfolk; as the building blocks of
its bright facade were laid in place, nothing, not even the
heavy storm clouds of racial disunity building on the
horizon, seemed capable of diverting that progress.
The Organization made no attempt under Duckworth to
return to the corrupt and profligate practices of its
wartime administration; its members had been absent long
enough from the seats of power that they were content to
settle for positions, without demanding authority.

Although

hard-headed, and occasionally dictatorial, Duckworth had no

x:LClaude J. Staylor, former Chief of Police and City
Councilman, interview by author, Tape recording, Norfolk,
25 July 1979.
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problem adapting to the programs begun under the People's
group.

He continued Harrell's administrative innovations,

merely rerouting the technical advisors through the mayor's
office.

He was extremely aggressive, but like Harrell, he

had a sense of how to handle himself; when he moved, he
moved decisively, but he never moved until he was satisfied
that all the conditions were favorable.

Harrell's departure

brought relations with the People's group dangerously close
to a head, but Duckworth stepped in with a firm hand to take
personal control of city government, and so assuaged some of
the fears of machine politics.
During the Duckworth era, Norfolk was clearly run from
the mayor's office:

Council policy was invariably decided

there during the private pre-sessions before the regular
public meeting, and those councilmen not in attendance were
told later how to vote.

Duckworth thrived on consensus, and

minor differences between Council members at the public
session took on major proportions in his mind.

Although

protective of the Organization's interests, Duckworth would
not brook incompetence.

He rose quickly to the top of the

Organization and soon, along with Prieur, dominated its
decisions as well.

This combination of elected authority,

political power, administrative expertise, and driving
personal force was devastating to city employees who
faltered or got out of line.
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Duckworth did not have to bargain for acquiescence
from the People's group; he won it through strength.

The

Silkstocking crowd respected Duckworth's ability and
integrity, or at least they feared crossing him without a
guarantee of victory.

Although more political than they had

been, Duckworth's program did not differ perceptively from
their own:

city hall was still well run; there was little

evidence of corruption; business leaders were still
consulted; the authority of the expert consultants and
advisors was still in tact; and the framing of Harrell's
blueprints was well underway.

All in all, the business

establishment had few complaints, although plenty of reason
to feel uneasy:

such power, concentrated in one man, if

misdirected, could prove disastrous for the city.

The

citizens, too seemed relatively content with Duckworth's
administration, and councilmanic contests during this time
produced very little in the way of a challenge to the
M a y o r 's preeminence.
This was truly the "Era of Good Feeling," as one local
historian labeled it:12

even the corporate and civic

leaders who had wrested control of the city's growth from
the courthouse ring politicians now breathed as well the
chloroform of prosperity.
city hall:

Business as usual prevailed at

"the reformers had grown tired, the regulars had

12Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 July 1961.
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taken over, and things would have to get pretty bad before
the reformers would stir again.13
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the Brown v.
Board of Education case struck like a thunderbolt through
this false sense of local optimism that prevailed in May of
1954. By the time the citizens of Norfolk looked up to
discern the dangers ahead, they found the state's political
leaders scurrying in panic for punitive strictures and
hastily contrived extra-legal shelters as a means of
diverting the raging force of racial discontent that had
been building for centuries in the backwaters that
surrounded the city.

There was never any question that

Norfolk would be left free, or that its leaders would even
be willing for that matter, to pursue an independent course
of reaction, separate from the rest of the state.

The very

fact that Duckworth was now so firmly entrenched at the
throttle of municipal control would mean that the path of
response would follow as well the same dictates of the Byrd
Organization.
It is ironic that Norfolk would become the main
battlefield upon which the fate of Virginia's Massive
Resistance (to school integration) plan would be decided:
it was one of the most liberal cities in the South, and vast

13Louis I. Jaffe, as quoted by Harold Sugg, "1945-1965:
Youth Takes Command," chap. in Lenoir Chambers and Joseph E.
Shank, Saltwater and Printer's Ink: Norfolk and Its
Newspapers (Chapel Hill, N.C.:
University of North Carolina
Press, 1967), p. 368.
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segments of its population had little use for those racial
codes and strictures, both written and unwritten, that were
primarily Southern.

The storm whipped waves of Massive

Resistance would break as well over Arlington, Charlottes
ville, Prince Edward County, and Warren County, but these
would be small scale tests of its voracity when compared to
a city of Norfolk's size.

At the time, Norfolk had a

population rapidly approaching 300,000 and was earning new
status as Virginia's largest city.

More than one-third of

its population represented directly the liberalizing
influence of service in its naval or N.A.T.O forces; the
rest of its citizenry greatly benefitted in their day-to-day
contact with these as well as other representatives of vast
national and international interests.

Norfolk, particularly

under the able leadership of Harrell and the People's admin
istration, had forsaken its obligatory glance to Richmond
for guidance, and instead looked to the rest of the world
for approval.
The many, varied opportunities of government service
in Tidewater had made the city a mecca for southern Blacks
hoping to improve their lot in life.

The integration of the

military forces that had taken place during the administra
tion of President Truman meant that Blacks could rise to
positions of leadership in an integrated society that
existed just on the periphery of Norfolk's own.

The lure of

steady e m p l o y m e n t in the area's many fine shipyards and
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re-work facilities had prompted a continual stream of
job-hunters that began pouring into the city before the
hostilities of World War II had even begun.

Although most

Norfolk Blacks were of relatively low economic status when
compared to their white neighbors, a middle class was
growing at a faster pace than elsewhere in the South.
Although most of the major trade unions had not yet been
cracked, the door of opportunity to non-discriminatory
positions in government and war-related industries had just
been opened, and opportunities in the private sector would
soon be available as soon as Blacks had achieved success in
these endeavors.
All in all, the history of race relations in Norfolk
had been good, especially under the even-handed municipal
management of C. A. Harrell and the Silkstocking crowd.
Only 27% of Norfolk's 300,000 citizens were Black, a Black
population "large enough to provide leadership, but not so
large as to be believed to threaten established
patterns."14

But to Duckworth, the Black leadership had

already proven itself a thorn in the side of municipal
unanimity, and Duckworth was not one to overlook even the
slightest irritant.

Even though Black councilmanic

challenger P. B. Young had posed no real threat in the 1952
race, Duckworth was apparently miffed that the Black

14Jane Reif, Crisis in Norfolk, (Richmond:
Council on Human Relations, 1960), p. 1.

Virginia
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community had opposed his own "harmony" slate.

There were

other, more serious signs of a growing challenge in the
Black community, far more significant than the periodic
offering of token opposition candidates.

By 1954 Blacks

found themselves in the position of increasingly vocal
opposition to the Mayor's policies in the fields of housing,
development, recreation, and municipal finance.

The Supreme

Court's decision in May of that year only opened up an area
of dissension that was more readily visible to the general
public.
Ever since the first Blacks began moving in to the
white section of Brambleton in the mid-1940s, a succession
of City Councils had been incapable of halting the demise of
traditional barriers to integrated neighborhoods.

The tub-

thumping of the Organizations' wartime Council gave mute
sanction to a wave of white violence and vandalism that
temporarily halted the spread in the Brambleton area,15
but the election of the People's Ticket in June of 1946 gave
new impetus to that transition.

The People's group tried to

maintain an air of orderly calm and reasonableness; their
approach was to talk out differences with committees
comprised of members of both races.

In the atmosphere of

calm that prevailed under their reign, traditional barriers
to color advancement in Brambleton fell quickly.

Brambleton

had always had led a somewhat tenuous existence as the sole

lsNorfolk Journal and Guide, 1 June 1946.
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white community in the zone of the city dominated by Blacks,
and its white residents had relied heavily on the combina
tion of natural, geographic, and traditional barriers to
keep it that way.

Once the color barrier around Corprew

Avenue was successfully breached and violence had subsided,
the area fell quickly to growing pressure to provide homes
for the emerging Black middle-class.

In 1949 Ruffner

Elementary was opened for the diminishing white population
of Brambleton and the Stonewall Jackson School was turned
over to the Black school system.16

In 1950, the John

Goode (Elementary) School, ironically named for Norfolk's
Confederate congressman and president of the Virginia
Constitutional Convention instrumental in stripping Blacks
of the power to vote,17 was turned over to the Blacks.

In

1952 Ruffner was reopened as a junior high school in the
Black school system, signaling the final defeat of the
area's last white holdouts.18
Once the color line had been successfully breached and
finally broken in the Brambleton section, it fell more
easily in other parts of the city as well.

Norfolk in the

1950s, like many other older Southern cities, was unlike its
Northern counterparts:

it did not have a single, central,

16Norfolk Journal and Guide, 1 June 1946.
17Henry S. Rorer, History of Norfolk Public Schools
(Norfolk:
by author, 1968), p. 207.
iaNorfolk Journal and Guide, 19 April 1958.
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Black ghetto surrounded by a ring of white suburbs.19
Instead, Norfolk was an amalgamation of a number of small
communities, most of which had their own sections for Black
housing.

Successive annexations had brought these communi

ties within the city boundaries, but the result was that
Norfolk's Black population occupied a number of isolated
districts that spread out from the central downtown housing
area.

Consequently, by 1950 Black communities existed next

to whites in the Atlantic City, Lamberts Point, Granby
(Bollingbrook), Sewells Point (Titustown), Berkley,
Campostella, and Tanner's Creek (Oakmont) sections of the
city.20

There was some pressure to expand the color lines

in these areas, but the traditional proximity of Black and
whites in the city had forestalled the white exodus that had
taken place in Brambleton, Chesterfield, and in some areas
of Berkley.21

Thus, there was little apparent danger of

open racial conflict within the city boundaries in 1954 when
the Supreme Court's school desegregation decision was handed
down:

the city's traditional residential patterns, its

history of good race relations, opportunities for
advancement in the military and government service, already
integrated military housing, and the increasing
desegregation of the city's private charitable, health

19Taueber and Taueber, op c i t . , pp. 35-96.
2°U. S. Census of Population,

(1950), op c i t . .

21Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 May 1946.
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religious, welfare, and educational boards22 seemed
adequate to surmount any submerged hostilities.
Increasingly, however, local attention began to focus
on the working class neighborhoods of the Tanner's Creek
District of Norfolk County, scheduled for annexation into
the city on January 1, 1955.

Portions of the district had

been unpoliced cesspools of crime, gambling, prostitution
and roadhouses that operated under quasi-official auspices
just beyond the legal reach of city enforcement; other areas
were characterized by vast tracts of substandard housing
without adequate plumbing or facilities.

The area had

already prompted uncharacteristic bickering on the otherwise
harmonious City Council over unexpectedly high cost of
annexation versus the dire necessity of Norfolk's continued
need for room for industrial and suburban expansion.23
By the summer of 1954, Norfolk County officials had
all but washed their hands of the area, its annexation
having been officially sanctioned.

The Tanner's Creek

District existed in a state of limbo:

Norfolk County

officials refused to maintain costly municipal services in
an area that would soon no longer be their problem, and the
City of Norfolk had not yet acquired title or authority to
deal with the area.

Norfolk's eleventh-hour hesitations

over the exorbitant asking price and the reluctance of a few

22Jane Reif, Crisis in Norfolk, p. 1.
23Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 March 1954.
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councilmen to close the deal only served to increase the
area's sense of isolation from governmental authority.

At

any rate, Tanner's Creek residents began to grow accustomed
to the idea of handling matters in their own manner without
any official intervention.
By mid-summer, the area's sense of isolation and help
lessness was further increased by the breakdown of tradi
tional color barriers in the formerly all-white Coronado
section.

Coronado was a small (300 homes) community of

white, middle-class wage earners; it lay between Tidewater
Drive and Sewells Point Road with its northern boundary at
Widgeon Road.

Since a large number of its families were

military, the area had a more rapid turnover of ownership
than would be otherwise expected.

Like many other areas in

the city, Coronado was bounded on two sides by the welldefined Black neighborhoods of Oakwood, Oakwood Park, and
Rosemont.24

Most of the homes in these traditional Black

sections were far below the level of the all-white Coronado
homes:

85% were found to be substandard in terms of plumb

ing, utilities, and "tarpaper construction."25
Coronado was bounded as well by one of the few housing
areas for middle-class Blacks, and only narrow Widegeon Road
separated the white and Black developments.

Chesapeake

Manor Apartments (332 units), Chesapeake Manor Gardens (389

24Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 August 1954.
25Norfolk Journal and Guide, 6 August 1955.
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homes), and Mamie Homes, Incorporated (150 homes), all built
since 1950, made the northern boundary of Coronado a haven
for Black middle-class families, many of them displaced by
Redevelopment Project One.

The Black community faced a

severe shortage of available middle-class housing, and the
long waiting lists at all of the properties north of
Coronado had put a premium on housing there.26

In addi

tion, a number of Black leaders complained that most Black
neighborhoods "were generally denied city improvements"2-7
such as curbs, gutters, parks, playgrounds, sewer and street
repair.

All in all, Coronado, with its plentiful supply of

middle-class housing, city improvements, and high rate of
turnover, was a natural target for Black expansion.
Trouble began when a Black couple was looking at a house in
the Black section on the north side of Widgeon Road; a white
Navy housewife spotted them, walked across the road, and
asked them if they wanted to buy her house.

Because of the

huge demand and short supply of middle-class housing for
Blacks, this first Navy family received a higher price for
their home than they would have received from a white buyer.
Other Navy families followed suit, and soon panic gripped
Coronado's more established white residents.

At about this

time the market in Coronado for sale to white buyers all but
disappeared; the white banking establishment, realizing the

26Norfolk Virginian-Pilot. 22 August 1954.
2-7Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 31 August 1954.
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inevitable, refused to finance white buyers in Coronado, and
the Veteran's Administration appraisals were dropped as they
"generally do go down in areas where Negroes are moving into
what was once all-white territory".23

Once the pattern

had begun, white home-owners found it impossible to reverse:
they were trapped and limited by powers beyond their grasp.
The harassment of Black buyers began innocently
enough:

two elderly white ladies had allowed a bundle of

papers to blow out their car window; other passing motorists
stopped to help them retrieve the papers.

When others

learned that the panorama of stopped automobiles lining both
sides of the street had frightened off a prospective Black
buyer, the idea of neighborhood caravans was begun "to show
that it was a white neighborhood."29

The idea caught on

immediately; although a number of homes were sold to Black
buyers, few Blacks had actually moved into their houses.

As

the word spread to outlying areas, outsiders began to join
in the caravans.

Soon random acts of violence, especially

against unoccupied dwellings already sold to Blacks, became
commonplace.

Bricks and bottles were hurled as missiles, a

"No Nigers (sic) wanted" sign appeared,30 the pipes to one
house were ripped out before a Black family could move

28Norfolk Virginian-Pilot. 22 August 1954.
29Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 30 July 1954.
3°Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 16 August 1954.
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in,31 a bomb was thrown at another house, a dozen white
youths rocked the car of a Black couple,32 another house
and automobile were bombed,33

bullets were fired into

Black homes,34 and soon armed caravans of whites and
Blacks began roaming the area looking for trouble.35

The

prospect that the present rate of property damage, if not
halted, would escalate into human tragedy became more and
more evident.
Blacks in and around the Coronado area were clearly
terrified by the racial turmoil they confronted.

The

Norfolk County Police, still the legal authority in the
Tanner's Creek District, were not much help in appeasing
their fears.

The County Police came promptly when called,

but they engaged in only minimal defensive patrolling.
Often the Police stood among crowds of jeering whites and
were indistinguishable from the taunters.

County officials

were understandably eager to play down the true extent of
the threat that existed in Coronado, but one officer's
characterization of the site of a bomb blast, "the hole
appeared to be that left by a dog trying to bury a

3XNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 August 1954.
32Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 August 1954.
33Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 September 1954.
34Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 20 September 1954.
35Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 August 1954.
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bone,"36 only aroused Blacks to the fear that little was
being done to protect them.

Black leaders turned first to

the Norfolk City Council for help,37 and then to the
governor when their pleas for assistance were denied.
Duckworth refused to provide police protection for Black
families because the city would not acquire jurisdiction
until January 1, 1955; Governor Stanley was powerless under
state law to commit the State Police or National Guard
unless the local governing body first requested aid.

The

fact that former Council aspirant P. B. Young, Sr., carried
the request to the governor over the protestations of the
Norfolk City Council, further enraged Duckworth.33

After

a month of escalating violence had passed since the request
for city assistance, the Virginian-Pilot stepped in with
some harsh words of criticism for the Mayor and the rest of
his City Council:
The leadership in the Norfolk City govern
ment has been short-sighted in deciding not to
show any interest in Coronado; the residential
area just outside the City line . . . .
It does not make good sense for a city to
use its authority one mile beyond the city limit
to make a numbers racket raid, such as was made
Thursday by Norfolk police, but to withhold its
influence and authority from a problem which has
potentially much more tragic consequences than a
numbers game.

3SNorfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 30 August 1954.
37Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 August 1954.
38Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 12 September 1954.
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It would be better to provide too much law
enforcement than what may tragically prove later
to have been too little and too late.
The hoodlum
elements ought not to be left in any doubt as to
what confronts them if they continue to make an
unpleasant situation worse.39
In desperation, the Black leaders finally approached
their old contacts in the Silkstocking crowd who, although
no longer in control of any governmental authority,
nevertheless still possessed enormous financial power and
corporate authority.

A reporter for the Journal and Guide

summed up the resultant beefed-up county patrols this way:
The powers-that-be Downtown, after caucusing
with the Uptown [Black] leaders, brought pressure
to bear upon county officials, and the tragedy
that could have been Coronado was averted.40
A serious breach between the city's Black community
and its white political leaders was growing, and the fact
that P. B. Young and others had effected, with Silkstocking
backing, a successful flanking maneuver around the Council
only made matters worse.

Duckworth and the Organization

were clearly opposed to any further expansion of the Black
population within the city, and they set about to severely
chastise anyone who strayed beyond the acceptable
boundaries.

The city government had done all that it could

legally do to block a group of Black developers from

39Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 September 1954.
4°Norfolk Journal and Guide, 7 January 1956.
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acquiring a large tract of land off Broad Creek Road; the
white leaders were strongly opposed to any development that
allowed Blacks to settle along the City's major approach
route from Virginia Beach (now Virginia Beach Boulevard).
Once they saw that the deal could not be prevented, the City
Planning Commission stepped in to prevent residential use by
Blacks, and zoned as much of the tract as possible for
industrial and commercial purposes.41

When Black leaders

persisted in attempting to develop the remaining acreage
into an attractive subdivision (Broad Creek Shores), the
city employed its powers of eminent domain to buy up some of
the land as a further obstacle.

The City Council passed an

ordinance authorizing the Department of Parks and Recreation
to acquire a 40-acre tract "by purchase or condemnation, if
necessary," for use as a public park and school site.42
The Black population of the city was enraged and could see
"no other apparent valid reason for seizing the land, other
than to prevent colored home owners from locating on
it."43

The action prompted a 40-hour whirlwind drive in

the Black community to collect enough signatures on a
petition for a referendum, and thereby block the ordinance
from taking effect.

41Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 31 August 1954.
42Norfolk Journal and Guide, 6 August 1955.
43Norfolk Journal and Guide, 6 August 1955.
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Newly appointed Councilman Roy B. Martin, Jr., rose
with the Organization's response, a proposal to "study" the
question, with an eye towards amending the section of the
city charter that dealt with such referendums.

The Black

community had organized the petition drive (25% of the total
vote cast in the most recent councilmanic election was
needed; since the last race had been one of the "no-contest"
elections for which Duckworth became famous, only 5,456
votes had been cast.

Black leaders collected 2,488 sig

natures in less than two days) in order to affect some sort
of compromise with the city,44 but the Council and the
Black community remained at loggerheads for more than a
month.

At last, with the day of the referendum fast

approaching, the Organization agreed to a compromise; it was
wisely unwilling to test its strength at the ballot box in
what was seen by many white leaders as an illegal and
arbitrary use of power.

The city agreed to take only 24 of

the original 40 acres in the site, and leave the other 16
acres, already platted and under contract, for development
as Broad Creek Shores.

The city's chief concern, that the

Black housing development be widely separated from all-white
Ingleside Elementary School, was met,45 and the Blacks
were able to keep a large tract of waterfront property,

44Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 July 1955.
4SNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 September 1955; Roy B.
Martin, Jr., former Mayor of Norfolk, interview by author,
tape recording, Norfolk, 18 February 1991.
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clearly separated by the city's acquisition and natural
geographic barriers from nearby all-white communities, for
expansion.

Councilmen Page, Abbott, and Riley, hardliners

to the biter end, dissented in the decision because it
included paying a premium price to the Black developers for
the city's share of the original tract.

The final balloting

on the matter produced one of the few split-votes ever
recorded on the Duckworth Council,46 and ensured the
Mayor's bitter enmity for cracking the facade of his
previously united front.

The Black community left the

Council chambers congratulating themselves for their
victory, unaware that Mayor Duckworth, a sore loser at the
game of power politics, was already plotting their demise.
At the height of the Broad Creek Shores controversy,
the city had appointed a three-man committee to study "the
need and desirability of obtaining additional sites for use
in constructing private homes for our colored citizens."47
At the time of its appointment, the Land Committee, or
Kaufman Committee as it was called in the Black community,
had been a part of Mayor Duckworth's efforts to compromise
the impasse short of granting land in the Broad Creek area
to Black developers.

Recognizing the city's "desperate

need" for additional, suitable sites for Black development
outside of Broad Creek, the Mayor turned to the Silkstocking

46Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 April 1956.
^ N o r f o l k Journal and Guide, 6 August 1955.
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crowd to solve the dispute peaceably.

The three most

powerful representatives of the old People's group still
left in the city's government— N.R.H.A. Chairman Charles
Kaufman, Planning Commissioner Henry Clay Hofhemier, II, and
John S. Jenkins— were appointed to the committee.

Privately

the committee was charged with the responsibility of finding
additional room for Black expansion in areas that would not
threaten white housing developments or segregated schools;
no one wanted a repeat of the racial strife that charac
terized the Coronado settlement.
Initially the committee received a hostile reception
from the Black community because of its association with the
Mayor's position on Broad Creek shores, but gradually the
panel's outstanding reputation for fairness and the high
esteem in which its members were generally held, won over
the support and cooperation of the Black community.

The

Journal and Guide apologized for its initial inhospitality,
terming it "a natural reaction to an unnatural determination
on the part of City Council."48

After considerable study

and numerous meetings with Black leaders, the committee
failed to find appropriate sites for new developments;
indeed Norfolk's desperate need for more space for all types
of expansion was the driving motivation behind its costly
annexation initiatives.

48Ibid.
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Instead the Land Committee adopted a proposal to
undertake an extensive reclamation project in a section of
the new Tanner's Creek District that included Oakwood,
Lincoln Park, and Rosemont— a 370-acre site that included
more than 1,000 dwellings, all of them already occupied by
Black families.

Oakwood began its existence as a shanty

town on the outskirts of existing (white) settlements before
the turn of the century.

For as little as $50 a Black

family could purchase a small tract of land and then
scrounge scrap lumber, tarpaper, and materials to build a
shack.

Eighty-five percent (85%) of the homes were sub

standard; few had adequate sanitary facilities; and even
fewer could be rehabilitated to comply with existing city
codes.49

Even the Journal and Guide recognized that the

area contained "some of the worst imaginable slums," and
applauded the committee's decision.50

The committee

proposed a massive redevelopment and reclamation project
that would rebuild the community to accommodate 2,500
families— 1,500 more than at present— in individual homes,
semi-detached housing, and garden apartments.

The project

would include an elementary school, playground, and small
shopping center.51

49Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 April 1956.
5°Norfolk Journal and Guide, 6 August 1955.
S3-Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 April 1956.
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The proposal was well received by members of both the
Black and white communities; "inasmuch as the site proposed
for reclamation has been occupied by colored people for the
past sixty-five years, the segregation factor does not enter
the package."52

In point of fact, no other alternative

existed for the area.

Most of the homes would have to be

condemned and torn down anyway under existing health, fire,
safety, and building codes, and the city would be unwilling
under current spending formulas to extend sewer and water
lines to the area or pave streets, provide sidewalks,
streetlights, or gutters.

The Redevelopment and Housing

Authority sought to allay the fears of Oakwood residents by
promising to give a "liberal" appraisal for existing homes,
relocate those homes sound enough to save, provide financing
for new homes, give residents priority in site selection,
and even trade comparable land for redeveloped sites.53
Kaufman and the N.R.H.A. were surprised then to hear
the voracity of the Oakwood community's opposition to
renewal.

Most residents knew they were too poor to afford

the new development even if their current substandard
dwellings were generously appraised; they lived in Oakwood
because there they could survive on little or no regular
income.

"We old people can't buy new homes," said one

resident, "If you take our homes, we'll just be out in the

52Norfolk Journal and Guide, 6 August 1955.
53Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 April 1956.
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street."54

Horae owners were understandably unwilling to

take their turn in the waiting lines for a unit in Norfolk's
already overcrowded public housing.

They had heard horror

stories from other Blacks who had been resettled during
N.R.H.A. Project One; thus, they were content instead to
stay where they were, as they were.

The strong anti-rede

velopment sentiment forced a critical re-examination of the
Oakwood project on the part of the city's Black leadership.
Attorneys J. Hugo Madison and Joe Jordan objected that the
project tended to perpetuate residential segregation.55
Others began to question the advisability of crowding an
additional 1,500 families in an area that already held more
than 1,000.

Most stated they would oppose it until the

current residents were given sufficient guarantees, written
or otherwise, to sway a majority of local support.

Thomas

Young, president of the Journal and Guide, and Rev. W. L.
Hamilton, pastor of Shiloh Baptist Church, Dr. Lyman Brooks,
president of Norfolk State College (now University) and
other Black leaders who maintained a strong attachment to
the Silkstocking crowd, still favored the project, but the
growing split in the Black community over the city's use of
its redevelopment and housing powers was quickly pushing
younger, more activist leaders to the forefront.55

54Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 April 1956.
55Norfolk Journal and Guide, 31 March 1956.
5SNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 April 1956.
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The Oakwood Redevelopment controversy was an important
episode in the history of the period for a number of
reasons.

First, it marked the emergence of an important

coalition between Mayor Duckworth and the remnants of the
People's group still in power.

Both groups were committed

to continuing the city's informal practice of segregated
housing and eager not to repeat the horrors of the Coronado
situation.

Mayor Duckworth may have been rebuffed at his

premature attempt to forestall a Broad Creek Shores settle
ment, but with the Silkstocking crowd and the Norfolk
Redevelopment and Housing Authority firmly in his camp,
further efforts would be both more calculated and more
successful.

Oakwood represented the willingness of the old

People's representatives to harness the powers of redevelop
ment to insure segregated housing developments.

It also

indicates the area of the city that was the most natural
target for new redevelopment activity:

few of the homes in

Oakwood could ever hope to pass the city's minimum housing
codes, and blight and dilapidation were evident throughout
the neighborhood.
Finally, Oakwood points to a growing split in the
Black community between the older, business oriented leaders
like P. B. Young, Rev. Hamilton, and W. T. Mason and the
younger, more aggressive activists like Joe Jordan, Victor
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Ashe, and J. Hugo Madison.57

The next round would be

fought in the courts, and the younger leaders had neither
the commitment to compromise nor the skill at bargaining
possessed by their elders.

Oakwood proved that these

younger, more aggressive leaders were gaining a ready
audience of listeners willing to hear the message that the
forces of state and local authority were being piled up
against them and that a new tack was both desirable and
necessary.

The more established Black leaders such as

Young, Hamilton, and Mason still commanded enormous respect
in both the Black and white communities, but all their
powers of amelioration would be needed to avert future
strife between their charges and the Organization.

57For a more complete explanation of this poinc, see
Henry Lewis Suggs, P. B. Young, Newspaperman
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1988),
p. 183.
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CHAPTER THREE
FIRST REACTIONS TO BROWN
The intensity of the school integration controversy
may best be seen within this context of an ongoing power
struggle between segments of the Black and white communi
ties; in both instances, Norfolk's pattern of residential
segregation, because it brought Black and white neighbor
hoods within close proximity to one another, was the cause
of friction between the races.

Even so, the initial

reaction in Norfolk to the Supreme Court decision was a
decided calmness.

School Superintendent Brewbaker spoke for

the educational community when he urged:
. . . an intellectual rather than an emotional
approach.
We must accept these decisions and
give them considered judgment and not let our
emotions get in the way . . . . We will do
everything we can from an intelligent point of
view.
Brewbaker went on to forecast "very little mixture" of
races due to the residential "lines" within the city.
Councilmen Ezra T. Summers and Roy Martin echoed the
political sentiment:
Norfolk
any city in
set up here
residential

will probably be less effected than
the state because of the geographical
[that includes] well-defined
districts.
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The Virginian-Pilot also pointed to the bulwark of de facto
segregation that stood against integration encroachments:
In Norfolk and other Virginia cities where
Negro and white schools are built largely in
conformity with the white and Negro patterns of
residence, where the Negro population is
distinctly in the minority, and where the two
races respect each other, adjustment to the new
order will be gradual and not likely to produce
deep change for a considerable time . . .
The majority of Southerners, and the best
of [the] Southern leadership will strive to
work out their civilization in accord with the
constitutional requirements."x
Newly elected Governor Thomas B. Stanley, fresh from
his narrow victory over Republican challenger Theodore
Roosevelt (Ted) Dalton, reacted calmly as well.

He contem

plated "no precipitate action" and stated that the "views of
leaders of both races will be invited" in approaching the
problems created by the court.

But Stanley's calm reaction

was met with a hail of abuse from Southside Virginia, from
whence had come his winning margin over Dalton, and soon he
assumed a more militant posture, "I shall use every legal
means at my command to continue segregated schools in
Virginia."

Former Governor Tuck accurately expressed the

Southside's sentiment:
There is no middle ground, no compromise
. . . If the other [areas of Virginia] won't
stand with us, I say make 'em . . . I f you ever
let them integrate anywhere, the whole state
will be integrated in a short time.

xNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 18 May 1954.
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A new political group, the Defenders of State Sover
eignty and Individual Liberties

,

was then being formed in

the Southside to feed the venom of the state politicians and
give credence to their pledge to resist integration at all
cost.

The Defenders did not represent the night-rider or

confederate-flag-waving brand of resistance, but as a
state-wide organization they gave backbone to all those
politicians, both state and local, who similarly pledged
unyielding opposition to integration in any form.’'
In spite of the hysteria that characterized the South
side in general and the leadership of the byrd Organization
in specific, the reaction on the part, of Norfolk citizens
remained one of tranquility.

A sampling of let.tors to the

editor of the Virginian-Pilot: revealed that by a two-to-one
ratio the writers expressed "a cairn, rational attitude
towards desegregation and/or a strong disapproval of the
public stand of Virginia officials."

A local group for

interracial cooperation concluded from this analysis that:
There exists in this area [Norfolk] of the
South a body of moderate, informed, thoughtful,
educated, and earnest public opinion which would
accept desegregation easily.
Extremist opinion
is always noisy, and people who are against
anything shout louder than those who arc simply
acquiescent.a

2Virginius Dabney, Virginia : The Now Dominion. (Garden
City, New York:
Doubleday, 1971), pp. !>2H-b3i.
3The Women's Council For Interracial Cooperation,
"Letters to the Press:
A Sampling of Public Opinion on
Desegregation," W.C.I .C. News Sheet, March, 19 lib.
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One predictable response from Norfolk officials was
the immediate halt and quiet reassessment of the city's
dramatic school building program.

The postwar baby boom had

brought the state-wide need for classroom space to crisis
proportions, and Governor John Battle had arranged to set
aside $75,000,000 in state funds for school construction
during his four year (1951-1955) term.

The localities had

previously been held responsible for all such construction
— a fact that put Virginia's school system at the bottom of
any listing of quality or funding effort:

in 1950 Virginia

had the lowest percentage of high school attendance in the
nation, next to the highest percentage of high school drop
outs before graduation, and next to the smallest percentage
of school age children in school— and the state had never
before done much to help its localities meet their pressing
needs.4

Norfolk, in the waning days of the People's

administration and City Manager C. A. Harrell's tenure in
office, jumped at this chance to receive its share of state
funding and embarked upon an aggressive $13,000,000 school
construction program that included new buildings and
improvements to both the Black and white school systems
alike.5

This program included the first new school build

ings for Blacks in the city, the others having been hand-medowns from the white community as population shifts and

4Dabney, op c i t ., pp. 522, 524.
sNorfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 28 January 1955.
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needs dictated.®

Four new schools,

(Bowling Park, Young

Park, Diggs Park, and Lindenwood) three of them built in
part with federal funds as a consequence of the city's
redevelopment efforts, had been added to the Black system
prior to the Brown decision,7 and other funds were spent on
additions or improvements to existing schools®.
The Norfolk School Board went to great lengths to
spell out its position as clearly as possible:
1. We intend, without mental reservation, to
uphold and abide by the laws of the land.
2. We believe in the Public School system, and
pledge our efforts to its continuation in this
City.
3. We believe that our primary duty is to
preserve and promote the welfare of all the
children involved, through education, and that
any system by us administered must be devised to
achieve this end, within the framework of the
law.
4. Unstudied action, or mere lip service to a
principle could jeopardize the aims of all, and
might well lead to disintegration, rather than
integration of any form.
5. We do not believe that local conditions
permit the customs, habits, or prejudices of
over a century to be abolished overnight by
fiat, but rather can be met or reconciled only
by prayerful deliberation, by reasoned planning,
and by the will and desire to succeed.

®Norfoik Journal and G u ide, 19 April 1958.
7W.P. Sullivan (Director of Buildings and Grounds),
"Cost Data, Outline Specifications and Facilities in the New
Schools Constructed in Norfolk, Virginia, Since 1951," a
report to the Norfolk School Board, 15 February 1956,
Norfolk Public Schools files.
aNorfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 28 January 1955.
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6. We do not think it is legally within our
powers to immediately effect these changes, but
rather we contemplate that the State Department
of Education, under whose rules and regulations
we now operate by law, must first make these
changes possible, as and when prescribed by the
Legislature of Virginia.
We assume and rely on
the fact that this will be done within the time
and in the manner required.9
In spite of their careful appeal to the political
realities of the day— "it is [not] legally within our powers
to immediately effect these changes"— and obeisance to the
State Department of Education and the state Legislature,
both controlled by the Byrd Organization, the fact that
their statement also carried the code words of compliance—
"abide by the laws of the land,"— and indicated their inten
tion to preserve public education "within the framework of
the law," gave further reason for the state's political
leaders to question whether Norfolk's School Board intended
to abide by whatever plan of opposition they eventually
dictated.

Norfolk's hope that "reasoned planning" would

eventually get them out of the dilemma offered no solace to
the rest of the state, but at least indicated a course of
action for local political leaders.
Behind the scenes the School Board worked to insure
that, through "reasoned planning,"10 it could back up its
assertion that integration could be minimized with careful
attention to the geographic location of its schools.
9Formal School Board Minutes, 1 July 1955, Norfolk
Public Schools files.
10Ibid.
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Although new school construction had been halted following
the Brown decision,11 rapid expansion of the whole Tide
water area, the advent of the postwar "baby boom" genera
tion, and the pending annexations meant that new schools
were needed almost immediately.

The first order of the

Board was to get its building plan back on track as quickly
as possible.
At the time of the Brown decision, the school system
had several projects under consideration which were
jeopardized by the changing political landscape.

In

addition to Oceanair Elementary, which was already in the
planning stages, three other sites were under active con
sideration for new schools:

a tract South of Indian River

Road at the Virginian Railroad tracks was proposed for
"Southside Junior High School" for Blacks; a large parcel of
land on Maltby, Shoop, and Withers Avenues in the Ballentine
area was supported as a replacement for the aging Lafayette
School; and a site just west of the existing facility was
proposed for rebuilding the equally dilapidated Titustown
Elementary school for Blacks (see Figure 1, page 148).12
All three projects faced new scrutiny, apparently as a
result of the Brown v. Board decision, and the Board's
intention to continue building facilities for Blacks seemed
to dissolve:

"Southside" (i.e., Campostella) Junior High

^ Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 13 October 1954.
12Letter from J. J. Brewbaker, Superintendent of Schools,
to H. H. George, Norfolk City Manager, 11 November 1954,
Norfolk Public Schools files.
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Black Housing Areas
Mixed Race/Transition Housing

Figure 1.
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School Sices Under Consideration in 1954

Titustown Elementary Annex
Southside (Campostella) Junior
Maltby Avenue Sice
Ingleside Junior High Site
Atterbury Road Site

4
5
6
7
8

Cottage Toll Road Sice
Military Highway Site
Norview Junior High
Lansdale Junior High Site
Lakewood Junior High Site
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was not built until almost a decade later; the Maltby Avenue
tract was sold to a private developer; and, although an
addition was built on a portion of the third site, Titustown
Elementary was never rebuilt as originally intended.
In addition to these projects, Superintendent
Brewbaker indicated that the City Planning Commission had
assisted in selecting five other sites in the Tanners Creek
district scheduled for annexation, where there was an
"urgent need" for two new junior high schools and three
700-pupil elementary schools.

The School Board proposed

building one of the junior high schools on additional land
around Ingleside Elementary, and a 33-acre tract in the
Sherwood Forest area (bounded by Atterbury, Birch, and East
Sewells Point Road) was being considered for both an
elementary and a junior high school; the other tracts under
consideration included a 20-acre site on Cottage Toll Road
(later Tidewater Drive) and Norman Avenue extended, a
12-acre tract one half block west of Military Highway, and
an eight acre site north of Norview High School.13

In

spite of the urgent need for new facilities, only one of
these sites was found acceptable.

Ingleside Junior High

School was never built, the site was too close to Broad
Creek Shores and other Black housing developments (see
Figure One, previous page).

Although the Board did decide

to build Sherwood Forest Elementary on a portion of the
tract on Atterbury and Sewells Point Road, the land was also
13Ibid.
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apparently too close to Black housing to win approval for a
junior high in the era of school desegregation; the Cottage
Toll Road tract, site of a city nursery, was found to be
unsuitable for development (three decades later it became
Northside Park); the Military Highway tract was rejected
when it was found to be in the path proposed for Interstate
64; and the smallest site of all, the eight-acre tract north
of Norview High School was used to satisfy the critical need
of the district for a junior high school (Norview).
Because of the urgent need for new school buildings,
there followed a furious period of planning by the School
Board.

School Board files indicate that a number of plans

were considered by the school administration over the next
few months, but the School Board only advanced those that
could clear all of the possible political objections.

Gone

was any focus on rebuilding aging Black facilities; gone
also were any sites that might prove to be too close to
nearby Black communities, and thereby pose a threat to
continued school segregation.

When construction plans for

1955 were finally announced, School Superintendent J. J.
Brewbaker assured the city manager that:
. . . desegregation will have no effect on this
building program.
With the exception of the
addition to Oakwood [Elementary School], all
other construction is for and needed for white
children.14

X4Letter from School Superintendent J. J. Brewbaker to
Norfolk City Manager Sherwood Reeder, 8 August 1955, Norfolk
Public Schools files.
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Even so, finding a suitable site for a badly needed
junior high schools in the Tanner's Creek District proved to
be a difficult task.

In addition to the Ingleside and

Sherwood Forest tracts, plans to locate the school at
Lansdale and Lakewood were also submitted to the Council for
approval.15

The Board even went so far as to have archi

tects draft plans for a Lakewood16 and a Lansdale Junior
High.

In end, however, after much behind-the-scenes

maneuvering, the Council scratched the Lansdale and Lakewood
sites from an extended list of proposed projects, and con
verted Willard Elementary into a junior high instead.17
Even though a consultant had indicated that Norfolk's
school population would increase by more than 4,000 students
per year for the next few years18— the equivalent of five
new schools a y e a r — Norfolk elected to move slowly and
deliberately, even if this meant badly overcrowding some
existing facilities and adding a double shift at others.19
Instead of launching an aggressive new building program as
originally envisioned, the Board opted to adopt a safer

15"Summary of Long Range Building Program: School
Construction Needs, 14 September 1956, Norfolk Public
Schools files.
16Pentecost & Courtney (Architects), "Lakewood Junior
High School," undated (1957), Norfolk Public School Files.
17"School Construction and Site Acquisition Program,"
25 March 1958, Norfolk Public Schools Files.
18Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 17 September 1955.
19Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 February

1956.
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course, and instead add new wings to its most overcrowded,
but existing, facilities.20
One of the schools marked for immediate construction
was a combination elementary-junior high for Black pupils in
the Oakwood-Rosemont section, where a large number of the
N.A.A.C.P. plaintiffs lived.

In a letter to City Manager

Thomas Maxwell, School Superintendent J. J. Brewbaker hinted
at the need for the combination school:
Negro junior high pupils attend Jacox, which
is approximately seven miles from the section in
which they live.
The nearest junior high is
Norview.21
Virginian-Pilot reporter Luther J. Carter went even further
when he surveyed the proposed building program with an eye
cocked towards the desegregation suit:
One obvious effect of a combination school
would be to accommodate some Negro junior high
pupils who might otherwise want to attend
Norview Junior High School, a white school and
by far the closest junior high to the OakwoodRosemont area.22
The School Board also pressed its case to build
"Southside"

(i.e., Campostella) Junior High School in the

Berkley section of the city to accommodate the growing Black

2°Henry S. Rorer, History of Norfolk Public Schools,
op cit., p. 346.
21Letter
from
J.
J.
Brewbaker,
Norfolk
School
Superintendent to Thomas F. Maxwell, Norfolk City Manager,
13 February 1957, Norfolk Public Schools files.
22Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 October 1956.
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population in that portion of the city.23

Again reporter

Luther Carter noted the changing racial composition of the
city as a motive for the proposed facility:

"School

officials have noted a pronounced tendency for whites to
leave Berkley, and for Negroes to move in."24
In fact Norfolk had made tremendous advances under the
Battle funds and C. A. Harrell's $13 million building pro
gram.

By 1953 the Norfolk School Board could say for the

first time that the cost of educating a white pupil and a
Black in the city's schools was equal,25 before Harrell's
reign the city's effort was determined by a complicated
formula that was weighted heavily upon the percentage of
total revenues received from Black and white taxpayers.

By

1950, however, the city was actually paying, on the average,
more to its Black teachers than to its white,26 having
raised salary of Blacks some 62% since the Organization's
wartime Council dominated school spending.2-7

In fact

Norfolk was cited by Senator Sam J. Ervin, J r . , of North
Carolina, for its efforts to improve its Black educational
system.

In an article he wrote for Look magazine defending

23Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 January 1957.
24Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 October 1956.
25Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 21 August 1953.
26This is due to the fact that 89% of the Black teachers
held a bachelors degree, while only 75.7% of the white
teachers held similar certification; Black teachers also
tended to stay longer, and thus were paid higher on the scale
because of this longevity.
^ Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 13 December 1951.
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continued school segregation in the South, a picture of
Norfolk's newly constructed Young Park School (built in part
with federal redevelopment funds) bore the caption:
New Negro schools, like this one in Norfolk,
Va., attest [to] efforts of [the] South to meet
[integration] problems in its own way.2®
At any rate, the impact of the Supreme Court's de
segregation decision and the over-reaction of statewide
political leaders forced a temporary halting and reassess
ment of school construction plans,29 in spite of the fact
that the Norfolk school population was growing by 3,000
students each year.30
The Ledger-Dispatch summed up the attitude of the
leaders in charge of the local school construction effort:
In recent years Southern states have been
making great financial outlays to put Negro
schools on a par with those for white students
. . . however, once the court's rejection of
separate but equal theory became known, there
was no longer any great pressure on local
officials . . . to continue the special and
costly attention to [the] Negro school building
programs.31
In spite of the official "go slow" attitude of the
Norfolk City Council, the School Board began to take its

2SSam J. Ervin, Jr., "The Case for Segregation," L o o k ,
April 3, 1956 (vol. XX, 7), pp. 32 and 33.
29Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 13 October 1954.
3°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 16 January 1955.
31Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 13 October 1954.
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first few cautious steps toward compliance with the spirit
of the Supreme Court decision and toward strengthening a
base of public support for moderation in dealing with the
crisis.

First, the School Board advanced a proposal to

create a bi-racial study group to recommend possible courses
of action.

The move was immediately endorsed by the Educa

tion Association and the Council of P-T.A.'s,32 but
opposed by the local branch of the N.A.A.C.P.

One Black

leader broke the deadlock with his endorsement of the con
cept, "There is no harm in studying and bringing integration
about in an orderly manner."

Next the School Board voted

down the state's proposed 30-days notice clause of teacher
contract terminations, a step recommended as a preliminary
to prepare for the eventual school closings in the event of
court-ordered integration.33

Gradually the School Board's

commitment to keeping schools open and complying with the
spirit of the Supreme Court decision began to win it both
accolades from the international press and a few denuncia
tions from Southern writers.

Typical of the positive

reaction was this statement from the Roanoke World N e w s ;
[The Norfolk School Board has supplied]
the first official word of calm in Virginia's
heated integration debate.
In so doing it
has broken the solid front of opposition to
the Supreme Court's decision and decree.34

32Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 June 1955.
33Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 18 June 1955.
34Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 11 July 1955.
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Norfolk School Board Chairman W. Farley Powers appeared
somewhat embarrassed by the sudden notoriety and stated:
I do not want to get into any controversy
[with the rest of the state].
We might make
some preliminary moves [to keep-schools open],
but we must abide by state law.35
School Superintendent Brewbaker was equally aware that
Norfolk's progressive attitude marked it in some sections of
the state as a "hotbed" of liberalism because:
We have been conscious that a change [from
segregation] is inevitable.
We have not been
trying to think up ways to circumvent the
ruling.36
Indeed the rest of the state appeared to occupy their
time by thinking up legal angles to circumvent the even
tuality of the Supreme Court's ruling.

Richmond News Leader

editor James J. Kilpatrick happened upon the century-old
doctrine of "interposition", whereby the state was supposed
ly able to "interpose" its own authority between that of the
federal government and its local political subdivisions, and
the interposition craze was begun.

The state's official

reaction was the Gray Plan— named for State Senator Garland
Gray of Sussex County who chaired the parent legislative
committee— that provided numerous ways for the state to
"interpose" its authority and so block integration.

The

plan called for a state pupil placement board that would
35Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 June 1955.
3sNorfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 11 July 1955.
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take over the pupil assignment duties of the local school
boards; the scheme, ostensibly not based upon racial
considerations, allowed the state to assign students to a
given school on the basis of individual health, aptitude,
availability of transportation, and "the welfare of the
particular child as well as the welfare and best interests
of all other pupils attending a particular school."

The

Gray Plan also called for special tuition grants of public
funds to the parents of school children who attended private
schools, parochial establishments, or public schools in
another jurisdiction, as well as an amendment to the
compulsory attendance laws whereby no child would be forced
to attend a desegregated school.

Few politicians and only

the Virginian-Pilot of all the state's newspapers opposed
the Gray Plan.

Provisions within the plan that would have

allowed local subdivisions to desegregate on a local option
basis if the federal courts persisted were scrapped by the
Legislature when Senator Harry F. Byrd, S r . , the scion of
the Organization, pointed out the need for all local
governments to stand together in "massive resistance" to the
dictates of the Supreme Court.

In response, the Legislature

passed the Stanley Plan, which required the Governor to
close any school under court order to integrate and cut off
all state funds from any school district which tried to
reopen in spite of the Governor's interposition.37

3’7Dabney, pp. 532-539.
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While the rest of the state was reeling under the
bombast prompted by the Gray Plan, the Stanley Plan,
Senator Byrd's Massive Resistance, and Kilpatrick's Doctrine
of Interposition, the citizens of Norfolk had another plan
with which to contend:

the Summers Plan.

Under Duckworth's

rule, Councilman Ezra T. Summers was the closest thing
Norfolk had to a maverick politician or independent voice on
the Council.3®

In July of 1955, Summers introduced a sur

prise proposal whereby the city could achieve court-ordered
integration if it ever came under a court order:

the first

step would be to have every parent in the school system,
both Black and white, fill out an intention card listing the
names and ages of their school-age children and whether or
not they wanted them to attend an integrated or segregated
school.

The School Board would then compile this informa

tion and determine how many schools it would have to operate
on an all-white, all-Black, or integrated basis, and then
assign each pupil to the school of his parent's choosing.
Obviously the unwritten key to the Summers Plan was the hope
that under such a framework, few parents, especially white
o n e s , would choose to send their children to integrated
schools; those that did would be duly punished by isolating
all the "trouble-makers" in just a few schools that drew not
from any discernible neighborhood, but rather from a citywide constituency.

Of course unofficial pressures and

economic sanctions could be applied to any white parent who
3SNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 March 1956.
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unwisely chose to send his children to an integrated school;
if no white parents chose integrated schools, then no
schools would be integrated.

Local politicians, including

Duckworth's city manager, who should have known better,
jumped on Summers' bandwagon by extolling the plan as "in
keeping with the Supreme C o u r t 's decision" because it did
assign every child to the school of his or her choice.39
Obviously the Summers Plan added little positive
thought to the discussion of the day, but it does indicate
the political mood of obfuscation and deceit that ruled.
There were people in Norfolk who understood the Supreme
Court decision and its ramifications, but by and large they
refused to believe that Norfolk schools would have to be
integrated or that public schools would have to be closed.
They placed too much faith in the hands of local and state
politicians who could promise them a plan, any plan, no
matter how ill-conceived and contrived, to circumvent the
Supreme Court's ruling.40

The true leaders of public

opinion in Norfolk— the business and civic elite— had been
so quashed by their recent political defeat and expurgation
at the hands of the Organization that they sat idly by while
the forces of irrationality gripped their city.

The clear,

small voice of reason provided by the School Board was all
too often left howling in the wilderness as the public
rushed to seize each new political panacea.
39Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 27 July 1955.
40Jane Reif, Crisis in N o r f o l k , op c i t ., p. 2.
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Undaunted by the political bombast of the period, the
Norfolk School Board went quietly about its business, hoping
to keep a low profile and so avoid confrontation with the
Organization leaders that dominated the rest of the city
government.

Taking a page from the old People's book on how

to deal with impending problems, the Board went ahead with
its plans to appoint a bi-racial committee to recommend
action; then it commissioned an exhaustive study— the Stiles
Report as it came to be known— of the Board, its policy,
practices, and the future needs of the Norfolk school
population.

When local politicians pointed frantically to

the need to stand toe to toe in Massive Resistance with the
rest

of the state— asone local legislator did with this

rhetorical outburst concerning the Southside counties with
their heavy concentrations of Black population:
Their house is on fire. They want us to
send firetrucks to help them.
I think it is our
Christian duty to help put out the fire for them
[by opposing desegregation].41
— the School Board resisted their impassioned pleas with
great aplomb.

School Board member Paul Schweitzer pointed

to how greatly Norfolk's situation differed from that of the
Southside:
There are only thirty per cent Negroes in
the Norfolk School system . . . geographically
located so that they are well taken care of in
their present schools. If we adopt a gradual

41Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 September 1955.
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plan of integration, there would be so little
you wouldn't notice it.
School Superintendent Brewbaker echoed this theme:
There would be few Negroes in white schools
because of existing "residential segregation
. . . I think we are all in favor of segregation
. . . It is just a question of what is the best
plan . . . . I ' m not in favor of integration,
I'm in favor of carrying out the Supreme Court
decree with the least harm to pupils . . . and
to the schools.42
Other school officials pointed to the Navy, N.A.T.O., and
government service as liberalizing influences that had
exposed many Norfolk students to a variety of cultures
without undue harm.

One principal stated that about one-

third of his students had already attended integrated
schools elsewhere without problems.43 In fact, when
Norfolk Catholic High School was integrated by the Catholic
diocese following the Brown decision, the event passed
without comment from the press or protest from the
public.44
The School Board's air of official calm had bought a
year of grace from legal pressures to integrate; the Board
had hoped to use that year to prepare the public for calm
compliance with the desegregation dictates, but time and
events had conspired against it to block this intention.

42Ibid.
43Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 January 1956.
44Jane Reif, op c i t ., p. 2.
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Unlike its counterparts in other parts of the country, the
Black community in Norfolk had not rushed into court to
force immediate integration of the schools; instead they had
followed the more temporizing course of petitioning the
School Board to desegregate.45

The threat of court action

of course lay behind that petition, but it was an important
first step towards finding a peaceful solution to the
desegregation controversy.

Unfortunately the School Board

could not respond in kind:

too much had transpired in the

year since that initial petition had been filed.

Instead,

the new state laws and overt political hostilities conspired
to block any authority the Board might have had to volun
tarily comply.

The Coronado and Broad Creek controversies

had bred a climate of racial mistrust and resentment— a
feeling that cut off all previous channels of communication
that existed between the races.

Unfortunately, and without

choosing such a course, the Board was now locked into a
larger political confrontation in which neither side could
afford to accept defeat.

Similarly, any opportunity the

Board might have had to defuse the approaching crisis with
token gestures of appeasement was now gone.

The year of

grace had passed, and only the courts could now decide the
outcome.
In the mounting atmosphere of racial tension that now
prevailed, the local chapter of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People began to step up the fire
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 14 July 1955.
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power of its assault upon the city's racial institutions.
Accordingly, attorneys Victor Ashe and Hugo Madison formally
abandoned the petition process and filed their school
desegregation suit in Federal Court in May, 1956,46 almost
two years to the day after the landmark Supreme Court
ruling.

Their suit reflected the changing mood of the Black

community:

a majority of the petitioners were from the

still racially tense Oakwood and Coronado sections of the
Norview area; most of the rest were from the transitional
neighborhoods of Atlantic City and Broad Creek, where racial
boundary lines were not yet clearly drawn.47
In spite of this late start, litigation in Norfolk
quickly proceeded, and was soon two or three steps ahead of
that in the rest of the state.

Part of the reason for this

fast pace was Federal Judge Walter Hoffman's no-nonsense
approach to litigation in his court.

Even though he had

strong local credentials, Hoffman was rapidly earning a
reputation as a distinguished jurist who would not brook the
obfuscation and delaying tactics employed elsewhere.

For

their own part, the local N.A.A.C.P. attorneys pressed
vigorously on the case, obviously encouraged by the fact
that Hoffman had already struck down segregated barriers in
the city's parks43 and public transportation systems.49
46Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 May 1956.
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 14 July 1955.
48Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 August 1956.
49Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 April 1956.
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The School Board closely followed this judicial trend,
and so proceeded cautiously under the assumption that
Norfolk's schools would similarly soon be under court orders
to integrate.

The Board appeared in all its pronouncements

to be fully prepared to operate a desegregated school system
under such auspices.

The City's political leaders, however,

were cognizant of the fact that integrated classrooms, no
matter how slight their impact might be upon the functioning
of the local school system, were diametrically opposed to
the policies of the state government:
Norfolk is already looked upon with
suspicion by some sections of the state; if we
are forced by Federal Courts to be the first in
Virginia to integrate, it would be held against
us by the rest of the state for the next twenty
y e ars.50
Norfolk faced the very real possibility that the state
would act to close down its public schools indefinitely
rather than see them integrated, just as Virginia had done
when nearby Sea Shore State Park fell under a court order to
desegregate.51
Since there had as yet been no shred of sympathy for
Norfolk's predicament, the School Board sought a closed-door
audience with Mayor Duckworth, the City Council, and the
city's legislation delegation; its members hoped to develop
some plan of action that would protect the city from

s°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 May 1956.
slJane Reif, p. 1.
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political reprisals from the rest of the state.

Norfolk's

only real hope in this regard lay in taking the final
decision to desegregate out of the hands of the local School
Board and passing the onus back to the state for resolution;
thus, if the state government could be forced to take the
blame for ordering desegregation of Norfolk's schools, then
there would be no reason for imposing economic sanctions or
exacting legislative retribution against the city for
complying.

To Norfolk's political leaders the threat of

reprisals from the rest of the state was very real, and one
that they feared more than the authority of the federal
courts:

the confrontation at Little Rock had not yet taken

place, and no one knew just how forcefully the federal
government would move to back up its court orders to
integrate.

On the other hand, the city's desperate wartime

financial experience provided ample evidence of just how
devastating the consequences of reduced state funding could
be to the city's economy.
Simply put, Norfolk's plan was to ask the state to
"interpose" its own sovereignty between the federal courts
and the Norfolk School Board.

To Norfolk's leaders there

appeared to be a great deal of logic behind this suggestion:
We c a n 't put a window in a school without
the state telling us what size it must be, and
on a matter as far reaching as segregation, the
state should be willing to stand up to it.
This
is clearly a matter in which the state should
tell us what to do.52
S2Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 May 1956.
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Accordingly the meeting broke with the resolve that
the city would request a special session of the General
Assembly in order to assure timely enactment of the
necessary legislation.

Public pronouncements of Norfolk's

interposition plan were highly touted by members of the
State Legislature and City Council in attendance; almost
immediately the School Board beg.an to back away from the
inflammatory language emanating from the closed-door
session.

Members of the Board felt that interposition

really meant "imposition"— that the plan only gave the rest
of the state a chance to impose its more conservative,
provincial philosophies upon the errant liberalism of its
urbane sister city— and that shutting down the Norfolk
School system was a step the rest of Virginia might be
willing to take, especially if Norfolk alone were to bear
the consequences.
resist at all cost:

This was a move the School Board meant to
they had been charged with the

responsibility of running the largest school system in
Virginia, and running the schools meant keeping them open
under any circumstances, even if the rest of the state
disapproved.

Members of the Board, therefore, attempted to

soften the impact of the city's interposition plan by
stating that Norfolk was merely seeking "the advice and
guidance" of the State Legislature.

They recognized that

under current state laws they were "unable to act alone"53
in the face of court-ordered desegregation, but a spokesman
53Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 14 May 1956.
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stressed that the Board "wants to conform to state policies,
but the continued operation of public schools here is of
utmost importance."54
The Board's reluctance to back Norfolk's interposition
plan publicly was the first sign of a coming confrontation
between the appointed members of the School Board and the
elected officials that made their appointments.

Unlike the

Council, the members of the Board were not responsible to
any particular partisan constituency, and not dependent upon
popular re-election for continuance; they were thus free to
choose the course they felt was best for the community
without all the posturing and puffery of the politicians.
Partly for this reason, researchers all across the South
were reporting that appointed school boards dealt far more
moderately with the desegregation crisis than did their
elected counterparts.55

In Norfolk the Council had a

particular reason to mistrust any evidence of independence
emanating from the Board:

in the past the Council had used

the Board as a convenient dumping ground for business
leaders from the People's ranks who still deserved special
recognition and appointment because of their high standing
in the community.

Up to then the School Board had been a

relatively powerless body— the decision to close schools or

S4Norfolk Virginian-Pilot. 13 May 1956.
5SSee Robert L. Crain, et al. , The Politics of School
Desegregation:
Comparative Case Studies of Community
Structure and Policy-Making (Chicago:
Aldine, 1968).
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keep them open in violation of state law had never before
been an issue— and Council's strict control of the budget
and spending served as a powerful check on even the most
errant body.

In the past there had been very little danger

in stacking the School Board with key business leaders
closer to the People's persuasion than the Organization's
own philosophy— membership on the Board carried the requi
site high community status of such an appointment without
any of the spoils potential of the city's Housing, Planning,
Zoning, or various Inspection Appeals boards— and the
Council felt that a display of strong business support for
public education was important for the city.

Finally, the

Council had sometimes employed the tactical strategy of
blaming the School Board for community ills when it came
time for reelection, and had thus always sought to avoid
placing any of the Organization's faithful in such a role.
It was this scapegoat role that most concerned Norfolk's
Council now: they feared that the public pronouncements of
the Board indicated a willingness, however reluctant, to
serve as a whipping boy for the whole state and accept
desegregation if it were so ordered by the courts.

Thus the

move to embrace the philosophy of interposition may be seen
as a timely ploy to subvert the authority of the local
boards and place control of the decision to resist desegre
gation back into the hands of more partisan operatives at
the state level.
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In spite of the School Board's apparent willingness to
accept court-ordered desegregation, it nevertheless pressed
vigorously its legal efforts to resist such an eventuality.
In private the Board may have been willing to defy the
state's authority, but in court it argued forcefully that
public school segregation was a valid exercise of the
state's police powers to protect its citizens, and was
therefore legal.

Similarly it indicated that the Board

itself was an agency of the state and thus subject to the
same privileges, protections, and immunity from suit as the
state.

Further the Board contended that the N.A.A.C.P. suit

was filed against the wrong party:

technically the Board

lacked the legal jurisdiction to establish and maintain a
school system on its own and merely served in an advisory
capacity to the City Council, against whom the suit should
have been brought.
little more weight:

The Board's final argument carried a
the court lacked jurisdiction in this

dispute, it contended, since only people duly qualified for
admission to the public schools and whose request for
transfer between schools had been denied could legitimately
prove harm.56

This was a telling point, since the Brown

cases had been brought on behalf of Black school children
who had applied to white schools and then been denied that
the "equal opportunity" to attend the school of their
choice; the Norfolk case, however, had been brought by
leading Black citizens who were petitioning the court to end
56Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 June 1956.
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a perceptible public wrong; none of the Norfolk petitioners
could show a personal harm.
The members of the School Board knew, however, that
they were merely buying time with their legal arguments, and
that in a few months the N.A.A.C.P. would return to court
with the right defendants duly enjoined and the proper mix
of plaintiffs able to prove injury by rejection of their
transfer applications.

The Board's legal maneuvering had

bought enough time to forestall school integration in
Norfolk for one more school year;57 they knew it would
take this long for the Board to receive, deliberate, and
then ultimately reject the petitions.

Their spirited

defense was enough to keep the state politicians off their
back for one more year; in the meantime they had begun to
develop a plan of their own which might take some of the
pressure off of the N.A.A.C.P. desegregation suit.

The

School Board approached the Council with a request for an
additional $15 million building program, much of it ear
marked for adding cafeterias, libraries, music centers, re
source areas, multi-purpose classrooms, and other facilities
to existing Black schools.5®

School Board member Benjamin

J. Willis was candid enough to comment on the sudden
upgrading of Black schools:

"The better their [i.e., the

Black] facilities, the less pressure their argument will

57Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 3 July 1956.
58Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 October 1956.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

171

have."59

One of the schools marked for immediate con

struction was

a combination elementary-junior high for

Black

pupils in the Oakwood-Rosemont section, where a large number
of the N.A.A.C.P. plaintiffs had been located.

Virginian-

Pilot reporter Luther Carter surveyed the proposed building
program with an eye cocked towards the desegregation suit:
The School Board has indicated that when all
appeals against the federal court order have
been exhausted, it will attempt to minimize its
effect by using a plan for gradual desegrega
tion.
[The Oakwood-Rosemont combination school]
would appear to be in line with this policy.
Superintendent Brewbaker also indicated that
eventually a combination junior and senior high
might be needed in the area [to further ease
desegregation pressures].50
As part of the overall plans for expansion, another junior
high school (Campostella) was being rushed to the drawing
boards to accommodate the growing Black population in the
Berkley section of the city.61
The Norfolk School Board's proposed building program
was not meant as another legal gimmick to head off school
desegregation; instead it indicated a thorough acceptance of
the reality that such a court order was imminent, and the
fact that the Board was merely trying to soften the impact
of shattered traditions.

Theirs was a moderate approach

and, as such, it put the Board in opposition to most of the

59Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 January 1957.
6°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 8 March 1957.
6a-Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 October 1956.
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state's senior political leaders who felt that the day of
integration could be forestalled forever.

There was some

hope as well that by giving the Black community their own,
top-quality schools, even in the remote areas far removed
from their existing, segregated schools, the School Board
would be relieving some of the pressures to integrate from
that quarter.

The certain appeal of such a sensible plan

was not, however, apparent to the local politicians.

City

Councilman Ezra T. Summers, ever the most vocal of an
otherwise close-mouthed Council, issued a strongly worded
statement supporting the state's Massive Resistance efforts
and advocating a "go-slow approach" in local school building
programs "until the integration disputes are settled."
Summers' insistence that the matter "should be studied more
carefully"62 dealt a death blow to the School Board's con
struction plans.

The rest of the Council was more diplo

matic in their rejection; instead they asked the Board to
revise its plan "to what we can afford" in light of the
precipitate rise in school bond interest rates now being
extended to Southern school systems threatened by
desegregation.

Then, as a final slap at the School Board,

the Council indicated that it was prepared to go ahead and
borrow money at those same inflated interest rates in order
to construct other capital improvements that might attract
additional state and federal funding.63

The School Board

62Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 May 1956.
63Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 19 December 1956.
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made their best case before the Council— they brought
surveys indicating that 97% of Norfolk's parents and 93% of
nonparents favored increasing school funding64— but it was
still rejected outright.

The inference was clear:

the

Council had higher priorities for spending than granting
money to Black schools just in case the court really ordered
desegregation.
There was nothing inherently wrong with the School
Board's plan:

it had been based upon the soundest and most

moderate judgement of the time; it relied upon professional
growth surveys indicating that the schools and improvements
would be needed anyway, even if the school system was
permitted to remain segregated.

What was wrong was that the

Board's plan had come too late; the city had just paid an
exorbitant price to annex a large section of Norfolk County,
and the Council could legitimately point to the fact that it
had a pressing financial need to extend full municipal
services to this area as soon as possible.65

This was

reason enough to block a costly school building program that
was, at best a stopgap effort to defuse the desegregation
crisis and, at worst, a reckless gamble to lure potential
Black plaintiffs away from the N.A.A.C.P. suit with the
promise of building and expanding their own segregated
neighborhood schools.

Norfolk had already made a precipi

tate effort in the last decade to bring its Black schools in
64Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 15 February 1957.
65Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 17 December 1956.
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line with their all-white counterparts and so offer equal,
although segregated, facilities for both races.

The city

could ill afford the Schools Board's building proposal, the
Council argued, especially if integration could be averted
through other, less costly means.
Politically as well the School Board's move came too
late:

the calm racial attitudes that prevailed in Norfolk

in the summer of 1956 had, by the winter, taken a nasty
turn, and the city's white residents were giving ample
evidence that they were no longer willing to buy off the
Black community with promises of separate but equal
facilities.

A shift in the desegregation stance of the

city's legislative delegation was the best bellwether of
this changing attitude.

In the summer, the bulk of the

delegation had stood behind the School Board's stance to
keep the schools open, even if desegregated.

The legis

lators went so far as to vow to fight the governor "in
opposition to any measure designed to deprive Norfolk's
schools of full financial support."66

A year later they

would back down from this moderate posture and declare that
they held only minor differences with the governor; they
disagreed on the tactics of how best to fight court-ordered
desegregation, but both the governor and the local legis
lators were in full accord that integration must be fought
with every legal means available.67

Within a year of that

66Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 July 1956.
^ Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 8 June 1957.
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statement they had gone full circle from opposition to
support of the Governor's efforts to close public schools
and cut off state funding as means to show Virginia's
Massive Resistance to integration.6s
One reason for this apparent shift in public opinion
was the growing impact of the N.A.A.C.P.

legal victories:

in the spring of 1956 Norfolk's public schools were but one
target in the scatter-shot legal approach of the local
N.A.A.C.P. as they rushed to achieve integration.

By the

fall, however, N.A.A.C.P. court action had forced all of the
area's parks, recreation centers, and public transportation
facilities to either desegregate or close indefinitely.

To

many, the public school system now stood as the last bastion
against a fully integrated society, and the N.A.A.C.P.'s
unrelenting legal pressures to crack this barrier as well
was causing increasing bitterness in the white community.

A

feeling was growing that Norfolk needed more time to adjust
to changes that had already taken place, and that continuing
the battle to desegregate the schools was only making racial
moderation more and more difficult.
It was inevitable in the growing climate of racial
antipathy that new groups would emerge to capitalize on this
force and direct it to serve their own needs.

Formerly the

Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties had
been a predominantly Southside effort by small businessmen
to combat desegregation in that area; now, however, the
68Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 10 March 1958.
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Defenders were gaining increasing acceptance in all parts of
the state.

The Defenders were not the hood-wearing, night

riders like their counterparts in the White Citizen's
Councils farther South; instead they had made every effort
to establish in Virginia a legitimate and gentlemanly
interest group, and one that clearly carried much weight
among the leadership of the Byrd Organization.69

Locally

the Defenders had rallied around the banner of the State's
Rights Party and were backing fellow Virginian T. Coleman
Andrews for President; they had established a political
headquarters to test public opinion, and, having found it
favorable, now planned to mount major challenges along
Massive Resistance lines to the city's legislative delega
tion.70

One other event at about the same time indicated

an escalation in both the rhetoric and expertise of race
politics.

Just as the city's business and civic elite were

kicking off their traditional fall Community Fund drive,
Norfolk was inundated with hate pamphlets aimed at one of
its beneficiary organizations.

After a hasty series of

meetings, the business community was forced to drop the
Urban League from the drive for its supposed support of
"race-mixing."

Although the local origin of the pamphlets

was unknown (the Defenders disavowed any responsibility),
the pamphlets were traced back to publication by a wing of

S9Virginius Dabney, pp. 531-533.
7 °Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 October 1956.
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the Christian Nationalist Party, renowned experts on
"rabble-rousing and sensational hate-mongering. "'7X

success of their organizational efforts, and the mounting
hostilities directed at the N.A.A.C.P. were giving rise to a
climate of political desperation.

All around racial

barriers were falling under the onslaught of litigation;
with them were crumbling institutions of long-standing
importance in the white community.

The hate groups were

preparing to fan the flames of racial unrest into a
dangerous political force.

The School Board had been re

buffed in its efforts to moderate the desegregation dispute
with an exorbitant building program aimed at lessening the
impact of desegregation.

The city's legislative delegation

had once stood firm in their opposition to closing Norfolk's
schools even if the courts ordered integration; now they
were backing away from that stance and instead were
preparing to vote for legislation that would turn over the
control of the city's schools to the very state politicians
most disposed to shut them down.

The liberalizing forces of

the People's group were no where to be seen; they had been
beaten back to their board rooms and counting houses, and
now only emerged to take part in lackluster deliberations on
relatively unimportant boards and advisory commissions.
Even the old warhorses of the Organization had accepted a
diminished role in governmental affairs; they had been
~71Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 October 1956.
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beaten back by the People's group, lost interest, and now
had resigned themselves to a backseat position as the price
of going along for the ride.

The entire city looked instead

to the one person who had emerged as the strong man in all
municipal deliberations.
Of all the major politicians in the city, only Mayor
Duckworth had been truly silent on the desegregation crisis.
At first the public assumed that the School Board and the
Organization's legislative delegation accurately represented
his thinking on the subject, but the vacillation of the
local legislators and the dispatch with which the School
Board's building proposal was dismissed gave rise to the
belief first that there was some middle ground between the
two, and finally lead to wide speculation that Duckworth,
too, had plans to save the city from integration.
By this time Duckworth was firmly in control of the
city and able to direct its growth towards attainment of his
own ends, and, since he had spent so much time erecting the
edifices designed by C. A. Harrell and the People's adminis
tration, he was impatient to get. on with the task.

Like

Harrell, Duckworth had a vision of a New Norfolk, but unlike
Harrell and unlike the Silkstocking crowd, Duckworth had
shown little commitment to the city's past and little
compassion for its people.

He saw himself as a manager,

both of the city's politics and its physical plant.

His

attachment was thus to Norfolk's structures, its adminis
tration, its political Organization, and its efficiency— the
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bricks and mortar of city growth.

It was a subtle distinc

tion, but one that would not be lost in the years ahead.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE BULLDOZER ERA
As the city's chief politician and highest elected
official, Mayor W. Fred Duckworth remarkably had not yet
spoken out on the subject of school integration.

Most

people supposed that, because of his political affiliation
with the Organization, his personal sentiments rested with
those who preached resistance at all cost, yet he had
endorsed none of the myriad scenarios of resistance that had
already been proposed by Governor Stanley, Senator Byrd, the
Defenders, the Gray Commission, Councilman Summers, James J.
Kilpatrick, and others.

He had never been directly caught

up in the rhetoric of interposition, and had been remarkably
tolerant of others who spoke up in an attempt to relate the
city's official position.

In an administration prized for

its closed-mouth unanimity, it was remarkable to witness the
School Board left free to pursue its own moderate course
while Councilmen like Ezra Summers veered off in more
extreme tacks.

Most observers conceded that Duckworth was

at least opposed to undertaking the expense of the School
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Board's building and modernization program, but even in this
regard there were those who felt that his resistance to the
concept was only temporary, and that the Mayor was only
withholding his approval as a bargaining chip in some
grander design:

as yet the city lacked the clout to force

the Black community to accept such a proposal as a token
victory short of desegregation.
By the winter of 1956 the Mayor had already built his
reputation as a consummate politician and a powerful force
in any endeavor touching municipal government.

In a matter

as far reaching as school integration, the Mayor oddly
as yet advanced no opinion.

had

Although no one knew what

course of action Duckworth proposed to follow if the city's
schools were really faced with the threat of court-ordered
integration, most citizens assumed that he would act as
dramatically as he had already done in almost every other
field of municipal action.

In fact, the Mayor had effected

such an overwhelming personal presence in every sphere of
government that the citizens, once so actively involved
during the days

of the People's rul e , had by now been lulled

into a state of

civic withdrawal.

The machinery of

municipal government appeared to roll on so smoothly with
Duckworth in control that the watchful eye of the public had
long ago deserted its overseeing position.
Duckworth had apparently achieved the promise of his
1950 Harmony Slate:

he had united professional expertise,
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business acumen, and political savvy into a single, concen
trated focus of power that carefully balanced the concerns
of both the business community and the Prieur Organization.
His new political force, and this was by all rights a
personal victory, was obeisant to neither the Silkstocking
Crowd nor the Organization, although it took its cues from
both camps.

Duckworth had found in action and accomplish

ment the common ground that united these two once opposing
forces.

The only real challenges to Duckworth’s administra

tion had come from the Black community:

P. B. Y o u n g ’s

councilmanic candidacy, the setback at Broad Creek Shores,
the bombings in Coronado, the racial unrest in Brambleton,
and the court challenges of the N.A.A.C.P.

The Mayor,

however, had gained the near-unanimous backing of the city's
banking, business, civic, and political leaders, and in the
six years since he had come to power under the Harmony
coalition, not a single effective voice had been raised in
opposition to his authority; he and his councilmanic running
mates swept to election victory year after year against only
token, gadfly resistance from the white community.1

One

measure of the depth of Mayor Duckworth's support may be
read in Norfolk's West Side voting precincts, the tradition
al stronghold of the city's Silkstocking establishment,

^-Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 14 April 1958.
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where now the Mayor and his slate were running up electoral
majorities that ran as high as ten-to-one.2
A number of reasons existed to explain the M a y o r 's
enormous personal success.

Foremost among them was the fact

that both time and events had been good to Norfolk, and as a
result the city was enjoying a period of unparalleled growth
and prosperity.

The city's financial success, and the

unquestioned sense of security that such engenders in the
general populace, had helped to b

about what one

observer termed the "Era of Good Feeling" in Norfolk's
history.3

The citizens were now proud of all that had been

accomplished in the decade since the war, and the public
controversy and conflict that had characterized the planning
stages under the People's government were now forgotten as
the reality of new highways, tunnel connections, annexa
tions, redevelopment, and related municipal facilities began
contributing to the city's enormous growth and prosperity.
Just as the careful, cautious, consensual approach of
the People's group had been perfect for the planning
process, Mayor Duckworth's forceful dominance of city policy
was ideally suited to the current building stage.

City

government functioned smoothly, almost too smoothly, under
the Mayor's firm leadership, and clearly he maintained
control over every phase of municipal operation.

No longer

2Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 June 1958.
3Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 July 1961.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

184

were Council meetings the long, drawn-out affairs that
characterized the People's sessions; instead Duckworth's
Council met in his office with a select assemblage of
advisors for a dress rehearsal.

At these private "pre

sessions" those in attendance hashed out the controversies,
arranged the compromises, and made all of the city's real
decisions.

Then, after all potential differences had been

ironed out, the Council would emerge for its public session,
a performance that ran, not surprisingly, as smoothly as if
every member had a script:

rarely was there a dissenting

vote, unnecessary discussion, or less that unanimous
approval of even the most far-reaching policy decisions.4
In council-manager cities such as Norfolk the mayor is
granted very few official powers beyond those of the other
members of the council; Duckworth, however, had added a
considerable repertoire of unofficial executive and legisla
tive powers to the traditional ribbon-cutting capacities of
a weak mayor.

Although lacking in official veto, budgetary,

or appointment powers, Mayor Duckworth had parlayed his
position as presiding officer into unquestioned authority
over the rest of the Council.

Council's private

"pre-sessions" had helped to strengthen his unofficial grip
on city policy, just as the smooth and polished public
performance of the Council had helped to heighten the sense

4Pretlow Darden; Robert L. Mason; and Harold Sugg, former
reporter for the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, interview by author,
Tape recording, Roanoke, 17 August 1979.
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that he alone was firmly in control.

This same sense of

domination carried over as well into other phases of
municipal government.

No longer were the city's appointed

boards and commissions functioning as the cutting edge of
public participation in municipal decision-making; Duckworth
had a strange habit of dropping in on the public session of
such boards, "suggesting" a desired course of action, and
then hanging around until he was satisfied that his
instructions had been enacted.s
In a city that traditionally experienced a rapid turn
over of both its top elective and appointive officials, the
Mayor quickly emerged as one of the few stable personalities
in the administration of municipal affairs.

By 1956 almost

all of the city's department heads, appointed board members,
and legislative delegation had been replaced since the
People's reign, and only Duckworth and Vice-Mayor George
Abbott had served more than four years on the Council.6
Ironically, both the People's government and the Organiza
tion's administrations that had preceded them had shied away
from placing even the informal powers of the city's weak
mayor position into the hands of a single individual such as
Duckworth for too long a period of time: the office had
shifted from Richard Cooke to Pretlow Darden at midpoint in
the People's tenure in order to better promote the

5Pretlow Darden.
6Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 September 1956.
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appearance of popular democracy that they craved.-7

The

Organization had followed a similar practice, but political
considerations figured foremost in their decision to
frequently rotate the seat:

experience had proven that the

increased exposure that came with the office made the
incumbent mayor the most vulnerable candidate when facing
re-election.

Duckworth, however, apparently experienced no

such qualms about either elective vulnerability or charges
of authoritarianism.

By 1956 he had held the office of

Mayor longer than any other person since the city manager
form of government had been instituted in 1918,® and he
gave no indication that he would be the least bit willing to
surrender his authority at any time in the near future.
Duckworth held far more than just the policy-making
functions of municipal government within his grasp; in a
very real sense he managed the day-to-day activities of city
hall as well.

Already operating under his fifth9 city

manager since he had taken office six years earlier,10 the

7Pretlow Darden.
BNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 September 1956.
9People's Manager C. A. Harrell resigned under pressure
eighteen months after Duckworth's election; Public Safety
Director Henry George served as Acting City Manager for eight
months before receiving official appointment to the post in
September, 1952; Sherwood Reeder died in office six months
after succeeding George on July 18, 1955; S. C. Morrisette
filled in for the interim until Thomas F. Maxwell was
appointed on February 15, 1956.
10Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 9 February 1956.
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city's department heads had learned to function smoothly
under the constancy of his leadership, channeling their
information directly to the Mayor's office in a route that
circumvented the authority of the city manager and the rest
of the Council.

In this skewed hierarchy the manager served

as little more than the M a y o r 's chief municipal adviser, a
rule which both irritated and exasperated the incumbents.
In these circumstances Norfolk was lucky to attract Thomas
F. Maxwell to the post.

Maxwell, although a man of many

talents that would ordinarily have recommended him for
higher status, suffered one debilitation that would forever
limit his rise beyond Norfolk's debased position: Maxwell
was a binge alcoholic who could only survive at the top in a
closed and protective society like Norfolk's where the
periodic abandonment of his position made very little real
difference to the administration of city government.
Maxwell, however, had a wizardry with budgetary policy,
fiscal planning, money management, and federal grantsmanship
that made him both an invaluable addition to the Ma y o r 's
staff at this time and an important municipal asset as the
city passed through its building phase of postwar
growth.1:L
Thus, in spite of the lack of official authority
traditionally associated with his position, Mayor W. Fred

^ R o b e r t L. Mason; Harold Sugg; and L. Cameron Gregory,
former reporter for the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, interview by
author, Tape recording, Norfolk, 20 July 1979.
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Duckworth functioned as a strong mayor in an otherwise
nonpartisan, professional, council-manager form of govern
ment; if all this power concentrated in one public official
and a handful of advisers disturbed the citizens of Norfolk,
Virginia, they gave little indication of such unrest.
Occasionally a newspaper editor would level a mild rebuke at
the Mayor:
The Administration in which Mayor W. Fred
Duckworth has been the leading figure, has shown
both good and bad points in its career.
Its
early weaknesses were a tendency to settle many
questions at the euphemistically named
"informal sessions" and a tendency to take
sometimes too lightly the recommendations of
qualified administrators and especially
appointed commissions and agencies.12
Most citizens, however, apparently regarded such
indelicacies as the natural consequence of having a
strong-willed and effective leader at the helm.

The Mayor's

very personal style of leadership and his extremely
hierarchical chain of command served in marked contrast to
the spirited popular participation that characterized the
Peopl e 's regime.

A surfeit of popular advice and consent

had appeared to bog down the People's government in the
planning process; Duckworth's "bulldozer drive and
directness"13— the words themselves would prove prophetic
— however, seemed quickly to cut through the preliminaries,

12Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 March 1956.
13Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 July 1961.
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and get on with the work at hand.

As long as the Mayor

continued to comprehend the full scope of municipal affairs
and carefully weigh the true consequences of his actions,
the people seemed to mind little if a few of the niceties of
democratic decision-making were bulldozed in the process.
Indeed, the major accomplishment of the Duckworth adminis
tration to date was "its ability to undertake large pro
grams" and bring them swiftly to their conclusion,14 and,
as long as the Mayor continued to focus the broad powers of
municipal government towards obtainable objectives, the
citizens seemed to care little if he wielded those powers
somewhat dictatorially.
Two examples of the city's planning process under
Mayor Duckworth help to illustrate both the enormous control
of the Mayor and the shifting emphasis of developmental
priorities under his administration.

The primary emphasis

of city planning under the People's government had been the
modernization and revitalization of Norfolk's downtown
commercial center— the "New Norfolk" of which they boasted.
Considering the size of the city, Norfolk had never had much
of a real downtown, and even in the People's era merchants
of the area's fragile commercial strip were already feeling
the press of competition from more residential shopping
centers.

Originally Norfolk had been a city built around

its waterfront, but hard times had befallen its shipping-

^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 March 1956.
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support industries— the ship chandlers, sail makers,
blacksmiths, repair and machine shops, rope and rigging
merchants, tarpaulin manufacturers, and naval hardware
brokers— since the demise of sailing ships and intracoastal
shipping, and the downtown had shifted two blocks away from
the rotting wharves and crumbling warehouses that bespoke
the heyday of this seaport existence.

The once prosperous

and active waterfront area had fallen almost completely into
disuse, and the city's remaining commercial strip gave ample
evidence of its former residential origins:

the classic

lines of Georgian and Victorian houses rose above the
polished marble and glass facades of first-floor business
establishments; narrow streets and winding alleyways now
clogged with the through traffic they were never designed to
carry; church spires stood in lonely vigil over neighbor
hoods without residents.13
Because the downtown commercial center was already
struggling to overcome its competitive handicaps, further
expansion in the commercial sector was not felt to be
practical; instead the city's Silkstocking planners looked
to development of the downtown's non-commercial advantages
as the only hope for its crowded, misplaced businesses.

For

this reason they looked to expansion of the city's cultural
and waterfront potential as a way to keep customers in the

13Charles K. Agle, A Master Plan For The Central
Business And Financial District, (Norfolk: Planning
Commission, 1956), pp. 19-20.
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vicinity of downtown shops.16

The only problem lay in how

best to stimulate a cultural renaissance and waterfront
recovery program.

At the time, redevelopment laws forbade

the taking of commercial or industrial areas,17 even those
that were abandoned and delinquent in tax payments,16 and
so the planners were forced to seek the kind of appropriate
municipal expenditure that would best stimulate private
construction.

For this reason they turned their attention

toward two theme-oriented extensions to the downtown, both
of which combined a minimum of already necessary public
expenditure as an attraction to similar private develop
mental efforts.
The first proposal focused on a Cultural Center to be
located just to the northwest of the existing downtown
commercial strip.

The major cultural attractions to the

center already existed with the Norfolk (Chrysler) Museum at
one end and the city's Center Theater/Civic Auditorium com
plex at the other end of the designated area; in addition,
the Planning Commission had convinced the Library Board to
relocate the Norfolk Public Library to new facilities to be
built in the center.

The area already possessed an urbane

lsNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 28 May 1956.
17Housing and Home Finance Agency, Slum Clearance Under
The Housing Act of 1949: A Preliminary Statement To American
Cities (Washington, D . C . , 1949).
16Charles K. Agle, A Master Plan For The Central Business
And Financial District, op c i t ., pp. 19-20.
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and international feeling, enhanced by the classic lines of
the Georgian and Federal architecture of the neighboring
Ghent and Freemason Street areas.

The nearby Smith Creek

Marina and the Hague Yacht Basin, replete with its foot
paths, bridges, and waterfront park, was a popular haven
both for boaters who followed the Inland Waterway and others
looking for a respite from the fast pace of urban living.
The Commission hoped to build on this recreational quality
of the area by relocating the city's Confederate Monument,
Norfolk's obeisance to its Southern heritage, to a mini-park
to be constructed in the middle of the Cultural Center,
hoping that it would serve to attract lunch hour picnickers
and pedestrian traffic to the area.

A second benefit of the

mini-park would be that it would help to re-channel traffic
into the downtown area in a more acceptable pattern; at the
time, five of the city's main downtown commuter streets
— Olney Road, Llewellyn Avenue, Duke, Boush, and High (now
Virginia Beach Boulevard) Streets--met in the middle of the
proposed Cultural Center and wound their way tortuously into
the main downtown commercial district.19
The Planning Commission hoped to use this new Cultural
Center, replete with its library, museum, parks, theater,
marina, and modern traffic connectors, to attract other
similar cultural enterprises into this common area.

The

planners hoped that trade delegations and N.A.T.O emissaries

19Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 December 1951.
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would relocate to the area into a consulate's row, thereby
continuing the international flavor already imparted by the
Hague and nearby Ghent neighborhood.

The Commission was

already hard at work trying to encourage some of the city's
leading charities and civic organizations to seek adjacent
sites, and its members were confident that once the Cultural
Center began to take shape, that a major convention hotel
would buy a site in the area.

The Silkstocking businessmen

and the various boards and commissions associated with the
planning of the center were trying to use their contacts to
convince some of the city's major enterprises to relocate
their corporate headquarters in the vicinity.

The city was

even reserving a site adjacent to the museum and proposed
public library that could be used in the future for a
municipal aquarium or naval museum.20
Plans for the Cultural Center were ambitious, but they
seemed realistic enough considering the constraints of the
period;

the planners had every reason to believe that local

businesses, restaurants, sidewalk cafes, and specialty shops
would be attracted by the combination of public and private
construction, fleshing out a new vitality to an area just
outside of the narrow confines of the existing downtown
commercial strip.21

The public funds necessary to support

such an undertaking were not large, and those earmarked for

2°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 December 1951.
21Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 9 July 1952.
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library construction and street improvements were necessary
regardless of the success of the rest of the project.
Enthusiasm for the plan was especially strong during 1951
and 1952, while C. A. Harrell was still manager, and before
the People's movement had wholly subsided from its position
of advisory importance at City Hall.
At about this time the same planners were casting
about for a parallel proposal to improve the city's
deteriorating waterfront area; they knew that here, too, a
similar combination of public expenditures for parks and
promenades, plus the right kind of private investment, could
attract a contingent of outdoor cafes and specialty shops.
A number of proposals were being bandied about, including
designs for a seawall, amphitheater, small boat marina,
highrise luxury apartment buildings, new City Hall/Civic
Center complex, naval museum, private housing developments,
cordon bleu seafood restaurant, a seafood market, and a
bazaar.22

The most promising proposal for waterfront

development came from the Norfolk Port Authority, a creation
of the old People's Administration.

Members of the

Authority hoped to unite many of the aspects of earlier
proposals around a single, two-staged development that would
both attract new investment and encourage improvements to
existing properties.

Phase One of their project focused on

the construction of a huge concrete pier that would extend

22Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 14 August 1956.
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far enough out into the main shipping channel to accommodate
the loading and unloading of even the deepest draft vessels.
Space along the pier would be rented out to shipping and
freight forwarding concerns, and on the shore, as part of
Phase Two of the project, a large quay would be built to
facilitate drayage.

The quay would be broad enough to

accommodate specialty shops, travel agents, seafood vendors,
a produce market, small restaurants, and outdoor cafes.23
Plans for both these projects— the Cultural Center and
the harbor quay— advanced just as rapidly as they would have
under the People's Administration; the city's volunteer
boards and commissions proceeded in a vacuum just as if they
had the same grant of power and responsibilities as before.
The Port Authority began buying up property at the foot of
Commercial Place and West Main Street and aggressively began
to line up prospects interested in leasing space along the
pier; local merchants and out-of-town investors alike had
contacted the Authority to inquire about commercial oppor
tunities along the quay.24

The Planning Commission was

moving just as aggressively to line up prospects for its own
development at the other end of the downtown area:

the

Salvation Army, the Union Mission, I.B.M., and other leading
corporate and charitable enterprises had been successfully
recruited to locate in the Cultural Center.

Thus, by the

23Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 28 May 1956.
24Ibid.
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time Council was approached for approval, both projects were
well off the drawing boards and fast becoming a reality.
No official reason was ever given for the rejection of
either proposal; in fact, the Council seems never to have
docketed the items or given them public audience.

In spite

of widespread enthusiasm and the editorial endorsements of
the Virginian-Pilot and Ledger-Dispatch, both projects were
accorded a low profile, back-burner status that was unusual
for such full-blown and well-planned undertakings.

The only

official action that was ever taken on either project con
cerned the Library Board's request to
library to a new

relocate the

site in the Cultural Center:

main

for four

years the Council delayed consideration of the project, and
then finally announced in August of 1956 that the Cultural
Center was "a long-range undertaking [that] has been
accorded a lower

priority" than other city projects.25 It

was a heavy blow

to all those who had pinned their hopes on

an East Ghent commercial revival, and even though portions
of the project still survived independent of the others, the
idea for a Cultural Center in downtown Norfolk was dead.
The Port Authority, too, was forced to shelve its plans, and
settled later for less expensive arrangements far removed
from the downtown financial district.26

2SNorfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 22 August 1956.
2SIt was either a stroke of genius or just a lucky
accident that the plans for the downtown waterfront facility
were so precipitously scrapped at this time, for the freight
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Thus, by the winter of 1956, every major program of
renewal or revitalization left over from the People's
administration had either been fully activated or quietly
put aside; the powers that controlled city hall had shifted
dramatically in the decade since the rise of the Silkstocking

Ticket.

No longer were the city's volunteer

boards and commissions, or the business and civic elite they
represented, a power in the planning and decision-making
process; no longer were the more rancorous conventions of
popular democracy— public hearings, open council meetings,
and issue review committees— essential to the city's policy
making apparatus.

It had been years since the city manager

had functioned as Norfolk's chief executive; instead Mayor
Duckworth and a handful of advisors ran every phase of
municipal government, exerting the same sort of ironclad
grip on the city's political structure as well.
The appearance that the city ran so smoothly under the
Mayor's direction was no accident; Duckworth had made a
special point to eliminate any opportunity for factionalism
or opposition on the Council before such could emerge.

In

fact, except for Organization stalwart George Abbott, who
posed no threat to Duckworth's continued direction, no other
councilmen had stayed in office long enough to develop a

handling utility of the project would have been rendered
obsolete by the enormous space and specialized equipment
needs of modern containerization.
See Hammer, Green, Siler
Associates, Economic Potentials in Downtown Norfolk,
(Norfolk: Planning Commission, 1970), p. 11.
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personal following.

Councilmen and city managers came and

went at city hall so rapidly during this era that one could
easily see why Mayor Duckworth, even if he had not been a
forceful leader, would be quickly recognized by the citizens
as the only stable force in the city's administration.
Councilmen were chosen from the broad ranks of independent
but small-time businessmen— insurance agents, real estate
brokers, wholesalers, and shopkeepers— who were successful
overachievers in their profession, but who exhibited no
remarkable capacity for autonomous action; none came to city
hall with any special following, gleaned either through
prior municipal experience, volunteer service, or through
leadership in the business or civic community, and each owed
his advancement to office entirely to Mayor Duckworth and
those around him.
The circumstances behind an individual1s selection to
elective office at this time remain clouded, but obviously
the unofficial nominating process that took place was
shrouded in sufficient secrecy to preserve both the politi
cal viability of the chosen and the continued domination of
the selectors.

Perhaps because selection of his 1950

Harmony Ticket had been engineered by some considerable
behind-the-scenes maneuvering, Duckworth and those around
him apparently never really trusted the popular election
process to elevate men of good standing and high ability to
the Council.

Two old standbys of the Byrd Organization were
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employed in Norfolk to tightly control the nominating and
elective processes:

first, the official slate of Duckworth-

endorsed candidates was held in secrecy until announcement
at the last moment before the filing deadline, thereby
eliminating those Organization hopefuls who had been passed
over in the unofficial nominating process.

Secondly, those

who ran for elective office were not always those who
served:

Mayor Duckworth and those around him perfected the

Organization's "planned incumbency" scheme whereby a trusted
incumbent would stand for re-election and mysteriously
resign so that a carefully selected successor could fill the
slot without risking the perils of popular election; the
newcomer would then have the advantages of an incumbent's
experience and exposure when he stood for re-election in his
own right two years later.

Advancement by appointment had

become a time-honored tradition in Virginia— most of the
state's congressmen, senators and other top office-holders
had advanced at least once in this manner27— and it quick
ly became a hallmark as well of Norfolk City government:
thus in 1953, newcomer Roy B. Martin, Jr., was selected to
fill the seat vacated when Councilman James M. Williams
resigned; Lewis L. Layton similarly took over in 1956 when

27In one of Virginia's most famous examples of planned
incumbency, former U.S. Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., took over
in December, 1964, the Senate seat his father vacated after
having won re-election the month before.
Norfolk's Clerk of
the Courts William L. "Billy" Prieur very nearly took office
under similar circumstances when his predecessor announced
his resignation on Election Night.
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incumbent Robert F. Ripley stepped down shortly after
winning re-election;28 and Linwood F. Perkins was appoint
ed in early 1957 when Councilman Ezra Summers died in
office.29

Norfolk was so obviously by-passing the popular

election process that the editors of the Virginian-Pilot
targeted the Duckworth administration for their lack of
political decorum:
[The newcomer] is in no way responsible for
it, but the changeover had one disconcerting
aspect.
Quite obviously the Councilmen, and
some others, too, knew in advance that [the
incumbent] would resign.
But the intention was
not made public until a successor had been
agreed upon.
It is a sounder procedure to give
the voters a little advance notice before
selecting a successor to a man they elected to
office.
Settling the whole problem behind
closed doors is not good procedure even if
the result, in all other respects, is
satisfactory.30
Most observers conceded that Mayor Duckworth had the
final word in the unofficial nominating process that
selected candidates for municipal office in Norfolk.

This

was no mean achievement when one considers the enormous
control exerted by Billy Prieur and his Organization during
their heyday, but Prieur had apparently lost interest in
municipal affairs since the near demise of his Organization
during the tenure of the People's administration.

Instead,

2BNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 February 1956.
29Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 26 June 1957.
3°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 February 1956.
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like many other of his contemporaries in the statewide Byrd
Organization, he had resigned himself to a lesser role.
Local experts point to Prieur's acceptance of an increasing
ly moderate and independent-acting,

"Young Turk" legislative

delegation as a sign of his lessening involvement in the
candidate selection and election process.31

The Young

Turks were so named because they were mostly men in their
early thirties, who, although they were members of the Byrd
Organization, sometimes refused to back the old Byrd
hierarchy.

Most were war veterans or urban legislators like

Norfolk's own Walter Paige, Theodore Pilcher, Toy Savage,
and Jack Rixey, who had on several occasions bucked the
Organization establishment in order to support issues of
urban concern or racial moderation.

In one sense they well

represented Norfolk's own urbane constituency, and were thus
good choices for the city, but in another sense, the Billy
Prieur of the 1930s, one of Harry Byrd's chief lieutenants
and an Organization stalwart, would never have brooked such
independence.
All across the state the Organization was in decline
and, especially in its urban areas, was giving way to new
leadership groups such as the Young Turks or Duckworth's
businessmen's coalition.

Prieur, who had always preferred

the seclusion of the back room to the spotlight of public

3R o b e r t L. Mason, Harold Sugg, L. Cameron Gregory, and
others.
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recognition, was now apparently content to accept a partner
ship role with Duckworth that placed the Mayor in the lime
light.

No one is really sure who held the upper hand, if

indeed either party dominated the arrangement, for both men
had powerful egos, and neither would have allowed himself to
play a secondary role.

It seems more probable that

Duckworth and Prieur, both conservatives, were in basic
agreement on most major matters, and that each held his own
unchallengeable dominion.

Prieur, who had by now made peace

with Congressman Porter Hardy, controlled State and Federal
patronage; Duckworth, on the other hand, controlled munici
pal policy without interference from the Organization.32
The Organization in Norfolk seems to have evolved away from
the potential for corruption that existed during the boom
period of the war years, and, once battered by the municipal
housecleaning during the People's administration, now seemed
content to concentrate on the less important "favors" of
city government that kept its machinery alive:

controlling

patronage appointments, government contracts, permit
variances, ordinance enforcement, and overseeing promotions,
especially in the more political agencies, like the Police
and Fire Departments.33

With a strongman like Duckworth

32Claude J. Staylor; Harold Sugg; Robert Mason;
and L. Cameron Gregory.
33Claude J. Staylor; and John F. Estes, former Police
officer, interview by author, Tape recording, Norfolk,
20 September 1979.
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at the helm of city government, the Prieur Organization now
seemed both unable and unwilling to challenge the authority
of the Mayor, thus giving him free reign to direct basic
policy as he wished.34
If the people were worried about the fact that all
this power, both political and governmental, was rapidly
concentrating in the office of their Mayor, they gave little
indication of such concern.

By and large, those advanced by

Duckworth and his advisors to both political office and
appointive positions were men and women of good character
who were probably more representative of all the people in
the city than the selections of the Silkstocking crowd.

If

a special danger existed in so establishing W. Fred Duck
worth as a benevolent dictator, it would come from one of
several quarters:

first, the Mayor and his advisors might

lose touch with the public will; they had spoken so long on
behalf of the citizenry in making all of the city's
decisions that they might now discover that they had lost
the ability to listen, and, in so losing touch, risk running
contrary to the will of the people on some critical issue.
Second, because the Mayor had been such an aggressive
spokesman and the people were so obviously content to sit
back silently, there was a danger that if a small and vocal
minority ever became really well organized, then the Mayor
might over-react to their pronouncements, as if all the

34Robert L. Mason; Harold Sugg; and Claude J. Staylor.
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people had spoken.

Also, the famous Duckworth temper might

intrude upon the Mayor's otherwise sound judgement.

Already

city hall was abuzz with murmured rumors about those indivi
duals, even respected members of the city's business and
professional society, who had dared in even a minor way to
oppose the Mayor or one of his programs, only to find their
livelihood suddenly threatened.35

Stories also existed

about how even senior city officials who had attempted to
question a Duckworth decision had been publicly humiliated
by the Mayor in a tirade of verbal abuse.3®

These,

however, were only petty examples of an even greater danger;
so far no one knew just how far the Mayor might go in a fit
of pique to destroy a political opponent or some other,
greater threat to his administration.

Earlier in the decade

the Black community had experienced a pattern of mayoral
revenge for their political deviation, and the Broad Creek
Shores controversy had shown that Duckworth was not opposed
to employing the official powers of the city to punish his
opposition, but these actions only hinted at the even
greater dangers that lay ahead now that Mayor W. Fred
Duckworth had achieved full domination over every phase of
Norfolk's municipal operation.

35Gordon Dillon, "An Exceptionally Talented Lad," Article
One I, no. ii (May, 1970), pp. 17-19.
36Harold Sugg.
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Finally, there was the danger that, in spite of all
his power and demonstrated skills, Mayor Duckworth had not
yet put his authority to work on any of his own programs.
C. A. Harrell and the People's administration had left
behind a very precisely planned and carefully orchestrated
program of action, and Duckworth's success in bringing those
plans to reality had brought him much well deserved popu
larity and unparalleled economic stability to the city.
Now, however, the People's program was past— Redevelopment
Project One was drawing to a close, the last units of public
housing were under construction, the bridge-tunnel connector
to Portsmouth was open, the ambitious annexation program was
complete, hundreds of new classrooms had been added to the
school system, new water and sewer works were already on
line, revamped health, housing, sanitation, and building
codes were being enforced, and the area was going through
the greatest building boom in its history,3"7 and if Duck
worth had an agenda of his own, it was a secret as closely
guarded as the announcement of his running mates in the next
councilmanic election.

Now that all these projects were

complete, and the People's follow-up phase of development
had been rejected, Norfolk was about to enter into a new
stage of growth that would carry Mayor Duckworth's distinc
tive and, as yet, undiscernible stamp.

The danger, of

course, was that all the powers he had amassed by building

^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 March 1955.
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to the People's blueprint might somehow be perverted by some
as yet unseen factor— his propensity for revenge, his
inability to discern the true voice of the people, or, in
the face of some great public silence, that he would be
prompted to over-react by a vocal and well-organized
minority now that he was both the architect and the builder.
Now at the peak of both his political and municipal
power, Mayor W. Fred Duckworth was preparing to launch at
last his own program of development, only this time there
was no fanfare, no minority advisors, no citizen involve
ment, and no prior publicity.

That was not his style; the

Mayor moved in a more deliberate and purposeful manner.

He

was unhampered by either the open accessibility or the
frenzy of participatory democracy that had so preoccupied
his predecessors as to bog them down in the form, instead of
the substance of government, and thus they had lost the
ability to continue.

The Duckworth style involved instead

both the acquisition of power and the display of its use,
and he had done well in both regards, having constructed the
base for unparalleled personal control from the blueprints
left over from the People's administration.

The Building

Era was now p a s t , and the last of the People's programs was
either completed or put away forever.

The Cultural Center,

the planned waterfront development, and the harbor quay had
all been tabled; instead Norfolk's priorities under
Duckworth would now shift away from developing its assets
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and turn toward destroying its liabilities.

Chief among

those liabilities, of course, was the impending school
desegregation crisis, now bottled up in the federal courts
on a string of technicalities that could snap at any moment.
Since Mayor Duckworth had not yet spoken out on the
desegregation issue, few residents could have guessed that
in the coming months he would attempt to deal so directly
with the crisis, using the powers of city government to
oppose the threat of forced integration as if it were just
another political rival.

The stakes in such an undertaking

were frighteningly high— the desegregation controversy was
more than just a collection of human opponents, it
represented the single most overwhelming force of the coming
decade.

Few people, however, were visionary enough at that

time to discern just how powerful that force would become,
and all across the Commonwealth the state's political
leaders were hastening to erect paper barriers and legal
obstacles to divert the onslaught of desegregation.
Duckworth alone emerged with a plan carefully contrived to
construct more permanent breastworks, and had his plan
succeeded, it probably would have been imitated all across
the nation.

Still, few men anywhere in municipal government

were in a better position to hazard such a venture:

Mayor

W. Fred Duckworth was riding high on the crest of a wave of
municipal accomplishment, partisan consensus, and personal
leadership; he had obtained absolute control over every
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phase of his city's governmental machinery, and he had
subdued almost every source of potent opposition.

Even so,

the risk was just apparent enough that the Mayor saw fit to
hedge his bets in secrecy and couch his plan in the guise of
the People's priorities.

This was a masterful stroke:

no

matter how comprehensive the endeavor, if it failed, he
would be able to step clear from its liabilities and disavow
the complicity of his involvement.
Redevelopment leaped suddenly to the forefront of
municipal policy, just as it had during the heyday of the
People's administration, and events began to move rapidly—
too rapidly for the citizens to fully comprehend either
their significance or their comprehensiveness.

In December

(1956), the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority
announced the commencement of two new undertakings, both
begun after the Mayor had forcefully suggested their
initiation.38

N.R.H.A. Project Two would concentrate on

clearing just over 37 acres of blighted housing in the
Lamberts Point section of the city,39 providing vital
growing room to the Norfolk Division of the College of
William and Mary and Virginia Politechnical Institute (now
Old Dominion University), finally enabling it to break out
of the narrow confines of its two-year preparatory and trade

sspretlow Darden.
39Norfolk Redevelopment And Housing Authority, Annual
Report to the City Council, (Norfolk: N.R.H.A., 1974). p. 39.
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school curriculum.

The second project proposed to bulldoze

90 acres in the Atlantic City portion of Norfolk,40 the
chief beneficiary of which would be Norfolk General
(Sentara) Hospital, another popular but badly landlocked
public institution.

Before that phase of the project could

even be approved, an additional 45 acres were added to the
Atlantic City proposal to accommodate long-standing People's
plans to improve adjacent health, highway, and tunnel
facilities.
In marked contrast to Redevelopment Project One, no
public housing was planned for either the Atlantic City or
the Old Dominion (N.R.H.A. Project Two) Project, even though
the two areas combined were more than twice the size of the
People's N.R.H.A. Project One, and the Atlantic City area
alone contained close to a 1,000 dwellings.41

As a matter

of fact, the Redevelopment and Housing Authority was just
beginning to embark upon another venture which would destroy
an additional 2,600 dwellings— units that would have been
perfectly suited as temporary public housing and ease the
relocation of refugees from the Atlantic City and Old
Dominion Projects.

By annexation, Norfolk had acquired the

468-acre site of Broad Creek Village, a temporary war
housing project still occupied by the families of government

4°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 8 December 1956.
41Frank Sullivan, "Norfolk's Redevelopment Story,"
Norfolk XVI: 7 (November, 1954), p. 9.
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the Navy,42 the Redevelopment and Housing Authority was in
the process of razing those dwellings to make room for a
mammoth industrial park,43 thereby compounding even
further the relocation problem.
Bulldozers were still roaring through the dwellings in
the Atlantic City, Broad Creek, and Old Dominion Projects
when the N.R.H.A announced a fourth venture, the Downtown
Redevelopment Project.

In a carefully concerted attack the

Authority swept bare more than 200 acres in the oldest part
of the city.44

The central focus of the assault was

Norfolk's notorious East Main Street sin strip, where once a
vast array of bars, honky tonks, amusement palaces, tattoo
parlors, flophouses, and burlesques had entertained the
fleet and brought disrepute to more legitimate downtown
businessmen.

More than 400 commercial structures would fall

in this massive attempt to wipe out a repugnant merchandis
ing industry, and an additional 485 residences would be
razed without the addition of any new public housing units
for their evacuees.45
With the initiation of these four near-simultaneous
endeavors— the Atlantic City, Old Dominion, Broad Creek, and

42Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 June 1954.
43Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority, Annual
Report To The City Council (1974), op c i t . , p. 39.
44Ibid., p. 15.
45Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 July 1961.
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Downtown Projects— the city was casting aside a sizeable
portion of its developed land— more than 800 acres were
scheduled for clearance— in exchange for new opportunities
for growth.

This new phase of redevelopment was unques

tionably the Mayor's:

although none of the four projects

were new ideas to his Administration— all four had been
kicked around, along with numerous other proposals, among
the various planning and advisory commissions— the enormous
scope of this undertaking was Duckworth's invention,46 the
size of the projects, the simultaneity of the endeavor, the
speed with which they were undertaken, and even the ration
ale for such dramatic action all derived their impetus from
his character.

In just pure size, this new phase in

redevelopment was staggering:

the four projects encompassed

an area ten times the size of N.R.H.A. Project One, which
itself was twice the size of any development that New York
or any other city had attempted.47

More than 20,000

people, almost a tenth of Norfolk's population,48 would be
forced to flee the bulldozers in this new phase of demoli
tion.

More than 4,000 residential structures, many with

several apartment, and more than 500 commercial structures
would be razed in this unprecedented series of projects.

4SPretlow Darden.
47Architectural

F o r u m , op cit., p. 132.

48Based upon an analysis of census tract data for the
four areas involved. See U . S . Bureau of the Census,U . S .
Census of Population: (1950), op cit.
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The rapidity with which all four projects were under
taken was almost as startling:

less than nine months lapsed

from the announcement of the Atlantic City Project to the
time that demolition work actually began in earnest; the
N.R.H.A. began tearing down structures in Broad Creek almost
as soon as it took title to the land from the Navy.

By

marked contrast, Project One had been three years in the
planning phase before the Council had made the first
appropriation, and then another full year passed before
demolition work actually began.

Also by comparison, no

formal plan existed for what would be done in the areas once
they were cleared.

Although the official explanation for

all four projects was that they were desperately needed to
provide room for industrial expansion, downtown development,
and growth of the city's municipal, educational, health, and
transportation facilities, no blueprints or scale models of
such enterprises were trotted out for public display.
Either the Mayor felt no need to "sell" the projects in this
way, or else he really did not have any firm commitments yet
for new hospital wings, educational structures, industrial
facilities, or commercial ventures.

N.R.H.A. Project One

was one-tenth the size of the new undertakings, and it had
still taken six years under the Duckworth administration to
complete, and this in spite of the fact that it was vastly
over planned in comparison to the new proposals.
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In spite of the fact that plans for redeveloping the
projects were at best only loosely formulated, the Duckworth
administration had good reason to rush them off the drawing
boards and into the demolition stage as quickly as possible.
The rationale behind this seeming impulsiveness was not
based upon any immediate demand for cleared land, for,
indeed, the Mayor had never placed a very high priority upon
the drudgery and precision of community planning; his forte
was quick and dramatic action, and the singleness with which
N.R.H.A. pursued condemnation in these projects was no
exception.

Ironically the administration that had built its

reputation upon building to the People's specifications
would now turn to rapid demolition of property before new
plans for its use could be fully drawn, but the simple truth
remains that new construction lagged far behind in the list
of municipal priorities.

The new focus was upon clearing

land where existing uses were seriously threatening the
continued prosperity of the city.

It is easy to see why the

sleazy bars and honky tonks, the festering slums, and the
seedy business houses scheduled for removal in the Downtown
Project were undesirable land uses, but why would a city
suffering an acute shortage of adequate and sanitary housing
units (the 1940 Census had demonstrated that 40% of the
city's housing stock was either "dilapidated" or contained
inadequate sanitation facilities)49 suddenly turn to

49Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 July 1961.
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destroy more than 3,500 units with decent plumbing?

Why,

too, would a city desperate for low-cost housing units,
especially for its Black residents, suddenly propose to
bulldoze more than 4,250 such units without planning any
additional housing, either public or private?
Each of the projects poses an interesting contradic
tion to sound planning practices.

Broad Creek Village, for

instance, was unquestionably an ideal site for future indus
trial development, but it would take years to fill the 468acre site.

In the meantime the area was occupied by 2,600

individual family homes, all less than 15 years old and all
equipped with modern sewage and sanitation facilities.
Although the homes had been built by the Navy during the war
as demountable units, prefabrication was becoming more and
more the rule in new home construction.

Uncertainty about

the future of the village had unquestionably contributed
markedly to its decline, but the area still showed signs of
health and usefulness as a solid working-class community.
Broad Creek Village had served a very unique and successful
purpose as a settlement of wartime government housing, but
shortly after the Korean War the Navy sought to sever its
relationship as landlord and turn that function over to
public housing agencies like the Norfolk Redevelopment and
Housing Authority.

Since N.R.H.A. Executive Director Larry

Cox had already gone on record as opposing the continuation
of Broad Creek Village as either low income or public
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housing,50 the area resident were bitterly opposed to a
N.R.H.A. takeover.

Since the property was technically in a

portion of Norfolk County still slated for annexation by the
city of Norfolk, the residents fought vigorously to have the
Navy turn it over to either the county or to some sort of
tenant-sponsored mutual ownership organization.

The

N.R.H.A. publicly persisted in its desire to demolish the
entire tract, and this bitterness between the tenants and
the new landlord helped to speed the deterioration of the
village once the N.R.H.A. actually did take over management.
Angry residents blamed the deterioration upon the Housing
Authority for failure to perform simple maintenance duties,
but the condition can just as easily be traced back to the
residents themselves, who, because of uncertainty over the
area's future, failed to maintain the same level of upkeep
as they had when the future of the project was secure under
federal auspices.51
Hurricane Hazel struck in 1954 just as the N.R.H.A.
was taking title to the property,52 but the debate over
which agency had responsibility to repair the damage,
including more than 30 carloads of missing shingles,53
soon became a moot point.

Once the N.R.H.A. assumed full

5°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 July 1955.
slNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 April 1955.
52Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 August 1954
53Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 June 1958.
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control, it began closing off certain sections and preparing
them for demolition.

The sight of barricaded streets,

vandalized properties, and boarded-up buildings panicked the
residents into agreeing to the total rezoning of the
property for industrial use.

They hoped that by agreeing to

the rezoning and the eventual demise of the entire site that
they were actually buying time; they hoped that the N.R.H.A.
would change course and institute a program of gradual
removal as prospects for industrial development solidi
fied.34

Their hopes, however, were short-lived; within

three years most of the residents had been driven out.55
It really makes very little difference who created a
slum out of Broad Creek Village, for by the time the
bulldozers actually began to roll through the area, blight
had become rampant.

What had once been a valuable assem

blage of relatively new housing units— all with two to three
bedrooms, hardwood floors, deep sash windows, modern plumb
ing fixtures, and sturdy interior constructions— had
degenerated quickly into a full scale slum, replete with
vandalized and deserted buildings, piles of rubbish, and the
look of despair that generally characterizes areas slated
for demolition.

In its heyday--during the war and the years

immediately following when its survival had been certain—
Broad Creek had been an ideal working-class community:

54Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 May 1955.
55Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 June 1958.
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had almost no crime, the neighbors looked out for one
another, shared a sense of purpose, and felt compassion and
kinship with one another— in short it exhibited a remarkable
unity of spirit and sense of community.

By the end of the

war it had lost its appearance as a military camp, and
residents worked feverishly to tend their gardens, improve
their dwelling, and save up enough to purchase their own
unit.

Although out in the county, Broad Creek natives felt

that they had their own little city unto themselves:

it had

its own schools, churches, parks, playgrounds, stores, and
commercial areas— and for more than 5,000 people it was
"home,” for many their first real home.

No wonder that its

residents fought so bitterly against the city's plans to
tear the structures down; they could not believe that with
all the newly-annexed farm land, Norfolk could not find a
better place for industry than on top of their homes.
Ironically, today, more than 30 years after Broad Creek
Village was razed, many of its original "slum" dwellings
remain in other parts of the city:

many of the residents

refused to have their units torn down, and so bought them
from the Housing Authority for a couple of hundred dollars,
and then paid to have them moved to other sites.56
Broad Creek Village was not, however, the only area of
the city where residents blamed the N.R.H.A. for precipitat
ing its decline by spreading rumors of destruction.

When

56Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 July 1979.
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Norfolk first began talking back in 1949 about wholesale
redevelopment of the city's aging neighborhoods on the
fringe of the downtown, Atlantic City was one of the few
predominantly white neighborhoods mentioned in the early
speculations.5-7

Founded around the cotton mill, Fort

Norfolk, the seafood industry, and the Smith Creek marinas,
Atlantic City had been one of Norfolk's first suburbs,
predating Ghent, its richer cousin across the Hague (Smith
Creek), by almost a decade.
Since Atlantic City contained the industries that
supported the carriage set who lived in Ghent, most of its
dwelling units were working-class row houses or multi-family
structures.

These lent themselves easily to over-crowding

and exploitation by nonresident landlords during the
critical housing shortage that prevailed throughout World
War II and the years immediately following, but these
conditions were prevalent in even the city's finest
neighborhoods.

As rumors of its redevelopment spread,

however, those same property owners were understandably
unwilling to undertake major repairs or improvements, and
the area took on many of the appearances of a "blighted"
neighborhood.53

Atlantic City, however, should have been

just the sort of neighborhood that the city's revamped
health, housing, and building codes were supposed to

S7Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 4 October 1949.
5sNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 1 July 1957.

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

219

rehabilitate; indeed, in the two years before the Atlantic
City Project was formally announced, more than a thousand
homes in the city had been rehabilitated.59

Much of the

housing scheduled for removal in the Downtown Projects had
unquestionably deteriorated beyond repair: census tract
studies indicate that more than 80% of the units had
inadequate plumbing facilities, that 96% were built before
1920, that 94% were without any form of central heating, and
that the median contract rent in 1949 had been only $14.51
per month.60

The Atlantic City Project, however, proves a

sharp contrast:

in 1949, at a time when the severe housing

crisis in the community had precipitated subdividing many
older homes into multi-unit apartments, almost a quarter of
the Atlantic City homes were still single family, free
standing houses; another fourth were free-standing duplexes,
a popular building style in many older neighborhoods; and
close to 20% of the homes were less than 30 years old.

In

addition, more than 70% of the units had adequate plumbing
(two apartments that shared a bathroom, a common practice in
many areas of the city, were downgraded in the census report
as having inadequate plumbing facilities).

More than half

of the units had central heating, and the median contract
rent was $34.86, more than twice the value in the structures

59Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 October 1956.
soU. S. Bureau of Census, U.S. Census of Population:
1950, vol. Ill, Census Tract Studies, Chapter 38 (Washington,
D.C., 1952). p. 22 (census tract 42).
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torn down in both the Downtown Redevelopment Project or
N.R.H.A. Project One.61

Undoubtedly a number of struc

tures in the Atlantic City project had deteriorated beyond
rehabilitation, even by today's standards in which restoring
older, central city homes has become so fashionable, but
many of the deficiencies noted in the census studies were
not only in keeping with existing city codes, they were also
common practices during the wartime and postwar housing
crises locally.62
Ironically, Atlantic City was chosen by the Norfolk
Health Department for a major code enforcement initiative
precisely because of the overall quality of its structures
and the fact that they were so salvageable.

Since federally

funded redevelopment projects required that the locality
rehabilitate one housing unit for each unit torn down,
Norfolk had adopted one of the first comprehensive minimum
housing codes in the country.

Because Norfolk was only the

second city in the nation (the other was Baltimore) to
attempt large scale enforcement of its code, the Health
Department was looking for a neighborhood that was good
enough to salvage, but not so bad that code enforcement
efforts would make little difference.

After careful

analysis of the 1950 census data and some preliminary field

61I b id., pp. 21 and 22 (census tracts 35, 39, and 42).
62see Marvin W. Schlegel, Conscripted C i t y , op c i t .,
pp. 20 - 50.
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work, the Health Department chose Atlantic City for the
first concentrated housing code enforcement effort in the
country.

When the staff of the Health Department met with

N.R.H.A. Executive Director Larry Cox, they were told that
the Housing Authority had no plans to begin any redevelop
ment activity in Atlantic City for "at least five to ten
years," and that were other areas of the city rated a much
"higher priority."63
According to G. D. Monola, the former Director of
Environmental Health who led the code enforcement project,
the only badly deteriorated section of Atlantic City lay
along the site of Brambleton Avenue.

Because this area had

mixed commercial, industrial, and residential uses, rental
units had been allowed by absentee landlords to degenerate.
Black families displaced by Project One had begun moving in
to this section, but because it was separate from the other
residential blocks, there was none of the violence or strong
community reaction that had occurred in Brambleton or
Coronado.

In short, Atlantic City had "integrated without

any difficulty . . . without any fanfare, any publicity, or
any Klan activity."

Moreover, the fact that Blacks were now

moving into these units meant that they could command higher
rents, and the landlords were thus more willing to make the
investments necessary to bring the dwellings up to code.

63G . D. Monola, former Director of Environmental Health,
interview by author, Norfolk, 3 April 1991.
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For this reason, the sudden announcement of the entire
demolition of the neighborhood caught both the residents and
the Health Department by surprise.

The code enforcement

project had just been completed, and nearly every dwelling
unit had been brought up to the city's new minimum housing
code, some at considerable cost to the property owners.
According to Monola, the Health Department had been meeting
regularly with the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing
Authority, and the Authority had not mentioned the possible
demolition of the neighborhood until the plans were
announced in the press.

The fact that the Housing Authority

had used the Health Department surveys as justification for
the demolition helped to deepen the rift between the two
agencies.

Although there were a "surprisingly large number

of owner occupied dwellings" in the area and most of the
dwelling units were well worth saving, especially now that
they had been rehabilitated, the Housing Authority persisted
in its effort, against the advice of the Health Department,
to push for demolition of the entire area.

Even though a

building could meet all the requirements of the city's
minimum housing code and still have major defects, the
Health Department felt that the Housing Authority had gone
overboard in its rush to expand the project beyond the
fairly restrictive area of blight along the present site of
Brambleton Avenue.

Block after block where only a few de

fects were listed were included in the project, but because
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these were lumped together with the worst cases, the area
just did meet the minimum requirement of five defects per
dwelling to qualify as a federally funded redevelopment
project.
Thus, in an ironical twist, the Atlantic City housing
units that had been rehabilitated as a result of N.R.H.A.
Project One, were then torn down in Norfolk's second phase
of redevelopment.

Residents were furious with the Health

Department, especially when they learned that the appraisal
of their property from the N.R.H.A. was less than the cost
of the improvements required by the Health Department to
bring the dwelling up to the minimum housing code.

The

Health Department's code enforcement effort suffered as a
result of the public uproar, and disagreements over the size
and scope of the Atlantic City project eventually led to a
severe split between the two agencies; no longer would the
Health Department help in the housing rehabilitation efforts
of the N.R.H.A.,64 and even today the city and the Housing
Authority operate separate housing rehabilitation units with
overlapping authority, mission, and purpose.
Obviously after eight years of rumored destruction and
the general state of despair and disrepair that follows such
rumors, portions of the Atlantic City neighborhood were in
danger of becoming a slum.

The Norfolk Redevelopment and

Housing Authority pointed to the Health Department surveys

64G. D. Monola.
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as proof that it had higher incidence of tuberculosis,
venereal disease, juvenile delinquency, dilapidated housing,
racial unrest, crimes, fires, and rat infestation than other
neighborhoods in the city,®5 but the residents complained
that all of these had come to the area since the talk of
redevelopment:
It seems that considerable time and effort
has gone into preparing reports by various
functions of the city government to show that
Atlantic City has been a detriment to the rest
of the city.
If it was such a blight on our
city, and its effects [were] so far reaching as
to affect the whole city, wouldn't this fact
have been so outstanding that it would speak for
itself without having to be figured [in such a
way so as] to prove it?s®
Few citizens and even fewer organizations were willing
to take up these cries, however, and oppose the project.
Only those most affected by demolition— the owners of
private homes, apartment buildings, or commercial property
in the target area— showed any inclination to fight.

The

most vigorous opposition to the Atlantic City Project came
not from the residents, but rather from yachting enthusiasts
and environmentalists who opposed the closing of the Smith
Creek Marina by the proposed low-level Brambleton Avenue
bridge.®7

Replacing the old two-lane drawbridge with a

®sNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 June 1957.
®®Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 1 July 1957.
67Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 January 1957.
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broad fixed span was, however, one of the few really neces
sary proposals in the entire project:

Norfolk desperately

needed another thoroughfare connecting the downtown with the
Hampton Boulevard corridor, and the proposed Brambleton
Avenue route clearly offered the best planning alterna
tive.6®

Moreover, almost all of the really deteriorated

dwellings in Atlantic City could have been demolished by
careful placement of this one highway project alone.

The

rest not only could have been spared, they were worth
saving.69
Other aspects of the Atlantic City Project were either
too vague for thorough assessment, too long-term in their
design, too haphazard in their application, or else so
incompatible with the other developments as to be strikingly
ill-conceived.

The project area itself was a strange

configuration that zigged and zagged its way from Clairmont
Avenue in West Ghent to Monticello Avenue in downtown
Norfolk, never stretching more than just a few blocks in
width (see Figure 2 on the next page).

The lines were

purposely drawn to exclude certain blocks, specific
commercial structures, and even single residences from
demolition while the area around them was completely

68See Charles K. Agle, A Master Plan For The Central
Business And Financial District, op c i t ., and Norfolk City
Planning Commission, Major Highway P l a n , Part I, Major
Highways and Streets, (Norfolk, 1950).
69G. D. Monola.
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leveled.

The 700 block of Yarmouth Street, for instance,

was spared by an odd gerrymandering of the district, while
the neighboring 700 blocks of Botetourt, Dunmore, and Duke
Streets were slated for removal.

All the waterfront

property along the southern edge of Smith Creek was slated
for demolition while the rotting wharves, sagging ware
houses, and crumbling storage facilities on the Elizabeth
River just a block away were spared.
Outside of the close to 40 acres that would be used
for hospital, public health, highway, and tunnel facilities,
the rest of the project seemingly had little reason for
inclusion.

Plans for their use were as yet unspecified, but

the N.R.H.A. speculated that the remaining 95 acres would
provide a basis for industrial sites, semi-luxury
apartments, and improvements along the Hague (Smith Creek)
waterfront,-70 yet none of these uses was fully compatible
with the realities of the site:

the proposed path of the

Brambleton Avenue thoroughfare swung too close to the
southern border of the Hague to render all but a corner on
each edge of the remaining waterfront property unsuited to
these purposes.

If the area was ever to have a real future

as a highrise or luxury housing development, the sites along
the Elizabeth River not yet scheduled for clearance would be
far better suited.

Similarly, the 56 acres that were set

aside for light industry in the project, had little hope of

■^N.R.H.A., Report, op cit., p. 12.
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FIGURE Z. Atlantic City Redevelopment Project.
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attracting prospective customers when realistically compared
to the 468 acres of prime industrial land being opened up in
the Broad Creek site.

In addition to major rail and highway

connections, the Broad Creek Industrial Park was close to
both the central business district and the rapidly shifting
population center of the Tidewater region; its sheer size
meant that a number of related manufacturing, assemblage,
and storage facilities could all be located in close proxim
ity.

The Atlantic City Project offered instead a number of

smaller, odd-shaped parcels of land, all of which carried
the higher taxation rate and building restrictions inherent
in a downtown location.
In sharp contrast to earlier People's endeavors,
planning of the public expenditure portion of the project
was more than just vague, it was counterproductive.

Only

the proposals for highway facilities and tunnel access ramps
were fully conceived before demolition began.

It was true

that Norfolk's hospital and public health needs would grow
in coming years, but the Atlantic City Project proposed to
clear in 1957 land for expansion of the medical center
complex that would not be occupied for at least twenty years
in the future.71

At the other end of the project the

N.R.H.A. was condemning the land around the Norfolk (now

71The present sites of the Tidewater Red Cross, Tidewater
Rehabilitation Institute, Mental Health Center, and Eastern
Virginia Medical School were cleared fifteen to twenty years
or more before their construction.
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Chrysler) Museum upon which the People's planners had once
hoped to build the Cultural Center extension of the downtown
business district.

Because of the city's extensive involve

ment with the Downtown Redevelopment Project— more than 200
acres in the heart of the city's commercial district were
swept bare and "only a dozen buildings were left standing,
giving the downtown the appearance of having been ravaged by
a massive air raid"72— the library, monument park, civic
center, naval museum,73 and other public expenditures were
needed instead to help fill in the hole left by demolitions
further downtown.

The land where once the People's planners

hoped to attract a consulate's row, charity organizations,
convention hotel, outdoor cafes, and specialty shops was
given over instead to long-term parking lots, open fields,
and misplaced convenience stores.

Hopes for a Cultural

Center and other orderly expansions of the central business
district were decimated by the sudden oversupply of vacant
land that now ringed the downtown.
Clearly there was no immediate need for all the vacant
land that had suddenly been made available through the
enormous scope of this redevelopment activity.

Although

each of the four projects had a noble purpose at its

72John C. Schmidt, "Norfolk: A City Remakes Itself,"
Baltimore, March 1959 (N.R.H.A. reprint), p. 6.
73Plans for a naval museum, which was to be built at the
foot of St. Paul's Boulevard near the Omni Hotel property,
collapsed more than a decade later.
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heart— expansion of industrial, highway, tunnel, education
al, or medical facilities— none evidenced any of the signs
of precision and clarity of purpose which so completely
characterized the endeavors of the People's Administration.
When one considers the tremendous destructive force un
leashed upon the city in these four new undertakings, the
more than 800 acres scheduled for clearance, the 20,000
individuals to be uprooted, the demolition of whole communi
ties, the heavy financial burden that would be carried even
far into the future, and the tremendous urgency with which
the whole affair was undertaken, it becomes obvious that
some underlying ulterior motive must knit these projects
together into a unified plan of action, and that, whatever
the objective, immediate demolition of properties that had
somehow become offensive was granted a far higher priority
than redevelopment.

Mayor W. Fred Duckworth had proven

himself to be too skillful at administrating the city's
affairs during the Building Phase of municipal growth to so
lose control during the Bulldozer Era; he had shown too
great a mastery of power politics not to be brokering some
sort of deal with these developments.
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FIGURE 3 . Norfolk's Black,. Mixed Race, and Transition Neighborhoods,
(.from 1950 U, S, Census figures)

Tanner's Creek District
(scheduled for annexation)

(12) r

County Line
Black Neighborhoods
Transition Neighborhoods
1. T1tustow n / Carney Park

6. O.D.U. / Lambert's Point

2. Oak wood / Rosemont

7. Atlantic City

11. Coronado

3. Uptown

8. Downtown

12.

4. Berkley

9. Brambleton

5. U. S. Navy Housing

Broad Creek Park

10. (Broad Creek Shores)
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FIGURE 4. Norfolk's Dual
School System, Circa 1954
(Norfolk Ledger-Oispatch,
18 May 19^4).
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CHAPTER FIVE
REDEVELOPMENT RATIONALES
The process of planning and redevelopment had come
full circle in Norfolk:

what had begun under the People's

administration as a noble attempt to build the great city of
the future had become corrupted by more pressing political
and social concerns.

Thus Norfolk, because it was the very

first city in the country to attempt redevelopment and among
the foremost to initiate urban renewal on any large scale,
also became one of the early leaders at manipulating its
exemplary purposes to serve a more personal, partisan end.
Redevelopment in Norfolk had fallen from its position as
part of an overall program of community improvement and had
instead become but one weapon in the arsenal of a powerful
political leader, one who was willing to employ this new
tool to chastise his enemies, reward his supporters, and
otherwise strengthen his grasp on municipal government.
Mayor W. Fred Duckworth was not so much trying to rebuild
Norfolk as attempting to redesign it in a more personally
acceptable form; in so doing he was guided as much by the
vagaries of redevelopment law as he was by more salient
considerations.
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Although Norfolk's four new redevelopment projects
proposed massive new public and quasi-governmental facili
ties— new hospital, public health, educational, highway,
tunnel, and municipal structures— all of these, and in fact
most of the other elements associated with the renewal plans
could have been achieved without subjecting the city to the
tremendous destruction necessitated by redevelopment.
Norfolk already had the power under its grant of eminent
domain to acquire private land for just such public uses,
but the city was attracted by the additional grant of
authority offered by redevelopment legislation.

Under

redevelopment, a city could legally acquire private
property, clear it, and then resell it to new and different
private owners.

This was supposed to correct the misuse of

valuable urban land, but, instead, it encouraged cities like
Norfolk to acquire more land than they could ever use.
Redeveloping an area, as opposed to just condemning the land
necessary for public facilities, actually rewarded a city
for expanding the scope of its public works proposals:
first, it allowed them to acquire huge tracts of valuable
private property that they could never have otherwise
obtained; secondly, the cities were paid by the federal
government in matching funds to clear the land for reuse;
finally, redevelopment cost the city no more than it would
have spent anyway on its smaller scale public works
projects.

Thus, although it had plans to use less than a
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third of the acreage in the Downtown and Atlantic City
projects for public facilities, Norfolk, because it could
qualify the entire area as redevelopment projects, was able
to acquire close to 200 acres of additional land on the edge
of the central business district, including some of the most
potentially valuable commercial and waterfront sites in the
city.

In addition, in purchasing, clearing, and redevelop

ing this land, the city did not have to put up a penny more
than it would have had to spend anyway on the necessary
public facilities.1
Thus redevelopment, because it gave the city these
vast tracts of highly valuable land, was a boon both to the
business community who sought their re-use and the power
brokers who controlled their eventual disposition.

The

Atlantic City and Downtown Projects were an immediate hit
with the leaders of Norfolk's Silkstocking establishment for
a number of other reasons.

Just as in N.R.H.A. Project One,

redevelopment destroys unwanted uses of land, and it was
easy to see why the old People's planners would have dreamed
of wiping out the "uglies" contained in the two project
areas:

the Downtown site contained some of the city's worst

slums that, because of their close proximity to the central
business district, would forever impede further commercial
expansion in the downtown area; in addition, the city's

xPretlow Darden; Roy B. Martin, Jr.; and Francis
Crenshaw.
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notorious East Main Street sin strip and red-light district,
Norfolk's most repugnant reminder of the shady days of its
wartime past, were likewise targeted for demolition; by
contrast, the housing and small commercial establishments in
the Atlantic City area were not nearly as deteriorated or as
offensive as those downtown, but the Silkstocking crowd had
never been happy with having this deteriorating workingclass community so close to the prosperous in-town estates
of the Ghent neighborhood, Norfolk's most prestigious real
estate development and the home of most of its Silkstocking
establishment.

The declining fortunes of the Atlantic City

area had already begun to affect real estate values in the
neighboring Ghent communities, and the N.R.H.A. Commission
ers, one of the last bastions of the old People's rule, felt
that the demolition slated for the area was the only way to
"save" Ghent from similar deterioration.2

Similarly, the

Old Dominion Project helped to create a convenient buffer
zone between the working-class community of Lamberts Point
and the wealthier subdivisions of Larchmont and Edgewater.
Some of the members of the old People's coalition
undoubtedly had been in on planning at least a portion of
Norfolk's new endeavors:

since 1950 the People's Planning

Commission had been proposing an additional access route to
the downtown area by linking Broad Creek Road (now
Brambleton Avenue) with an extension of Hampton Boulevard;

2Pretlow Darden.
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the Elizabeth River Tunnel Commission had been lobbying
almost as long for an additional underwater link with
Portsmouth at its Pinner's Point terminus;3 the massive
municipal Health Department that had been so much a part of
the People's cleanup and code enforcement campaigns had been
in desperate need of expanded facilities for some time; and
for more than a decade a general consensus had prevailed
among the business community that the fate of any New
Norfolk would be invariably linked to proposals to expand
the city's two-year college and its general hospital into
vast urban educational and medical centers.

Indeed, the

list of those who served on the governing bodies of Norfolk
General Hospital and the Norfolk Division of the College of
William and Mary/Virginia Politechnical Institute State
University during these planning years very nearly matches
any comparable listing of Norfolk's power elite during the
People's administration.

Not even the United Fund, the

traditional civic endeavor of the Silkstocking establish
ment, could match the drawing power of these two popular
institutions:

at least five N.R.H.A. commissioners had

served on the hospital's board; two city managers, two
judges, one state senator, one city councilman, one school
superintendent, three N.R.H.A. commissioners, two newspaper
publishers, two Planning commissioners, and one former

3see Norfolk City Planning Commission, Major Highway
Plan, Part I, Major Highways and Collector Streets (Norfolk,
1950.)
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governor of Virginia had served in a similar capacity for
the fledgling precursor to today's Old Dominion University.
A number of other factors were involved in any re
development project, and in these four new endeavors
particularly, that were immediately attractive to large
segments of the business community.

Redevelopment,

especially when it was attempted on such a grand scale, was
obviously good for business because it brought an infusion
of new jobs, new revenues, new developmental opportunities,
and numerous other spin-off and multiplier effects to the
local economy.

Some businessmen would obviously profit

directly from the projects, either because they owned
property affected or because their own enterprise would
participate in some stage of the work.

Those firms directly

involved in demolition, construction, contracting, building
supply, and related activities, including many enterprises
owned by the power elite of the People's era, favored these
new redevelopment proposals; the lawyers who would handle
the condemnation proceedings, the real estate experts who
would handle the appraisals, and a host of bankers, building
and loan executives, real estate agents, and other pro
fessionals who stood to gain by having so many new people
suddenly on the move.

Others looked forward to unloading

failing properties that might otherwise have been difficult
to sell:

slum housing faced with major renovations under

the beefed up health and housing codes, landlords in the now
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fading red-light district, expanding industries and
commercial enterprises that needed to unload outmoded and
obsolete facilities, and sagging retail establishments faced
with heavy competition from suburban shopping centers.
Others saw the massive clearance operation as a way to save
their properties by placing open space barriers between
their own establishment and deteriorated areas.

Some would

gain by the new development possibilities already under
consideration— the new medical center complex, for instance,
would enhance the practice of every Tidewater physician,
attracting many of them to new office facilities within
close proximity— while others felt that they would gain by
participating in the design of future uses for the massive
tracts of cleared acreage that were still uncommitted.
The myriad economic benefits of redevelopment were
readily apparent to all who had participated in N.R.H.A.
Project One:

both to Mayor Duckworth, who had played a role

in bringing it to a conclusion, and the People’s planners
who had participated in its design.

N.R.H.A. Project One

had provided an unparalleled economic boost to the area, and
its well conceived Tidewater Drive industrial mini-park was
filled almost before it opened.4

No one doubted that

Norfolk would continue with new redevelopment proposals, and
new ideas were eagerly bandied about in the business
community--some of that speculation may in fact have made

4Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 March 1956.
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new redevelopment projects necessary by hastening the
decline of neighborhoods under consideration.

There were

also, however, some very solid reasons why no individual
businessman or corporate entity would want to oppose the
projects under consideration, no matter how far-fetched or
ill-conceived they might be.

Duckworth had never been an

easy man to confront, and now, with the very special powers
inherent to redevelopment, any person who openly sought to
oppose the Mayor, his programs, or his policies would be
committing an act tantamount to social and financial
suicide.

With so much of the Downtown and neighboring

Atlantic City residential and commercial properties
scheduled for clearance— 326 acres with more than 500
commercial and 700 residential structures— four powerful new
economic weapons fell into the hands of those who controlled
the city.
Foremost among these was the power to determine the
exact boundary lines of the project areas, and, by
inference, to decide which structures would be exempt.
Since few solid commitments for private development and even
fewer irreversible proposals for public facilities existed
at the time of demolition, the N.R.H.A. had tremendous
leeway in determining which structures would fall and which
would be spared.

Initial plans showed that only 90 acres in

the Atlantic City area would be cleared,5 but later it was

5Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 8 December 1956.
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expanded,6 and then enlarged again7 to include an addi
tional 50 acres of predominantly commercial properties.

The

final shape of the project zigged and zagged its way all the
way from Clairmont Avenue in the heart of West Ghent to
Monticello Avenue in the middle of downtown (see Figure Two,
page 227), purposely avoiding a few commercial structures
such as the newly built Greyhound garage facilities on
Colley and Brambleton Avenues, and just as randomly
including others for demolition.

The Tidewater Construction

Company, the largest commercial establishment effected, was
ultimately so bitter about its inclusion that it departed
Norfolk forever for headquarters beyond the city limits.®
Secondly, the city had considerable leeway in
determining the acquisition value of land scheduled for
demolition. In most cases a flat fee, without regard for the
actual condition or value of the structure, was offered by
the city for all buildings in a certain class.

Those whose

buildings were equal to or below the value offered were
obviously satisfied; those with more valuable properties
faced the costly prospect of hiring an attorney and
additional appraisers in order to undergo a prolonged legal
battle.

One local attorney, a member of an old line family

6Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 17 February 1957.
7Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority, Annual
Report to the City Council (1974), op c i t . , p. 39.
aNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 January 1957.
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with solid connections into the Silkstocking establishment,
was willing to fight condemnation and appraisals of business
properties, but in case after case he found local appraisers
unwilling to buck the city:

they knew that if they attested

to the true value of the properties in question, then they
would never get any appraisal work from the city again.9
Corollary to the ability to fix the value of the
building was the power to actually drive down the worth of
property under consideration, a not uncommon complaint from
the Broad Creek10 and Atlantic City Projects.11

Robert

A. Caro tells in The Power Broker how New York handled
recalcitrant property owners who attempted appeal low
appraisals:
properties,

bulldozers moved in to demolish uncontested
leaving the holdouts stranded in a vast

wasteland of rubble and debris, replete with swirling dust
storms and unguarded excavations.

Electric, sewer, gas and

water lines to remaining homes were cut by city workers.
Hordes of scavengers and looters descended upon the area to
pick the remaining buildings clean.

Each day the holdouts

had to fight their way through an increasingly tortured
course of rubble, muggers, and derelicts.

Still one

resident held out until the city tore down an adjoining
building with which he shared a common wall:

he dropped the

9see Gordon Dillon, op cit.
10Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 April 1955.
i:LNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 1 July 1957.
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appeal and packed his family before his own home
collapsed.12
Additionally, redevelopment gave the city considerable
leverage with the local banks and lending institutions.

The

National Bank of Commerce (later Virginia National Bank, and
now SOVRAN Bank), the locus of power for the Silkstocking
crowd— its officers and board of directors included two
former People's Councilmen (Cooke and Darden), two N.R.H.A
Commissioners (Kaufman and Darden), three Planning Commis
sioners (Hofheimer, Nicholson, and Miles), and numerous
other bluebloods of the Silkstocking crowd, including John
S. Alfriend, Frank Batten, Charles F. Burroughs, E. T.
Gresham, John S. Jenkins, Jr., Harry Mansbach, Hunter
Phelan, Dan Thornton, and Richard F. Welton, III;13 a year
later Duckworth was added to the board14— kept a sizeable
chunk of both the city and N.R.H.A. funds, which ran
somewhere between four and five million dollars at this
time.15

In 1970, the first year that such reports were

12Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the
Fall of New York (New York: Random House, 1975), pp. 880-884.
13Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 9 August 1957.
14Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 9 June 1959.
15Mr. Lewis Conrad of the City Auditor's Office reports
that between 1957 and 1958 the city kept a balance on hand of
between $2,582,817.92 and $3,235,531.16 in four banks, one of
which was The National Bank of Commerce; the city rotated its
funds monthly from bank to bank.
Mr. James E. Smith,
Controller for the N.R.H.A., puts the N.R.H.A. 1958 daily
funds at about $1,500,000; funds were kept separately for
each redevelopment project and housing development.
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made available to the public, the N.R.H.A. kept more than a
million dollars of its funds in that bank, while most of the
other banks had less than a tenth of that amount.

One

establishment lawyer willing to oppose the N.R.H.A. not
surprisingly found that his business clients were refused
bank loans because "they had the wrong lawyer."16

For

most other attorneys, realtors, wholesalers, appraisers,
contractors, and building supply houses, the lure of fat
fees, healthy commissions, and the purchasing power of the
N.R.H.A. and other city agencies was enough to assure their
support.
Finally, the city was afforded considerable leeway
over the disposition of land once it had been cleared.
Redevel- opment land suitable for business use was
considerably cheaper than competitive sites that would still
have to be cleared; thus the power to establish a pecking
order to decide which business or corporate entity would be
rewarded with prime building sites was an important
motivator in the effort to drum up support.

Whether or not

the city actually ever used its considerable powers over
commercial proper-ties, finances, and land disposition on
any grand scale to force compliance and cooperation really
makes very little difference; there were those like the
establishment lawyer mentioned above who suffered for their
token opposition to the Mayor's redevelopment programs, and

16Gordon Dillon, op c i t . , p. 18.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

245

evident to all other members of the city's commercial and
professional establishment.

The fact that those powers,

containing both awards for cooperation and punishments for
opposition, existed in a virtual political vacuum and lay in
hands that were not above using such powers to excise what
ever was deemed objectionable, was enough of an incentive
for at least tacit support in these undertakings.

Business

men, especially those with influence that stretched beyond
the realm which the Mayor could ordinarily reach, soon found
that cooperation with Duckworth's new redevelopment pro
posals could be a mutually profitable agreement; those who
opposed the city or its agencies for whatever reason, faced
the prospect of certain defeat anyway and probably consider
able needless hardship.

Those who might have spoken out to

oppose plans so loosely formulated and so obviously capri
cious needed no other incentive to remain silent.
Thus, when the Mayor ran into heavy opposition from
the Atlantic City residents,17 he quickly scheduled a
second public hearing which was packed, as one reporter
described it, with members of "the leading business and
financial interests representing organizations who [sic]
foster the overall needs of the city."18

With the backing

of the Silkstocking establishment assured, the Atlantic City

lvNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 January 1957.
lsNorfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority, Annual
Report to the City Council (1974), p. 47.
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Project was pushed through over the cries of its residents.
Similar support enabled the Mayor to crush opposition to
both the Downtown19 and Broad Creek Projects.20

The

earlier warnings of Norfolk's two daily newspapers— "the
powers of a housing authority should be zealously guarded
and used only in proven cases as a last resort21"— the
traditional spokesmen of the business community, were now
hushed.

Neither paper spoke to the vast uncertainties or

incongruities in the projects; instead the Ledqer-Dispatch
praised the vision of the proposals:
This will be a dramatic second stage in a
process that is giving much of Norfolk a
splendid new look.
But the really important
factor— and the one which is encompassed in the
very phrase "slum clearance"— is the ugly old
look which the city is casting off.22
Even in its saddest editorial lament, a poignant piece
that bemoaned the passing of a portion of the Atlantic City
area that had "a Greenwich Village flavor" and a "Bohemian
and cosmopolitan character," the Virginian-Pilot added that:
Change must come and better things for the
whole downtown area will be wrought through the
Atlantic City Redevelopment Project. 23

19Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 September 1956.
2°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 June 1954.
21Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 20 May 1953.
22Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch,

27 July 1957.

23Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 31 January 1959.
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No where did either paper question why so many acres had to
be leveled so quickly, especially when so few solid commit
ments for new construction were evident; either the access
to information was really limited to the official press
releases, the editors were afraid to undertake an expose
when so much of the city lay in ruins and the city's future
was irrevocably tied to the success of the projects, or
else, as one editor later revealed, a reporter really was
measured by what he knew but couldn't write.24
The sad truth is that a local newspaper would never
want to reveal the compelling motivation behind these four
new redevelopment endeavors, nor would any scion of the
business establishment seek to oppose the urgency of the
projects.

More was involved than a pressing need for new

public service facilities, more than a desire to provide
growing room for popular institutions, more than longing to
destroy deteriorated or unwanted properties, and more than
just a desire to build a new and exciting city.

The actual

size and shape of the Downtown and Atlantic City Projects
were in part dictated by the requirements of the federal
enabling legislation.

Title I of the Housing Act of 1949

forbade the taking of land for non-residential uses, unless
the area acquired was:

"(a) a slum, deteriorated or

24Robert L. Mason.

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

248

deteriorating area, and (b) is predominantly residential in
character."23
In order to acquire the vast tracts of light indus
tries, warehouses, flophouses, honky tonks, and commercial
properties as proposed, the project borders were made to zig
and zag their way through just enough slum housing to quali
fy the entire area as both "deteriorating" and "predominant
ly residential in character."

The Broad Creek development,

since it was not technically a redevelopment project at all
but rather a gift from the Navy, was not bound by the same
restrictions.

The housing included in the Downtown Project

was undoubtedly one of the worst slums in the city— more
than 85% was badly deteriorated by U.S. Census estimates—
but Atlantic City was no slum, in spite of massive efforts
by the N.R.H.A to prove otherwise.

The Atlantic City

neighborhood may have been in danger of becoming a slum, and
it might thereby legally qualify for clearance under the
U. S. Housing Act, but Norfolk still had a number of other
bona fide ghettos that should have merited first considera
tion for clearance long before Atlantic City; instead, the
area should have been a prime contender for neighborhood
rehabilitation and restoration, and not demolition.
Premature talk of redevelopment and over-hasty speculation
about clearance had produced a dramatic change in the

25Housing and Home Finance Agency, A Guide to Slum
Clearance and Urban Development (Washington, D.C., 1950),
p. 7.
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neighborhood— not a change in the housing or the living
conditions, but nevertheless enough of a change in the
character of its residents to vault the neighborhood to the
top of the list of priorities for clearance under the
political conditions that existed in the Norfolk of 1957.
This same change in the character of population, not so much
the need for the space or the condition of the buildings,
was what doomed Broad Creek Village and the Lamberts Point
neighborhood in the Old Dominion Project as well.

In spite

of the fact that the Atlantic City, Broad Creek, Downtown,
and Old Dominion Projects meant the almost simultaneous
uprooting of more than 4,000 families and the destruction of
a large percent of the city's lower-end, middle-income
housing stock (probably close to eight percent of the city's
total housing stock), the simple truth is that the political
leaders that controlled Norfolk had no interest in preserv
ing these neighborhoods in their existing character, regard
less of the condition of their structures; and, in fact,
were in a hurry to demolish them as quickly as possible.
A similar situation existed with Norfolk's schools.
Although the city had at least three schools still in
service that were built before the Civil War (i.e., J. C.
Smythe, Lott Carey, and John B. Goode), these buildings
would see almost two more decades of service.

Instead,

Norfolk was proposing to tear down Broad Creek26 and

26Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 21 December 1957.
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Benmoreell2-7 elementary schools, both barely more than
twelve years old; close Pineridge Elementary28 (it would
reopen several years later), built within the last decade;
and convert the Patrick Henry Elementary School for use as
administrative offices.29

Although Benmoreell and Pine

ridge were wood frame buildings that were erected as
"temporary" structures during the war years, they were still
serviceable, especially if funds were invested in their
upkeep.

Pineridge was a concrete block structure built in

1947 that sat on a ten acre site at Sewells Point and
Progress Roads.

It contained 19,500 square feet, 15 class

rooms, eight demountable classroom units, an art room,
library, and multipurpose room.30

Both Pineridge and

Broad Creek were in the rapidly expanding Tanners Creek
section of the city just annexed from Norfolk County where
the School Board had just been told it needed to add the
equivalent of four new schools a year for the next ten
years.31

Patrick Henry Elementary, built in 1892 and

27Letter from J. J. Brewbaker, Superintendent of Schools,
to John Corbell, Clerk of the City of Norfolk, 7 May 1956,
Norfolk Public Schools Files.
2SNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 February 1956.
29Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 August 1960.
3°Memorandum from Philip A. Steadfast, Director of the
Norfolk Department of City Planning, to Paul Smith, Assistant
Superintendent for Business and Finance, 27 January 1976,
Norfolk Public Schools files.
3XNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 September 1955.
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expanded in 1920,32 was being converted to office use even
though the School Administration had been saying for several
years that it wanted to move out of the downtown area to a
site closer to the center of the district.33

Why would it

now acquiesce to such a drastic plan of school closings,
demolition, and reuse?
The reason why may best be seen in the Atlantic City
neighborhood:

the 1950 Census revealed that it was the only

predominantly white neighborhood in the city where Black
families comprised more than ten percent of the popula
tion;34 since that time the newspapers noted "the changing
character of the neighborhood from white to Negro."35
Premature talk of redevelopment had helped to break down the
already tenuous color barrier, and landlords who refused to
make major improvements to property threatened by demolition
found they could still charge full rental fees to Black
families because of the housing crisis in the Black
community.

One contemporary news account described the

situation this way:

32Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 9 August 1957.
33Letter from J. J. Brewbaker, Superintendent of
Schools, to Sherwood Reeder, Norfolk City Manager,
8 August 1955, Norfolk Public School files.
34U. S. Bureau of the Census, (1950), op c i t . , p. 22;
and Norfolk Chamber of Commerce, "Population and Housing
Survey," Norfolk XVI: 7 (November, 1954), pp. 10 - 20.
35Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 March 1957.
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The talk in Atlantic City is that property
owners are realizing higher rentals from Negros
than they had in the past from whites.
"A lot
of them are partitioning the interiors (into
additional units) to get a lot more money," one
resident says.3®
The fact that Atlantic City was a transition neighborhood
going through a dramatic change in its racial make-up was
underscored in a caption to a Virginian-Pilot photograph:
"I've no idea where I would go . . . but I won't live with
Negroes all around me."37

Years later former Mayor and

N.R.H.A. Commissioner Pretlow Darden would admit that the
Atlantic City Project was undertaken, at Mayor Duckworth's
insistence, in part to "protect" the nearby Ghent area,38
still the city's chief Silkstocking neighborhood.
Similarly the Lamberts Point neighborhood, a predomin
antly white settlement, showed, even in 1950, a small
concentration of Blacks in the vicinity of the college;39
by 1957, this small Black community had expanded due to the
sgueeze put on the Black housing market by redevelopment,
the city's general population explosion, and the lack of
homes built especially for the Black community.

Broad Creek

Village had begun its existence in 1943 as a Navy housing
project for whites only, but when President Truman

36Ibid.
37Ibid.

38Pretlow Darden.
39Norfolk Chamber of Commerce, op cit.
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integrated the armed forces after World War I I , a number of
Black families began to appear in the project.

As

uncertainty about the project's future increased in the
1950s, so also did the small percentage of Black population,
isolated at first only in one small corner of the
community.40

A similar situation existed in the

Benmoreell Navy Housing Complex on Hampton Boulevard just
outside of the Norfolk Naval Base:

although a relatively

small number of Blacks were shown living there in the 1950
Census,41 their numbers had grown as whites gained other
housing opportunities in the growing number of private,
whites only, developments which ringed the base.

The

housing shortage for Blacks had cracked the previous racial
barriers in the Berkley section of the city, and the School
Board noted with dismay "the pronounced tendency for whites
to leave Berkley, and for Negroes to move in."42

The

Downtown Project areas, which had been predominantly Black
for decades, still housed at least 19 white families.43
Thus, one of the major reasons for Mayor Duckworth's
sudden and massive reliance upon the powers inherent in
redevelopment was to accomplish the one thing that neither

4°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 January 1958.
41U. S. Census of Population,
tracts 9 and 11.

(1950), op c i t . , census

42Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 October 1956.
43Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 January 1958.
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the courts nor the legislature, nor any political leader,
local or national, could promise:

Mayor Duckworth was

attempting to replace de jure (i.e., segregation mandated by
"Jim Crow" laws) with de facto (i.e., the separation that
occurs more naturally as a result of o n e 's choice of
residence in a predominantly Black or white neighborhood)
segregation.

The Duckworth Plan proposed to do more than

just control urban blight, it aimed to wipe out all of the
city's transition neighborhoods where indistinct color lines
had failed to produce two distinct neighborhood school
communities, the one Black and the other w h i t e .
The concept of geographic proximity and neighborhood
schools is essential to understanding the mastery of Duck
worth's approach.

The U.S. Supreme Court had been carefully

lead to its finding that separate schools were inherently
unequal by meticulous documentation of three instances:
1. The Brown case involved the child of a Black
minister who was living in an otherwise all-white
neighborhood.

Because Linda Brown was forced by state law

to attend an all-Black school farther from her residence
than the all-white school attended by her neighbors, the
U. S. Supreme Court ruled that this separate treatment of
Black students living in white neighborhoods was unequal,
and therefore unconstitutional.
2.

A companion case involved Prince Edward County,

Virginia, which had no public high school for Black pupils.
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Because attendance at the county high school was restricted
to whites only (Blacks were bused to an adjoining county),
the Court ruled that in such instances where no public
schools existed for Blacks, then the doctrine of separation
was unequal and therefore unconstitutional.
3.

Other companion cases involved school systems

where lawyers could show by a preponderance of statistical
evidence— per-pupil expenditures, teacher salaries, quality
of textbooks, age of physical plant, support facilities, and
the like--that the Black schools were clearly inferior to
those for whites only.

In such instances, the Court ruled,

where separate schools are demonstrably unequal, then the
laws requiring such separation are unconstitutional.44
Thus a careful reading of the legal situation at the
time revealed that segregation was safe from attack as long
as the city had enough high quality Black schools closer to
all of the city's Black residents than were the white
institutions.
Norfolk was no longer worried that its Black schools
could be found inherently inferior to its white institu
tions:

the city had made vast strides at improving and

up-grading its Black schools, even to the point where its
Black teachers were better paid, more educated, and more

44Milton Finkelstein, Hon. Jawn A. Sandifer, Elfreda S.
Wright, Minorities:
U.S.A., (New York:
Globe Books, 1971),
pp. 123-130.
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experienced than the white teachers.45

Indeed, writing in

February, 1957, U. S. Federal District Court Judge Walter
Hoffman commented on Norfolk's success in achieving a
"separate but equal" dual system of education:
The sum and substance of the School
Superintendent's evidence is that the City of
Norfolk has substantially complied with the
"separate but equal" doctrine, which was
applicable prior to the decision in Brown v.
Board of Education. The City of Norfolk is to
be commended for its rapid strides in bringing
about an equalization in physical equipment,
curriculum, teacher load, and teachers'
salaries.
If the "separate but equal" doctrine
were now in existence, there would be no
grounds for relief to be afforded these [Black]
plaintiffs.46
Mayor Duckworth was worried, however, that a close
scrutiny of the city's neighborhoods would reveal several
areas where color lines were indistinct or where Black
students actually lived closer to the all-white school than
the Black school they were attending.

The Duckworth Plan

aimed simply at stomping out any potential variance to the
de facto segregated school concept tentatively still
approved by the Supreme Court because it was based upon
geographic proximity rather than state law.

Top priority

among those schools that would have been forced to integrate

45Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 13 December 1951.
46Leola Pearl Beckett, et al. v. School Board of the
City of Norfolk, et a l ., Civil Case No. 2244, U. S. General
District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, reprinted in
Race Relations Law Reporter 2: 2 (April, 1957), p. 338.
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on the basis of neighborhood proximity was the Patrick Henry
Elementary School in the Atlantic City section of the city.
The Virginian-Pilot underscored the Mayor's concern in this
regard:
The increase of Negro population in Atlantic
City in recent years is reflected in Patrick
Henry School, which would feel the highest
proportionate integration of the thirteen
Norfolk white schools in "fringe" districts.
Recent figures indicated that there would be 50
Negro pupils to 300 white pupils at Patrick
Henry in the event of desegregation.4"7
Thirteen of the plaintiffs in the N.A.A.C.P. school
integration suit lived closer to Patrick Henry Elementary
School than to the Black institution they were attending
when the suit was filed in May of 1956.4S

When the

Atlantic City Project was announced, the case had just
finished its discovery phase, and Judge Hoffman was
preparing to order the integration of Patrick Henry
Elementary, which had previously served just the white
students in Atlantic City.
According to the testimony of the Division
Superintendent, there are some localities in the
City of Norfolk, which will create individual
problems in the elementary school system,
particularly at the Patrick Henry School and the
Gatewood School where the percentage of white to
colored students would be approximately four to
one, with the preponderance of the student body
being white, which allocation is based upon the

4VNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 March 1957.
4BNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 May 1958.
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one, with the preponderance of the student body
being white, which allocation is based upon the
assumption that the school children are assigned
only in accordance with normal geographical
consideration.49
Judge Hoffman obviously realized that the Norfolk
Redevelopment and Housing Authority was rushing to reduce
the impact of his decision to integrate Patrick Henry
Elementary:

. . . . as to the Patrick Henry School, there is
a redevelopment and housing plan now in its
early stages which, if carried through to its
completion, will substantially reduce the number
of colored children who would ordinarily be
assigned to [the] Patrick Henry School.50
Not even Judge Hoffman realized the speed with which
the Housing Authority would undertake its planned demolition
of the project area.

Although the project was not announced

until December (1956), its boundaries were not really set
until late May (1957); even so, by the start of the
1957-1958 school year, demolition had been extensive enough
that more than two-thirds of the Patrick Henry classrooms
stood empty.51

By the time the crucial 1958-1959 school

year was ready to begin, the school had closed entirely.52

49Leola Pearl Beckett, et al. , v. School Board of the
City of Norfolk, V a . , et a l . , op cit. p 339.
5°Ibid., p. 339.
51Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 9 August, 1957.
52Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 May 1958.
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Five other plaintiffs in the N.A.A.C.P. suit lived
closer to the all-white Gatewood School in the Berkley
section of the city than to one of the Black schools there;
by the time the 1958-1959 school year was about to begin,
the Gatewood School, the other school that Judge Hoffman had
indicated would experience extensive integration,53 had
been shifted to the Black school system, thereby relieving
that threat as well.

The political powers that governed

Norfolk at the time were well aware, as was the VirginianPilot, that such actions dissipated the strength of the
N.A.A.C.P.'s argument:
The significance of a plaintiff's proximity
to a school has been pointed up repeatedly in
other places where desegregation was ordered
. . . Two elementary schools that formerly faced
the prospect of desegregation apparently don't
any longer.
Gatewood School, now white, will
become a Negro school next fall.
For five
plaintiffs, it was the closest school.
Patrick
Henry School is nearest for thirteen plaintiffs,
but this school will be converted to administra
tive uses.54
The other nine plaintiffs in the original N.A.A.C.P.
complaint lived closer to a Black school than a white
one,55 thereby giving the School Board "legitimate"
reasons for denying their applications for transfer.

The

S3Leola Pearl Beckett, et al. , v. School Board of the
City of Norfolk, V a . , et a l . , op cit. , p. 339.
54Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 March 1957.
SBIbid.
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N.A.A.C.P. suit had been filed in May of 1956,ss and only
the city's headlong rush into redevelopment of the Atlantic
City area had averted the immediate threat; bulldozer
diplomacy had achieved the desired result in less than two
years' time from conception to completion.
The Mayor and his advisors were well aware that under
current state law, if even one of Norfolk's 46 elementary
schools were forced to open with mixed classes, then state
funds, which then accounted for one-fourth of the local
school budget, would be cut off to all 46 schools in that
category.57

Although their precipitate actions in the

case of Patrick Henry and Gatewood Elementary Schools had
temporarily "saved" at least the elementary school system,
they were not in the least disposed to take any chances:
for this reason Pineridge Elementary School in the Broad
Creek section was closed,58 and Henry Clay Elementary
School in the Downtown area59 and Broad Creek Village
School60 were torn down as a result of the other
redevelopment projects.

The School Board, whose earlier $15

million school building program had been rejected because of
past differences with the Council, now was sent scurrying

56Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 May 1956.
57Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 May 1958.
5SNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 February 1956.
59Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 January 1958.
6°Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 21 December 1957.
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back to the drawing boards for a quick, and less costly,
revision.

Their revised $5.5-million proposal included an

immediate go-ahead on the combined elementary, junior, and
senior high school for Blacks in the Oakwood-Rosemont area
and cutting back the proposed additions and improvements to
existing Black schools by 40%.61 The Oakwood-Rosemont com
bination school was clearly designed to alleviate the triple
threat of integration to Norview Elementary, Junior, and
Senior High schools in the newly annexed Tanner's Creek
District.

Mayor Duckworth was anxious that the School Board

dispense with the preliminaries and get on with the building
"as rapidly as possible."

A Virginian-Pilot reporter quoted

the Mayor's rationale:
This is the school that the School Board
promised the court it would build by this fall.
Let's go ahead with it as rapidly as we can.62
The only other area that might possibly be effected
immediately by court-ordered integration lay in the Lamberts
Point section of the city.

Although six of the original

N.A.A.C.P. plaintiffs attended the Smallwood Elementary
School (Black), all lived closer to that school than to
nearby Madison or Larchmont elementary schools (white).63
Nevertheless, the city's Old Dominion Redevelopment Project

63-Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 28 March 1958.
62Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 14 January 1959.
63Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 May 1958.
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(N.R.H.A. Project Two) would bulldoze 40 acres in the area,
wipe out the transition neighborhoods, and re-establish
readily identifiable color lines in that community.

Thus,

of the more than 500 Blacks that were determined to
"threaten" the sanctity of the white segregated school
system in the winter of 1956,54 fast action towards
redevelopment and school construction had alleviated the
legal standing based upon geographic proximity of all but
about 40 of the potential plaintiffs, and none of these as
yet posed any immediate threat in current litigation.
Duckworth's plan to make de facto segregation a permanent
substitute for de jure segregation appeared to be a master
ful success:

only Black students in the tiny Bollingbrook

community (near Suburban Park School) in the Granby district
and secondary students in the Titustown and Benmoreell areas
remained as yet unaffected by changes already instituted.
Of the 16 schools potentially threatened by a court order to
integrate based upon the theory of geographic proximity, two
(Patrick Henry and Broad Creek Village) were in the path of
the redevelopment bulldozer, another (Benmoreell) was to be
torn down by the city for a park, two (Robert Gatewood and
John Marshall) had been transferred from the white to the
Black school system, one (Pineridge Elementary) had been
closed, three others (Norview Senior High, Norview
Elementary, and Norview Junior High) had been spared by the

64Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 February 1957.
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Rosemont combination school then under construction, and
four others (W. H. Taylor Elementary, Blair Junior High,
Maury High School, and James Madison Elementary) had been
rescued from much of their potential threat by an aggressive
redevelopment program (see Figures 5, 6, and 7, on the
following pages).
Mayor Duckworth's plan to achieve total de facto
segregation was in full keeping with the political realities
that then existed in Virginia.

The School Board, the City

Council, the city's legislative delegation, and other savvy
political leaders knew full well that if Norfolk took any
action towards potential compliance with the impending
desegregation litigation.- then such action would "provoke"
the rest of the state into a "Stop Norfolk" movement that
could have dire consequences for the city.65

Political

leaders knew that the city's best hope lay in delaying the
eventuality of such a decision long enough so that a number
of other localities would be forced into the "same boat" as
Norfolk, and thereby form the impetus for a more realistic
approach by the rest of the state.

A crisis hitting several

localities simultaneously, most political leaders believed,
would build up quick political pressure for the governor to
convene the legislature in a special session to enact some
sort of "reasonable" plan for gradual desegregation.

The

city's best hope in the winter of 1956-1957 was to hold out

6SNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 16 March 1957.
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FIGURES.

Norfolk's-Racial Patterns and Redevelopment Areas, Circa 1958.

Redevelopment Project
Black Neighborhood
Transition Area

(1) Old Oaninion Project (NRHA #2)

(3) Oowntown Redevelopment Project

(2) Atlantic City Project

(4) Broad Creek Industrial Park
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SCHOOL

POTENTIAL BLACK POP.

Patrick Henry Elementary

50

ACTION

DISPOSITION
Closed

Atlantic City Project

DATE
7/10/57

Robert Gatewood Elementary

50 - 60

Transferred to Blacks

Transferred

5/20/58

James Madison Elementary

25 - 30

Old Dominion Project

Rezoned

7/10/57

Construct Rosemont

Rezoned

3/27/58

Norview Elementary

35

James Monroe Elementary

1-3

Not Available

W. H. Taylor Elementary

1-3

Atlantic City Project

Rezoned

7/10/57

Closed

2/09/57

Pineridge Elementary

Navy Housing

Broad Creek Project

Broad Creek Elementary

Navy Housing

Broad Creek Project

Torn Down

12/20/57

Benmoreell Elementary

Navy Housing

Closed the School

Torn Down

5/7/56

John Marshall Elementary
Norview Junior High

extensive
200 - 225

Transferred

3/21/57

Construct Rosemont

Rezoned

3/27/58

Rezoned

7/10/57

Transferred to Blacks

Blair Junior High

some

Atlantic City Project

Granby High School

some

Not Available

Maury High School

some

Atlantic City Project

Rezoned

7/10/57

Build Rosemont & Coronado

Rezoned

3/27/58

Norview High School

75

Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 February 1957.
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FIGURE 6. FROM DE JURE TO DE FACTO: SCHOOL RESREGATION IN NORFOLK, 1956-1958
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Black Housing Areas
Mixed Race/Transition Housing

Figure 7.

A

a
c
D
B
F

Impact of De Facto Segregation and School Locations

Benmorell
Madison
Patrick Henry
Marshall
Gatewood
Broadcreek

G
X
Y
Z
1
2

Pineridge
Norview Junior, Senior and
Maury High
Blair Junior
Rosemont Elementary/Junior
Coronado Elementary
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long enough for cases already pending against Arlington,
Charlottesville, Newport News, Prince Edward County, and,
hopefully, other localities to achieve a simultaneous
decision.66

The Norfolk case, which was decided by Judge

Walter Hoffman on February 12, 1957,67 was by then winding
its way through the appeals process to the Supreme Court,
but local legal experts privately doubted that legal
maneuvering could stall desegregation for the one more year
it would take the cases in other cities to catch up . 6S
The emergency state laws that established the state pupil
placement board had already been declared unconstitutional
in the Norfolk case, and that decision had been upheld by
the U. S. Supreme Court.69

It seemed that in the winter

of 1956-57 that there was little the city could do to
forestall desegregation of its white public schools in the
fall (1957)--at least a full year before any other locality
would be faced with a similar crisis— except sit back and
accept the calumny of the rest of the state.
Thus, the Duckworth Plan, although no such proposal
was ever publically announced, was introduced within this
atmosphere of political panic; there was no announcement of
any concerted program to achieve anything other than the

66Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 March 1957.
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 February 1957.
6BNorfolk Virginian-Pilot,

26 March 1957.

69Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 October 1957.
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publicly espoused goals of the various redevelopment pro
jects and school building programs, nor was there any wide
spread understanding of just why the city was taking these
particular steps; nevertheless, a certain calm prevailed
among the citizenry that "something" either would be or was
being done to avert the crisis, regardless of the cost of
such a diversion.

The immediate action— the time between

the first public hearing to the first demolition was less
than six months— on the Atlantic City Project and the
transfer of the Robert Gatewood Elementary School to the
Black system solved the crises at hand by frustrating the
14 litigants who would most definitely have been assigned to
white schools during the 1957-58 school term.

With the

state pupil placement legislation declared unconstitutional,
a local board policy of denying transfer, regardless of the
race of the applicant, to a school at a greater geographic
proximity was just enough of a legal loophole to delay
speedy enactment of Judge Hoffman's order.

It was a

brilliant ploy, and one that won an additional one year
reprieve for the Norfolk Schools.70

That extra year gave

the city time to plan for additional delays by using the
powers of redevelopment and the policy of school con
struction to forestall additional transfer requests based
upon geographic proximity; until this was achieved, the
School Board was clearly instructed to deny all requests for

70Ibid.
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transfer from a Black to a white school, even if faced with
court order to do so.71
At its very least the Duckworth program of concerted
redevelopment and school construction helped to buy time
before the city had to face the eventuality of school
desegregation; at its very best, the plan would lessen the
impact of school desegregation upon specific areas targeted
by the N.A.A.C.P. suit, and thus make it possible for the
court to diffuse that impact as thinly as possible among all
the schools in the city— a step that was crucial in leading
to the eventual compliance with and acceptance of desegrega
tion.

In all likelihood, the general public, given the

political climate and emotional conditions of the day, would
probably have concurred with his program had they been given
a chance.
The important thing from the point of view of history,
however, is that the public was never given a chance to
approve or disapprove the overall program; neither were the
people given an opportunity to understand or disregard its
consequences.

Duckworth's Plan had been carefully hand

crafted in a political vacuum of his own construction.

The

Duckworth political strategy of pre-session dress rehearsals
and "briefing" sessions for the Council, of the "planned
incumbency" method of denying voters a reasonable voice in
selecting freshmen councilmen, of "mayoral government" that

73-Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 August 1958.
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disregarded the advice of citizen boards and professional
authorities alike, of one-party dominance that crushed
opposition and stifled constructive dissent, and of "strong
man rule" that promoted one elected official above all
others, had produced a dictatorial climate of consent that
would permit whatever the ruling powers, benign or other
wise, wished.

The public was removed from its far more

active role under the People's administration, and can
hardly be held culpable for the failures of the Mayor's
policy.

Redevelopment projects, especially, had to fulfill

federal requirements that the affected individuals had been
provided a full opportunity to be involved in the planning,
design, and implementation of the program.72

Norfolk,

however, was extremely remiss in this regard, and its
officials preferred to run the city as much like a company
as they could— as if they were the board of directors, major
decisions could be made in secrecy, and no one else mattered
very much.73

The people, however, seemed to care very

little one way or another about the crucial decisions that
faced the city; so long as they were spared the gory details
of complicated policy decisions, they would approve by
inertia whatever actions, no matter how drastic, were
undertaken to preserve the status q u o .

72Luther J. Carter, formerly City Hall and schools
reporter for the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, interview by author,
Tape recordeing, Washington, D.C., 12 January 1991.
73Ibid.
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As for the business community, their consent was
assured from the outset.

Redevelopment was too good for

business in general and too important an economic boost for
the Tidewater area as a whole to be opposed.

The Mayor was

simply enacting their most far-fetched dreams, although with
a speed, a scope, and an urgency they may not have under
stood.

Surely there were those among the business community

who fathomed the true motivation behind the Duckworth
redevelopment proposals, but these same leaders knew how
disastrous a school confrontation would be for the city.
The state had backed the city against the wall on desegre
gation:

the federal courts would not allow it to continue

public education as before, and yet the state would not let
it retreat towards token integration.

Credit is due Mayor

Duckworth because he at least found a way to break out of
that corner.

Probably no one, not even the Mayor, expected

redevelopment to provide a permanent solution to the prob
lem, but it did supply the city with a grant of additional
powers that might help him negotiate some sort of settlement
short of desegregation with the Black community.

At the

very least, the Duckworth Plan answered the court direc
tives, bought additional time for the city to work out a
more permanent solution, and gave the Mayor flexibility to
deal with both the crisis at hand and the rebuilding of the
city.

No one in the city's business or political leadership

really expected that Black children would ever attend white
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schools in Norfolk,74 and so nobody suspected how much the
city had traded for what would turn out to be a temporary
fix.

Ironically, by advancing such a far-reaching program

under these less than honorable motivations, the Mayor had
finally achieved the promise contained in the moniker of his
1950 Harmony Ticket:

the city's business establishment and

its political organization were at last joined together in a
consensus on municipal directions--more united than they had
been at any time since Fred Duckworth had assumed control of
its destiny.

74Robert L. Mason.
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CHAPTER SIX
PRELUDE TO CONFRONTATION
In spite of the apparent success of the Mayor's rede
velopment program to prevent school desegregation, a number
of factors began to appear which would serve to harden
Norfolk, and especially its established business and poli
tical leadership, into a stronghold of Massive Resistance.
In that context, and to everyone's surprise, Mayor W. Fred
Duckworth turned out to be a "very Massive Resister,"1 and
did something few would have suspected:
with reality.2

he lost all touch

For several years since the Brown decision,

the local chapter of the statewide Massive Resistance
support group, the Defenders of State Sovereignty and
Individual Liberties, had labored to establish a respected
political force that could be counted on to endorse the Byrd
Organization when it advanced ardent segregationists, but
also to oppose it when it backed lukewarm or local option
resisters.

In spite of its penchant for lost causes, such

as the T. Coleman Andrews Separatist Party 1956 Presidential
bid, the local Defenders had carved for themselves a small

1Pretlow Darden.
2Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 4 July 1975.
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following among the city's retail merchants and small
businessmen, the major component of their parent, statewide
effort.

It had been pushed in the past dangerously close to

the fringe of accepted political behavior, but it had always
fought its way back to the core of this small constituency:
when one of its local members was found to be distributing
"hate sheet" literature, the Defenders passed a resolution
condemning such actions.3
The logic of the Defender's argument was powerfully
convincing for most of Norfolk's white citizens:

they be

lieved that the U. S. Supreme Court had made an "unconstitu
tional" decision in the Brown case, thereby substituting
"judicial legislation" under pressure from the N.A.A.C.P.
for the more legal process of constitutional amendment.
This "unconstitutional" decision posed a grave threat, they
believed, to the powers of all state governments, the timehonored tradition of state control of public education, and
the right of the majority to create the society of their
choosing.

Since a majority of the people in the country so

obviously favored a continuation of segregated schools, they
argued, the Brown decision really worked to undermine rule
by the majority in favor of the interests of a few.

The

Defenders backed their claim of an "unconstitutional" court
decision with a supporting document signed by three-fourths

3Forrest P. White, M.D., unpublished, untitled, and
undated (1959) article, Norfolk Committee for Public Schools
files, Old Dominion University Archives.
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of the state supreme court justices in the country.

A vast

majority of Norfolk's white voters apparently agreed with
the Defender's unconstitutional-court-order sentiment; it
was the second part of their logic they resisted:

the

Defenders felt that closing the South's public schools in
defiance of court orders to integrate was the only proper
way to show public opposition against such dangerously
political decisions.4

As long as there was no real threat

of either integrating or closing Norfolk's schools, the
people of Norfolk were not committed to this course of
action; the Virginia Legislature, however, had adopted this
stance in choosing the Stanley Plan of Massive Resistance
over the Gray Commission's local option proposal of
moderation.
Partly as a means to test the depth of Massive Resist
ance feeling in Norfolk, the Defenders fielded a three-man
slate in the June (1957) Democratic Primary to challenge the
Organization's more moderate legislative delegation.

The

race provided a perfect test of conflicting philosophies:
the Organization regulars included a strong Young Turk
contingent of urban progressives, had been supporters of the
more moderate Gray Commission local option plan to comply in
part with court-ordered desegregation, and had opposed the
Stanley Plan, endorsed by the Defenders, to close desegre
gated schools.

Lieutenant Colonel J. Addison Hagan, Jr.

4Ibid.
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(U.S.M.C., Retired), a Byrd Organization irregular who had
served a stint in the Virginia House of Delegates following
the war, headed the Defender ticket, which included Harvey
E. White, Jr., a young attorney, and Frank R. Ford, a
downtown jeweler.5

The incumbents did their best to avoid

the Massive Resistance issue, preferring instead to tout a
more moderate platform which included poll tax repeal,
budgetary reform, and liberalization of the state's archaic
liquor laws.5

In spite of the considerable strength of the

Prieur Democratic Organization and the backing of the
business community, the Defender's ticket of Hagan-FordWhite waged such a vigorous campaign that the incumbents
were afraid.

The final outcome of the tally hinged on late

returns from a few questionable voting precincts; Colonel
Hagan vehemently maintained that Billy Prieur stole the
election by stuffing the ballot boxes to insure victory.7
The attitude of the Norfolk voters was clearly harden
ing against moderation, and a position of defiance that
included the sacrifice of closed schools was gaining in
popularity.

When the issue emerged again five months later

in the Virginia gubernatorial race, public opinion had come
full circle.

The Democratic candidate was J. Lindsay

5Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 April 1957.
GNorfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 29 March 1957.
7J. Addison Hagan, interview by Dr. James Sweeney,
Transcript, 25 January 1977, Old Dominion University Archives.
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Almond, a formidable campaigner fully able to take advantage
of this rising tide of defiance: he was universally recog
nized as having been the legal brains behind the Stanley
school-closing Plan of Massive Resistance.

Almond had given

up a seat in Congress to fill in as the state's Attorney
General; he had won re-election twice to that position, and
was now impatient to move up to Virginia's highest office.
The Organization's nod probably would have gone instead to
State Senator Garland Gray,

author of the state's more

moderate local option plan of compliance.

Senator Gray had

hardened his own resistance and had backed away from the
plan that bore his name, but Almond's full-blown entry into
the Democratic Primary forced him to withdraw.

The

Republicans again nominated Ted Dalton, their most popular
and attractive candidate in almost 80 years.

Four years

earlier Dalton had come within just a few percentage points
of defeating Governor Stanley, admittedly a less formidable
opponent than Almond.

Dalton's platform was a paragon of

moderation, calling for repeal of the worst of the Massive
Resistance laws and otherwise preventing school closings.
Almond, however, campaigned with the full Massive Resistance
bombast, calling for hardline defiance all the way to the
school house door.
The race was a classic contest of public sentiment on
the desegregation question:

both candidates were strong

campaigners who enjoyed solid party backing.

Almond,
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however, swept to an easy victory, pulling more than 60% of
the vote.
control:

Dalton had been swamped by events far beyond his
when President Eisenhower sent federal troops to

Little Rock, Arkansas, to enforce court-ordered desegrega
tion, all hope of a Dalton victory faded forever.

Although

no one in Virginia really wanted to close public schools,
Almond's Stanley Plan did promise a way to prevent integra
tion without having to face a similar threat of armed troops
in Virginia.®
The intervention of federal troops into the Little
Rock school crisis obviously had a profound effect upon
local residents.

Whereas only a few months earlier most

Norfolkians apparently were prepared to accept a minimum of
desegregation in order to keep the public schools open, now
a number of indicators pointed to the fact that a majority
had begun to prefer instead school closings to even token
integration.

The sight of bayonets, rifles, and uniforms

had seemed to underscore the argument of the resisters that
the South was at war with the federal courts, and that any
tactic which by-passed or postponed a similar confrontation
in Norfolk was acceptable.

Almond tallied an "impressive

majority" in the city by campaigning almost exclusively on
his Stanley Plan to circumvent federal court-ordered
desegregation.

The local legislative delegation, too, began

®Virginius Dabney, Virginia: The New Dominion, op c i t . ,
p p . 538-540.
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to back away from their own earlier position of moderation
in favor of a hardline posture.9

They were obviously aware

that not even ballot box finagling could have saved them if
Little Rock had occurred just before their own Democratic
primary race against the Defender slate.

Just before that

primary they had pledged their willingness to go "head-tohead" with the governor to prevent a funds cutoff or school
showdown in Norfolk;3-0 now, less than a year later, they
were promising to let Governor Almond "have a perfectly free
hand, even if it means closing our schools."3-1

The

strength of the Defender's challenge, Almond's impressive
showing in the city, the opposition to the events in Little
Rock, and an emerging sense of defiance on the part of the
citizenry had convinced the Norfolk legislative delegation,
among the most moderate in the General Assembly, to support
a hard-line stance of Massive Resistance that would obvious
ly have been personally repugnant to every one of them only
a year earlier— events were moving rapidly to a showdown in
Norfolk.

No wonder that, taken in this context of defiance,

the Mayor's Plan of immediate and selective redevelopment of
vast segments of the city was accepted by all those in a
position to guess its true intent.

9Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 10 March 1958.
3-°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 July 1956.
13-Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 14 May 1958.
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One other factor was cited as contributing to the
shift of the local legislators:

the unrelenting legal pres

sure still being applied by the N.A.A.C.P.'s attorneys.12
Any thought of congratulatory action on the Mayor's part for
avoiding a Little Rock in Norfolk in 1957 quickly faded; the
N.A.A.C.P. refused to back down.

Duckworth's Plan and his

obvious willingness to employ the myriad powers of
redevelopment against the homes of Black litigants had
bought time, but the N.A.A.C.P. was not intimidated into
dropping its case.

Instead Duckworth's actions forced a

rethinking of the strategy, and the N.A.A.C.P. went right
ahead with its plans to enlist new plaintiffs, and so
continue the earlier challenge.

If the N.A.A.C.P. had erred

in its initial effort, the mistake was because the first
litigants were drawn from only a few isolated neighborhoods;
second, it had concentrated its legal attack upon desegre
gating the city's elementary schools, the one educational
institution most closely bound by the geographic confines of
a single neighborhood.

The Mayor had won the first round

because he was willing to demolish the threatened areas and
their neighborhood schools.

The N.A.A.C.P. was determined

to win this round by avoiding the neighborhood schools.
Since the Mayor had not yet shown any inclination to
destroy the city's larger and more costly secondary institu
tions, the N.A.A.C.P. apparently decided to aim its second

12Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 10 March 1958.
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legal assault at Norfolk's white junior and senior high
schools.

This tactic seemed appropriate for a number of

reasons.

First, the assault seemed to block the Mayor's use

of the redevelopment weapon:

each secondary institution

served too many students and too wide a geographic area to
make it a target for either closing or urban renewal.
Although the city had shown its willingness in the Atlantic
City and Broad Creek Projects to attack predominantly white
neighborhoods, a new redevelopment effort of any great
magnitude was probably out of the question.

Second, the

wide geographic area encompassed by each secondary institu
tion meant that there were potentially hundreds of litigants
for whom the argument of geographic proximity could be made.
Third, the Black community had never been entirely happy
with the challenge at the elementary level, partly because
it involved younger children who would be less prepared for
the personal hardships and even dangers inherent in integra
tion, and partly because it involved the destruction of
strong neighborhood loyalties and personal ties.

The

assault on secondary schools would involve older students
who could more easily be prepared physically and mentally
for the rigors involved.

The Black community could solidly

support such a move because it involved the impairment of
fewer Black neighborhood loyalties.

There was only one

Black high school and two Black junior highs in the city,
and to most segments of the Black community (and even some
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in the white) the most insidious form of racial discrimina
tion was evident in the lines of Black youths that were
forced to queue up at an early hour for long bus rides
across town to these institutions.

The decision to partici

pate in litigation was one that the secondary students could
make for themselves:

many would rather face the personal

dangers involved in integration than face the prospect of
six years of crosstown busing.

Finally, there were elements

in the white community that might be more sympathetic to
breaking down the doors of segregated secondary institu
tions than in an assault on the city's primary schools:

the

white students involved might be more open to new ideas and
less tied to the attitudes of their parents than their
younger brothers and sisters in the elementary schools; the
parents might be less protective of older students because
they were better able to handle themselves; and the bastion
of the neighborhood school, so important to both the Black
and white communities, would be by and large protected by
expanding the concept to include racial as well as
geographic neighbors.
The N.A.A.C.P. had instituted a brilliant legal maneu
ver, and one which it sensed would be ultimately successful.
Duckworth, however, was not disposed to give up so easily;
he could foresee doom if the N.A.A.C.P.'s plans were carried
out, and so, with the powers of redevelopment useless
against this new and fortified threat, he began to seek new
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means of racial intimidation to force the Black community to
withdraw from the litigation.

By late spring of 1958 the

pressure upon him had become so intense that he did some
thing few who knew him would have suspected:

he lost his

grip on reality,13 ordinarily an ever-present personal
resource, and became embroiled in a prolonged name-calling
battle with the Black community.

As an elected official

whose public credibility was at stake, the Mayor was bound
to lose such a battle, ever if he won all the skirmishes:
his personal invective, whether spoken openly or in the
private companionship of cronies, had no place in the local
political arena.

At the outset, however, his political

position and personal power were so entrenched and his
dominance so insured that the reaction of the white
community was hidden behind a veil of silent assent.
The opening shots in the verbal battle were fired by
the Mayor when a group of traditional Black leaders
approached the Council in June of 1958 with a request to
establish a bi-racial advisory commission to reverse the
deterioration in race relations that had taken place in the
preceding months.

It was a simple request, and one with

which the old People's government would have complied
forthrightly.

Dr. Lyman Brooks, the president of Norfolk's

Black state college and a figure of gentility highly
regarded by both the Black and white communities, rose to

13Robert Mason.
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present the petition.14

Before he could get through

reading the first lines of his request, however, the Mayor
felt prompted to utter a prolonged racial slur which
included the inference that there were "too d — n many Blacks
behind bars and not enough at the tax counters."15

The

Mayor's off-color remark at the usually staid and highly
predictable Council session clearly caught the press and
spectators off guard.

Most, including the news reporters

present, pretended not to hear the invective, and Dr.
Brooks, much to his credit, refused to argue the point, but
the affront came in for some mild criticism at the hands of
the Virginian-Pilot editorial writers as "an unwelcome and
irrelevant note that is not a politically sound one."16
If Mayor Duckworth had hoped to provoke an outburst
from the Black leadership and so turn public reaction
against them, he was sadly mistaken.

Instead, his off-color

invective only served to strengthen the resolve of the
Blacks to air their grievances before a broader representa
tion of the white citizenry.

Newspaper reporters who sought

a response from Dr. Brooks, found only this staid response:
The fundamental thing that is disturbing to
me is that there really are no relations between
the races in Norfolk.
I'm not sure Norfolk
people know where they stand on this . . . .

14Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 June 1958.
15Norfolk Virginian-Pilot , 12 June 1958.
16Ibid.
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Richmond, is considered to be a more conservative
city, yet Negroes are on all the important
commissions in Richmond . . . . Norfolk has no
police officer above the rank of patrolman, and
there are no Negroes on any policy-making
commission under city government [i.e., the
School Board, Redevelopment and Housing
Authority, Planning Commission, Port Authority,
etc.], except the Recreation Commission, which
is purely advisory.17
Dr. Brooks, always a powerful force in arranging con
ciliation between the races, was clearly trying to point the
way towards several symbolic shifts that could be made
immediately to placate the Black community and help resolve
the current racial impasse.

Indirectly, by pointing the

finger at city hiring and appointment practices, he was
laying the blame for nonexistent racial communications at
the feet of the Mayor and his political organization.

P. B.

Young, Sr., who had served on a number of advisory boards
and bi-racial special commissions during the P e o p l e ’s reign,
noted other causes of concern:
The deterioration in race relations--in
business, government, welfare agencies, the
Community Fund, school administration--has been
noticeable since the Supreme Court decisions
began banning segregation in public schools and
public parks. . . . [other factors which should
share the blame are] the current housing
shortage, difficulties in obtaining credit for
[Black] construction, and the activities of the
Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual
Liberties.13

17Ibid.
18Ibid.
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If Duckworth had thought that his hard-line attitude
would force the Black community to back away from school
desegregation, then he had erred significantly; in fact, the
uproar caused by his prejudicial slur only served to unite
the Black leadership more closely than ever before behind
the goal of attaining desegregated schools.

In the absence

of other symbolic goals befitting their rank and standing in
the community (such as Black elected officials, judges, top
city administrators, or appointees to the major boards and
commissions), the desegregation of Norfolk's public schools
in direct defiance of the wishes of the Mayor and the Prieur
Organization that had fought so hard against them, obviously
took on new meaning for the city's Black leaders.

A group

of prominent Black ministers responded to Duckworth's retort
by opposing his desire to have Blacks "waive their civil
rights" as a condition to restoring racial harmony; other
Black leaders joined them in repudiating the Mayor's
attempts at bi-racial "bargaining."19

The N.A.A.C.P.,

the group targeted by Duckworth as the villains of racial
disunity, declined comment in the white press, and, instead,
redoubled their efforts to attain Black plaintiffs for their
litigation.

Before the Mayor's action, they had obtained 44

Black requests for transfer;20 after the imbroglio, they

19Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 June 1958.
2°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 June 1958.
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were able to sign up more than 100 plaintiffs,21 in spite
of the fact that the School Board was releasing the names of
all such litigants for publica-tion22— an action that
clearly subjected them to the dangers of verbal abuse,
intimidation, and possible physical assault.
The Duckworth Plan of combining redevelopment demoli
tion with targeted school construction appears to have been
undertaken to achieve two ends.

The plan had the effect of

moving to replace segregation by law (de ju r e ), which was
then falling under court attack, with de facto segregation
(in fact), by demolishing and otherwise realigning those
previously all-white segregated elementary schools threaten
ed by integration from the small Black populations living
within their geographic boundaries.

The N.A.A.C.P.'s

brilliant reversal of strategy in the shift of its legal
focus upon the city's white junior and senior high schools
had rendered the Mayor's Plan useless towards this end.
Each secondary school drew from too large a neighborhood for
redevelopment to be successful, and each school was too
large and expensive to tear down or relocate; nor could the
Mayor realistically consider transferring such schools to
the Black community without facing widespread revolt from
white school patrons.

Even though only six schools were

involved in the N.A.A.C.P.'s renewed legal assault, more

21Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 August 1958.
22Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 June 1958.
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than 10,000 white students, cutting across every neighbor
hood and stratum of society, would be effected.

Also, the

courts would never have permitted the construction of Black
mini-high schools, because such schools would clearly have
been educationally unsound without the necessary expense of
the support facilities required for accreditation.
The second, and more tangential, possible impact of
the Duckworth Plan was to discourage future applications for
transfer from the Black community to white schools.

In this

the tactic had clearly failed, but whether this was because
of the Mayor's abrasive remark or because the Black communi
ty was really united behind its younger, more aggressive
leaders remains unknown.

At any rate, the effects of racial

intimidation, both official and unofficial, had failed to
pressure the N.A.A.C.P. into withdrawing its suit from the
courts.

As a final stab toward such an end, the School

Board, under the tutelage of Ben Willis, regarded as the
most conservative of the Duckworth appointees,23 delayed
the reappointment of every Black teacher in the school
system,24 but this action, also failed to produce the
desired panic.
The Black community had rallied firmly around the
N.A.A.C.P. and its efforts to desegregate the city's

23Forrest P. White, M . D . , untitled,
undated (1959) article, op. cit.

unpublished,

24Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 June 1958.
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secondary schools; the harshness of the Mayor's attitude and
the viciousness of such racial intimidation had precluded
any hope of an out-of-court appeasement with symbolic
gestures--something that might have worked in part at some
earlier date.

By the summer of 1958, the Black and white

communities could be perceived to be locked in a head-tohead struggle over school desegregation from which there
could be no retreat.

Far from discouraging new litigants,

the harshness of the struggle had produced 151 new plain
tiffs, all but one of whom fell into the category of living
closer to the white secondary school to which they had
applied.25

In the Black community these litigants were

treated as though they were crusaders engaged in a holy war.
The Journal and Guide hailed the new plaintiffs in a
euphoric photo-essay:
Study these faces . . . for they are the
faces of the future.
These young boys and
girls, with their parents' permission of course,
are the brave, pioneering, far-seeing, and
ambitious types who always figure in progress.
Having read about the trials and tribula
tions of others attending for the first time
previously all-white schools— in Little Rock,
Charlotte, Nashville, for instance— they still
chose to obtain their constitutional right to a
non-segregated education.
They may or may not gain their goal
immediately.
But they, or others who follow
them certainly shall— or democratic government
shall have become a mockery, and law and order
under a system of court-interpreted law shall

25Norfolk Virginian-Pilot , 30 August 1958.
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have ceased to exist effectively in the United
States of America."2®
Now that the integration of at least some of Norfolk's
secondary schools seemed assured--the new legal action was
certain to be successful and the goal of integrated schools
now seemed beyond negotiation for the city's Black leader
ship— public opinion began to coalesce around three separate
philosophical responses.

The Defenders firmly believed that

closing the public schools in defiance of a court order to
integrate was necessary to show united opposition to the
Supreme Court's dangerously political decisions.

If the

South held solid in its efforts to resist the Court's
encroachment upon state's rights and individual liberties,
then, they argued, the federal government would be forced to
back down.

There were not enough troops, the Defenders

argued, to force integration in every Southern community;
they didn't want trouble here in Virginia, and that was why
the state's political leaders had endorsed their idea to
close the threatened public schools rather than invite
conflict.

As one of the first communities in the South to

be faced with the probability of court-ordered integration,
Norfolk stood at the brink of an historic moment.

If

Massive Resistance worked here, the Defenders argued, every
other community across the South would be heartened.

In

light of the prominence of the city's position, the closing

2SNorfolk Journal and Guide, 30 August 1958.
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of the school house doors was a "small sacrifice" to pay for
the freedoms of the majority.
Maybe the schools will be closed for a time,
maybe for a whole year.
But it's a mighty small
sacrifice to pay to prevent integration and
discourage the federal courts from further
encroachments on s t a t e 's rights.
We can teach them [the children] just as
well in private schools; maybe better, because
w e '11 have a little more control over what
they're going to learn . . . . When we close the
schools in September, I say to mothers, don't
start squawking.27
Thus as a "temporary" substitute for those public schools
that might be forced to close in September, the Defenders
had formed the Tidewater Education Foundation to operate
segregated alternative schools for those students who found
themselves locked out of public classrooms.

The T.E.F.

offered a way for parents to support the concept of segre
gated public education for a nominal fee without sacrificing
the schooling of their children.

In addition, the T.E.F.

would be free to make its pitch to the community at large,
unfettered by the essentially negative political image of
the Defender's name.

If the "small sacrifice" the public

was expected to bear was to grow into more than a y e a r 's
duration, as most Defenders believed it would, the T.E.F.
was prepared to buy up the closed public schools for a
nominal fee and reopen them as segregated, private

27Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 July 1958.
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institutions.

To help defray the cost of private schools,

the state had enacted legislation to provide substantial
"tuition grants" to students forced to attend integrated
schools.23
The great majority of Norfolk citizens, however, did
not yet seem ready to accept the extreme measure of Massive
Resistance proposed by the Defenders and the T.E.F. system
of surrogate private education.

The epitome of the city's

moderate opinion even as late as the summer of 1958 was
expressed by School Board Chairman Paul Schweitzer who, when
he contemplated the possibility of closing all of the city's
white public schools, proclaimed: "I just can't imagine
36,000 children out on the streets.
imagine.

It's just impossible to

Let's don't lose our faith yet."29

There were

two scenarios of how a school lockout could be prevented:
the first was the rather pollyanna belief that "it couldn't
happen here"— that either some event or, as before, some
means would be found to further delay or defray the
imminence of the legal challenge.

Nothing as dramatic as

Mayor Duckworth's Plan of selective redevelopment was
envisioned in this scenario, but the full appeals process
had not yet been exhausted, the court order was not yet
absolute, and some legal gimmickry was still possible.

2BSee Benjamin T. Muse, Virginia's Massive Resistance
(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1961).
29Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 June 1958.
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Others believed, as did Joseph Leslie, editor of the Norfolk
Ledqer-Dispatch,30 that the public schools would have to
be closed, but only for a brief period of time.

These

people held that the decision to close public schools in
defiance of court orders to desegregate was a powerful
political weapon that, once wielded with resolve, would
force both the courts and the Black community to withdraw
and accept some other symbolic victory short of desegre
gation.

This was the essence of the Massive Resistance

theory:

that once the white community stood solidly against

integration, even going so far as to accept private school
alternatives, the crisis could not continue, and Congress,
the courts, the President and the state authorities would
seek to ameliorate a settlement.

Local Organization

chieftain Billy Prieur, the bulk of the state's Byrd
Democratic leadership, and the majority of the Norfolk
business community apparently held this belief.31
There were others in the city who felt, however, that
a school crisis was both more imminent and more long-lasting
than most people suspected.

They feared that the crisis

could not be as easy to resolve as the Organization
promised.

Foremost among their ranks was Lenoir Chambers

and the rest of his editorial staff on the Virginian-Pilot.
Once Norfolk closed its schools, they argued, the city faced

3°Robert L. Mason.
31Ibid.
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a far more difficult confrontation than it might otherwise
have experienced:

the Black community would not back down,

the courts would not relent, and the city would be forced to
submit to a greater federal authority over its public
schools once they were reopened.

The biggest effect of such

a school closing effort, they argued, would be the targeting
of Norfolk as a national scapegoat for 300 years of Southern
culture:
If our schools are closed, not only our
children suffer, but the entire city will be
severely damaged economically.
Norfolk's black eye on the national scene as
a result of closed schools would be one of the
most disastrous effects.
Norfolk is in the
market for industry . . . but industry would not
likely come to a city with a closed school
reputation . . . .
The closing of any schools, and the dis
organization of the school program might have a
disastrous effect on the Community Chest . . .
naval facilities . . . efforts to attract
industry . . . and every aspect of the economic
well-being of our city.32
The only hope that the anti-resistance forces could
offer was that the public schools could survive a minimum
amount of integration: accepting a few Black students would
neither dilute nor destroy the education program of the
white majority.

Only in this way, they argued, could the

city take its school system out from under the authority of
the federal courts and continue its economic growth

3^Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 20 June 1958.
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undeterred.

The most important action the people of Norfolk

could take, the anti-resisters argued, would be an out
pouring of public support for the school system regardless
of its racial purity.33

The School Board had labored for

almost four years to achieve this end, but as yet there had
been no such showing of public support for the schools, even
if desegregated.

At the beginning of the summer (June,

1958), a small group had approached the Mayor with the idea
of forming a pro-school organization; they envisioned a
group of prominent white citizens who would be willing to
openly commit themselves to continuing public education at
all cost.

In general, the Mayor indicated that he favored

the formation of such a group— he felt that such a white
citizen's organization could prove useful if the schools
were really closed at a later date34— but he was ardently
opposed to those who now sought its establishment, and thus
rebuffed their efforts as premature.
Duckworth had good reason to back away from this
particular organizing party; most of those who approached
him would be unacceptable to the bulk of Norfolk's white
citizenry.

The founding group of the Norfolk Committee for

Public Schools was well aware of the dilemma faced by their
organization; many of the organizers had worked prominently

33Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 September 1958.
34Robert L. Stern, board member, Norfolk Committee for
Public Schools, interview by author, Tape recording, Norfolk,
22 April 1978.
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in the city's various inter-racial activities, and they knew
all too well that they would immediately be accused of
trying to force integration on the public schools if they
surfaced as the leadership of such a group.35

If the

Committee was to be successful as a pressure group, then it
would have to be prepared to abandon its leadership to a
more representative assemblage; it would have to actively
recruit members who personally favored segregation, but who
preferred a continuation of public education even more
ardently.
Still the organizers felt that the founding of such a
group in June of 1958 was crucial to the fate of the city.
Few people had given any real thought as to what their
response would be if Norfolk's public schools actually were
closed for a prolonged period of time.

The court decree

ordering desegregation, and therefore forcing a closing
under state law, could come at any moment; yet most resi
dents, if they thought about the impending crisis at all,
were so unrealistic in their approach to the subject that
they were still busy trying to discern new legal tactics to
circumvent the court's authority.

Even the city's ordinar

ily savvy and well-informed political and economic leader
ship clung naively to the belief that somehow a strategy
would be found to stall the decision for another year or
two.

The pro-school advocates saw that in the summer of

35White, op cit.
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1958, only the Defenders were seriously making plans to
prepare for a prolonged school closing, and the T.E.F.'s
concept of private, segregated academies as an alternative
to desegregated public education was abhorrent to those who
now sought the Mayor's support.

They knew that the Massive

Resisters had shown themselves to be too powerful in the
last elections not to be taken seriously in the event of a
school showdown.

Unless there was some sort of competing

pressure group capable of orchestrating a strong showing of
support for keeping the schools open, they reasoned, then
Duckworth and the rest of the s t a t e 's political leaders
would be forced to bow to the Defender's push to close
schools in defiance of federal authority.

The pro-school

advocates knew that they themselves could not lead such a
movement if it were ever to have a chance of success, but
they hoped to establish the framework through which other,
more moderate and established elements in the community
could respond when the appropriate time arose.

In this

sense, the secretive founding of the Norfolk Committee for
Public Schools was not premature:

if the moderates were

ever to speak out in time to prevent a dismantling of the
city's system of public education, then, the founders
believed, they would have to be prodded by Norfolk's liberal
elements; otherwise, the natural inertia of the citizenry,
the superior political power of the Defenders, and the
prevailing belief that the conflict would somehow quickly
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resolve itself, would all work instead to prolong the
impending crisis.36
In the climate of malaise that prevailed, however, it
would be difficult for the pro-school advocates to discern a
locus of moderate support.

The one group that should have

been most aware of the approaching confrontation, the School
Board, was burdened by conflicting loyalties that rendered
its leadership impossible.

On the one hand, the Board

members were each deeply committed to continuing quality
public education, part of the rationale for their appoint
ment; on the other hand, however, they also owed their
advancement to a political organization itself actively
advocating Massive Resistance defiance.

Initially the

School Board had adopted a moderate posture that was
designed to make compliance with a desegregation order
possible for the white community to accept.
Brown decision their response had been:

Right after the

"If we adopt a

gradual plan of integration, there would be so little, you
wouldn't notice it."3’7

But that position of moderation

had become increasingly difficult to maintain in the charged
racial atmosphere that had emerged in the last few years.
Back in 1956 the board had endorsed an old People's concept
and formed a bi-racial advisory council to study the

36White, unpublished article.
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 January 1956.
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integration problem,33 but by the summer of 1958, that
early spirit of racial cooperation had totally vanished.
The N.A.A.C.P.'s new legal ploy had shifted the burden of
defending white Southern culture more squarely onto the
School Board than before, yet its members were becoming
increasingly aware that at least some of the 151 Black
litigants would slip through whatever screening criteria the
Board could legally impose.

If even one Black were assigned

to a white secondary school, then, under the state's Massive
Resistance laws, all such secondary institutions in the city
would be closed.39

School Board Chairman Paul Schweitzer

deftly summed up the situation faced by the Board that
siammer:

"It is obvious that this irresistible force of [a]

court order is about to collide with this immovable object,
the state."40
In spite of its earlier willingness to accept a
minimum of integration if it became necessary to save the
schools, there was every indication now that the School
Board intended to follow the policy established by Mayor
Duckworth and the city's political leadership and resist
court-ordered integration at all cost.

Surely the Organiza

tion expected the Board to resist; the city's legislative
delegation had completely reversed its moderate stand of

3aNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 August 1956.
39Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 14 May 1956.
4°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 June 1958.

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

300

compliance after examining the appeal of the Defender-backed
candidates,41 and there was every reason to believe that
the School Board, a similar assemblage of progressive
individuals not noted for their independence, would do
likewise.

If differences between the School Board and the

more conservative City Council existed, they were not made
public, and, in general, the school program progressed with
the solid backing of the Council.

In July, School Board

Chairman Paul Schweitzer was cordially reappointed without
any indication of differences with the Organization.42
That the School Board had in the past been overly aggressive
in its building proposals seemed to have been generally
forgiven by the Organization as the natural error of a
volunteer citizen group not charged with overseeing a
broader range of municipal responsibilities.

In any event,

the School Board's more modest scaled down building proposal
now seemed to fit closely with the city's overall plan to
achieve de facto segregation in the schools, even if the
publicly stated intent of the Board's proposal was "to mini
mize the effect of integration by using a plan for gradual
desegregation"43— a sentiment that on the surface seemed
to vary widely from the Mayor's intent.

Even the Board's

earlier posture of moderate compliance— a stance that

41Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 10 March 1958.
42Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 January 1959.
43Norfolk Virginian-Pilot. 8 March 1957.
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generated quite a favorable response from the local press,
some national attention, and more than a little

notoriety

among the Southside extremists44— seemed to have been for
given as the pronouncements of the Silkstocking holdovers
then on the Board; a majority of the School Board had been
replaced with Duckworth appointees since that time.
Subsequent statements by the School Board had been
issued jointly with the Council and the city's legislative
delegation, both of whom had at one time similarly vowed to
keep Norfolk's schools open at all cost.45

To the best of

its ability the Board had cooperated in every way with the
Council and its efforts to delay, avert, and even sabotage
the eventuality of school desegregation during the summer of
1958.

It waited until mid-August to render its decision on

the N.A.A.C.P.'s transfer applicants, and even then, under
pressure from the Federal Court to make a determination,
rejected all 151, using both rational logic and subterfuge
to do so.

It rejected 62 applicants because the individuals

had failed to submit to the follow-up interviews or testing
program required of all who sought transfers within the
school system; another 60 were determined to be unsuited for
transfer because of low test scores, poor grades, or a
record of "too frequent transfers;" 34 applicants who
requested transfer to schools in the Norview area, where

44Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 July 1955.
45Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 January 1959.
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racial intimidation and bombings had taken place, were
denied because of the district's past history of racial
disturbance:

"The Board is of the opinion that integration

there would renew such conflicts and produce grave adminis
trative problems within the school system— all to the
detriment of good education and the public welfare."

Four

other applicants were denied admission to Maury High, Granby
High, or Blair Junior High Schools because the Board
believed that:

"The isolation which would be caused by such

an assignment would be detrimental to educational progress
and may well cause emotional instability and even detriment
to health."45

Only one of the potential transfers was

rejected because it came from a Black living closer to a
Black school than a white one.47
The Board's decision did not, however, last very long;
in less than two weeks the Court rejected its rationales of
"potential racial tension" and "probable isolation" of a
Black student in an otherwise all-white school.

Thirty-

eight applicants fell into these two categories, and their
transfer folders were once again turned over to the Board
for appropriate assignment.

The Board now had one more

chance to find new excuses for rejecting these applications.
A slight modification in the district lines for the pro
jected Rosemont School, the Black combination elementary,

46Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 August 1958.
47Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 30 August 1958.
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junior, and senior high school that was the focus of the
Mayor's de facto segregation plan, brought a majority of the
38 applicants within that school's assignment area.

Al

though School Superintendent J. J. Brewbaker was forced to
admit to the Court that the district lines for Rosemont were
hastily redrawn only "after he had learned the addresses of
the applicants involved [in the litigation],48 Judge
Walter Hoffman allowed the Board to deny the transfer
requests of all the petitioners so affected.

The Board was

thus able to manipulate district lines to accommodate all
the remaining litigants challenging the city's elementary
schools, but when every possible readjustment was made, 17
Black secondary students still retained an unchallengeable
right to legally request a transfer to the white school
closer to their homes than the Black school they were
presently attending.

Finally, acting "against the Board's

better judgement, but pursuant to the law as interpreted by
the Court,"49 Norfolk School authorities, under threat of
legal duress, were forced to accept these final 17 appli
cants just days before the 1958-59 school year was scheduled
to begin.
Ironically, the most important decision ever made by
the Norfolk School Board took place not in a public meeting,
but rather in a private home.

Because board member Francis

48Ibid.
49Ibid.
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Crenshaw had just undergone an emergency appendectomy, the
rest of the board gathered around the bedside of his West
Ghent home to discuss their options.

No one was willing to

go to jail, although Ben Willis apparently wanted to explore
this possibility.

Since City Attorney Leonard Davis had

been forced to withdraw from representing the Board (because
of the possible conflict in representing the City Council),
the Board was also without legal counsel, except for
Crenshaw, an attorney who specialized in redevelopment and
maritime law.

Still, its members all knew that Hoffman's

threat to send them away to the nearest federal prison for
contempt of court was not an idle one.

Gradually they came

to the conclusion that in the long run integration would be
easier to accept if the assignment of Black pupils to white
schools came from fellow Virginians and not an officer of
the federal court.50
By dragging the decision out over as long a period as
possible, the Board was actually preparing one more ploy to
delay the implementation of the assignments.

A motion was

immediately filed asking for a postponement on the grounds
that "Norfolk was wholly unprepared at this time for
immediate compliance," and that the Board needed additional
time to arrange for the security of the transferees and to
otherwise "prepare" school officials, patrons, teachers and
students for "the sudden shift" in the traditional pattern

5°Francis Crenshaw.
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of Southern education.51

Their plea was based on the hope

that the violence and uproar precipitated by similar court
action in Little Rock would be reason enough to dissuade the
local court from imposing its will upon a community still
unprepared for implementation.

Even though Judge Hoffman

felt that he could not accept the argument at this late
date, he did assure the Board that if, on appeal, the U. S.
Supreme Court ruled favorably or even called for further
arguments on the matter, he would entertain a subsequent
motion to re-transfer the 17 final applicants back to their
original Black schools for one more year.

The School Board

delayed for two more weeks the scheduled opening of the
city's schools while the Supreme Court pondered their
appeal.52
When seen against this backdrop of legal stall, footdragging, and delay, the statewide vilification of the Board
is hard to comprehend.

Only after every conceivable court

room maneuver had been exhausted and its members seriously
threatened with criminal contempt citations, had the Norfolk
School Board voted to assign Black students to a white
Virginia school.

Even so, the state's political leaders

rushed to heap abuse on the Board for making the assignment
"voluntarily;" their objection was that the Board, itself--a
group of Virginia citizens duly empowered by the state and

51Ibid.
52Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 September 1958.
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local laws--had accepted the transfers rather than leaving
the task to the Court, viewed by most as an illegal usurper
of the state's authority.

This was a crucial distinction in

Virginia's interposition argument:

Governor Almond, the

Organization's calmest and most reasoned spokesman, stated
that the courts had the "power" to make such assignments,
but lacked the "constitutional authority" to do so.

Local

school boards, he continued, were restrained by the state's
Massive Resistance statutes from making such assign
ments.53

In Almond's scenario, the Organization had every

right to curse the Board because, when given the chance to
obey one governmental authority and defy the other, Norfolk
school authorities chose to follow the dictates of the
federal court, and thus ignored sovereignty of the state of
Virginia.

More than that, the Board's action threatened to

undo the Organization's tenuous interposition logic and
deflate the rhetoric of Massive Resistance.
That the Board made this very deliberate decision
without at least some degree of calculation on the part of
at least a few of its best informed members seems improba
ble.

There was one major difference between the Norfolk

School Board and the posture of the Byrd Organization, both
its statewide leadership and its local affiliate:

the

appointed members of the Board were willing to operate the
city's schools even if integrated, and the elected

53Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 September 1958.
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politicians were adamantly opposed to such a course.

To the

Board, the assignment of 17 Black students to six previously
all-white junior and senior high schools was the type of
minimum of integration— "so little you wouldn't notice
it"54— that both the Council and the city's legislative
delegation had once said they could abide.55

The politi

cal climate had changed drastically since the Council had
assented to such moderation, and it was no longer willing to
support those sentiments now.

Norfolk had come to the point

where there were only two courses of action open to the
city: either to open the public schools on an integrated
basis, or close them indefinitely.

The Council now agreed

with the leaders of the statewide Byrd Organization that
closing the public schools in defiance of the court's
authority was the only way to teach the federal government a
lesson; the School Board felt that such a course would be
highly destructive, both to public education and to the
Southern culture in general.

For this reason, the Board

purposely acted in such a way as to undermine the state's
intention to interpose its authority in a show of Massive
Resistance.

The School Board was composed entirely of

individuals who personally preferred segregation; they had
made every effort to resist assigning Blacks to previously
all-white schools in Virginia until forced to do so by the

54Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 January 1956.
55Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 January 1959.
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federal district judge, but once having done so, they were
determined to abide by that ruling in order to preserve the
public educational system they held even more dearly than
segregation.

This was the basis for the underlying dis

agreement that existed from this point onward between the
individual members on the School Board and the Norfolk City
Council.
The Norfolk School Board represented an unlikely pair
ing of individuals destined for such heroics, and consider
ing the climate of casual malaise that then characterized
the majority of the population, their action in defense of
public education in the city could well be termed "heroic."
It was not a blueblood Silkstocking group, although most of
its members bordered on the periphery of the city's business
and financial establishment.

There were no First Citizens,

no bank presidents, no major industrialists or corporate
entrepreneurs; only one had achieved any renown for his
charity work, and only one was even active in the Chamber of
Commerce.

Just as they had for most of the city's other

independent boards and commissions, the P e o p l e 's appointees
had long ago been replaced by respectable, but politically
unknown, small businessmen and professional people who owed
their advancement entirely to Mayor Duckworth and the
Organization Council.

An examination of its membership

revealed a group of prosperous individuals striving for
respectability in a city which, in spite of its size, still
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carried much of the atmosphere of a small town: Chairman
Paul Schweitzer operated an industrial pump manufacturing
firm; Benjamin Willis owned a plush carpet and salon
furniture establishment founded by his father; W. Farley
Powers was a top executive with one of Tidewater's few large
industrial concerns; Francis N. Crenshaw practiced maritime
and redevelopment law; William P. Ballard managed the family
seafood business; and Mildred J. Dallas had retired as an
executive with a local automobile agency.56
These were just the sort of small business and p r o 
fessional leaders who had the most to lose by provoking an
open confrontation with the dominant political forces of
both the state and municipal government:

they depended too

heavily upon government contracts, professional fees,
inspections, and regulation to lightly defy such authority.
On the integration question in particular, they had the most
to lose if they or their business establishments became the
target for boycott or vigilante activity.

In short, they

were not the sort of individuals who ordinarily stand alone
against such authority, yet stand alone they did, in
defiance of both a well-established political order and a
highly passionate vocal minority.

5SBiographical information comes from the following
sources:
Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 16 February 1960; Norfolk
Ledger-Dispatch, 29 May 1961; Norfolk Ledger-Star,
1 September 1964; Norfolk Ledger-Star, 22 December 1972;
Richmond Times-Dispatch, 3 February 1963.
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The School Board's singular act of courage set in
motion a variety of forces which now vied for public accept
ance; at the same time, because it

held out the hope ofyet

one more reprieve from the courts,

the action made it

difficult for any coherent plan of

action to win that

endorsement.

the two week delay in

For Mayor Duckworth,

the

scheduled opening of the schools provided one more opportu
nity to pressure Norfolk's Black leadership into withdrawing
the final 17 litigants.

Both publicly and privately, the

Council used every resource at its disposal to force some
sort of compromise from the Black community,57 but racial
antipathies had progressed too far in the last few months
for the city's Black leadership to accept any sort of token
remuneration now that victory appeared so close at hand.
Although this time the Norfolk newspapers, fearing reprisals
against the individuals involved, declined to print the
names and addresses of the 17 approved transferees, the
Journal and Guide suffered no such qualms:

all 17 were

featured in a photo-essay that praised their courage and
pioneering spirit, although recognizing that, under the
realities of Virginia's massive Resistance school closing
laws, they "may not gain their goal immediately."58
In the weeks leading up to the School Board's defiant
action, the organizers of the fledgling Norfolk Committee

^ Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 19 May 1960.
ssNorfolk Journal and Guide, 30 August 1958.
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for Public Schools had begun to move their group into a more
public posture.

Quietly they had begun the task of contact

ing the city's respected and conservative citizens— the
cream of the city's business and civic elite--asking them to
join, or even form themselves, a pressure group that would
work to keep the schools open in the face of court-ordered
integration.

The two week delay in the scheduled opening of

schools gave the Committee the opportunity it sought to
organize an out-pouring of public support for keeping the
threatened schools open.

They hoped that now that a

moderate position of court compliance had been adopted by
the School Board, it would be easier for the rest of the
business community to follow that lead.

The Committee

organizers were convinced that the Governor would have a
hard time closing the schools in any community where he felt
strong opposition from the conservative business
establishment, and this thought gave new impetus to their
push for membership.

Most of those approached, however,

were sympathetic to the cause advanced by the organizers,
but still unwilling to come forward publicly at this time.
Typical was the reaction of one well-known civic leader:
I'm with you one-hundred percent; however,
you know my position.
If I place myself in the
forefront of your movement, it might harm my
organization.
Come back when you get your first
hundred business leaders, and I'll be glad to
join.59

S9White, unpublished article, p. 3.
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Other community stalwarts found similar reason for
refusing to join the Committee: businessmen were worried
about possible economic reprisals against their firms;
executives did not want to face loss of position or pres
tige; municipal and state employees feared pressure from the
Byrd Organization; doctors, lawyers, realtors, and other
professionals worried about losing clients; ministers did
not want to face divided congregations; civic workers wanted
to avoid pressure from their governing boards; naval
officers were concerned about the effect upon their careers;
federal workers were specifically instructed by the Health,
Education, and Welfare headquarters in Washington that this
was a "local affair" and that they should not play a public
role; and everybody was concerned about the subtle social
pressures and ostracism that might be applied against anyone
who deviated from the silent norm and took a vocal stand one
way or the other.

Many of the community leaders approached

by the Committee urged the group to wait longer before
making any public move; they might help once the schools
were actually closed and the hardships were real, but the
time was not yet right, they felt, for going public with
such an organization.60

As long as the Supreme Court had

not yet ruled on the School Board's appeal, and as long as
there was still some hope of gaining another reprieve, the

6°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot,

19 September 1958.
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risk of public exposure was still too great for the great
bulk of Norfolk's citizens to step forward and oppose the
closing of the city's schools.
The Committee, however, was in a hurry to expose
itself and launch a legitimate pressure group before the
schools were actually closed.

They saw that, in spite of

the atmosphere of acquiescent hesitancy that blocked their
movement, the Defender-backed Tidewater Education Foundation
was boasting a membership that had passed the 2,500 mark.
Although that group as well could not count any members of
the city's Silkstocking establishment among their ranks, the
T.E.F.'s claim to respectability was enhanced by the
leadership of attorneys like James G. Martin, Harvey E.
White, and Robert Boyd, by merchants like W. I. McKendree,
Frank R. Ford, and by educators like William J. Story, Jr.,
and Hal J. Bonney, Jr.61

The organizers of the Norfolk

Committee for Public Schools surveyed this roster and de
cided that the public had to be offered a calm and rational
choice that stood in opposition to closed schools and
Defender-sponsored private education.

It was apparent to

them that the city's white secondary schools would be closed
by the Governor, and that the students who formerly attended
those institutions would be locked out of a public education
because of the 17 Black transfer applicants, the minimal

6XNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 12 September 1955, and other
sources.
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amount of integration the city's leadership seemed earlier
ready to accept.

The hardship would not be isolated to a

single group or cluster of neighborhoods; it would be
universal, cutting across every social and economic line.
The city's schools had already been closed voluntarily for
two weeks in the slim hope that the courts would prevent a
more permanent lockout; the Committee organizers hoped that
going public with a pressure group now, even if premature,
would snowball enough support to prevent further disruption
of the school year.
Most of those business and civic leaders who had
earlier indicated support for such a group were invited to
attend an organizational meeting at a private residence in
the prestigious Larchmont section of the city.

The meeting

was a dismal failure to all those who had worked to
establish the group:

the few citizens who had any claim to

the city's social and financial elite stood on the front
porch of the residence, showing their private sympathy for
the cause but also indicating their reluctance to join the
proceedings inside that would be made public.

There were no

bank directors present, no Silkstocking corporate execu
tives, no leading merchants, no elected officials, no member
of the naval, federal, or state bureaucracies, no major
religious or spiritual leaders, and only a handful of
interested professionals or small businessmen were in
attendance.

By and large it was the same individuals who
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had pressed from the outset for the establishment of a
pro-school organization who now attended.

The enormity of

the crisis, the School Board's courageous act of halting
compliance, the Virginian-Pilot's stirring editorial
endorsements of philosophical support, and the seeming
finality of their appeal--less than a week remained before
the Governor would be forced to act— had failed to
appreciably swell their ranks.

The Committee was left with

a small group of active and concerned citizens, respectable
but carrying no great weight in the community, and who felt
that the issue was now so great and the demands so pressing
that they must push ahead and expose themselves alone to
whatever risks were involved in founding such an organiza
tion of public advocacy.62
Since the Norfolk Committee for Public Schools was
still too liberal, too Jewish, too unsophisticated, and too
carpetbagger in nature ever to have any hope of convincing
the city's business and financial leadership to go public
with their concern, the group wisely set its sights on a
lesser appeal.

In a statement to the press, the Committee

announced instead its intent to form a parent's lobby in
support of public education and to finance legal efforts to
block the closing of the schools.

Still convinced that the

formation of even a scaled-down organization was not pre-

62Forrest P.
Robert L. Stern.

White,

M . D . , unpublished

article,
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mature, the founders issued a carefully worded statement
that detailed its philosophy and reason for existence:
Private schooling cannot replace public
schools on a broad scale without serious and
lasting disruption of the educational facilities
of the community.
Private schools cannot be
legally maintained with public funds under
public direction, nor can they be held
accountable to local government or the general
public.
We believe that under the Federal Court
orders only two courses of action are open to
Norfolk: either proceed toward minimum
compliance with the Federal Court order or to
begin the destruction of the public school
system.
The Norfolk Committee for Public
Schools believes that the first course will be
far less destructive than the latter.63
The Committee chose as its president Reverend James C.
Brewer, minister of the Norfolk Unitarian Church, hoping
that having a minister at the head of the organization gave
credence to its appeal, even though the Unitarian Church was
held in less than orthodox esteem by the staunchly Baptist,
Methodist, Episcopalian, Presbyterian, and Lutheran
congregations in the city.

The Committee chose one of the

few businessmen in attendance that night, Irving F.

(Buddy)

Truitt, the head of a small real estate and insurance firm,
to be first vice-president; Mrs. Eugene D. Kidd, the wife of
an independent insurance agent and head of the Stuart
Elementary P.-T.A., as second vice-president; Mrs. Robert H.
Thrasher, the wife of a local psychiatrist and an active

63Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 September 1958.
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civic worker, as secretary; and Dr. Forrest P. White, a
pediatrician, as treasurer of the Committee.

Real estate

broker Ellis James, Professor Robert L. Stern, high school
government teacher Margaret White, Mrs. Joseph Commander,
and "another member who requested that his name not be
disclosed"64 rounded out the executive board.

It was not

a prestigious assemblage— reporter Luther Carter once
referred to the organization as "mostly a

grouping of

'little people,'"65 an assessment that was true even by
the Committee's own standards.

The un-named board member,

Dr. Mason C. Andrews, a prominent gynecologist, the only
person with any real standing in the Silkstocking community,
felt that he could best serve the Committee in attracting
people of equal prominence if his name were not released to
the press.

The group was so desperate for a link to the

city's civic and business leadership that it grudgingly
accepted the unusual arrangement, even though it infuriated
others on the board who felt that Dr. Andrews had gone b e 
hind their backs in removing his name from publication.66

The Norfolk Committee for Public Schools, just like
the School Board and the editors of the Virginian-Pilot, had
vastly overestimated the public's capacity to either compre

64Ibid.
65Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 October 1959.
66Forrest P. White, M. D . , unpublished article, pp. 4-5;
Robert L. Stern.
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hend the gravity of the situation the city faced or resist
the scapegoat fate to which Norfolk had been condemned by
the state's political leadership.

Events proceeded at such

a rapid pace that the desperate pleas of all three for sup
port of their efforts to keep the schools open were rendered
moot.

The final legal hurdles were quickly overcome, the

last-ditch appeals for yet one more delay denied, and on
September 22, 1958, in accordance with Virginia's Massive
Resistance Laws, the doors of the city's six previously allwhite junior and senior high schools remained locked while
those of its segregated elementary institutions opened for
the fall semester.

There were no closings in the city's

parallel Black school system, and there all twelve grades
opened as usual.

In all, close to 10,000 white and 17 Black

students had been locked out of their classrooms, and
neither the Governor nor the President could offer much
prospect of an early resumption of classes.67

The best

the Governor could offer was the vague hope that somehow a
loophole could be found around the legal obstacles that
prevented opening the unaffected grades in the closed
schools,63 but under state law, once a single Black
student was assigned to a white classroom, all other grades
in that class across the entire city must close as well.69

67Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 September 1958.
6BNorfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 26 September 1958.
69 Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 March 1957.
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Even with the school doors actually padlocked, how
ever, few citizens were willing to discuss the implications
or project the consequences of such drastic measures; even
fewer seemed willing to gather to talk about what should be
done.

The majority of Norfolk's leaders apparently still

dismissed the idea of a prolonged school closing as "scare
talk," and promptly banished such thoughts from polite
conversation.

Most appeared to cling to the belief that the

Byrd Organization had somehow outsmarted the federal
authorities by daring to close the schools, and that soon
either the courts or the Black community— they did not
really care which —

would back down.70

The realities of

the confrontation that had taken place the year before in
Little Rock, or the relative success of school integration
efforts in such cities as St. Louis, Charlotte, Nashville,
and Washington, D.C., remained far from their thoughts.
"The best of the Southern leadership" and "the majority of
Southerners" that the Virginian-Pilot had promised would
rise up to abide by the authority of the courts71 were
nowhere in evidence.

The cream of the city's civic and

business elite, at one time so vocal in determining the
course of their city's direction, remained completely
silent, abandoning the stage entirely to the Mayor, the

7 °Robert L. Mason.
71Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 18 May 1954.
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Organization, and others who shouted encouragement from the
periphery.

Instead, prejudice— the unreasonable adherence

to the conventions, traditions, and mores of the past—
reigned supreme, replacing even civic pride and boosterism
as the single underlying force behind every phase of
municipal policy.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
IN PURSUIT OF A MANDATE
Norfolk's was not the only educational system effected
by the state's school closing laws the--schools in Prince
Edward County, Charlottesville, and, to a lesser extent, in
Arlington and Front Royal were closed as well— but Norfolk
was by far the largest scale test of the state's Massive
Resistance plan to replace integrated public institutions
with a system of private, segregated academies, financed in
part by public funds.1

There was never any question that

Prince Edward County, the birthplace of the Defenders of
State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, would prove how
well Massive Resistance could work on a small scale.

There

the Defenders were well organized and a respectable segment
of the community; when Blacks attempted to desegregate the
only public high school in the county, Prince Edward Academy
opened its doors to almost all the county's white secondary
students.

Even when the county high school was finally

reopened after years of courtroom litigation (the Prince
Edward suit had been a companion case with the Brown v.
xfor a more detailed report on Massive Resistance
elsewhere in Virginia see Benjamin Muse, Virginia's Massive
Resistance, (Bloomington, Ind.:
Indiana University Press,
1961); Bob Smith, They Closed Their Schools:
Prince Edward
County, Virginia, (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of
North Carolina Press, 1965); and Eley, op cit.
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Board of Education decision), most of the county's white
students continued on at the Academy.
Of all Virginia's small cities, Charlottesville was
perhaps the poorest choice from a political perspective for
the Organization showdown over school integration:

because

of the strong influence of the University of Virginia,
education was too highly prized and people too independent
for Massive Resistance to succeed there.

Under ordinary

circumstances, Norfolk, too, with all the liberalizing
influences provided by its naval, N.A.T.O., shipping and
port facilities would have been an equally poor choice for a
Massive Resistance showdown.

Richmond, with its close ties

to the Southside, the Organization, and its capital-of-theConfederacy heritage, would have provided a much more
malleable citizenry.

The leadership dynamics in Norfolk,

however, gave Massive Resistance a far greater opportunity
for success than most would have thought possible:

in spite

of its size, the city had a generally small and in-bred
leadership that was usually united in its aversion to
outside authority— a fact that had made Norfolk unpopular
with the Byrd Organization and the State Legislature.
Duckworth, one of the few outsiders to be truly accepted by
all levels of Norfolk's society, had come to occupy a unique
place of leadership in the city.

First chosen as a

compromise candidate to bring harmony between the warring
business and political factions of the city, he had
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succeeded beyond all expectations in that mission, winning
both the respect and the loyalty of the Organization and the
Silkstocking crowd in the process.

In the years since he

had come to power, Duckworth had employed his consummate
political, financial, and managerial powers with such
success that he had become not just the leader, but the true
focal point of the community.

In short, Norfolk was far

from typical for cities its size:

few other municipalities

anywhere in the nation were so completely dominated by the
personality of a single individual or had dissent so
thoroughly silenced by his restraints.
Public education in Virginia was under attack in the
Norfolk crisis at its weakest link:

the secondary school.

Historically, since little more than basic skills was all
that was necessary for comfortable survival in the agrarian
economy of the Old Dominion, Virginia was among the last
states in the nation to support the concept of universal
public education, and certainly among the most reluctant to
fund any more than an offering of minimum competency.
Alongside its impoverished system of public education,
however, thrived a highly structured system of private
preparatory schools and semi-public universities, such as
the College of William and Mary and the University of
Virginia, to which the average graduate of the state's
public schools could hardly aspire.

Thus public schools in

Virginia helped to reinforce a sort of social caste system
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that allowed the state's leading citizens to follow this
parallel education tract in part underwritten by scarce
public funds, and often at the expense of the more uni
versal, public school system.

The growth of the secondary

school movement in the state can be traced back to the
appearance of an urban middle class just before the turn of
the century, but even as late as 1958, several rural
counties still lacked their own public high school— a major
reason why the Old Dominion consistently ranked near the
bottom of any measurement of education quality in the
country.

Even in urban areas such as Tidewater, secondary

education was not universal, and was still the property of
the middle class.

Mandatory school attendance laws did not

apply beyond the age of 14, and because wartime and Depres
sion era drop-out levels had run unusually high, a notice
able percentage of the urban middle class had been forced to
forego secondary schooling.

The median education level for

adults in Norfolk, with one of the finest public school
systems in the South, was still less than tenth-grade, and
more than one-fifth of the city's teenage population over
the age of fourteen had already dropped out of school.2
It is against this backdrop of closed leadership, oneman politics, and spotty support for public education in

2U.S. Bureau of the Census, U. S. Census of Population,
1950, vol. II, Characteristics of the Population, Part 46,
Virginia, chapter B (Washington, D.C.:
U. S. Government,
1952), p. 46 - 47.
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general and secondary schools in particular that the concept
of Massive Resistance had its most important test in
Norfolk, Virginia.

In one sense the Defender's plea for

support had a great deal of validity:

if Massive Resistance

could be made to work here, it would be successful all
across the South; Norfolk was not just their first large
scale test, the time, the circumstances, and the leadership
dynamics of the city offered Massive Resisters at least a
reasonable chance to score a major victory for their cause.
Since public schools were still open for elementary
students, only a small percentage of the city would actually
be locked out of public classrooms.

Of these, perhaps as

many as one-fifth would drop out of high school anyway.
Another group could successfully make the shift to one of
the city's fine private preparatory schools— including the
Norfolk Academy, Carolton Oaks (now Norfolk Collegiate),
Garrison-Williams, Country Day, and Norfolk Christian— all
of which were then undergoing an unprecedented building
boom, prompted in part by the school desegregation crisis.3
The Navy was concerned enough about the permanency of the
closings that it, too, was drawing up plans to expand its
own school system to a series of off-base institutions for
military dependents.4

Another group of secondary students

could be expected to transfer to other segregated public

3Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 December 1958.
4Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 22 January 1959.
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schools in nearby communities (estimates put this figure at
more than 500 students)5 or leave the area entirely to live
with friends or relatives in other parts of the country.
Thus, although close to 10,000 secondary students
would actually be locked out of public classrooms in
Norfolk, the maximum load to be carried by the Tidewater
Educational Foundation and any other substitute system of
private schooling would actually be less than 5,000 pupils
once the Navy's off-base schools began operation.

The

T.E.F. hoped that the traditional lure of the enhanced
status of private schooling and the chance to strike a blow
at outside intervention would provide a strong incentive to
prospective patrons.

For the first time many of the city's

middle-class residents would be able to afford the luxury of
private schooling for their children now that the state
provided a $250 per child per semester tuition grant to such
students— one of the hallmarks of the Massive Resistance
package of legislation.®

Armed with this additional

attraction, the T.E.F. began to plan ambitiously for the day
when Norfolk's schools would be closed.

Even before the

lockout was final, T.E.F. President James G. Martin
announced that the group was prepared to educate as many as
4,500 students, and more if the need arose.

The T.E.F. had

5Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 October 1958.
®Forrest P. White,
M . D . , "Tuition Grants:
Strange
Fruit of Southern Integration," South Atlantic Quarterly,
Autumn, 1960.
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made arrangements to rent the public schools in nearby South
Norfolk for less than three dollars a month per student.
The T.E.F. had found a powerful ally in William J. Story,
J r . , the South Norfolk School Superintendent and a member of
the State Board of Education; Story had agreed to start his
city's schools one hour earlier so that the buildings could
be cleared by 2 P.M. for the T.E.F.'s private schools.

The

group's major effort, however, focused upon a day school to
be operated at Bayview Baptist Church; other buildings
across the city would be utilized as the need for more
facilities arose.7
In spite of its optimism, the T.E.F. faced an enormous
logistical problem in its effort to provide private replace
ments for even half of the city's closed secondary institu
tions.

Norfolk employed a whole staff of school administra

tors, supervisors, principals, and teachers to struggle with
just the sort of transportation, textbook, personnel,
guidance, curriculum, accounting, and property maintenance
problems that awaited the handful of paid staff members and
volunteer committees at the T.E.F.

This shortcoming was

continually paraded before the public by Lenoir Chambers and
the editorial staff of the Virginian-Pilot:
Substitute private schools are by their very
nature "inferior education". . . . [They would]
be hurriedly makeshift, even if adequate
teachers, adequate facilities, or accreditation

7Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 12 September 1958.
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could be found . . . . providing public educa
tion is the duty of the American government.®
Even if the public had been willing to overlook the
administrative shortcomings of the T.E.F., their ambitious
plans to replace the closed, integrated public secondary
schools with a private system of segregated academies were
crushed by forces that had been up to now only incidental to
the struggle.
One of the first such blows came before the schools
had even closed:

there were early indications that certain

religious denominations which could have served potentially
as both a power base and alternative source of educational
facilities for the forces of Massive Resistance, were
instead solidly aligned against school closings.

The

Catholic Church was among the first to speak on the national
level in urging compliance with the dictates of the U. S.
Supreme Court; locally, Norfolk Catholic High and its feeder
parochial elementary schools had been successfully inte
grated for a number of years.

Six Black graduates were

preparing that year to march for the first time in Norfolk
Catholic's commencement exercises.
One other religious group, the Jewish community, stood
at the forefront of those who acted at every level in oppo
sition to the closings of public schools.

The historically

strong Jewish belief in the importance of public education

®Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 September 1958.
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was a sustaining force behind the Committee for Public
Schools and other efforts on the part of individuals to
oppose Massive Resistance; leaders in the Jewish community,
however, feared retaliatory actions taken against them as a
minority if they assumed, as a group, any public role in the
conflict, and they were effective in quashing any public
statement on the part of synagogues or other established
Jewish groups.9
The big break in the battle against Massive Resistance
came when the Protestant denominations began openly to align
their forces against those who sought to dismantle public
education.

The first step came in the summer of 1958, when

the Norfolk Presbytery voted nearly unanimously to support
the dictates of the federal courts; additionally, the
Presbytery cautioned its member churches against allowing
their facilities to be used for alternative private school
classes, even if the public schools were actually
closed.10

Other Protestant denominations, including the

Lutherans and the bishops of the Episcopal Church, quickly
followed suit with similar instructions for their congre
gations.

Methodist and Baptist organizations had a more

difficult time following through with similar strictures for
their own churches; Bayview Baptist and a number of other
Southern Baptist facilities figured strongly already in the

9Jane Reif, Crisis In Norfolk, op c i t ., pp. 1, 9.
10Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 7 August 1958.
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T.E.F.'s game plan of resistance.

The Norfolk Ministerial

Association, however, a Protestant organization largely in
the control of Methodist and Baptist clergymen, acted
courageously even when their individual churches were
reluctant to act.

The day after Norfolk's schools were

closed, 66 of the city's 74 Protestant clergymen met to sign
a statement requesting that city and state leaders take
immediate steps to reopen them.11

Next, the group sent

representatives before Mayor Duckworth and the Council to
repeat their request to reopen the schools on a local-option
integrated basis.12

The ministers, however, realized that

they spoke as individuals, and not as official representa
tives of their church boards or their congregations, and
many later faced increasing hostility from their churches as
a result of their convictions.

One Methodist leader, Dr.

Edgar A. Potts, chairman of the Ministerial Association,
faced immense personal hardship and abuse from the hands of
his church board and congregation; others saw their assign
ments cut short and their careers jeopardized because of
their actions.
At any rate, the ministers found themselves aligned
with another even more vocal professional group in their
effort to reopen the public schools.

Although several

teachers were active in the formation of the Committee for

i:LReif, pp. 9, 10.
12Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 1 October 1958.
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Public Schools, as a group Norfolk educators resisted
efforts to take a public stand before schools were actually
closed.

Attorneys for the School Board successfully

persuaded the Norfolk Education Association not to make any
statement that might put them in conflict with the city's
political leadership; instead, the N.E.A. unanimously passed
a resolution which affirmed its full backing of the School
Board and its efforts to comply with the federal courts,13
a statement which only indirectly hinted at its antagonism
against Massive Resistance.

After the schools were closed,

the N.E.A. voted by a better than five-to-one majority to
petition the City Council to reopen the closed schools under
local authority (i.e., without state funding) on an
integrated basis, if necessary.14

Individual teachers

then joined with the more active of the city's ministers to
establish private tutoring groups in a number of private
homes and churches, not as substitutes for public schools,
but rather to prepare students for reopened schools.

As

many as 3,500 students were eventually involved in these
"parlor schools" that included facilities at 23 churches
across the city.15
School authorities and Education Association officials
quickly became concerned that these "parlor schools" could

13Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 September 1958.
14Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 3 October 1958.
15Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 13 October 1958.
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degenerate into replacements for public schools, and thus
accomplish the same end as the T.E.F. proposal.

Addition

ally, they feared that support for public school teachers,
who were still receiving full pay at state expense,xs
would wane if educators were discovered making money as a
result of the school crisis.
A survey by the Virginian-Pilot found that many teach
ers served the informal tutoring groups without pay and that
the maximum salary appeared to be about $150 a month.

The

N.E.A. accordingly adopted a resolution that recommended a
salary of only $50 a month for this extra work.

The

Education Association made sure that the public understood
its resolve to close these informal tutoring groups as soon
as the public schools opened, regardless of whether or not
the schools opened on an integrated basis.17

In addition,

the N.E.A., in an effort to put pressure on the city's
elected officials, voted to withdraw from the stopgap
schools at the end of the semester, even if schools were not
yet open.

The N.E.A. feared that its members' efforts to

continue teaching even during the school crisis might tend
to make parents complacent, and thus less prone to push for
quick reopening of the closed schools.1®

16Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 2 October 1958.
17Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 November 1958.
lsNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 October 1958.
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Individually the teachers struck an even more direct
blow at the forces of Massive Resistance.

Efforts by the

Tidewater Education Foundation to informally recruit public
school teachers for its private facilities were continually
rebuffed by the School Board, the School Administration, and
the teachers themselves.

Finally, out of desperation,

T.E.F. President James G. Martin, IV, went to the Mayor for
help.

Duckworth intervened and assured the T.E.F. an

audience with the teachers;19 Norfolk's out of work edu
cators listened quietly while Martin made his pitch for
their help.

Then, one by one, they quietly left the

auditorium; only one of the 450 stayed behind to sign up.
Governor Almond's pronouncement that teachers could still
draw full state pay while teaching private school classes
failed to produce converts among the city's professional
educators;20 they were determined in their resolve to
resist any effort that might undermine the public school
system.

The one teacher who stayed behind stated that she

was "just curious" to hear the rest of the T.E.F.'s offer;
she, too, refused to sign on as a recruit.21
The teachers' unanimous rejection of the T.E.F.'s
employment proposal was a bitter defeat for that organiza
tion, the Defenders, and all those state politicians who

19Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 January 1959.
2°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 12 October 1958.
21Reif, p. 6.
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favored Massive Resistance.

Even Mayor Duckworth, because

he had so greatly committed himself by granting the T.E.F.
an amicable audience before the teachers, felt personally
rebuked by their defiant walkout.22

The Tidewater Educa

tional Foundation resolved to go forward with its plans
anyhow, hoping to start small but pick up teacher support as
the crisis continued.

A handful of retired school teachers,

fundamentalist ministers, and bored housewives were
recruited to serve as their temporary educational staff.
Late in October, more than a month after the public schools
had actually closed, the T.E.F. opened its Tidewater Academy
with only six instructors and less than 60 students; plans
for expansion of its facilities at Bayview Baptist Church
were contingent only upon its ability to find additional
qualified teachers.23

Fewer than 1,000 students accepted

the T.E.F.'s invitation to attend night classes in South
Norfolk;24 for the great majority of those students who
wished to continue their education in spite of the school
closings, the tutoring groups led by their former teachers
offered the only acceptable alternative.

Norfolk teachers,

by unanimously rejecting the financial rewards that would
accompany a defection to the T.E.F., had almost singlehandedly destroyed any chance that the Defenders, Mayor

22Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 January 1959.
23Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 October 1958.
24Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 October 1958.
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Duckworth, or the Byrd Organization could ever make Massive
Resistance work in the city.23
With the tutoring groups in full session, Norfolk's
secondary students had an appropriate forum through which
they could remain permanently in the public eye, constantly
reminding the city's leaders that they intended to stick
with the concept of public education no matter what might be
the political cost in shattered traditions.
tried to remain visible in their school clubs
activities, just as if the schools
closed:

Most students
and

themselves had

related
never

football teams played a full schedule that fall

before the usual complement of parents, cheerleaders,
students, and onlookers; marching bands continued to play
on, even though their uniforms and instruments were still
locked inside the school buildings; Granby High wrestlers
continued individually to dominate the state competition,
even though they were barred from participation as a team.
From the very first school leaders

all across the

city took

up the cry of "School At Any Cost"

and put it in the form of

petitions— "not as segregationists or integrationists, but
as students who want an education, we ask you to please keep
our schools open"— rallies,26 banners,27 and letters to

25Robert H. Mason.
26Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 September 1958.
27Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 September 1958.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

336

the Mayor,23 each time drawing attention to their desire
to reject substitute segregationist academies in favor of a
continued hope for a return to public education.
The strong outpouring of support shown by parents for
the tutoring group concept indicated that the mothers and
fathers of those students also preferred to wait for the
public schools to reopen, even if integration were present;
for them, tutoring at the hands of qualified educators, even
without the proper facilities or necessary textbooks avail
able, was much preferable to sending their children to un
accredited private institutions with uncertified personnel.
These parents, however, found it difficult to express any
form of united expression of their sentiments.

Two years

earlier, as a part of their program to sap the vitality from
the pro-school movement, the Defenders had taken control of
the Norfolk City Council of Parent-Teachers Associa
tions,29 and then successfully defended that takeover from
moderates hoping to dilute the P.-T.A.'s "hardline" segrega
tionist stance.30

W. I. McKendree, president of both the

Defenders and the P.-T.A. Council, led a move to disband the
individual P.-T.A. units at the closed schools in order to
further dilute parental opposition to the Defender's Massive
Resistance plans.

The wrangling that took place between the

2SNorfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 26 September 1958.
29Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 30 March 1957.
3°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 16 March 1957.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

337

segregationist officers and the pro-school parents erupted
at every school P.-T.A. across the city, and in all but one
case, the parents eventually forced some sort of statement
in favor of reopening the closed schools,31 but not before
the struggle had taken a heavy toll in terms of both time
and energy.

On that score at least the Defenders had

effectively blocked off any channel of united opposition,
successfully stifling both the timing and the mechanism for
such a response.
For those who still hoped to mount some sort of
citizen lobby in support of keeping the schools open, the
Norfolk Committee for Public Schools appeared to be the only
logical alternative remaining.

Rebuffed in their efforts to

attract Silkstocking backing, the Committee had redoubled
its efforts to. recruit the ministers, the teachers, the
student leaders, the parents, and the other school patrons
who seemed more willing to speak out.

Within a week after

its formation was publicly announced, the Committee had been
able to announce over 3,000 supporters committed to "non
violent means to insure a peaceable transition to desegre
gated education."32

This group, although large enough in

size to rival the more established Defender's organization
and thereby claim a legitimate position in the public eye,
was hardly powerful enough to influence the outcome of the

31Reif, p. 8.
32Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 September 1958.
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crisis through sheer numbers alone.

Even after it had

opened a downtown headquarters, passed out handbills on
street corners, run newspaper advertisements, deluged public
officials with correspondence, and politicked in every
conceivable fashion,33 the Committee had only managed to
double its size to 6,000 members34— hardly enough to dodge
its integrationist stereotype, a label that destroyed any
effectiveness it might have had as a pressure group.
A similar fate had befallen each of the groups that
had attempted to speak out against Massive Resistance.

Once

Norfolk's schools were actually closed, the impetus for
public action seemed to fade in the inertia of the general
"wait-and-see" attitude that gripped the people.

In this

climate of public apathy, any group that broke the silence
to speak out must, of necessity, be extremist, and it
thereby cut itself off from the citizens it hoped to lead.
The ministers had spoken out bravely in favor of compliance
with the court and against church support for private
academies, but without the power of their congregations
behind them, they could no longer speak for the city's
religious community.

In their unanimous rejection of the

T.E.F., Norfolk's teachers had acted courageously, but by
establishing their own private tutoring groups they were
accomplishing in large measure what the Defenders had sought

33Reif, p. 5.
34Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 22 October 1958.
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to establish:
schools.

a segregated alternative to integrated public

The tutoring groups that had sprung up in private

homes, church buildings, and empty store fronts were
actually contributing in a large part to the apathy of the
parents and the students themselves.

The general public

tended to overlook the crowded quarters, the shortage of
textbooks, the total lack of libraries and supportive
materials, audio visuals,

laboratories, maps, and the like,

and saw instead the makings of an even finer education for
their children— they witnessed instead a classroom situation
that consisted of only a small number of motivated students,
dedicated teachers, and a high degree of individual
attention.

These were educational commodities that could

only be found among the most expensive and exclusive private
preparatory schools, and now everywhere across the city they
could be found for less than fifty dollars a month.35
Parents began to see how much their children were learning
in spite of the makeshift quality of such institutions, and
a very real danger existed that they would now decide that
maybe private schools were better after all.

Leaders of

student groups and parent organizations who still favored
public education at any cost found that they could not be
heard as long as the tutoring groups remained in operation;
their best efforts to rally support produced only hollow
resolutions that lacked the backing of the large body of

35Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 17 November 1958.
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public school students, parents, and patrons who had the
greatest stake in continuing universal public education.
In Norfolk no one had as yet been forced to pay the
price for closing the public schools. The Virginian-Pilot
continued to hammer away editorially at the long-term
economic disaster that awaited the city--loss of industry,
naval ship reassignments, rejection by business prospects,
forfeiture of major shipyard contracts, and the like— but
these were intangible expenses that had not yet hit home for
the average citizen.

The Pilot went on to estimate that the

minimum cost of operating a public school system in the city
without state funding and control would mean at least a
one-third rise in local real estate taxes and a concomitant
drop in federal impact aid funds36 (which were still
channeled through the state government before being routed
to the city).

As long as tutoring groups continued,

however, with their primary form of subsidy coming from the
state's obligation to honor the teaching contracts of the
instructors in the closed schools, the more direct costs of
rising taxes and increased local support for education
seemed distant and unreal.

As long as no one had to pay

directly for Massive Resistance, the great majority of
Norfolk's citizens remained silent and aloof from the
struggle, preferring instead to allow others to incur the
risks inherent in active participation.

36Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 16 October 1958.
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In this atmosphere of public malaise, the Norfolk
Committee for Public Schools saw little hope for success if
it operated, as just another local pressure group; instead it
vowed to seek other means through which to reopen the closed
schools.

With its effectiveness compromised on the local

level, it turned its attention toward convincing state and
national leaders.

A delegation from the Committee talked

with Governor Almond and urged him to return the closed
schools to local control.

The Committee's audience with the

Governor, although unsuccessful in its stated aim, did point
the way to an even more effective course of action. The
Governor's response that only the courts could reopen the
closed schools,37 strengthened the Committee's resolve to
add class action litigation to its rapidly diminishing
arsenal.

The Committee hoped to obtain a Norfolk attorney

for their suit, but quickly discovered that no local lawyer
was willing to risk his livelihood in such a venture.

With

much reluctance, the Committee turned to outside sources,
and finally induced Edmund D. Campbell of Arlington to take
the case; once the certainty of the suit was assured, local
attorney Archie Boswell agreed to associate with Campbell in
the Committee's behalf.

On October 27 (1958), a class

action suit was filed in federal court on behalf of the
Committee for Public Schools; the suit named Governor
Almond, the School Board, and others as defendants in its

37Norfolk Virginian-Pilot. 23 October 1958.
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efforts to reopen the schools.33

The suit was filed on

behalf of 33 white parents and their children (a total of 89
plaintiffs),33 but realtor Ellis James took the biggest
risk in lending his name to the proceedings.

The state was

already testing the legality of the school closing in
Harrison v. D a y , a "friendly" suit filed in the Virginia
Supreme Court,40 but James v. Almond, the Committee suit,
went far beyond this rather limited action.

The plaintiffs

in James v. Almond claimed in federal court that the closing
of Norfolk's six previously all-white secondary schools had
deprived them of equal protection of the laws guaranteed
under the Fourteenth Amendment.4x
The sudden shift of the Norfolk Committee for Public
Schools into the field of litigation obviously caught the
N.A.A.C.P. off guard.

The N.A.A.C.P. was quick, however, to

realize the historic significance of the action:

James v.

Almond was the first lawsuit of its kind to be filed by
white litigants in the South.

If the Committee was willing

to take the lead with this sort of intensive legal action,
the N.A.A.C.P. would trust them enough to withdraw its own

38Reif, p. 6.
39Norfolk

Virginian-Pilot,16 January 1959.

4°Norfolk

Virginian-Pilot,24 October 1958.

4XEdmund D. Campbell and Archie L. Boswell, Brief for
Appellee, United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, No.
7848 (James v .
Almond), Norfolk Committee for Public Schools
files, Old Dominion University Archives.
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litigation to a secondary position.

When its own suit was

filed a few days later, it was entered only as companion
litigation to the Committee's action.42
On another score, however, the N.A.A.C.P. was un
willing to back off, even during the height of the crisis:
it refused to let up on its quest to enlist new transfer
applicants for the 1959-60 school year.

The N.A.A.C.P. was

thus signaling its intention to keep up the long-term legal
pressure to desegregate Norfolk's schools, thereby refusing
to negotiate any sort of token settlement short of integra
tion.

Duckworth and the Council, however, were redoubling

their own efforts to force the Black community to withdraw
the 17 pending transfer applicants.

At one Council session

Duckworth turned to a group requesting the reopening of
schools and stated, "If you gentlemen want to help, you
could talk to the fifteen families of the seventeen Negro
children and try to get them to withdraw . . . .
could open these schools tomorrow."43

Then we

Councilman Abbott

then stated the Organization's position,

"In other words,

we've got seventeen Negro children who are keeping 10,000
white children out of school."

Duckworth followed by laying

most of the blame on the N.A.A.C.P., and said he felt that
they:

42Reif, p. 6.
43Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 1 October 1958.
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. . . did not truly represent Norfolk's colored
population.
The City has demonstrated what
Norfolk's colored people mean to it by spending
millions on slum clearance and schools, yet
Negroes here pay less than five per cent of the
taxes and make up seventy-five per cent of the
jail population.44
The Mayor's unfortunate repetition of these inflam
matory sentiments— a similar remark back in June had rallied
the Black community behind its more extreme leadership in
the N.A.A.C.P.--reveals a lot about both his famed intemper
ance and the sense of helplessness he felt in the crisis.
It also demonstrates a fatal flaw in the Mayor's thinking
that tended to view complex issues in their most simplistic
terms, especially casting the people behind those issues in
the role of either supporters or detractors.

For Duckworth

there was no middle ground— no way to be both independent on
principle but supportive on the issues--and this made it all
the more difficult for the School Board and other leaders in
the community to take a stand before the Mayor had publicly
committed himself one way or another.

Duckworth, although

he was an excellent leader, was a poor coalition builder,
and the fact that he had achieved up to now a broad base of
support in the white community was more a result of his
forcefulness than any diplomatic bent.

For their own part

the Black community refused this time to be goaded by his
remarks; those who were frustrated by the school closings

44Ibid.
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had not yet found a suitable target for their enmity, and
the city's Black leadership did not want to challenge the
Mayor in a name-calling contest that might further
jeopardize the tenuous racial harmony that still generally
prevailed.

The Mayor probably would have been delighted to

have such sharply defined antagonists, but except for the
N.A.A.C.P.'s new litigation, the city's Black leadership
seemed perfectly content to pull back from the struggle then
going on in the white community.

One of their most promis

ing efforts in this regard was an attempt to focus the
attention of their own constituency upon efforts to prepare
the 17 Black transfer students for the realities of inte
grated classrooms.

The Black community started a separate

tutoring group for these "pioneers" and spared no effort in
their attempt to prepare them for the challenges of the
future.

The curriculum, taught by a bi-racial staff,

covered more than just the necessary academic subjects:

the

students were coached in dress, poise, etiquette, psycho
logical preparation, self defense, and a whole host of other
skills that would make for a smooth transition to integrated
schools.45

Mrs. W. T. Mason, chairman of the project,

told the students, "When you sought entrance to white
schools, you left your childhood behind."46

4SWomen's Council on Inter-Racial Cooperation, "How
Norfolk's Closed Schools Were Reopened," panel discussion,
Norfolk, February 25, 1959.
46R e i f , p. 25.
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When Norfolk's public schools were first closed back
in late September, each of several groups— the Committee for
Public Schools, church and ministerial associations, school
teachers, student leaders, and parent organizations— tried
valiantly but unsuccessfully to arouse the sort of community
reaction required to prompt a speedy reopening.

Each group

failed, not so much because their own actions were meaning
less or by themselves unsuccessful, but because the public
refused to budge from the shelter of its complacency.

As

the weeks of closed schools wore on into late October, even
these tiny voices of activism in opposition to Massive
Resistance subsided.

The public grew more and more rest

less, yet it lacked a target upon which to focus.

As the

weeks of closed schools continued, the attention of the
public began to shift away from Massive Resistance and the
petty competition for popular support among its activist
organizations; instead it began to focus on the more subtle
clash of values in the political arena.

Massive Resistance

was not dead in Norfolk, but the decision of the school
teachers to open their own tutoring groups had managed to
forestall the hard choices the citizens would eventually
have to make.

Now, however, other groups had decisions

thrust upon them that would bring them more and more into
the focus of the controversy.

Neither the School Board nor

the Council had wanted Norfolk's schools closed, and both
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had done everything in their power, sometimes even going
beyond the authority of their office, to prevent the impasse
that had developed.

Differences that existed in the

methodology of their separate approaches to the problem had
earlier revealed some possible obstacles to continued
harmony once the city's schools were actually closed, but by
and large such differences were kept well hidden from the
general public.47

The School Board's fleeting act of

bravery in defiance of the state's political hierarchy had
all but gone unnoticed locally in the crush of events that
followed.

No one but the Southside's most rabid segrega

tionists had really wanted martyrdom for the Board, and such
a spirit of wanton self-sacrifice would have been required
if its members were to seriously consider defying the
federal court, thereby risking a jail term for contempt.
The average citizen cared very little from whom the actual
integration assignment orders had come, the federal courts,
and not the School Board, would forever carry the blame.
The Council, too, could have overlooked the Board's defiant
initiative had not more public differences surfaced once the
certainty of closed schools was assured.
A fundamental ideological disparity existed between
the members of the Council and the School Board that made
continued harmony between the two groups impossible once the
future of the city's public schools was really threatened.

47Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 January 1959.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

348

The members of the Norfolk School Board ascribed to the
theory that integrated public schools were better than no
schools at all, and better even than any substitute system
that could be offered in the private realm.

To this end the

Board proposed almost immediately that the City Council join
it in petitioning the Governor to relinquish state control
of the city's closed secondary schools.

This was the one

loop-hole in the state's Massive Resistance plan whereby a
closed public school could reopen, albeit on an integrated
basis.

Local control, however, meant loss of state funding

and a considerable increase in the local tax rate.48

Thus

observers were not surprised when the Council rejected the
Board's plea,4® and submitted instead an alternate plan of
its own, requesting Governor Almond to reopen the closed
schools on a segregated basis--something he obviously could
not

do without being in direct conflict with the

of the federal

government.

Mayor Duckworth next

authority
devised a

complicated scheme whereby the Governor would have to close
only those grades actually under court orders to integrate;
students in the unaffected grades could then be reassigned
to other public schools in the city.

Because Norfolk was

then operating on a split-year system, with graduations in
both January and May, Duckworth felt that the city could
open the second semester (the "H" sections) of the eighth,

48Norfolk

Virginian-Pilot, 16 October 1958.

49Norfolk

Virginian-Pilot, 25 January 1959.
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ninth, tenth, and eleventh grades.

Since Blacks had not

been assigned to the twelfth grade, schools could have
opened for seniors and the "H" sections— roughly 40% of the
white students locked out of classes.

Governor Almond and

the state superintendent of schools quickly lined up the
neighboring school systems of South Norfolk, Norfolk County,
Portsmouth, and Princess Anne County to accommodate the
remaining students in the "L" sections of each grade.50
Although no one knows whether their opposition was based
upon operational considerations, conscientious objections,
or, as one press report indicated, legal grounds,51 the
Norfolk School Board apparently refused to participate, and
the plan died without implementation.52

Regardless of its

reason, the Board's refusal to participate helped to
increase the level of the conflict with the Mayor and the
Council.

The Board had felt all along that the people of

Norfolk would not stand for closed schools, and that any
proposal, such as this new bypass plan, that sought to
either prolong the crisis or else shift the burden of closed

5°Mayor W. Fred Duckworth, Letter to Governor J. Lindsay
Almond, 6 October 1958, Box 136 (Litigation, Norfolk: School
Segregation, 1958), Executive Department papers of Governor
J. Lindsay Almond, 1958-1962, Archives, State Library,
Richmond.
51Such a plan probably would have constituted "separate
treatment" of the students involved. Federal Judge John Paul
had indicated in the Charlottesville and Warren County cases
that "if the state is going to abandon public education, it
must abandon it completely."
52Christian Science Monitor, 8 October 1958.
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schools from a community responsibility to an isolated
hardship destroyed their goal of providing quality public
education.53
Mayor Duckworth found himself torn somewhere between
the School Board's desire for segregated public education
and the Organization's demand to make Massive Resistance
work.

He was too pragmatic a politician to think that those

17 Black students would somehow taint the education of the
10,000 whites locked out of their classrooms, but he was
also too savvy to attempt to oppose the Organization on its
best issue in decades.

The School Board, however, repre

sented a very powerful portion of his own personal coalition
of businessmen and Byrd Machine backers, and its sentiments
in favor of public education very probably accurately
expressed the sentiments of the majority of the business
community.

The School Board and the editorial writers of

the Virginian-Pilot probably represented the still private
concerns of the Silkstocking community, more than even
Duckworth would have cared to admit.

Thus the Mayor was

faced with the first real conflict within the harmony
coalition since its formation eight years earlier.

Although

he had shown a great deal of racial intolerance in both his
remarks and his policies, Mayor Duckworth was above all else
a sharp politician, and the Organization had already shown
that race-baiting was good politics.

He had not overtly

53Francis Crenshaw.
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committed himself to promoting the Organization's Massive
Resistance plan, only to giving the Defenders a fair hearing
in the absence of public schools; to do otherwise, in light
of the Defender's past record of electoral appeal, would
have been bad politics.
The public was probably unaware of the full ramifica
tions of Duckworth's dilemma, but they were knowledgeable
enough to know that the Mayor was the key to any resolution
of the current crisis:

both the School Board and the

Massive Resisters needed his support to prevail.

The School

Board's request that the Council join it in petitioning the
Governor to return the schools to local control brought this
behind-the-scenes conflict to the forefront of public
attention.

Local control meant public schools, but it also

meant integration; a denial of the Board's request would
prolong the school closing and promote Massive Resistance.
The political risks of joining the Board in its petition
were enormous:

it meant bowing to the N.A.A.C.P., the

federal courts, and the Committee for Public Schools; it
meant forfeiting forever the support of both the Defenders
and the Old Guard of the Organization; if the appeal were
successful and schools were reopened without state funding,
the Mayor would be personally responsible for a huge
increase in local taxes; and finally, such an act would
place the Mayor far beyond any course of action that the
public had as yet indicated it would approve.

To deny the
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Board's request, however, would risk provoking the ire of
the School Board, the patrons of the public schools, the
editors of the Virginian-Pilot, and probably the
Silkstocking element of the business community.

Seen in

this context, the M a y o r 1s attempt to avoid the question by
calling upon the Governor to reopen the closed schools on a
segregated basis comes as no surprise.

The Mayor's bypass

plan was just another smoke screen tactic to stall the
issue, but the decision would not go away; the School Board
and the Virginian-Pilot continued to press the question,
firm in their resolve to use every opportunity to witness
for public education.

The fact remains, however, that the

issue was not as clear-cut as the Board made it appear:
once the Council joined it in petitioning the Governor to
return the schools to local control, nothing guaranteed that
the Governor would then honor their request.

State law was

just vague enough on the point that the Governor was under
no obligation to make any response at all.

If this were so,

then the School Board was urging a course that might poten
tially isolate the Mayor and the Council from their coali
tion of support, divide the community, and then make them
appear ineffective for attempting such a futile gesture.
The simplest solution to their dilemma would be for the
Governor to indicate ahead of time that he would refuse any
such request for local control, but when a delegation of
local officials sought a preliminary indication of his
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disposition, the Governor "just grinned."54

Almond was

also too good a politician to commit himself and risk
alienating his own coalition of supporters.
Mayor Duckworth, however, had discovered another
solution, and one that would not only legitimately stall the
issue for at least another month, it would also take him
permanently off the hook:

he would let the people decide

the question in an informational referendum.

The Mayor, in

announcing the Council's decision to delay action on the
School Board's request until after the referendum, explained
his rationale:
. . . such a referendum is a prerequisite to any
city action on the current school crisis . . . .
Governor Almond was elected by an overwhelming
majority to do exactly what he has done [i.e.,
close the schools faced with integration]. I
think the only way to impress the Governor is to
let the same voters show him what they want done
n o w .5 5
His emphasis on "the same voters" was part of the
brilliance of the tactical ploy:

since this was an off-year

for elections in the state, the referendum would come at a
time when only 46,000 individuals— less than a fourth of the
city's adult population— had their poll taxes paid up to
date; nor was there any time to either register new voters
or to allow delinquent accounts to be brought up to date.

N o r f o l k Virginian-Pilot, 19 October 1958.
^Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 October 1958.
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The question was to be put to the same conservative and
established electorate that had given a two-to-one mandate
to Governor Almond and Massive Resistance the year before.
Secondly, since the referendum "was purely informational in
nature, "the vote would not decide anything; the Council
would be free at any time to disregard the outcome if it
felt so inclined.56
The Organization was clearly the beneficiary of the
Mayor's decision:

their constituency would be the ones who

would decide the issue; less than a sixth of the voters
would be Black;57 Navy personnel and others new to the
area would be disenfranchised by the poll tax and pre
registration requirements, and the short time frame would
not allow the pro-school forces an opportunity to mount much
of a campaign of opposition.

Further, it put the School

Board, the Committee for Public Schools, the editors of the
Virginian-Pilot, and the school patrons in the unenviable
position of having to oppose both the Mayor and the concept
of popular democracy.

The School Board, realizing that it

had been outflanked by the maneuver, attempted to pull back
from a clash with the Organization:

it refused to attack

either the Council or the referendum, and instead chose only
to complain about the additional 30-day delay inherent in
the straw vote procedure.

In an editorial entitled "In

56Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 October 1958.
57Ibid.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

355

Principle, Wrong; In Practice, Confusing" the VirginianPilot eloquently expressed the frustrations that the Board
chose only to vent in private;
[The referendum tactic] demonstrates an u n 
willingness to exercise the leadership in city
government which Norfolk has learned over the
years to expect as the mark of councilmanic duty
and obligation.
It runs directly counter to the
views and formal recommendations of the Norfolk
School Board, [and] thereby digs a deep and
ominous chasm between these two bodies . . .
resort to it is not municipal statesmanship.
It
is refusal to face unpleasant but unavoidable
facts.5S
Lawyers for the Committee for Public Schools were even
more direct in their attempt to expose the ploy:

"The

referendum is a device to get Council off the hook.

I know

it's a hot potato . . . They don't want to stand up and be
counted."S9

The vote and the closed electorate were,

however, only a part of the overall plan:

Duckworth and the

Norfolk City Council wanted to make sure that the voters—
their constituency— would have to face the same tough
decision that the School Board demanded.

When the final

version of the proposition was drafted, the actual question
was weighted with the code phrase "Integrated Basis as
required by the Federal Court" that would make a clear-cut
decision difficult:

ssreprinted from Reif, p. 17.
S9Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 12 November 1958.
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Shall the Council of the City of Norfolk,
pursuant to State Law, petition the Governor
to return to the City control of schools, now
closed, to be opened by the City on an
Integrated Basis as required by the Federal
Court?60
Voters were to check "For Petitioning the Governor" or
"Against Petitioning the Governor," but the decision did not
stop there.

Also on the ballot was a section labeled "For

Information Only, Not To Be Voted On:"
In the event the closed schools are returned
to the City of Norfolk, and are re-opened
Integrated by the City, it will be necessary,
because of the loss of State Funds, for every
family having a child or children in Public
Schools from which State Funds are withheld,
to pay the City a substantial Tuition for each
child in or entering such Public Schools.61
The pro-school advocates who had hoped to rally voter
support in favor of opening the closed schools now found
that task impossible:

the time frame was too short to mount

an effective campaign; the electorate was too closely allied
with the Organization; and the question was now both too
confusing and too emotionally charged for voters to make a
meaningful choice.

The loaded ballot meant that the

opponents of Massive Resistance would first have to
undertake a highly organized and well financed effort to
re-educate the populace before they could tackle the issue

6°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 November 1958.
61Ibid.
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in the referendum.

The teachers, the ministers, the

Committee for Public Schools, the School Board, and even the
editorial staff of the Virginian-Pilot were incapable of
such a monumental undertaking.
The Committee for Public Schools saw how hopeless its
task had become, and turned its efforts instead to legal
actions that might block the referendum.

Two suits were

filed— one challenged the legality of such a purely informa
tional action where no binding decision would be rendered;
the other hoped to strike the "For Information Only" portion
of the ballot on the grounds that the concept of charging
tuition fees for public schools was contrary to state
law--but both efforts were expeditiously struck down by the
local and State Supreme Court justices.52

The School

Board must have also been frustrated by the Council's
decision to weigh the question against their recommendation,
for they apparently openly considered campaigning in favor
of petitioning the Governor.

Mayor Duckworth got word of

the Board's intent, and publicly lectured them on the
virtues of neutrality in such a heated question:
The Council is maintaining a "hands off"
policy on the referendum.
We don't have any
idea of politicking one way or the other.
I
would like to suggest that the School Board do
the same.53

52Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 November 1958.
53Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 22 October 1958.
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School Board Chairman Paul Schweitzer tried to respond that
"politics has never entered into the Board's decisions," but
both of the city's newspapers picked up the tone of the
exchange as an attempt to rebuke the Board and get them back
into line.64

Even though it backed down from its intent

to campaign openly on the issue, the School Board still
chose a course that was independent from the Mayor:

instead

it put itself on record as opposed to charging any form of
tuition fee.

Public schools are an essential community ser

vice, members reasoned, the cost of which must necessarily
be borne by the entire public, and not just those who bene
fit directly.

To the Mayor's charge that he was "politick

ing" with even this stance, Schweitzer answered, "I don't
intend to be involved in politics.

I intend to inform the

public of the facts and let them make up their minds."65
Board member Benjamin Willis, a Duckworth appointee thought
to be the most conservative of the group, was even more
contemptuous of the Mayor's attempt to silence their
collective conscience; "I'll wear no man's muzzle," was his
reply, "it is the School Board's duty to inject itself into
the controversy."66
The referendum issue had left the members of the
Norfolk School Board more isolated than ever before:

64Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 October 1958.
65Reif, p. 19.
66Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 30 March 1960.
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were not quite at war with the Council and the city's
political leaders, but they were certainly further out on
the limb of opposition than any other group of successful
businessmen had been in almost a decade.

They were cut off

as well from the rest of the business community:

not a

single financial or commercial leader of any note had been
willing to join them, the teachers, the Ministerial Associa
tion, or the Committee in any action which might threaten
the Organization's Massive Resistance program.

Norfolk

under Duckworth had always prided itself on the unanimity of
its business and political leaders, and now the School Board
threatened to disrupt that hard fought harmony in the middle
of the most intense crisis that coalition had faced.

The

pressure on its members to remain quiet and play a receding
role was intense,67 but unanimously they rejected this
course as a matter of conscience.

They knew that the

referendum would be a disaster for the closed schools; not
because the concept of public education would be rejected,
but rather because the election would only further delay the
inevitable decision to comply.

In the meantime the forces

of Massive Resistance would have a chance to claim some sort
of mandate— a unanimity of popular defiance that the Council
obviously hoped would impress the federal courts and hasten
their retreat.
gesture:

Instead the Board saw it as a futile

the lesson of Little Rock was clearly that the

S7Ibid.
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federal government had no intention of withdrawing.

Still

the Board hoped that by opposing only the references to
tuition payments that they had chosen a moderate position
somewhere between the two competing demands:

they were not

instructing the voters to vote "For" integrated schools, but
neither were they advocating a decision "Against" the con
cept of public education.

In reality they were attempting

to be true moderates on an issue in which there could be no
moderation, and each step they took brought them closer to
the moment of choice between further confrontation or
compliance.

School Board member Benjamin Willis thought

that the Board should resign and abandon its collision
course--"I feel the School Board has served its usefulness,"
he said, but Chairman Paul Schweitzer was more philosophic:
"You follow the detour, take the bumps, and hope that you'll
soon be back on the good road again."ss
At any rate the six individual members of the
Norfolk School Board seemed willing to risk both their
political futures and their business ventures over what each
must have felt was a matter of conscience.

Each had

personal reasons for choosing this independent course, but
all six were obviously sustained by a common and overriding
belief in the merits of public education, and in a way each
provided a powerful, living testimony to that ideal.

Paul

Schweitzer, the chairman and most visible spokesman for the

6BNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 January 1959.
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Board, possessed the least formal, but perhaps the most
valuable educational experience.

Schweitzer had grown up on

a ranch in Arizona, where most of the farmhands in the
community were Mexicans; although he never attended college,
he had, in his own words, experienced an "integrated" educa
tion:

"My sister and I were the only gringos in that little

one-room schoolhouse . . .

it was a lonely experience.1,69

Board member W. Farley Powers was born and raised in a log
house in the impoverished coal mining counties of Virginia's
Southwest; hard work and a solid devotion to learning had
been his only escape from the deprivation that surrounded
him.70

William Ballard had grown up in an equally

impoverished Eastern Shore region of the State where he was
employed by the family fish and oyster packinghouse.

After

working his way first through high school and then college,
he returned to raise the family business into one of Tide
water's leading employers.71

Ben Willis, too, had been

forced to work his way up from the loading docks of the
family business, and although, as the heir to his father's
posh furniture salon, his upbringing had been much more
typical of the rest of Norfolk's business and social elite,
he owed his fortitude and personal philosophy to something
his father had taught him:

"There are two things you cannot

69Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 16 February 1960.
7 °Norfolk Ledger-Star, 22 December 1972.
71Norfolk Ledger-Star, 1 September 1964.
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compromise— principle and equality."'72

Francis Crenshaw,

probably the most worldly of the six, brought an equally
important perspective to the Board:

growing up as the son

of a Navy captain, he had lived in most of the port cities
on both the East and West Coasts, and had actually attended
integrated schools in New England.-73

Mrs. Mildred Dallas,

the only woman on any of the city's major boards and commis
sions, was also the only educator in the group.

Although

she had finished a successful career as an executive with
one of the downtown automobile agencies, she had retired to
establish her own private kindergarten in the fashionable
Lochaven section of the city.
Thus, although they shared a common background in the
center of the city's civic and business elite, all six
members of the Norfolk School Board evidenced a profound
commitment to concepts of equality and public education— a
conviction strong enough to endure the sense of helplessness
and isolation they now faced.

Although publicly in favor of

petitioning the Governor and privately opposed to even
putting the decision to a vote, the School Board neverthe
less backed away from openly campaigning on the issue— Mayor
Duckworth's scolding had produced at least that much
compliance— abandoning instead that cause to the Committee
for Public Schools and the other zealots of the pro-school

~72Richmond Times-Dispatch, 3 February 1963.
’73Francis Crenshaw; Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 29 May 1961.
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movement.

In spite of the fact that the odds were heavily

stacked against them, the Committee still nursed vague hopes
that Duckworth and the Organization had blundered by putting
the issue to a vote:

they hoped that the privacy and

anonymity of the polling booth might allow for a surprising
outpouring of support in favor of reopening the schools.

It

was a remote possibility, but the Committee nevertheless
prepared 50,000 guide ballots, numerous handbills, and a
massive newspaper advertising campaign to promote a vote
"for" public schools.

Even as they pushed legal efforts to

block the loaded wording on the ballot, the Committee under
took its own "for information only" campaign, zeroing in on
the potential economic disasters that lay ahead if schools
remained closed; secondary themes included the warnings that
the city's public school system would "be crippled for a
generation" and that Norfolk's children were forfeiting
"their American birthright of a free education."74
The Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual
Liberties led the forces that urged a vote "against" the
resolution--the Council remained true to its pledge to stay
out of the contest once it had drawn up the ballot.75

In

one sense it was a classic struggle between the liberal
Committee and the ultra-conservative Defenders, but the odds

74From guide ballots, handbills, and newspaper
advertisements, undated (November, 1958), Norfolk Committee
for Public Schools files, Old Dominion University Archives.
75Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 November 1958.
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were too heavily stacked against the resolution to make it
either a meaningful contest or a fair fight.

The wording on

the ballot, the nature of the electorate, the short duration
of the campaign, and the tacit opposition of the Organiza
tion all doomed the Committee's efforts to failure before
they had even begun.

The only surprise in the results was

the paucity of the turnout:

only 21,000 people— less than

half of those eligible, and only a tenth of the city's adult
population— showed up to cast a ballot in the most important
electoral contest in a decade.

The referendum to petition

the Governor to reopen the closed schools lost by a healthy
3-to-2 margin, the same figure by which U. S. Senator Harry
F. Byrd and Governor J. Lindsay Almond had defeated their
recent anti-Organization opponents.

Only 3,600 Black

voters— still less than half of those eligible— turned out
to help the pro-school forces; their presence, however,
helped to dilute the harshness of the 2.5-to-l rout that the
Committee suffered in the white precincts.76

Even so, the

vote was much closer in the Silkstocking strongholds on the
West Side than in the blue collar neighborhoods in the
northern, eastern, and central portions of the city.77

5Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 19 November 1958.
^Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 November 1958.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
A VERY MASSIVE RESISTER
The people had spoken, or so it seemed; the message of
their mandate was, however, indistinct.

On the one hand,

they appeared to endorse a continuation of the school
closing strategy as a means to avoid federal pressures to
integrate; on the other hand, they gave no indication of
just how long they would support such tactics.

The message

was clouded by the fact that as yet no one had really
suffered greatly from the closings:

the establishment of

tutoring groups and the heightened sense of community
involvement and shared emergency had helped to mask the fact
that the burden of Massive Resistance fell disproportion
ately upon the young, the poor, and the transient population
not represented in the established electorate.

The people

had not, as spokesmen for the Defenders claimed, endorsed
Massive Resistance:

the tutoring groups themselves and the

dismal patronage attracted by the T.E.F.'s offering of
segregated private academies gave substantial testimony to
the fact that Norfolk parents at least wanted the education
of their children to continue in the public realm.

If there

was any significance at all to the election, and any meaning
to the events that fall that preceded the contest, it was
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that most citizens were still waiting for some sort of
dramatic action that would resolve the crisis— the scenarios
proposed by both the T.E.F. and the Committee for Public
Schools were found unacceptable— and that most were hoping
unrealistically for a return to segregated public education
— the one option not available.

In short, the people of

Norfolk had not gone so far as the Governor surmised as to
reject forever the idea of racially mixed schools;1 they
just were not prepared to accept them yet.
The one man who bore the heaviest responsibility for
reading these auguries was Mayor W. Fred Duckworth, and both
time and events were conspiring in such a way as to insure
that his judgment of the referendum's relative importance
would be clouded by other, largely political, considera
tions.

Far from lessening the pressures upon him to act,

however, the referendum had served instead to focus new
attention upon his response, thereby helping to underscore
his sense of helplessness in the face of outside forces.
Governor Almond had already declared that he had "no weapons
left" to forestall integration from future court orders,2
and those around Duckworth saw this as an opportunity to
promote his ascendancy.

The referendum and the voters'

support for the school closing policy was viewed positively
by the state's political leaders, and Duckworth was fast

^-Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 20 November 1958.
2Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 4 January 1959.
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becoming the chief beneficiary of such acclaim.

One savvy

political commentator summed up Norfolk's newly won respect
among the state's conservative camp in this fashion:
A gleam has replaced the old suspicious look
when you mention Norfolk in the politically
potent domain called the Virginia Southside.
It's because of a new feeling that Norfolk is
not going to bow easily to school integration.
And that gleam shows when the name of Norfolk's
frank-talking mayor comes up.
The word most
often heard in describing his actions is that he
has "guts."3
Increasingly the eyes of the state's political leaders
began to turn away from the staid and passive elegance of
the governor's office to the energy and dynamism of
Norfolk's mayor; there was no question that they liked what
they saw.

Almond had won office by portraying himself as

the brains behind Massive Resistance, but now it Duckworth
who was seen as the guts, and his blunt-spoken "go-getter"
image proved a sharp contrast to the rolling rhetorical
rodomontade that characterized Almond's style.

Almond

appeared to be the consummate silver-haired patrician, the
type Virginians had always sought for higher office, so it
was ironic that now, in crisis, they should turn to Duck
worth, the epitome in appearance of the urban political boss
with his stocky, even pudgy, five-foot, ten-and-a-half-inch
frame, replete with bright, intent eyes and jowly visage.4

3Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 January 1959.
^Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 September 1954.
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Even his trademark, the ever present cigar and cigar holder,
was more big city stoagie than the plantation havana of the
gentile; he smoked three a day,5 but unlit, all three did
double duty as the maestro's baton of Duckworth's furious
pace of action:

"he thinks fast and calls the shots

quickly— sometimes with a suddenness that is startling— "is
how one reporter described him, going on to add that he "can
snap with a voice which is some where (sic) between a bark
and a bite."

It was this very openness— "he's no diplomat,

but he lays his cards on the table face up— "6that was now
getting him attention from Virginia's most ardent segrega
tionists:

they sensed a steely harshness in his opposition

to federal authorities that seemed lacking in A l m o n d 's calm
demeanor.

In short, Duckworth, not Almond, appeared now to

be the politician who had the potential to emerge as the
hero of Massive Resistance, and already his name was being
bandied about by political insiders across the state as a
possible contender for gubernatorial nomination.7

Local

Organization chieftain Billy Prieur had begun to cart him up
to Winchester for regular sessions with Senator Byrd,
reportedly both to underscore the importance of Norfolk's
continued resistance and to explore the possibilities of
advancing the Mayor's political career.

For the first time

5Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 5 September 1960.
sNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 September 1960.
^Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 January 1959.
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Fred Duckworth himself was entertaining ambitions that
stretched beyond municipal service, and he was eager to
parlay this potential new statewide following into the
Organization's nod for governor.®
All of this political speculation— as yet only the
talk of insiders who thrive on such badinage— led Duckworth
to misinterpret the results of the referendum as both a
personal endorsement of his policies and a call to arms for
further resistance.

For the time being, however, the vote

seemed to both solve all his present problems as well as to
promote new opportunities:

first, it relieved the Council

of having to make any decision at all on the School Board's
appeal for gubernatorial intervention; secondly, it seemed
to mend a potential rift in his business/organization con
stituency by allowing the people, and not the politicians,
to rebuke the School Board for entertaining thoughts of
surrender; it had bought him time in which to establish that
cool and rational citizen response to the crisis was
possible; and finally, and perhaps most importantly, it had
convinced the rest of the state of the solidarity of
Norfolk's resistance to school integration, relieved the
pressure from the Southside to overreact, and bought time in
which to effect a purely local decision.

Unfortunately

personal ambitions and political pressures seemed to blind
the Mayor to the beneficial escape-valve qualities of the

aPretlow Darden, Robert Mason, and others.
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referendum, and led him instead to an overreaction in behalf
of the cause of Massive Resistance.

Mayor Duckworth

possessed a marvelously analytical mind that was well suited
to the rough and tumble realm of urban politics:

he now

sized up the situation in terms of potential obstacles,
options, and sources of opposition, and then proceeded one
by one to clear the obstacles and opposition from the path
that blocked his choice of options.
Chief among those obstacles was the threat still posed
by actions before the courts.

It was not the Harrison v.

Day "friendly" suit brought to test the legality of the
state's laws, nor even a continuation of the N.A.A.C.P.'s
integration litigation, that most observers feared; instead,
the Committee For Public Schools' James v. Almond action
appeared to be the challenge upon which the fate of Massive
Resistance hinged; this entreaty, wholly unexpected by both
Duckworth and the Organization, had Governor Almond and the
legal experts concerned.

Almond knew that the state could

not continue to offer public secondary education to Black
students in Norfolk, but not to whites, and that this
challenge by white parents would ultimately sink the
interposition logic of Massive Resistance.

Duckworth,

however, was not inclined to accept defeat so easily, and
instead, began to lay the groundwork for a plan that would
undermine the Committee's action.

At the first Council

meeting after the referendum Duckworth proposed a "cut-off
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of funds" clause in the School Board budget slated to begin
January 1 (1959), thereby reserving for the Council the
right to "change or cancel the unexpended portion" of school
funds at any time during the year, even prohibiting specific
expenditures if it wished.
such a ploy:

There were several reasons for

first, it brought the independent-acting

School Board more directly under Council's control by giving
the Council the power of month-to-month approval of every
facet of the School Board's budget.®
Board was clear:

The message to the

Duckworth would not stand for any further

rift in his political coalition, and any future independence
would be immediately rendered useless by Council's new
funding control.

Secondly, the measure was in part designed

to retaliate against the errant teachers who had undermined
the Organization's Massive Resistance strategy.

According

to reports, Duckworth, who had personally intervened to set
up the meeting, was still smarting from the teachers' rude
rejection of the T.E.F.'s offer or employment.

The funds

cutoff move now gave the Council the power to directly
jeopardize both the salary and the job security of the u p 
start teachers still under contract.

When School Superin

tendent J. J. Brewbaker expressed his concern that the
measure might hamper both current personnel and future
recruitment efforts, "I hope we don't do anything to
encourage teachers to look for other jobs— we have good

®Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 November 1958.
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teachers," Mayor Duckworth snapped, "With what some of them
have done . . .

I would have to disagree with you."10

These two retaliatory aspects of the funds cutoff
measure were, however, only secondary to other more pressing
considerations.

With the added power, Council now directly

controlled a potential solution to its legal dilemmas.

In

the event that the ruling in the Committee For Public
Schools' James v. Almond suit went against the city, the
Council could close the remaining white junior high as well
as the city's Black junior and senior high schools, a move
that would put Norfolk's case in uncharted legal waters.

No

court had yet ruled that a municipality was required to
offer secondary education to its citizens; in fact, Virginia
Attorney General Albertis S. Harrison had already ruled that
the Supreme Court's Brown decision had struck down the
entire state constitutional mandate to provide public
schools at all, because the establishment of a public
educational system was entirely conditional upon the schools
being segregated.11

The legal arguments in the James v.

Almond case turned upon the fact that the city was providing
public secondary schools for some and not all of its
patrons; if the city were to close the remaining secondary
institutions, the ploy would at the very least tie up the
legal efforts to integrate the schools for several more

10Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 January 1959.
lxNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 8 November 1958.
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years,12 perhaps giving the Organization enough time to
permanently salvage its Massive Resistance plan to sub
stitute private, segregated academies for integrated public
schools.
Closing the city's Black junior and senior high
schools was at this time, at least, a last resort and only
an ancillary aspect of the proposal.

The major purpose of

the clause was not to stand as a legal dodge, but rather to
serve as the most formidable in a series of power plays
designed to pressure the Black community into finally with
drawing their integration efforts.

Up to now the School

Board had been able to stand effectively as a buffer between
the Mayor and the Black community, insulating the Black
educational system from political reprisals.

Now that the

School Board had been short-circuited out of direct control
of any portion of the city's school funding, the entire
Black educational system was dangerously exposed to
reprisals.

Councilman Lewis Layton renewed the Mayor's call

for a Black withdrawal from integration efforts, and was not
above dangling the potent threat of such a fund cut-off as
the new cutting edge of that demand.

As if to back up that

threat with immediate action, Council proceeded to slice
$200,000 from the budget of the Department of Public
Welfare, the burden of which would fall disproportionately

12A similar maneuver in Prince Edward County was not
definitively broken until 1963.
See Bob Smith, They Closed
Their Schools, op cit.
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upon the city's Black citizens.

In spite of the Governor's

response that he was opposed to such retaliatory measures,
Duckworth wanted the Black community to know that this time
he meant business:

"The only way schools can reopen now is

by getting the cooperation of the colored citizens."13
The Black community knew full well that the M a y o r 1s threat
was no idle bluff:

he had both the inclination and the

capacity to carry it out.

"We could do nothing less in the

light of the school referendum,"14 was Duckworth's care
fully worded analysis of the Council's authority to affect
such a cutoff.

The threat was real enough:

unless the

N.A.A.C.P. withdrew all legal efforts to integrate the
city's schools, the Black community would be faced with at
best a prolonged shutdown and, at worst, a permanent closing
of its secondary school system and additional retaliatory
encroachments upon its elementary schools.

The enormous

progress in Black education that had taken place in Norfolk
in the twelve years since the People's group first took over
the city government would now come to an abrupt halt, and
was even in grave danger of retrogressing.

Was the Black

community willing to trade the future of an entire genera
tion of its young people for the expanded educational
opportunities of 17 youths?

The Mayor was betting that they

would not.

13Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 November 1958.
14Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 14 January 1959.

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

375

The Mayor's fund cutoff proposal was a direct result
of the lopsided referendum victory, a growing awareness of
his own personal political aspirations for higher office,
and an increase in the hostile attitudes of a few of the
state' most powerful and most ardent segregationists.

The

referendum had helped to quiet much of the rabid rhetoric
emerging from Virginia's Southside, but some overt and
highly visible steps to preserve the legal facade of Massive
Resistance seemed necessary to appease former Governor Bill
Tuck and others who had been roused by the Virginian-Pilot's
editorial policy and its continued coverage of the pro
school advocates.

Duckworth had come under increasing

pressure, in spite of his own growing personal popularity
with these resisters, to prove that Norfolk was not a
"hotbed of integrationists" as Tuck and his cohorts were
charging.15

The funds cut-off measure was designed in

part to appease these sympathies, as well as to buy the city
enough time to negotiate some sort of out-of-court settle
ment of the issue.

Tuck and the rest of the Southside's

Massive Resisters represented a powerful political force in
the Organization— one with which even a Mayor lacking in
ambition for advancement would have to deal in order to ^
secure continued state funding for the tunnels, highways,
bridges, institutions, and other projects that were so
crucial to Duckworth's development desires— and they were

15Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 November 1958.
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not above threatening to cut off state funds earmarked for
any political jurisdiction which bowed to court-ordered
school integration:

"If Norfolk won't stand with us, I say

let them stand alone" was Tuck's philosophy.16
Within this context of threatened Southside retribu
tion a minor incident took on even larger proportions in the
Mayor's post-referendum posture of defiance.

The plight of

Norfolk's white secondary school students had begun to
attract national media attention, and Duckworth heard that a
C.B.S. film crew from Edward R. Murrow's "See It Now" series
was in town to film a Committee for Public Schools' rally.
Duckworth personally called School Board Chairman Paul
Schweitzer to have the Board deny the Committee's rental
permit to use public school buildings for its meetings.17
The prospect of national coverage of a pro-school rally in a
Norfolk public building was one that would have strong
negative repercussions among the Southside's resisters.
When the School Board, apparently caught off guard by the
sudden order, asked for clarification, they were told that
"the Council did not want the schools used by this or any
other group discussing the problem of integration,"xs and
that the Council was merely expressing its "concern for the

16Ibid.
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 November 1958.
lsNorfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 26 November 1958.
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safety of persons who might attend such meetings."19

The

Mayor was so determined to establish a new policy that
excluded the Committee For Public Schools from the trappings
of official sanction that he risked angering the local
Defenders chapter which met regularly— in fact met the very
week of his order— at Suburban Park Elementary School.20
Even so, the policy apparently achieved its desired end:
the rental fees were refunded, and the Committee was forced
to scurry to secure private quarters for its rally, which
was eventually held, greatly deflated by the sudden shifting
of locations, at the Y.W.C.A.
The Mayor's quick action on both the funds cutoff
measure and the pro-school rally so soon after the refer
endum— both moves were accomplished within a week of the
voting— earned him accolades of praise from the Organization
hierarchy and the Southside cheering section.

Both actions

not only point to how futile opposition to the Mayor had
become, but also to just how long the crisis might continue.
More and more Duckworth, and not Almond, appeared to be the
man fully in charge of the situation, and the School Board,
the teachers, the Committee For Public Schools, and the
others who preached moderation realized just how little
influence they had left in that corner:

in attempting to

convince the Mayor of the rightness of their cause, they had

19Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 November 1958.
2°Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch,

26 November 1958.
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become his enemies, outcasts whom he sought every opportu
nity to harass and harangue.

Moreover, no immediate end to

the crisis appeared to be in sight:

no movement could

realistically occur until January, when the Council assumed
control of the School Board's funding, the court cases were
slated for resolution, the Black community would have to
respond, the tutoring groups were scheduled to cease,21
and the School Board threatened to resign if overruled on
its opposition to the M a y o r ’s funds cut-off proposal.22
Norfolk had reached an interim period:

the flurry of

activity that followed the first weeks of closed schools had
all but died away; closing the schools was no longer a novel
approach to preventing integration— the doors had now been
locked for more than three months, and the federal govern
ment showed no signs of the quick surrender promised by the
proponents of Massive Resistance.

Onlookers could not agree

whether the citizens were really "complacent" or just
"frustrated" by their lack of power to influence the outcome
of the crisis,23 but regardless of the true nature of
their attitude, Norfolk was remarkably quiet for a city with
10,000 students out on the streets, and the future of both
its public educational system and continued racial harmony
at stake.

21Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 October 1958.
22Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 January 1959.
23Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 October 1958.
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In the air of official calm that prevailed, Norfolk's
rumor mills worked overtime, helping to shift the focus of
attention away from the political arena that was now
involving a different cast of characters.

Increasingly the

focus of parents and civic leaders began to turn away from
the student leaders towards a different type of student— not
the ones who attended the tutoring groups, lead protests, or
were active in school clubs and organizations.

The citizens

became more and more concerned that the effect of the school
closings and the Lost Class of 1959 could be measured in
terms of greater casualties than just classes missed,
athletic competitions canceled, and college plans postponed:
they feared that it could be tallied as well in the sudden
upsurge of teenage unemployment, hostility, delinquency,
crime, pregnancy, forced marriages, dropouts, and the like
— the type of effects that have a more lasting impact upon
the future of the community.

Lenoir Chambers and the

editorial staff of the Virginian-Pilot began to hammer away
at this theme as well as the long-term economic ruin that
lay ahead.

Washington continued to sound ominous notes

about the crisis' potential impact upon naval contracts,
personnel assignments, and billeting arrangements— the Navy
was obviously reluctant to make assignments to a community
that lacked full public education— but these warnings seemed
to go unheeded.

Rumors spread about officers who had

requested transfer, ships that had been reassigned,
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development prospects frightened away, and the growing
likelihood of Congressional retaliation.24
In spite of these dire warnings that the under
pinnings of Norfolk’s economy were severely threatened, the
full impact of the school crisis had not yet hit the
business community as had been predicted.

Local business

leaders and economic trends were still pointing as late as
January of 1959 to a bright outlook and a rapid recovery
from the national slump that characterized the later years
of the Eisenhower administration.23

Even so, elements

within the business community never gave up their attempt to
attract the old elements of the People's group to the
pro-school camp.

When efforts to add such leaders to its

own organization failed, the Norfolk Committee For Public
Schools attempted to establish an independent advisory board
of community elites, but even this effort proved hopeless:
only lawyer Archie Boswell, insurance broker L. Jerome
Taylor, industrialist William L. Shepheard, City Park
Commissioner Fred Heutte, artist Kenneth Harris, and
gynecologist Mason C. Andrews enlisted in the organization.
Other notable progressives in the community such as lawyer
Henry E. Howell, Jr., and entrepreneur Albert Hofheimer
refused to allow their names to be associated with even this

24Reif, pps. 11-12, 21-22.
25Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 1 January 1959; 4 January
1959; 15 January 1959.
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group.26

In October lawyer Archie Boswell and School

Board Chairman Paul Schweitzer joined with psychiatrist
William F. Blair and Lewis W. Webb, Jr., provost of the
junior college that was the precursor to Old Dominion
University, in an effort to get the Norfolk Chamber of
Commerce to take a positive stand opposing the school
closings.

After a stormy session that included discussion

of the closings'

impact upon the Navy and industrial

recruitment efforts, the Chamber's Education Committee
passed the resolution by a twelve-to-four vote.

Dr. Herman

M. Williams, Assistant School Superintendent, expressed the
fears of the educators in attendance:
Frankly, I feel that secondary education in
Norfolk is doomed.
I feel that the leadership
in the State of Virginia has never been behind
public education; they have primarily supported
private schools.
That is the reason Virginia
ranks 45th in education [out of 48 states].27
The Chamber, however, refused to act on the resolution, just
as it had when Barfield's Civic Affairs Committee requested
a similar response a month later.

Barfield pleaded with the

Chamber to take a stand "in this unprecedented civic
disaster in order to furnish this community with the strong
leadership and guidance it so urgently needs."28

2SReif, p. 5, and other sources.
27Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 October 1958.
2aNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 17 January 1959.
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Over and over again the editorial pages of the
Virginian-Pilot echoed the theme that Norfolk's business
leaders must put a stop to the school crisis, that it had
gone on long enough, and that the city's future as a major
naval base was threatened;29 even so, not a single leader
of the old People's group, not a single major corporate
executive or civic leader, dared to take up the challenge.
The only corporate voices that were heard came from outside
the city, although some, like the president of the Norfolk
and Western Railroad, former governor and president of the
University of Virginia Colgate Darden (brother of Norfolk's
former Mayor),30 political leader Francis Pickens
Miller,31 and other statewide industrialists,32 had a
special relation-ship with the city.

Only a young Frank

Batten, publisher of the Virginian-Pilot and Ledger-Dispatch
newspapers, was willing to travel from Norfolk to join with
three dozen business leaders from across the state to meet
with Almond and urge him to reopen the closed schools.33
Most of the rest of Norfolk's business and civic
establishment remained quiet on the issue, giving Duckworth

29Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 17 January 1959 and 1
January 1959.
3 O

Dabney, p. 537.

33~Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 7 December 1959.
32Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 December 1958.
33Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 September 1990
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a free hand with which to negotiate with the Black
community.
In spite of the fact that almost every element of the
white populace stood poised against them— or at least seemed
prepared to silently assent to the closing of their schools,
too, in retaliation— the Black community refused to back
down from their integration efforts:

they were prepared to

choose desegregated institutions over no schools at all.34
Thus on January 13, 1959, Mayor Duckworth announced the
intention of the Norfolk City Council to close down after
February 1, all grades above the sixth— an additional 1,914
white pupils and 5,259 Black students would be locked out.
A small band of ardent open-the-schools advocates made an
emotional plea at the session for Council to "think it over"
before taking this drastic step.35

The editors of the

Virginian-Pilot lamented that this was "the cruelest blow of
all to the Norfolk public schools," and the executive board
of the Norfolk Committee For Public Schools once again made
an ardent plea for a show of support of public education
from the Silkstocking community:
Community leaders and organizations should
speak out [now] for a reopening of schools.
The time has come for the business and civic
leaders to take a public stand.
So far the
"First Citizens," the bank directors, the
owners and executives of business and industry,

34Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 December 1958.
35Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 14 January 1959.
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the Chamber of Commerce, the Civic Clubs, and
the great majority of professional men have not
[yet] been heard from.35
Ironically the first crack in the wall of solidarity
came not from any of these sources, but rather from within
the Council itself.

For the first time in the history of

the crisis, a single

councilman split from the pack and

voted "No" to a Duckworth directive.

Councilman Roy B.

Martin, Jr., a Duckworth appointee with a six-year tenure,
caused a ripple of surprise and then glee to break over the
pro-school advocates; their pleas had been heard.

Martin, a

top executive with Foote Brothers food wholesalers, cited
economic concerns as the reason for his opposition:
I sincerely feel we are headed for a
definite backward step economically if we do not
straighten out our school situation, not further
impair it. M y strong apprehension about the
economic future of Norfolk impels me to vote
"No."37
Years later Martin would indicate that it was the punitive
nature of the measure, as much as the economic considera
tions, that made it objectionable:

"It was stupid from my

point of view to enlarge the problem by closing more
schools."3B

36Norfolk Virginian-Pilot. 14 January 1959.
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot. 14 January 1959.
3SRoy B. Martin, Jr.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

385

The unofficial silence had at long lost been broken,
but there was no flood of Silkstocking sentiment to seize
upon this opportunity for expression.

The business communi

ty remained just as silent as before, failing even in this
eleventh hour opportunity to back one of its own in an
action of raw courage and seeming political suicide.
Instead of serving as the rallying point for a groundswell
of business opinion against the Mayor's retaliatory tack and
in favor, at long last, of the principles of public
education, Roy Martin stood as alone in moderation as the
School Board had once found itself.

"The middle of the road

is a thin yellow line where you get hit from both sides,"
one political observer later noted,3® and nobody felt that
aphorism more keenly than Roy Martin.
Martin's vote, although a seemingly useless act of
defiance that failed to stir an outpouring of Silkstocking
support for reopening the schools, was not as suicidal as it
may have first appeared.

Martin, although at 37 the

youngest member of the Council, was fast emerging as the one
representative of the Duckworth coalition with his head
closest to the ear of the people and his heart closest to
the throb of the business community.

The editors of the

Virginian-Pilot were determined that his action not stand
alone as an isolated incident, and therefore promoted the

39Henry E. Howell, Jr., The Wit and Wisdom of Henry
Howell (Norfolk:
Howell for Governor Campaign, 1973).
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apparent split in unprecedented news and editorial coverage
for a single council vote.

The pro-school advocates--the

teachers, ministers, Committee For Public Schools, P.-T.A.'s
and their sympathizers— who up to that point had carried the
banner of opposition to Massive Resistance alone, took
heart.

If Martin was willing to risk his political career

on a single vote, they figured, then he must have sensed
some new surge of sentiment stirring from the populace.

For

this reason, they planned a flurry of activity, unmatched
since the first weeks of the closings, to probe this new
development.
The Virginian-Pilot, too, sensed the change, and
attempted to crystallize the situation:
At present Norfolk may be likened to a bus
coming down a narrow mountain road in the
command of drivers who have misread the road
map, neglected to read the warning signs, and
who are cheered on by a group of front-seat
passengers who don't know what they are doing
. . . Norfolk's task would be difficult under
any leadership . . . but the difficult task is
horribly compounded when the leadership acts on
vain and dangerous assumptions.
There will be
hope when— but only when— a lot of silent,
unhappy people screw their courage to the
sticking point and speak and act.40
The first shots in the new barrage were fired at a
regular meeting of the Granby High School P.-T.A.

Granby

had now been closed four months, but suddenly 450 people
jammed a standing-room-only meeting to demand a more vocal

4°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 16 January 1959.
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opposition to the Mayor's school closing plan.

The result

was the first resolution by a Norfolk group opposing the
retaliatory measure against the city's Black schools.41
The most telling fusillade in the new barrage came not from
the closed secondary schools, but rather from an unexpected
corner.

The Bay View section of the city had been famous

known for its strong Massive Resistance sentiment in the
past,42 its Baptist church had served as the initial home
of the Tidewater Education Foundation, and the Bay View
P.-T.A. had been one of the first strongholds captured by
the Defenders in their attempt to seize control of the
city's Parent-Teachers Associations.43

Even though only

26 Bay View seventh-graders would be affected by the cut
off, a crowd of angry parents at a packed meeting of the Bay
View P.-T.A. shouted down the objections of W. I. McKendree,
president of both the T.E.F. and the Bay View P.-T.A., and
voted unanimously to pass a resolution opposed to closing
any more schools.44
were astounded:

The editors of the Virginian-Pilot

"in these dark

View P.-T.A. lights a candle of

days, the action ofthe
hope."

Bay

Inall, five city

P.-T.A.'s voiced "full scale protests" in the next few days
against the Council's funds cut-off proposal, but because

41Norfoik Virginian-Pilot, 15 January 1959.
42Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 16 January 1959.

43Norfoik Virginian-Pilot, 18 January 1959.
44Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 16 January 1959.
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Bay View was so widely known as a stronghold of Defender
sentiment, the Virginian-Pilot took its action as a cue to
ask, "Has The Counter-Revolution Begun?"45
The next salvo was fired by the School Board, a group
that had been relatively silent since it had been stripped
so unceremoniously of its financial power.

In an action of

silent defiance, the Board served as the Committee For
Public School's star witnesses in the James v. Almond suit.
In the irony of legal maneuvering, the School Board had been
named as a codefendant along with the Mayor; now, under
cross-examination by the Committee's lawyer, the Board
members backed up each of the Committee's claims of economic
and educational hardship.

Perhaps even more important, the

School Board now took two remarkable actions that brought it
almost into a position of direct confrontation with the
Council— a conflict which publicly at least it had sought up
to now to avoid.

First, Board Chairman Paul Schweitzer was

authorized to issue a carefully worded statement that
skirted on the edge of open defiance by indicating the
Board's displeasure with Council's new school closings:
The School Board is interested in educating
the children of Norfolk . . . our first obligation
to the community is to get our schools back to
operation in an orderly manner at the earliest
practicable date."46

4SNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 18 January 1959.
46Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 20 January 1959.
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Next the Board gave every indication that it would
like to lose the new suit brought by the Committee For
Public Schools to block the funds cut-off measure.

Although

the Board and the Council had both been named as defendants
in the action, City Attorney Leonard Davis, the individual
responsible for their joint defense, withdrew from the case,
leaving the Council alone to face the courts.47
A new harshness in the Mayor's attitude had brought
about the situation where the School Board and one of his
own Council members were willing to risk open disagreement;
for the first time they understood just how far Duckworth
was willing to go to make Massive Resistance work in the
city, and the prospect frightened them.

At the very time

most Norfolk residents were beginning to entertain thoughts
of reopening the schools, Duckworth was calling selected
members of the School Board and the City Council to a secret
strategy session at his home.

There, Duckworth, Vice-Mayor

George Abbott, and Organization head Billy Prieur— Roy
Martin was not invited, although presumably he heard about
its content from others in attendance, indicated both their
willingness and their intention to close every school in the
city, if necessary, in order to prevent integration.4®
This was no idle threat to induce the Black community
to recapitulate, this was to be the city's policy in the

47Norfolk Virginian-Pilot. 25 January 1959.
48Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 27 January 1959.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

390

m o n t h s , and even years, ahead, and the prospect of even more
closed schools and a continuation of hardline resistance
frightened the Board members present almost as much as
Duckworth's next announcement:

he was then holding for

Council's consideration an offer by the T.E.F. to buy up the
city's closed school facilities and operate them on a
private, segregated basis.49

This was the final step in

the total abandonment of public education that anyone with
any pretensions of moderation had to oppose:

with the

schools closed, their buildings sold, teacher salaries cut
off, and the low-cost tutoring groups phased out, it would
be only a matter of time before enough of both the teachers
and the students accepted Massive Resistance, reopening the
public schools on a private, segregated basis with the
assistance of the State's generous tuition grants.

There

was no question that Duckworth and the Organization had at
their disposal the machinery that would make Massive
Resistance work in Norfolk, and the fact that they both had
such a capability and were apparently willing to utilize it,
was enough to make both the School Board and Councilman Roy
Martin revolt in spite of the risks they might incur as a
result of their defiance.
Events now began to proceed at such a rapid pace, h o w 
ever, that they quickly outstripped these two hopeful signs
of protest.

On the same day that the School Board was

49Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 28 January 1959.
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announcing its opposition to the funds cut-off plan, the
entire legal structure of the school-closing tack was being
struck down in separate actions before State and Federal
Courts.

Both the State's "friendly" Harrison v. Day action

before the Virginia Supreme Court and the Committee For
Public Schools' more far-reaching James v. Almond suit filed
in Federal Court proved disastrous for the proponents of
Massive Resistance.50

The court decisions, however, only

spoke to the issues presented in the fall, and failed to
address the new obstacles presented by the funds cut-off
plan.

The courts only served, therefore, to cut out all

middle ground between an immediate re-opening of the closed
schools on a desegregated basis or the more permanent
closing that Duckworth now envisioned.

Thus, the courts

could prevent any type of evasive scheme to keep the de
segregated schools closed, but only so long as Norfolk main
tained a school system with public funds.

Duckworth was

thus free to enact the next phase of Massive Resistance.51
The fact that both the Federal District Court and the
Virginia Supreme Court handed down their decision on exactly
the same day was no accident.

In early December (1958)

U. S. District Judge Walter Hoffman had run across Chief
Justice Eggleston of the Virginia Supreme Court on a golfing
outing in Princess Anne County.

Judge Eggleston drew

5°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 20 January 1959.
53-Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 January 1959.
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Hoffman aside and inquired as to whether the three-judge
federal court then impaneled to hear the James v. Duckworth
case had reached a decision.

Hoffman replied that it had,

and that he was writing the opinion, which was being
prepared for release on December 22 (1958).

Eggleston

indicated that the Virginia Supreme Court was also readying
its decision in Harrison v. D a y , but that the justices were
split, and the dissenters would not be ready with their
opinion until January 19 (1959).

Hoffman took the hint, and

signaled that he would delay his opinion until January 19.
Judge Eggleston nodded, and departed with a smile.
We both knew it was better for Virginians to
hear it [the death of Massive Resistance] from
their own court.
Judge Eggleston never said
which way his court had decided (and I never
indicated which way mine was going), but I knew
what he wanted, and which way the [state] court
was leaning when he said he was writing the
majority opinion.52
Now that the courts had finally acted, the issue of
more comprehensive school closings came in for a new round
of response.

In a fiery speech to a statewide radio and

television audience, Governor Almond made the Organization's
position known.

In a flamboyant prelude the Governor

referred in lurid terms to the:

52Walter E. Hoffman, U. S. Federal District Judge,
interview by author, Tape recording, Norfolk, 8 March 1991.
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. . . livid stench of sadism, sex immorality,
and juvenile pregnancy infesting . . . mixed
schools . . . . Let me make it abundantly clear
for the record now and hereafter . . . I will
not yield to that which I know to be wrong . . .
we have just begun to fight!"53
Congratulations poured in from Senator Byrd, legis
lative leaders, and hardcore resisters in every corner of
the Commonwealth, all expressing their desire to lead
Norfolk into yet another round of school closings, legal
obfuscation, and delay.
Almond's rhetorical resistance, however, failed to
convince President Eisenhower to back down now that his
courts had spoken.

Although he allowed that Norfolk's

overall problem was "very difficult," the President stated
that he was really more concerned with the plight of the
sons and daughters of federal workers, naval personnel, and
others more directly in his charge.

His staff had

researched the issue and thought that the Federal Government
could provide government-sponsored schools only for the 500
or so dependents actually living on the base; the rest would
be locked out of classrooms just like their civilian
counterparts.54

The editors of the Virginian-Pilot were

impressed at how well the President had been briefed on the
local dilemma, but they were even more concerned that
Congressional leaders might take the opportunity to punish

53Dabney, p. 542.
54Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 January 1959.
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the city by cutting off its federal impact aid funds.55
Although Representative Thomas Ashley of Ohio had introduced
a bill to reduce federal establishments in any area where
the public school system had been abandoned,56 this effort
was balanced by the fact that other Congressional leaders
were considering legislation that would provide additional
funds and facilities to educate the off-base Navy dependents
in Norfolk.5-7
Public reaction in Norfolk to the fast-breaking chain
of events was loud and angry, even if its message was
unclear.

At a stormy session of the Council following the

courts' pronouncements, Mayor Duckworth found for the first
time that he was unable to conduct the city's business.

In

a city inured to years of meaningless Council sessions that
served only as a rubber stamp for private agreements from
the informal pre-session, a strange event took place:

an

angry crowd, three-fourths of whom were women, was deter
mined to prevent the Council from enacting its usual show of
empty democratic pageantry.

The entire meeting was

repeatedly interrupted by clapping, catcalls, boos, and
laughter from a rowdy crowd of onlookers; finally, after 35
minutes of this verbal assault, Duckworth adjourned the
meeting in disgust.

Only two people had officially

55Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 January 1959.
56Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 January 1959.
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 January 1959.
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addressed the Council in the interim:

Norfolk artist

Kenneth Harris, a Duckworth relative by marriage, and
another spokesman for the Stuart Elementary P.-T.A. both of
whom spoke against the fund cut-off proposal.58
The Norfolk School Crisis had long been the focus of
national media attention— the Christian Science Monitor
(8 October 1958), Boston Globe (12 October 1958), New York
Times (4 January 1959), and other of the country's leading
newspapers prominently featured the struggle; Governor
Almond's picture adorned the cover of Time magazine
(22 September 1958) in an issue that featured the Norfolk
crisis as its lead story; and the Friendly World Broad
casting Company of Philadelphia had carried a special
half-hour broadcast to its 350 radio affiliates across the
country59— but now an event took place on prime time
national television that helped to crystallize both local
attitudes as well as national opinion.

At the height of the

turmoil and just two days after the court rulings, C.B.S.
television ran an Edward R. Morrow/Ed Friendly production
entitled "The Lost Class of '59:
eight P.M. Wednesday, January 21.

The Norfolk Story" at
This was the end result

of the filming that had taken place in late November, in
spite of the difficulties faced by the crew— Mayor Duckworth
refused to be interviewed and then blocked filming at public

5BNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 January 1959.
59Reif, p. 22.
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school locations.

Even so, the production was remarkably

objective,60 seeking to portray speakers from both sides
of the issue in a town-meeting type of forum.

The Norfolk

Committee For Public Schools had been asked to provide
speakers representing their viewpoint, and had wisely chosen
students, teachers, and parents instead of their own
organizational leaders.

The program also featured a segment

that brought the viewers up to date on the recent legal
developments, including a telling interview with a resolute
Governor Almond.

In spite of the factual documentary

presentation of the hour-long program, the chief impact, for
local residents at least, was emotional.

Portions of the

program that focused poignantly on the hardships of the
locked-out students— how the closing had fragmented the
goals and ambitions of the best and the brightest and doomed
their less achievement-oriented classmates to the dismal
prospects of teenage unemployment and listlessness— were
instrumental in shaping half-formed local opinions:

for the

first time Norfolk really saw its crisis as it was viewed
by the rest of the world.61

For those businessmen who had

up to now been relatively unconcerned about the city's loss
of national reputation, the prime time exposure, the d ocu
mentary objectivity, the emotional impact, and Edward R.
Murrow's reputation for honesty helped to project an urgency

6°Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 22 January 1959.
61Reif, p. 22.
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to the crisis that was not present before:

slowly the

realization dawned that the Organization had brought the
city to the brink of a municipal disaster unlike any it had
faced since the postwar People's revolt, and that if the
gimmickry of closed schools continued, a decade of municipal
reform, national leadership, social concern, and vital fence
building with the Navy would be destroyed, along with the
city's reputation and its hopes for a secure future.
Events had taken place so rapidly that week of January
19-23, 1959--first, the advancement of the funds cut-off
measure; next, the occasion of two simultaneous court orders
striking down the legal framework of Massive Resistance;
followed by the sight of the Governor vowing further resis
tance; Congress and the President publicly advocating
altered appropriations ahd possible financial retaliations;
and finally, the prime time appeal of the Edward R. Murrow
production— that the state’s political leaders, including
Mayor Duckworth, apparently lost touch with the changing
mood of the people.

The politicians were still preparing to

take their cue from the results of the November referendum
and a quiet December of public acquiescence— they assumed
that the people still wanted to fight court-ordered integra
tion to the bitter end, even if it meant more school
closings along the way.

Something, however, had happened to the public mood,
and more and more individuals were apparently now ready to
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quit the fight.

No one is really sure which event, or even

which combination of events, triggered the shift, but for
the first time a massive change was evident.

To many of the

city's business leaders it was the finality of the State
Supreme Court's— a Virginia, and not a federal court—
decision:

"My own court had spoken— I had divorced myself

from the U. S. Supreme Court and I had given up any alle
giance I had to it--that's when I was willing to lay down
the fight."62

For others it was the spectacle of the

Governor in full red-faced harangue in combination with the
personal losses portrayed by "The Lost Class of ’59" that
finally brought home the realization of how Norfolk must
appear to the rest of the nation.63
In spite of the surface tranquility that had descended
upon the city the weekend that followed the furious pace of
fast-breaking events, a strange hubbub of activity was
taking place in a number of subterranean circles.

Mayor

Duckworth was plugged into a statewide hookup of frantic
political leaders scurrying to help plot the Organization's
next step.

A bloc of Southside legislators headed by State

Senator (and later Governor) Mills Godwin was attempting to
devise by telephone a series of desperation measures which
would block the reopening of the desegregated schools.
Among the plans under consideration was a ten-day school

62Pretlow Darden.
63Reif, pp. 21 and 22.
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holiday until the Legislature could meet, a proposition to
close every school in the state until each could be
selectively re-certified by a state safety inspector, a
statute that would make it a felony offense for courts to
assign pupils to any school without the backing of the
state's pupil placement board, a repeal of the state's
compulsory attendance laws, and an amendment to the Virginia
Constitution that would allow local jurisdictions to close
down their own schools.

There was even a proposal that

paralleled Mayor Duckworth's fund cut-off plan, only
reaching out to a statewide application.64

It was just

this sort of frantic activity— the high-level phone calls,
the hurried conferences, the official entreaties, and the
speculative nature of the various schemes being advanced—
that blinded Duckworth and the Byrd Organization leadership
to more subtle murmurs in the rest of the community.
Another factor seemed particularly to influence the Mayor in
his deliberations:

Duckworth reported receiving somewhere

between 50 and 100 phone calls that weekend threatening
violence or to "blow up the schools" if they reopened
integrated.

Whether the calls were local or were a part of

some Southside plot to shore up his continued resistance
makes very little difference:

by the time the weekend

closed, Duckworth had fully committed himself to initiating
another round of school closings, racial intimidation, and

64Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 30 January 1959.
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legal obfuscation.

The specter of violence and the fear of

a cut off of state funds if Norfolk bowed to integration
were the reasons he publicly cited for that commitment."*
The rumor mills worked overtime in Norfolk that week
end, but besides reports of political intrigue and specula
tive legislation, they buzzed with the excitement that some
thing big was going on in the business community.

The

grapevine had it that a downtown meeting had been held
between the Navy's top brass and some gilt-edged Norfolkians, the remnants of the old Silkstocking crowd; in it,
supposedly, the Navy issued an ultimatum:
schools or lose the fleet.

either open the

Other rumors had it that two

powerful local financial leaders were called to an urgent
conference in Richmond with representatives of the state's
largest banking and mortgage interests; reportedly they were
told that the school situation had to be cleared up before
serious economic repercussions were felt.GO

Regardless of

the veracity of these rumors, they do express some very real
fears that were circulating among the city's civic and
financial elite:

now that the courts had finally spoken,

business leaders were afraid that the Navy and the federal
government might take some retaliatory action if the city
continued its posture of defiance; others could see that
efforts to attract new industry were already falling apart;

65Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 27 January 1959.
66Reif, pp. 21 and 22.
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and financial experts had their eye on the collapse of local
bond issues in the Northern mortgage markets.

The substance

of these realizations lent credence to the rumors and may
well have formed the basis for what followed.
The Tuesday editions of the Virginian-Pilot and LedgerDispatch carried the most dramatic evidence of the shift in
public opinion that had taken place that weekend.

There in

the front sections of both papers was a full-page
advertisement, really an appeal to reopen the schools now
and avoid further resistance, that by itself was both a
trend-setter and the most important single event in the 141
days of the Norfolk School Crisis.

The advertisement

carried the following message signed by 100 of the city's
most prominent business, financial, industrial, and civic
leaders:
While we would strongly prefer to have
segregated schools, it is evident from the
recent court decisions that our public schools
must either be integrated to the extent fully
required or must be abandoned.
The abandonment
of our public schools system is, in our opinion,
unthinkable, as it would mean the denial of an
adequate education to a majority of our
children.
Moreover, the consequences would be
most damaging to our community.
We, therefore,
urge the Norfolk City Council to do everything
within its power to open all public schools as
promptly as possible.67
A front page, banner headline and the accompanying story
proclaimed the appeal to be "the first time a large segment

67Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 27 January 1959.
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of the Norfolk business community has taken a public stand
in the city's school crisis."

The editorial page hailed the

event as "a new clear voice . . .
change . . . .

a striking and welcome

a striking new development."

Even though the petition was officially addressed "to
the City Council" and a group spokesman protested that:
The petition is not intended in any sense
to be critical; [it offers instead] positive
support for the opening and preservation of our
public schools. We think it is Norfolk's only
realistic alternative.
This disclaimer was not enough to prevent the public
perception of the document as a personal affront to the
Mayor, his power, and the course of action he had chosen.
This was the first time in his eight-and-a-half year tenure
of office that any concerted group of businessmen had ever
tried to publicly influence a Council decision, much less
move so forcefully and so openly to oppose its authority.
As a further sign of the intended insult, the signers had
handed over the petition to attorneys for the Norfolk
Committee For Public Schools so that it could be introduced
that very day as evidence in the Committee's new James v.
Duckworth effort to block the Mayor's plan to implement
further closings.68

Even so, former Mayor Pretlow Darden

and a representative group of the signers had gone to see
Mayor Duckworth on Monday to soften the blow before the

6BIbid.
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appeal was made public.

Their recollection of the conversa

tion only underscores the Mayor's anger and his helplessness
at having been double-crossed:
Darden:
We're doing something good for the
city and good for you . . . it gets you off the
hook because these schools have got to be
opened.
Duckworth:

You've stabbed me in the back!

Darden: Well, you can always say if you want
to that a bunch of these— whatever you want to
call us— got this thing up without your know
ledge.
Would you like to see it?
Duckworth:
Hell, no!
I don't want to see it!
I don't want to see it if I can't do anything
about it.®9
Even though the signers referred to themselves
innocuously as the Committee of One Hundred, the appeal
marked the re-emergence of the People's group, long since
buried in the onslaught of Massive Resistance and Organi
zation politics.

The petition had all the markings of an

old People's production:

the inspiration for it came from

former People’s Mayor Pretlow Darden in collaboration with
Frank Batten, the young president of Norfolk Newspapers,
Inc., the parent company of the Virginian-Pilot, the LedgerDispatch, and WTAR radio and television stations.

Darden

and Batten had hand-picked the group that would be eligible
as signers, and then personally carried it to the chosen,
going first to their old allies from the Silkstocking days.

69Pretlow Darden.
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Former People's campaign chief Charles Kaufman had polished
the wording of the final draft of the statement,70 exactly
as he had done for every major campaign announcement a dozen
years before.

Besides Darden and Kaufman, the list was

spotted with names of those activists and appointees who had
helped to lend credence to the People's crusade:

John S.

Alfriend, Richard D. Cooke, Jr., Charles F. Burroughs,
George A. Foote, C. W. Grandy, Henry Clay Hofheimer, John S.
Jenkins, Jr., Clarence B. Robertson, Dan M. Thornton, Thomas
H. Wilcox, and J. Rives Worsham.71

More than anything else,

however, was the fact that the Committee of One Hundred was
the purest representation of the city's blueblooded finan
cial elite that had surfaced in a decade— a veritable roster
of the Norfolk banking and business fraternity, highlighted
by the realization that at least ten of the signers lived
not in Norfolk, but in nearby Virginia Beach.
The statement by the Committee of One Hundred was both
an opinion-maker and the most important milestone in marking
how far public sentiment had shifted in the past week.

Once

the city's major business and financial leaders had so open
ly crossed the power and authority of the Mayor, it was both
safe and fashionable for others who had been long silent to
breathe a sigh of relief and express their own pro-school
sentiments.

Typical of the community's gratitude at the

7°Darden.
71Pretlow Darden.
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eleventh-hour conversion of its former Silkstocking leader
ship was the action of one downtown florist who sent a red
rose to each of the signers.

Typical, too, was the appeal

of 35 of the city's young business and civic leaders— too
young to have been a part of the Pe o p l e 1s regime, and were
thus left off the official roster of One Hundred— who ran
their own advertisement the next day so that their voice
could be counted.

This new appeal was the work of Harvey L.

Lindsay, Jr., who spiced the text with references to the
specific fears of the business community:

that further

resistance would lead to the loss of valuable educators, the
withdrawal of Navy ships and airplane squadrons, and the
massive failure to attract new industry and investment to
the area.72
One example helps to underscore both how committed the
Mayor was to the Organization's course of continued resist
ance and just how opposed he was to the surrender sentiments
expressed by the Silkstocking crowd.

The same day that

Pretlow Darden and the others approached him with their
appeal, but well before the existence of their effort was
made public, Mayor Duckworth had the perfect opportunity to
turn the statements to his own personal and political
advantage.

The Committee For Public Schools had brought

suit against the Mayor and the members of the City Council,
seeking to enjoin them in its James v. Duckworth litigation

72Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 28 January 1959.
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from cutting off the School Board's funds and closing more
schools.

Armed with the still-secret knowledge of the

Committee of One Hundred, Duckworth could have appeared as
the initiator of that appeal by withdrawing the city's de
fense in the suit, thereby conceding the issue and effec
tively dropping the school closing plan.

Instead, he chose

not to abandon the suit, but argued all the more forcefully
in favor of the funds cut-off authority, specifically
detailing his fears about potential racial violence if the
schools were allowed to reopen.-73
The Mayor had badly miscalculated if he had hoped that
the usual plodding pace of litigation before the federal
courts would give him time to reconsolidate the Organiza
tion's political power and position.

With unprecedented

speed, Federal Judge Walter Hoffman— a local with strong
ties to the Silkstocking establishment— ruled against the
Council the very next day, the same day that Norfolk
citizens were reading in their papers about the Committee of
One Hundred.

The very existence of the Silkstocking appeal,

and the fact that the One Hundred had turned it over to the
Committee For Public Schools to strengthen their legal
position, may have played an important part in negating, as
far as Judge Hoffman was concerned, the Mayor's fears of
racial violence; in any event the evidence that a substan
tial portion of the community now favored a reopening of the

~73Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 27 January 1959.
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schools enabled Hoffman to permanently enjoin the City
Council from any action which might withhold funds or
otherwise interfere with the School Board's plans to reopen
the closed institutions.74
The speed and impact of this new ruling was a shocking
reversal for the Mayor, doubly so because it increased the
perception that the Silkstocking crowd had fought him and
won.

Even so, the Mayor was not entirely defeated:

he

still had two courses of action open, either of which would
preserve his status as the hero of Massive Resistance and
advance his standing with the statewide Byrd Organization.
The Defenders were urging him to declare the closed school
buildings as surplus and quickly sell them to the T.E.F
before they could be reopened by the court.73

The Organi

zation was apparently urging him to defy Judge Hoffman,
continue to withhold the school funds, and appeal the
ruling.

Such a course would risk a contempt of court

citation and possible imprisonment, but this was a prospect
that the Organization actually relished, and was even then
urging upon Governor Almond as well.76

The sight of a

political leader behind bars to preserve the freedom of
choice rights of the majority was just what the Organization
wanted to promote its Massive Resistance cause celebre:

74Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 28 January 1959.
75Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 28 January 1959.
76Richmond Times-Dispatch, 10 February 1980.
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Duckworth would but risk personal martyrdom, they would
treat him to national media attention, public prayer vigils,
certain canonization in the Organization's ranks, and an
endless stream of little old ladies, housewives, and mothers
bearing baked goods and other wares for the jailed hero.77
On the other hand, there was no guarantee that the Mayor
could get a majority vote on Council if he chose either
route:

Roy Martin's opposition a week before had been the

purest political gamble— a bet that had paid off already in
the flurry of following events, and there was every reason
to expect additional resistance in the changed political
atmosphere that existed since the Committee of One Hundred
went public.

Finally, the Mayor's decision may have been

clouded by the fact that the School Board had publicly
announced its intention to open the schools anyway, even if
the Council continued to withhold funds in defiance of the
courts:

the Board apparently had enough surplus funds, coal

and other supplies left over from before to open for a few
days even without Council's support.VB
It was these latter considerations— Duckworth could
not risk losing a bitterly split vote on his own Council for
a point that would be rendered useless anyway by the School
Board— that probably weighed heavily in his decision to at
last abandon the struggle.

In spite of the dire warnings of

77Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 9 June 1964.
~7BNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 27 January 1959.
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Senator Harry F. Byrd that his Organization would be "wiped
out" if Virginia gave in to integration,79 Massive Resist
ance was over, at least in Norfolk.

The Mayor bitterly

refused to discuss the matter further, flatly telling all
comers to an historic Council session that marked the end of
his own resistance:

We [the Council] have been taken out of

the school business [by the courts].

Anyone who came here

to talk about schools can go to the School Board."30

Thus,

there was no obstacle to the schools reopening immediately
that Monday, February 2 (1959), as the Board had hopefully
proclaimed earlier in court.

Mayor Duckworth, in admitting

defeat, was doing his best to retain whatever was left of
his old businessman's/organization coalition in spite of the
setback.
If Duckworth’s fall from the heights of municipal and
political power was dizzying, it was no less dramatic than
Governor Almond's sudden about-face on Massive Resistance.
Almond, usually possessed of a calm and rational demeanor
punctuated by both a thorough knowledge and deep apprecia
tion of the law, was also on occasion given to stentorian
bombast on the order of what one observer labeled "Orange
County [Virginia] Courthouse, circa 1910 (when William
Jennings Bryan's influence was running high)."sx

These two

^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, 4 August 1974.
8°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 30 January 1959.

slDabney, p. 539.
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facets of his personality— his keen legal sense and his
equally cutting rhetorical style— had collided. Almond had
been the studious legal brains behind Governor Stanley's
legislative efforts to block integration, and had been
marvelously effective at creating a solid legal facade for
the state's circumvention efforts.

Almond, knowing full

well that this house of cards he had helped construct would
one day come tumbling down, had also counseled a delegation
from the Norfolk Committee For Public Schools that only the
courts could reopen the city's closed schools.

Almond, of

all people, should not have been surprised to find that the
state's legislative barriers to integration had collapsed so
suddenly.

On the other hand, Almond was such a maestro of

segregationist oratory that he had buried the more moderate
but never-the-less potent challenge of Republican Ted Dalton
under the verbal fusillades of his stirring rhetoric.

The

Governor's fiery bombast following the double court orders
to reopen the schools— "We have just begun to fight"— may
have also been partly responsible for Mayor Duckworth's
overly repressive reaction.

Almond explained in later years

that he was tired, distraught, and just not thinking clearly
when he made "that damn speech" in defiance of the court
orders.

He had meant to assure Virginians that he would do

everything possible to preserve segregation, even though he
knew a few schools would have to integrate, but the rumble
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of his rhetoric got the best of him.82

In the unfortunate

opening remarks in which he hoped to express his own
personal repugnance of integration, he got carried away; by
the time he got to the conclusion in which he called upon
the people of Virginia to stand with him in the struggle—
"be not dismayed by recent judicial deliverances,"83 he
told them— he had falsely fueled the fires of their
expectations.

There was every reason to think, as many

leaders in the Commonwealth did, that the Governor was still
saving one more, as yet unrevealed, legal gambit for the
present circumstances.84
It was a much quieter and rational Governor who now
stood before a special session of the Virginia General
Assembly— only eight days after his rabble rousing rotomontade, and just two days after Judge Hoffman canceled Duck
worth's funds cut-off plan— to inform them that he could not
stop the integration of a few of the state's schools:83
the best he could do was to try and minimize the racial
mixing in those schools.

The Massive Resisters were

thunderstruck, and a few even referred to him as "Benedict"
Almond,88 especially after he threatened the next day to

82Dabney, p. 542.
S3Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 January 1959.
84Dabney, pp. 542-543.
85Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 January 1959.
8SDabney, p.

543.
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veto any of the last-ditch circumventions proposed by Mills
Godwin and his coterie of Southside legislators.37
Instead of legal obfuscation, he pressed forward with a more
moderate program to modify the state's tuition grant
program, strengthen the prohibitions against violence,
repeal the compulsory attendance legislation, and establish
a commission to recommend further proposals.33
With the Mayor's new-found recalcitrance and the
Governor's solid opposition, Massive Resistance in Virginia
was finally dead.

There was now no legal obstacle to the

schools opening on Monday, February 2 (1959), as the School
Board planned.

The only real stumbling block lay not in the

politicians, but in those other individuals who had resisted
so massively, and who even now were not prepared to drop the
cause.

Duckworth's fears of possible racial violence were

very real; even in modern, urbanized Tidewater there still
existed that element of rabble that would stop at nothing to
prevent or disrupt the integration of Norfolk's schools.
Fortunately there was also in the city an element that had
at least part of the scene firmly in control:

local report-

ers--the Virginian-Pilot, Ledqer-Dispatch, and Norfolk's
radio and television newscasters— remained faithful to a
private understanding not to publish reports of or lend
credence to rumors of racial violence or intimidation.

87Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 30 January 1959.
SBDabney, p. 543.
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a cross-burning across from all-white Norview High School
and within sight of the Black homes in Coronado went un 
reported.

Luckily most local citizens were unaware of these

incidents; this conscious omission of any reference to
strife or the possibility of conflict on the part of the
local press was indicative of the stern and cautious
attitude which public officials and responsible citizens
generally took in order to avoid the occurrence of "another
Little Rock" in Norfolk .33
There was at least one other hopeful force moving
behind the scenes to insure a peaceful resumption of
classes:

the national press had picked up the fact now that

Norfolk— "distinctive among most Southern cities"— had a
"powerful and articulate group of ’moderates'" who helped to
balance off the racial hostilities of the Defenders and
their followers.90

The Silkstocking crowd, relishing

their re-emergence since the giant splash of their People's
d a y s , were not now content to sit back and rest on the
laurels of their newspaper advertisement.

Besides lending

their collective voice quietly to those who were calling for
an orderly resumption of classes, Norfolk's business and
civic establishment sought a more active role.

They turned

their efforts to their youthful counterparts in the
hierarchy of the school's social and service clubs.

The Key

s9New York Times, 1 February 1959.
9°Ibid.
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Clubs (Kiwanis-sponsored) of the closed Granby, Maury, and
Norview High Schools jointly took an advertisement in the
city's newspapers that pleaded, as their Silkstocking elders
had petitioned, with the city's youth and adults alike "that
the orderly reopening be completed as smoothly and as quick
ly as possible so that we may proceed with our immediate
objective— to obtain an education."91

On behalf of their

various student bodies, they pledged to try and solve their
problems, "In a mature manner and under no condition will
rowdiness be condoned." "We believe," they predicted, "that
the students of our respective schools will conduct them
selves with a dignity that will bring credit to our
city."92

It was not until later that it was revealed that

this youthful advertising blitz was secretly financed by a
single "civic-minded individual."93
Monday morning, February 2, 1959, would prove to be a
crucial test of Silkstocking diplomacy when schools reopened
integrated after months of Massive Resistance hysteria.
Were public pronouncements, unofficial news blackouts,
newspaper advertising campaigns, and even the urgent plead
ings of student leaders— all evidence of the type of quiet,
behind-the-scenes manipulation of the city's civic and
financial leadership— enough to turn away racial hostilities

91Reif, p. 15.
92Ibid.
93Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 February 1959.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

415

that had been building for months?

Was the State Legisla

ture's recent ban on bomb threats and schools violence,94
as well as the Council's last-minute defeatist appeal "to
every segment of the community to conduct itself in the same
peaceful and law-abiding manner that has been one of the
commendable aspects of this trying t i m e ,"9 3 enough to turn
back the last-ditch defiance which both political groups had
until recently supported?

There was a widespread fear among

the city's leadership that in spite of all of these pre
liminary precautions, more still needed to be done to signal
once and for all the end of Massive Resistance.

As the

representatives of the nation's leading newspapers, maga
zines, radio, and television networks began to pour into
Norfolk that final weekend in January, the city's Silkstocking business establishment began to realize just how
much would be at stake that next Monday morning.

One

single, isolated racial incident, or worse, one random act
of violence, once it had been permanently etched into the
headlines of the nation's newspapers, magazines, and nightly
news broadcasts, could erase more than a decade of concen
trated effort to restore the city's once-fallen reputation.
Not since the lusty wartime days of booze, racketeering,
prostitution, and the sleazy honky-tonks of Norfolk's
notorious East Main Street sailor town— already undergoing

94Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 4 February 1959.
9SNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 1 February 1959.
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full-scale demolition— would so many eyes be on the city;
not since the Staylor Raid of 1946 was Norfolk so at the
mercy of its hoodlum elements.
So much was riding upon peaceful resumption of classes
on Monday that the city1s leadership dared to approach
Norfolk’s most effective proponent of Massive Resistance for
a final symbol of defeat and racial reconciliation.

Behind

the scenes that weekend there was one final effort to
arrange instead a visual image that would ensure both
domestic tranquility and the city's good name.

Friends,

business associates, civic leaders, relatives, and even
minor political kingpins descended upon the Mayor, urging
him to make the most difficult decision of his political
career:

he must walk, they argued, with the handful of

Black students that were to enroll in the previously
all-white Norview Junior and Senior High Schools.96

If

there was to be violence or racial incidents, representa
tives of the media were betting that they would occur at
Norview High School, and indeed the crush of cameramen,
reporters, photographers, and media correspondents that
would surround that institution on Monday could well
encourage potential neighborhood troublemakers— identified
in the local vernacular as "suedes" because of their reputed
addiction to suede shoes9-7— to show off.

There was more

96Pretlow Darden and Robert Mason.
9-7New York Times, 1 February 1959.
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than just the reputation of the local toughs, however, that
had earmarked Norview as the focal point of Monday morning's
news coverage:

the area had been one of the most fruitful

bastions of Massive Resistance sentiment, evidenced by the
recent cross-burning incidents there; the rhetoric of
Norview whites was still salted with vague references to the
bombings and racial strife that had taken place four years
earlier in the nearby Coronado section; as a newly annexed
territory, Norview was one of the few areas in the city that
owed no allegiance to the calm, deliberative progress of the
Silkstocking reign; and finally, as a composition of largely
blue collar neighborhoods, the official pronouncements of
Norfolk's business and civic elite probably counted for less
there than elsewhere in the city.
The course now urged upon the Mayor by the hourly
delegations that descended upon his private residence was
painted in the most pleasing colors possible:

one quiet,

dignified walk up the school house steps— in sharp contrast
to the grandstanding tirades of Arkansas' Governor Faubus in
Little Rock— once it had been carefully immortalized by the
electronic eye of the nation's media, would do more to
promote the city, the Mayor, and even the Organization than
any other step he could take.

Business leaders argued that

it was the one action that would help to focus positive
national attention upon the city's cosmopolitan image, the
integrity of its leadership, its spirit of rejuvenation, and

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

418

its efforts to attract new industry.

Political leaders

argued that both the Mayor and the Organization had the most
to lose at the hands of the local voters if violence marred
the resumption of classes.

Further, they implored, that

with such a visual event, the Mayor could upstage Governor
Almond's split with Senator Byrd, and cut short efforts to
unify opponents of Massive Resistance into a threat to the
Organization.

Finally, they urged, here was a ready-made

opportunity for both the Mayor and the city to escape the
onus of school closings--a chance for Duckworth to prove his
political resilience, re-establish his rapport with the
rapidly shifting mood of the people, and solidify his base
of support in the business community.

Unless he took some

such action to insure the tranquility of the reopening
ceremonies, the mantle of political leadership in the city
would pass from him to the School Board, Roy Martin, and
other "moderates" who personally supported segregation but
who also had the courage to oppose the final stages of
racial retribution associated with Massive Resistance.
No one really knows how close Mayor Duckworth came
that weekend to accepting this unusual reversal:

on its

surface the offer was attractive enough, but, it also
involved a good deal of betrayal of principle and admission
of guilt.

The decision, however, was his and his alone; no

other political, civic, or governmental leader could sub
stitute for him and have such impact.

Duckworth, however,
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other political, civic, or governmental leader could sub
stitute for him and have such impact.

Duckworth, however,

would have no part of such a gesture, and no one will ever
know whether personal pride, prejudicial animosities, devo
tion to principle, or more mundane political considerations
figured most prominently in his decision.

An increase in

uniformed police, the heightened visibility of school per
sonnel, and the welcoming gestures of the principal would
have to suffice; when school opened on Monday morning, the
Mayor was no where near the waiting cameras at Norview High.
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EPILOGUE
A SECOND SCHOOL CRISIS
All was calm as Norfolk's closed junior and senior
high schools reopened Monday morning, February 2, 1959.

In

spite of the presence of almost a 100 journalists and
television cameras, most of which were amassed outside of
Norview High School, there was nothing unusual to report.
Local reporters noted that there were "a few instances of
name calling," but that the "windy 26-degree weather
discouraged parents from lingering."

The editors of the

Virginian-Pilot praised the "display of sanity and poise and
dignity that made a difficult day a notable one."

President

Eisenhower, who received hourly reports of the progress
through a special telephone connection in the federal court
house,1 telegrammed his congratulations to the 63 student
leaders who had founded the "Back to School, Keep It Cool,"
campaign;2 the New York Times viewed the scene as a "turn
ing point for integration;"3 and the televised footage of
orderly students reporting to class stood in sharp contrast

xWalter Hoffman.
2Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 February 1959.
3New York T i m e s , 1 February 1959.
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to events in Little Rock, Mobile, and other points across
the South.
Thousands of students went back to public
education . . . with unmistakable eagerness,
seriousness, and determination . . . they want
these public schools to remain open and operating
. . . There was universal calm and acceptance in
Norfolk today . . . This city should be proud of
its sons and daughters.4
Norfolk's calmness and good sense were everywhere
praised across the nation, and at least a small portion of
its ugly wartime image had been erased.

Ironically the

New York Times credited "redevelopment and public housing
developments" as being a factor in preserving "comparatively
good race relations."

The story went on to report that "a

number of handsome new Negro schools have been built [here]
in the last decade," and then indicated that:
Norfolk is distinctive among Southern cities
in that it has a powerful and articulate group of
"moderates" who balance off the Defenders and
their followers on the school controversy.5
Although the Times obviously had the outpouring of
public support that emerged after the advertisement of the
Silkstocking Committee of One Hundred in mind when it made
this assessment, its appraisal came as somewhat of a shock
to the Committee for Public Schools and others who had

4Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 February 1959.
5New York Times, 1 February 1959.
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labored without much success during the five months of the
school closings to provide a counterpoint to the Defenders
and rally some modicum of support for public education;6
nevertheless the Times was only one of many publications to
note that Norfolk was unique in that the critical legal
action to reopen the closed schools came from white parents,
and not Black plaintiffs.

The only really "powerful and

articulate" opposition to Massive Resistance came from
Lenoir Chambers and the editorial staff of the Norfolk
Virginian-Pilot; as the clear, calm voice of reason in a
state which seemed bent upon sacrificing public education to
preserve political principle, he was richly deserving of the
Pulitzer Prize he received for his efforts to keep the
school open.
Other researchers have perpetuated the myth that "a
powerful public school movement organized very quickly" in
Norfolk to defeat Massive Resistance.7

In point of fact,

the Committee for Public Schools, the school teachers, and
others who hoped to spark a pro-school movement were
relatively powerless until after the closed school were
reopened, and the Committee of One Hundred, who had played
almost no role during the controversy, only meant to signal

sRobert L. Stern; Dr. Forrest P. White, M.D., unpublished
article, op cit.
7Robert L. Crain, et al., The Politics of School
Desegregation; Comparative Case Studies of Community
Structure and Policy-Making (Chicago: Aldine Press, 1968),
p. 231.
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that it was time to surrender in Norfolk, not signal any
opposition to either Duckworth or the dominant Byrd Organi
zation.®

Ironically, Mayor Duckworth, more than any other

single individual, was responsible for promoting the ragtag
elements of opposition during the school crisis into a full
blown resistance movement a few months later when he misread
the political auguries that followed the reopening of the
schools.
It would have been easy for Mayor Duckworth to have
retreated with grace and blame the collapse of Massive
Resistance in Norfolk on Governor Almond, as apparently
Senator Byrd did.9

Certainly he had personally done more

and gone farther to keep the Massive Resistance movement
alive in the city than even the staunchest Defender could
have expected.

Even though Pretlow Darden and others in the

Silkstocking establishment tried repeatedly to counsel him
to adopt just such a course,10 the Mayor refused to
retreat from the battle lines he had drawn.
Norfolk, for all its cosmopolitan image, was still a
Southern city, and its voters especially still harbored
strong segregationist sentiment.

Even as late as the week

of January 26-31 (1959), the week after the court decisions

®Pretlow Darden.
9Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 9 June 1964; Eley, op c i t . ;
Benjamin Muse, op cit.
10Pretlow Darden.
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and just before the schools actually reopened, a team of
researchers from the University of North Carolina found that
almost 80% of Norfolk's white residents clung to their sup
port for segregated schools:

more than a third still denied

the legality of the federal courts to order desegregation,
and 40% thought the city should resist further.

However,

only one adult in five thought that continuing segregation
was a viable option for the city, and there was almost no
sentiment for sacrificing public education to preserve
segregated schools.11

Nevertheless it was precisely this

sentiment that Mayor Duckworth misread.
In commenting on the reopening of schools in Norfolk,
the New York Times indicated that although a major victory
for public education had been won in Norfolk with the
reopening of the schools, this was a "Gettysburg"— a turning
point that signaled a retreat— and not an "Appomattox," or
final surrender of the Massive Resistance forces.12

Mayor

Duckworth and the Byrd Organization seemed bent upon con
tinuing the fight, even though the tide of war had clearly
turned against them; what may have been smart tactics in
support of lost causes proved to be bad politics in Norfolk.
Almost before the national press had departed the
city, Mayor Duckworth fired the first salvo in what was to

i:LErnest . Campbell, et. al. , When a City Closes Its
Schools (Chapel Hill, N. C . : University of North Carolina,
1960), pp. 56-61.
12New York Times, 8 February 1959.
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tie a continuing attack against the School Board and its
efforts to continue public education in the city.

At a

meeting with the Board, the Mayor warned that the Council
was going to "cut the devil out of the 1960 [school]
budget," and as to prospects for any more funds for school
construction, "it will take an act of Congress to get it out
of us."

As part of its strategy to cut the cost of school

construction, the City Council disclosed a plan to build six
to eight three-room school houses, each accommodating 90
pupils (30 per grade) in grades one through three, in the
eastern half of the city.

In commenting on the proposal,

the Virginian-Pilot editorialized that:
While the plan apparently would slow down
desegregation of the first, second, and third
grades through the creation of smaller school
districts, councilmen stressed it was prompted
by the need for inexpensive schools.13
Although the educational drawbacks to the plan were
clearly evident, the School Board found itself having to
give serious scrutiny to the Council's mini-school proposal.
Still, it refused to be stampeded into adopting such an
obviously flawed approach, especially when it held such
long-term adverse consequences for public education in the
city.

When it appointed a seven-member task force to study

the Council's plan, the Board made sure that it included a
representative cross-section of both the Black and white

13Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 February 1959.
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communities.1'1

When this group reported back two weeks

later, it bot surprsinigly supported instead buildings of 16
to 20 classrooms as the "ideal" size for a three grade
primary school.15

The committee nevertheless approved of

the idea of using smaller primary schools "strategically
located to relieve crowding" in several areas of the city,
and then proceeded to list nine such areas already served by
Black schools (Lindenwood, West, Clay, Goode, Jackson,
Carey, Titus, Bowling Park, and Young Park).16

In the

end, however, the School Board was forced to bow to the
financial pressures of the City Council, and several
"vest-pocket" schools were built for whites over the course
of the next year:

two five-room school houses (Pretty Lake

and East Ocean View) were erected on small lots in the Ocean
View portion of the city,1-7 and another five-room school
(Easton) was proposed for the newly annexed area east of
Broad Creek.18

Two other ten-room schools were also

14Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 27 February 1959.
15W. E. Campbell, "Report of the Committee Relegated By
the School Board of the City of Norfolk to Study the Proposal
for Construction of Small Primary Community Schools,"
(undated, 1959), Norfolk Public Schools files.

16Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 March 1959.
17Letter from J. J. Brewbaker, Superintendent of Schools,
to Thomas F. Maxwell, Norfolk City Manager, 21 May 1959,
Norfolk Public Schools files.

18Letter from J. J. Brewbaker, Superintendent of
Schools, to Thomas F. Maxwell, Norfolk City Manager,
29 May 1959, Norfolk Public Schools files.
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started (Poplar Halls, and Fairlawn) in the Eastern portion
of the city.19

Also included in the School Board's plan

was an "emergency ordinance" condemning a 2.5-acre site in
the Coronado area, "a predominantly Negro section," for six
demountable classroom units.

Reporter Luther Carter noted

that the hastiness of this action would have an impact upon
pupil assignment for the next (1959-60) school year:
The opening of the Coronado school will
have the effect of reducing, if not entirely
eliminating, the number of potentially qualified
Negro applicants in Coronado for Norview
Elementary . . . The proximity of the Coronado
schools [Rosemont and Coronado] would give the
School Board a valid reason to assign Coronado
children there even should they meet the academic
and other standards for a nearer white school.
The Coronado school will represent a
modification of the City Council's "little red
school house" [concept].
[Coronado] . . . would
not have a cafeteria, auditorium, playgrounds,
and certain other facilities which have been
incorporated in larger elementary schools.20
Black leaders were understandably upset by the p r o 
posal, and complained that the new school would be both edu
cationally unsound" and an "obvious attempt to circumvent"
the desegregation decisions of the courts.

When they went

to the City Council, Duckworth told the Black leaders that
their complaint "smacked of integration and segregation,"

19Letter from Brewbaker to Maxwell, op c i t . ,
21 May 1959.
2°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 8 July 1959.
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and they "got nowhere."21

The School Board attempted to

reassure the Black leaders that the "same facilities will be
lacking at some new white schools now being built."

They

went on to explain that the Board did not want to build a
large, expensive school since it might be in the path of a
proposed interstate highway, but that additional classrooms,
a cafeteria, and auditorium, and other facilities would be
added to the Rosemont combination elementary and junior high
school for Blacks in the same area.22

Black leaders were

not impressed by this defense, and promptly filed suit in
federal court seeking to enjoin what they determined were
"makeshift schools . . . constructed for the purpose of
pursuing the policy of racially segregated schools."23
While it was fighting this battle over the Council's
"little red school house" proposal, the School Board also
had to worry that the Mayor would make good on his promise
to "cut the devil"24 out of the rest of Norfolk's public
school program.

Since school districts in Virginia are

dependent upon their municipal government for financial
support, the School Board lacked any taxing or funding power
of its own.

When the City Manager announced his spending

priorities for the up-coming fiscal year, he proposed a

21Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 July 1959.
22Ibid.
23Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 20 August 1959.
24Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 February 1959.
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reduction of more than five percent of revenues provided by
the city.

Even a cut of this magnitude was not enough to

satisfy the Mayor, and the Council proceeded to remove an
additional 2.5% (a 7.5% reduction).25

When the smoke had

finally cleared, the Norfolk School Board found that local
funding support for public schools had dropped by a whopping
13.4% from the previous year.26

The Mayor obviously

wanted to eliminate any possibility that the Board might be
able to provide a raise to the teachers who had helped to
sabotage his Massive Resistance efforts, a theory openly
advanced by the Virginian-Pilot.27
Although the authority of a City Council to direct
school operations in Virginia are relatively limited, Mayor
Duckworth was finding that he could skillfully use his
powers of the purse to keep the issue of Massive Resistance
alive.

The effect of any major cutback in local funding

support would fall disproportionately upon Blacks, since
most whites could afford to either supplement the education
of their children or send them to private schools with the
support of the state's substantial tuition grants.

Moreover, if Mayor Duckworth could keep the white schools in
the city either small enough to be immune from integration

25Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 May 1959.
26This figure comes from an analysis of the General Fund
Budgets of the Norfolk Public Schools for the 1958-59 and
1959-60 school years, Norfolk Public Schools files.
27Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 October 1959.
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threats or else so overcrowded and unattractive that Blacks
would resist further efforts to desegregate, he could still
achieve many of the ends of the resisters.
Thus the Board not only had to worry about loss of
funding support and the pressure to build small, inadequate,
but integration proof (under the court standards of the day)
school houses, it also found that the Council was reneging
on its promise to build the badly needed secondary schools
that had already been promised.

Lansdale Junior High, which

had been approved by the Council two and a half years
earlier, completely designed, and accepted by the State
Board of Education,28 was never built; Lakewood Junior
High suffered a similar fate.

Although there were problems

with the site at both locations (Lansdale was too close to
the airport,29 and Lakewood had foundation problems), both
schools had been promised for the 1959-60 school year.
Virginian-Pilot, however, intimated that the delay was
linked to other, more political concerns:
The State Board of Education approved the
plans in the fall of 1957, but the project failed
to move forward. . . . Months went by, and
nothing happened.
It finally became apparent
that the Council was waiting to see the outcome
of the impending desegregation crisis.30

2sNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 June 1958.
29Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 October 1959.
3°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 8 August 1959.
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Additional annexation and the impact of the redevelop
ment projects closer in town33- was putting a tremendous
burden on the schools in the eastern half of the city.

A

disastrous annexation decision— Norfolk had sought 33 square
miles in the western portion of old Princess Anne County,
but instead had ended up with only 13, a large part of which
were water system lakes and the airport which it already
owned— was exacerbating the problem.

Norfolk was stuck with

the students, but none of the schools which served them, and
this urgent need was in part responsible for the acceptance
of the "vest pocket" schools being erected in East Ocean
View, River Forest Shores (Easton), and Fairlawn (See
Figures 8 and 9 on the following pages).32 The fact that
the School Board would be facing the new school year with
reduced funds, badly overcrowded schools,33 and nothing
but inadequate mini-schools in the works was prompting a
second Norfolk School Crisis, and one in which the Board
again found itself pitted against the Mayor and the City
Council.
Public schools, or at least the quality of public
education in Norfolk, were again threatened, and once more
the pro-school forces vowed to do battle against the Mayor

3XNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 January 1958.
32Frank S. Pace, former City Planning official, interview
by author, Tape recording, Norfolk, 24 January 1991; Roy B.
Martin, J r ..
33Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 11 November 1959.
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Black Housing Areas
Mixed Race/Transition Housing

Annexed From Princess Anne County

C!\

Annexed Frcm Princess^Aqge County

Figure 8.

New School Buildings, 1959

A
B

Easton Elementary

D
Elementary E

Fairlawn Elementary

East Ocean View

Poplar Halls Elementary

C

Pretty Lake Elementary

p

Coronado Elementary
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FIG U R E 9 .

SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION S T A T I S T I C S ,

1 9 5 2 -1 9 5 9 1

Year

School

1952

Calcott Elementary

58,254 sq.ft.

12.0

White

1952

Lakewood Elementary

58,254 sq.ft.

12.0

White

1953

Bowling Park Elementary

58,254 sq.ft.

12.3

Black

1953

Lindenwood Elementary

40,635 sq.ft.

9.5

Black

1953

Diggs Park Elementary

44,400 sq.ft.

10.6

Black

1954

Young Park Elementary

50,540 sq.ft.

8.0

Black

1955

Suburban Park Elementary

48,919 sq.ft.

15.0

White

1956

Northside Junior High

114,375 sq.ft.

14.5

White

1956

Oceanair Elementary

57,242 sq.ft.

17.7

White

1957

Lansdale Elementary

53,100 sq.ft.

18.7

White

1957

Sherwood Forest Elementary 53,100 sq.ft.

13.3

White

1958

Rosemont Elementary/Junior 40,000 sq.ft.* 13.0*

Black

1959

Coronado Elementary

2.2

Black

1959

East Ocean View Elementary 10,790 sq.ft.*

1.2

White

1959

Pretty Lake Elementary

10,790 sq.ft.*

1.2*

White

1959

Poplar Halls Elementary

22,000 sq.ft.* 17.8

White

1959

Easton Elementary

12,000 sq.ft.* 11.7

White

1959

Fairlawn Elementary

22,000 sq.ft.* 16.4

White

Square Feet

7,500 sq.ft.

Acreage

Race

^estimate of size and area at the time of first con
struction; does not reflect later additions and expansions.
1 W. P. Sullivan Director of Buildings and Grounds,
"Cost Data, Outline Specifications, and Facilities in the
New Schools Constructed in Norfolk, Virginia, Since 1951,"
February 1956, Norfolk Public Schools Files: Henry S. Rorer,
History of Norfolk Public Schools, op c i t . , p. 346; School
Building Planning Task Force Report, January 1985, Norfolk
Public Schools Files.
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and the Organization Council.

Not only were the financing,

building program, and pay policies in jeopardy, the City
Council had appealed its earlier reverses in federal court,
and now indicated it had every intention of continuing the
fight to cut off the funds to both black and white secondary
schools.34

The School Board was apparently unwilling to

back the council on this and other anti-education measures,
because the Mayor and the city's Democratic Organization
began to advance a bill in the legislature which would
expand the number of positions on the Board from six to
seven members, and shorten the terms of service from three
to two years. The bill would have the effect of allowing the
Council to immediately replace all six of the Board
members35 who had worked so diligently to save public
education in the city during the school crisis.

School

Board member Francis Crenshaw released a statement to the
newspaper that summed up the politics of the situation:
At the present time, I believe there is a
difference of opinion between members of the
school board and the council as to [the] proper
handling of the integration problem . . . . The
legislation pending in Richmond will . . . bring
the board more closely under councilmanic
control.
I know of no other reason for adding a
seventh member . . . nor can I otherwise
account for a reduction in the term of office
from three to two years.35

34Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 2 May 1959.
35Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 April 1959.
35Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 April 1959.
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Fortunately this new school crisis found a political
outlet before public education was damaged irreparably.

It

was in response to public opposition to the effort to fire
the School Board that Mayor Duckworth let his guard slip in
public enough to threaten his Massive Resistance coalition.
When an officer of the Norfolk Committee for Public Schools
(Mrs. Barr Attaway) inquired whether it was the intent of
the Council to reappoint the incumbent members of the School
Board if the bill passed, Mayor Duckworth grudgingly
replied, "I don't think it's any of your business."37
Although in retrospect the infraction does not seem
that severe, the pro-school forces immediately seized upon
the incident as a new cause celebre of municipal reform.

A

flurry of letters to the editor, as well as the editors
themselves, questioned whether the public did have a right
to know, and whether such "despotic" behavior was proper for
a "public servant."

Pro-school advocates launched a massive

tactical campaign to isolate the Mayor, his spirited temper,
and his legendary disregard for public participation.

In

the heat of the battle, the point was lost that the Mayor
was addressing the Committee for Public Schools, a long-time
adversary.

Letters to the editor zeroed in on the fact that

he had been rude to a Southern (white) woman, conduct
thought to be unbecoming of a public official; others noted

^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 April 1959.
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that a visiting government class from Granby High School had
received a real-life lesson in big city politics.3®

The

slogan "none of your business" was just short enough to fit
on match book covers, key chains, and other tokens, and soon
these code words reverberated all across the city.
The pro-school forces probably could not have made the
issue stick had not the timing of the outburst coincided
perfectly with the upcoming Democratic Primary for the state
legislature.

Two seats were open because of the retirement

of incumbents; the Organization, the pro-school forces, and
the Defenders all had candidates in the race.

In addition,

an incumbent state senator (Edward L. Breeden) was under
attack by a coalition of Defenders and the most conservative
elements of the Organization because he had backed away from
the last ditch efforts to save Massive Resistance.39
The election hinged entirely on the Massive Resistance
issue, and all sides posed the question of their election
based upon their view of education in the city.40

On

election day, the pro-school forces claimed total victory,
winning both the disputed house and senate seats;41 in
doing so, they launched the political career of Henry Howell

38Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 April 1959; 25 April 1959;
26 April 1959; 27 April 1959.
39Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 April 1959.
4°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 July 1959.
4XNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 July 1959.
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and a force of progressivism that would be a major player in
city and state politics for the next three decades.

The

force included an alliance between the pro-school forces and
the Black voters of the city, who had up to that point had
voted solidly Republican.42

The Defenders, on the other

hand were crushed, and never appeared in Norfolk again as a
major political force; even the Organization lost, in part
because it had failed to properly answer charges that one of
its candidates had been affiliated with the Defenders.43
With champions in elected office for the first time,
the pro-school forces found that their cause quickly took on
a more authoritative air.

The anti-school policies of the

Mayor and the City Council soon came under attack from this
new quarter,44 and it was not long before the Organization
was in full retreat before a growing coalition that was
emerging between the "little people" of the pro-school
forces and the mainstream of its business community.45
Shortly thereafter, George Abbott, a 17 year veteran of the
Council seen as the most political of the group, resigned
from office and was replaced by School Board Chairman Paul
Schweitzer.

Observers saw the move as an attempt to create

42Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 30 October 1959.
43Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 July 1959.
44Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 22 November 1959.
45Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 October 1959, and
8 December 1959.
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a new "Harmony Ticket" with the business establishment, or
at least an effort to "cut the ground from under" the
emerging pro-school forces.46

In spite of this move,

however, the pro-school forces, now under the leadership of
Henry Howell,47 endorsed Schweitzer43 and advanced two
business candidates of their own, both of whom had been
active on behalf of the pro-school forces during the School
Crisis.49

Although only the candidacy of Sam Barfield was

successful, the victory was seen as a direct rebuff to Mayor
Duckworth, his "dictatorial rule," the Council's actions in
the desegregation crisis, and the secrecy of the process of
city planning and governmental decision-making.30

Fred

Duckworth declined to seek re-election in the next race, and
the office of Mayor was turned over to Roy Martin, the one
councilman who had dared to break with the Organization
during the school crisis in order to support a continuation
of public education in the city.

Norfolk had thus come full

circle, and although the process of government became more
contentious as decision-making came more into public view,
the primacy of councilmanic support for public education was
never again at issue; the bi-racial coalition of pro-school

4SNorfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 16 February 1960
^ Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 15 June 1960.
4SNorfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 10 June 1960.
49Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 March 1960.
5°Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 15 June 1960.
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advocates, the Silkstocking business elite, and the city's
Black leadership that emerged to promote educational issues
following the crisis strengthened and matured into the
dominant political force for the next three decades.
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CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION
Bombarded, blockaded, captured, and even plundered,
Norfolk had endured much at the hands of its enemies over
its more than 300-year history.

But it had also suffered

just as greatly from enemies within:

it had been razed by

the patriots, embargoed by the federalists, undercut by
intrastate rivalries with the fall-line cities up river,
terrorized by armed mobs during Reconstruction, and then
very nearly ruined when disarmament followed World War I .
In between it had been decimated by contagion and conflagra
tion of all kinds.

Through it all, however, the promise of

prosperity lingered just close enough that its merchants
dreamed of the day when her fine natural harbor would rival
the great ports of New York, Boston, Charleston, and Balti
more.

It was the pursuit of that dream that brought its

citizens the requisite resiliency to bounce back from each
of the crushing blows of defeat, only to be leveled again.1
At first glance, Norfolk's history during the postwar
era was not remarkably different from that of other American

xFor a complete history of Norfolk, see Thomas J.
Wertenbaker, Norfolk:
Historic Southern Port (Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 1962).
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cities.

The hustle and bustle of the war years gave way to

a momentary respite, and then raged on in the frantic growth
of suburbia.

The highways zoomed, the skyscrapers loomed,

and the babies boomed in the prosperity of America's "Golden
Years."

A tide of reform that swept all across the Sunbelt

touched briefly on Norfolk's shores at the close of World
War II,2 lingering just long enough to bring new leadership
and new competence to city hall, and then rolled on by.

The

civic elite who ruled Floyd Hunter's Atlanta3 in 1950 had
their counterparts who reigned briefly over Norfolk's
growth, but then were forced to share power with the
established politicos, just like their colleagues in
Denver,4 New Haven,5 New York, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, St.
Louis, Milwaukee, Baltimore, and Detroit.®

While in power

Norfolk's businessmen elite set in motion a remarkably
far-reaching plan of action that put the city at the
forefront of almost every municipal endeavor associated with
city planning and urban renewal.

By the middle of the

decade, however, the city's leadership had sorted itself

2Carl Abbott, The New Urban America:
Growth and
Politics in Sunbelt Cities (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1981).
3Floyd W. Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel
Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1953).
4Carl Abbott, op. cit., p. 136.
sRobert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, Conn.:
University Press, 1961).

Yale

®Carl Abbott, pp. 251-253.

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

442

into several distinct camps, each with its own focus on the
issues of greatest concern; just as in New Haven, business
men focused on redevelopment and economic growth, politi
cians concentrated on the political arena, and education was
left largely to the middle class that owed only fleeting
alle-giance to either the city's big businessmen or its more
established political leaders.7
Opposition to school desegregation, however, brought
unity to the leadership of the city, and one man, Mayor W.
Fred Duckworth ruled preeminent, even if only briefly, over
almost every sphere of civic endeavor.

It is unusual, but

not unknown for the mayor in a council-manager city to
assume such power, and the concentration of such authority
is ordinarily relatively brief and often associated with
some popular mandate to clean up city hall, initiate major
reform, rejuvenate the downtown business area, or otherwise
achieve some long sought public endeavor.8

In Norfolk's

case, the Mayor's political fortunes both rose and fell with
the tide of Massive Resistance, and it was in Norfolk that
the Byrd Organization's highly touted scheme to circumvent
the authority of the federal courts met its match.

Barely a

year after federal troops had marched into Little Rock,
Arkansas, to enforce a court order to desegregate, the
public senior and junior high schools in Norfolk were closed

^Robert Dahl, op cit.
sCarl Abbott, pp. 251-253.
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in defiance of a similar legal mandate.
happened.

Remarkably nothing

For five months the schools remained closed,

locking 10,000 white students out of class.

Precisely

because Norfolk was urban, and just a little cosmopolitan,
Massive Resistance finally failed.

Although predominantly

Southern in nature, subtle variations in its cultural ethos
enabled Norfolk to endure its school integration crisis
differently than other cities in the South:

one of its

daily newspapers kept up an unrelenting pressure to reopen
the schools; a white citizens

group formed to initiate

successful legal action; and,

under threat of economic ruin,

the city's business elite finally emerged to close the
curtain on Massive Resistance, at the same time reopening
the political system to the type of
that is more typical of major

competitive environment

urban centers.

Thus, two events alone make the history of Norfolk
during the 1950s remarkable— the intensity of its attack on
urban blight and the ferocity of the resistance to school
desegregation— that they are inexorably linked should come
as no surprise.

The rate at which federally funded bull

dozers gobbled up slums to make way for urban renewal earned
Norfolk All-American City honors and a lasting place in the
record books of municipal achievement; at the same time the
bitter confrontation between the opponents of school
segregation and the proponents of Massive Resistance won it
barely a footnote in the history books, and only fleeting
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dishonor on the national scene.

The city's reaction to

these two issue, and, indeed, their very emergence as
historical turning points, may be traced to the rise and
fall of two very distinct foci of power— the one economic,
and the other political— irrevocably tied together in a tale
of pride and prejudice— the story of how municipal power
came to serve two very different political ends.
Because, for the most part, Norfolk's history is so
very ordinary during this period, it may be seen as repre
sentative of the forces and concerns that faced other areas
in the Urban South.

It is only the scale of its redevelop

ment activity and the desperation of its school closing
controversy that make it exemplary as a case study of the
inter-relationship between the two.

Although the story of

school desegregation and urban renewal in Norfolk may be
more compelling than in most communities, it is not thought
to be unique.

There is good reason to believe that what

existed in Norfolk on such a grand scale, could also be
found in more subtle forms in hundreds of other cities
across the nation.

Norfolk's reaction to school desgre-

gation in the 1950s was not unique, and, in fact was so
typical that it may well serve as the model of what occurred
in other communities.

Neither is it unusual that its powers

of urban renewal came to be employed during this era to
achieve more political than purely economic ends— that, too,
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is a pattern that has been well documented elsewhere.9
Only the scope, and not the direction, of Norfolk's response
is larger and more dramatic than elsewhere.

Indeed, the

very magnitude of this reaction is what makes the story in
Norfolk so exemplary of the three distinct stages hypothe
sized at the outset of this work:
1. An Attempt to Make Separate "Equal," 1950-1955.
Like their counterparts across most of the nation, Norfolk's
leaders were well aware that the system of "separate but
equal" schools for Blacks and whites, at least as it existed
in many parts of the rural South, could not long endure a
withering legal challenge in the postwar era.

Partly

because of the overwhelming presence of the military, which
had been integrated since 1948, its citizens were also aware
that the old barriers of segregation were falling.

As part

of a larger mandate to reform every phase of city adminis
tration, the People's Movement of 1946 deliberately set
about the task to equalize both the facilities and the
operation of its dual public school system.

Writing in

February of 1957, U. S. District Court Judge Walter Hoffman
commented on the success of this effort:
The sum and substance of the School Superin
tendent's evidence is that the City of Norfolk
has substantially complied with the "separate

9Martin Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer (Cambridge,
Mass.:
M.I.T. Press, 1964); Jewell Bellush and Murry
Hausknecht, e d s ., Urban Renewal:
People, Politics, and
Planning (New York:
Doubleday, 1967).
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but equal" doctrine, which was applicable prior
to the decision in Brown v. Board of Education.
The City of Norfolk is to be commended for its
rapid strides in bringing about an equalization
in physical equipment, curriculum, teacher load,
and teachers' salaries.
If the "separate but
equal" doctrine were now in existence, there
would be no grounds for relief to be afforded
these plaintiffs.10
The progress in Norfolk caught the attention of other
Southern leaders as well.

Writing in Look magazine, U. S.

Senator Sam Ervin (D-N.C.), later of Watergate fame,
commented that new schools for Blacks, like Norfolk's Young
Park Elementary, gave testimony to the South's effort to
resolve the disparities of segregation "in its own way."11
Between 1950 and 1955 Norfolk completed four new elementary
schools for Blacks (Young Park, Bowling Park, Lindenwood,
and Diggs Park), three of which were built with federal
redevelopment funds, and transferred a newly constructed
junior high (Jacox) to the Black school system.

In addi

tion, it initiated a major building program to modernize the
other aging Black facilities with new classroom wings, cafe
terias, libraries, auditoriums, and other badly needed
improvements.

Teacher salaries had been equalized in 1941

10Leola Pearl Beckett, et al. v. School Board of
City of Norfolk, V a . , et al . . Civil Case No. 2244, U.
General District Court, Eastern District of Virginia,
reprinted in Race Relations Law Reporter 2: 2, (April,
p. 338.

the
S.
as
1957),

lxSam J. Ervin, Jr., "The Case for Segregation," L o o k ,
3 April 1956, pp. 32-33.
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as a result of a lawsuit,12 and by 1951, Norfolk was
reporting that it spent more to educate a Black child than a
white, due largely to the fact that Black teachers, because
they had more seniority and degrees, were higher on the
scale than their white counterparts.
Thus, the local record of attention to the fiscal and
physical aspects of making separate race schools more equal
is in full keeping with efforts all across the South to
maintain segregation in a more equitable setting.

While the

Brown cases were under deliberation, most of the states
where schools were segregated by law (de jure) began a
deliberate effort to upgrade Black schools, provide addi
tional funding resources, equalize teacher salaries, and
otherwise preserve

segregation "on a voluntary basis."13

Just as it was in the forefront of other municipal planning
endeavors, the fact that Norfolk constructed four new Black
public schools during this era, helped to continue its
reputation of progressive achievement.
2. A Transition Period, 1955-1956:
Hostility.

from Calmness to

A dramatic confrontation over school desegrega

tion in the South was not necessarily inevitable; most
Southern leaders reacted calmly to the initial announcement

12Henry S. Rorer, History of Norfolk Public Schools,
1681-1968 (Norfolk:
by author), p. 69.
13W. D. Workman, Jr., "The Deep South," chap. in Don
Shoemaker, e d . , "With All Deliberate Speed" (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 92.
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of the Supreme Court's decision outlawing separate race
schools.

Indeed, they had expected some such determination.

Only the reversal of the long standing legal tradition under
attack in the title case, Brown v. Board of Education,
really caused much consternation.

If federal courts were

truly to follow the letter the decision in B r o w n , as it
became increasingly obvious that they would, then it meant
that school attendance patterns in the South would have to
be drastically revised so that each child would have to
enroll in the school closest to his or her home.

In

deciding Brown. the Court left intact the type of segrega
tion, even though not absolute, that was found most often in
the cities of the North, West, and Midwest, where separation
of the races was due to the individual's choice of neighbor
hood or place of residence, i.e. de facto segregation.
Thus, substantially equal schools that served separate race
neighborhoods were still permitted by the Court; it was only
the peculiar circumstance presented by Linda Brown, a Black
living closer to a white school than a Black o n e , that was
actually found unconstitutional.
The doctrine of proximity enunciated in Brown repre
sented a much greater threat to segregated schools in the
South than elsewhere, for it meant that, not only would
Blacks be admitted in fairly large numbers to formerly white
schools--a situation that was rare enough elsewhere--in many
Southern communities, because of the high percentage of
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Black population, whites might have to attend nearby Black
schools, a situation that was not found anywhere else in the
world.3-4

Part of the reason for the calm initial reaction

from Southern leaders to the early pronouncements of the
Court was the feeling that their efforts to achieve equal
school facilities had been successful, and that segregation
could continue on a "voluntary" basis.

It was only when

litigation was initiated in their own community and they
realized the particular problems posed by the doctrine of
proximity that first panic, and then wholesale opposition to
the Court, set in.
Norfolk in 1950 was like Orlando and a number of other
Southern cities in that, in addition to a large central
slum, Blacks occupied a half dozen or so housing areas
scattered around town.3-3

In their research on housing

integration in the 1950s, Karl and Alma Taueber found that
this pattern was typical of older, more established Southern
cities, like Charlestown (South Carolina), Washington,
Baltimore, and New Orleans; newer Southern cities, those
that boomed after the Civil War (i.e., Atlanta, Birmingham,
Memphis, and Augusta) were more like their Northern counter
parts in that Blacks were concentrated almost exclusively in
single downtown "ghetto."

The newer cities could thus adopt

3-4Robin M. Williams and Margaret W. Ryan, eds., Schools
in Transition:
Community Experiences in Desegregation
(Chapel Hill, N.C: University of North Carolina Press, 1954).
15Abbott, p. 93.
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the Northern model of de facto segregation without undue
hardship; it was only in the older Southern cities, where
the Black population was more dispersed, that the doctrine
of proximity meant that large scale integration would be
required.

The Taueber's explained that the "backyard" or

"alley-dwelling" type of housing arrangement found in the
older Southern cities, like Norfolk, was due to the fact
that each major white middle-class neighborhood had its own
nearby Black residential area from which it could pull
domestic laborers.16

Residential integration in Norfolk

may have been even more pronounced than elsewhere, since
Navy housing, desegregated since 1948, presented additional
pockets of Black population living in mostly white areas of
the city.

Moreover, the fact that Blacks were spread across

the city meant that there were transition areas, blocks
where housing was shifting from white to Black, in a number
of neighborhoods.

It was these areas that posed the great

est threat to efforts to preserve segregated schools on a
"voluntary" basis.
The calm reaction of the Norfolk School Board to the
U. S. Supreme Court's ruling in the Brown v. Board of Educa
tion cases was held up as a model for the rest of the South.
There was little concern on the part of the Board that
schools could be desegregated in the city with a "minimum of

lsKarl E. and Alma Taueber, Negroes in Cities:
Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Change (Chicago:
Aldine Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 23, 48.
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integration"— "so little you'd hardly notice it"— without
major disruption or problem.

The city's Catholic school

system, including Norfolk Catholic High School, had been
desegregated without incident at the start of the 1954-55
school year,17 an the Board had little doubt that the same
results could be achieved in the public schools.

Not until

the city actually faced litigation to desegregate did the
city's leaders realize the explosive potential of the
situation they would face.
Politics and events quickly overtook the official calm
expressed by the School Board.

Virginia's governor

(Stanley) and many of the state's urban political leaders at
first expressed sentiments that paralleled those of the
Norfolk School Board, but the ferocity of the resistance
building in the rural Southside counties, the Black belt
that formed the core of the Byrd Organization's voting
strength, soon forced a retreat from such moderation.
Hostility to the prospect of school segregation was fed by
the fact that locally the city's bus system, its state park,
and other recreation facilities had either desegregated
voluntarily under the threat of litigation or else under
force by a mandate from the federal court.

The change is

most apparent in the sentiments of Norfolk's legislative
delegation, which at first supported the Board's sentiments,
later wavered, and by 1956 was in full retreat as the

^ S o u t h e r n School News, 1 October 1954.
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delegates faced fierce opposition from the Defenders of
State Sovereignty and Individual Liberty, Virginia's well
organized, and for the most part, well-heeled, staunchly
pro-segregation, pressure group.
The School Board's calm, "Wait and See" attitude soon
gave way to a quiet reappraisal of its own building effort.
A few additions that were scheduled for Black schools were
delayed, and the Board began to evaluate the location of a
number of proposed schools in light of the critical issue of
residential proximity.

A proposal to build a replacement

for the aging Lafayette School was scrapped, as were at
least four prospective sites for a badly needed (white)
junior high school.

It seems that some of these sites were

rejected in part because they were too close to Black
residential areas to avoid desegregation under the Brown
precedent (see Figure 1, page 148), but the issue was
clouded by the fact that Norfolk had also just annexed new
areas where similar facilities were also badly needed.
Increasingly the School Board in Norfolk found itself
isolated in both spirit and approach from the rest of the
city's political leadership.

Public reaction to the possi

bility of school desegregation was stiffening, partly be 
cause the city was finding that it would not be given much
of a transition period to shift from a segregated to a
desegregated school system.

Any thought that local Blacks

would be content with separate facilities under the new
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efforts to equalize Black and white education was quickly
dashed:

the N.A.A.C.P. filed a petition with the School

Board seeking desegregated schools shortly after the Brown
decision was finalized, and once its administrative remedies
were exhausted, proceeded directly to federal court.

U. S.

District Judge Walter Hoffman was also not inclined to grant
the kind of delay that seemed customary elsewhere in the
South, and was preparing to order a couple of elementary
schools desegregated in the fall of 1957, an event that
would have put Norfolk on the same collision course as
Little Rock.
Leaders in Norfolk were much like their colleagues in
other parts of the South,13 and indeed much of the rest of
the nation:19

when they saw that legal challenges to

segregation were emerging in their own community, they
tended to blame this "interference" on the work of "out
siders," and failed to see it as a legitimate expression of
local Black hostility to the institution of segregation.

At

first the N.A.A.C.P. bore the brunt of this attack, and the
state legislatures especially focused their wrath through
anti-N.A.A.C.P. laws designed to threaten or intimidate its
membership.

The reaction of

N.A.A.C.P. spilled over into

the white community to the
other community activities, and

Norfolkians, just like others across the South in areas

18Southern School N e w s , 6 January 1955.
19Williams and Ryan, op

c i t ., p. 237
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thought to be racially moderate, had their own experience
with hate mail, racist literature, and racial turmoil.
Events were particularly intense in Coronado, a formerly
white section of the city where the color line had been
successfully breached.

There, Blacks who were attempting to

break the color line in an established white neighborhood,
had to face the threat of firebombs, vandalism, hostile
mobs, and racial taunts.

The crisis of housing in the Black

community, which was in part exacerbated by redevelopment
activity, was forcing racial change in a few other
neighborhoods as well.

Coronado was but one symptom of the

problem; similar hostilities were evident in the Brambleton
and Berkley sections of the city, both of which by the
mid-1950s had nearly completed their transition to
predominately Black housing areas, and in the Atlantic City,
Lamberts Point, and Broad Creek areas on the fringe of the
downtown, which were just beginning to tip.

Just as in

Coronado, efforts by the Black community to develop new
homes in the Broad Creek Shores subdivision were met with
strong opposition from whites in the surrounding areas.

In

fact, the pattern of housing in older Southern cities, like
Norfolk, where whites and Blacks lived in greater proximity
to one another, may have been in part responsible for some
of the growing animosity between the races.
By 1956 race relations in the city, which had been at
their highest peak a few years earlier, had deteriorated
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badly.

No longer were Blacks consulted on major planning or

development initiatives, and even when controversies arose,
such as the Broad Creek Shores development, Black leaders
had so few contacts in city government that they had to turn
to leaders in the banking and financial community for media
tion.

One Black leader characterized the situation as, "in

Norfolk, there are no relations between the races."20
School Board, too, found itself just as isolated.

The

In spite

of the strong personal commitment of its members to continue
public education in Norfolk at all cost, it was obvious that
political leaders in both the state and the city were more
than willing to let public schools evolve into some sort of
state sponsored private educational system in order to
remain segregated.

Increasingly the School Board was being

called upon to help hold the line against desegregation.

It

had been willing to do its part in carefully planning the
location of new facilities, but soon it would be asked to
play an even larger role.

As members of the middle class,

all of whom had benefitted enormously from public education,
the Norfolk School Board, like hundreds of others across the
South, was not willing to participate in the demise of
public education in the city.

Partly because they recog

nized this difference, political leaders in Virginia and
half a dozen other Southern states moved to take away from
the local boards certain of the administrative powers

2°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 June 1958.
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necessary to maintain public schools.

Instead they created

a melange of state pupil placement boards and commissions,
all designed to "interpose" the authority of the states
between the Black litigants and the boards.2X
Thus the School Board and political leaders in Norfolk
had, by 1956, found themselves in the midst of a firestorm
of public unrest.

The community seemed headed on the fast

track towards a court-ordered desegregation of its public
schools, yet the state's political leaders were indicating
that they would not permit even the most minimal form of
integration.

Also by 1956, public opposition to the courts

had reached a fever pitch.

Neither situation was unique to

Norfolk, although the particular circumstance of its dis
persed Black population may have leant an extra air of
urgency to deliberations there.

Since the established

political order cannot long endure such a heightened level
of public unrest, the leadership in Norfolk, and indeed much
of the rest of the South, felt obligated to take every legal
step at its disposal to delay as long as possible the
eventuality of desegregated schools.

One logical assump

tion is that local leaders in Norfolk and hundreds of other
Southern communities followed the lead of their counterparts
in the U. S. Congress and the state legislatures, and began
to prepare to move beyond rhetoric towards action.

23-Southern School News, February, 1957.
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3.

Overt Attempts to Move from De Jure to De Facto

Segregation, 1956-1960.

The doctrine of "interposition"

that began to emerge in the rhetoric of the politicians
found its outlet in a host of special state laws designed to
interpose the authority of the state between the federal
courts and the local school officials.

Most of these laws

dealt with pupil placement, student transfer policies,
attendance,22 and financial control of the schools, but it
is just as logical to assume that local officials followed
these same legislative trends in their own enactments.
Gradually the realization began to dawn on municipal offi
cials all across the South that, because public education
was much more a community than even a state responsibility,
the powers of the local school boards and city councils to
administer public schools were even greater than those of
the state.

Thus, a logical extension of interposition logic

already being advanced by numerous state leaders enabled
local officials to discover that their own inherent powers
to assign pupils, rule on transfer applications, build
schools, utilize space, draw attendance zones, and otherwise
administer the day to day operations of the public schools
could be judiciously applied to preventing or at least
delaying the eventuality of court ordered desegregation that
would prove so disruptive.

22Patrick E. McCauley, "Be It Enacted," chap. in Don
Shoemaker, e d . , "With All Deliberate Speed," op c i t .,
p. 132.
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Norfolk officials, as well as others across the South,
quickly seized on these powers and began to take the steps
that would be necessary to delay segregation.

Even though

data on the attendance zones in Norfolk in the 1950s no
longer exists, the application of the interposition philos
ophy at the local level may still be tracked by following
the fate of the school buildings most directly threatened by
court-ordered integration.

Since the first round of litiga

tion followed almost exactly the proximity precedent
established in the Brown v. Board of Education case, by the
winter of 1956-1957 Norfolk faced the certainty of court
ordered integration of several of its elementary schools the
following (i.e., 1957-58) school year.

In discussing the

particulars of the situa-tion, U. S. Federal District Judge
Walter E. Hoffman noted that the problem of integration
would be particularly acute at two elementary schools:
According to the testimony of the Division
Superintendent, there are some localities in the
City of Norfolk which will create individual
problems in the elementary school system,
particularly at the Patrick Henry School and the
Gatewood School where the percentage of white to
colored students would be approximately four to
one in Patrick Henry and eight to one in
Gatewood, with the preponderance of the student
body being white, which allocation is based upon
the assumption that the school children are
assigned only in accordance with normal
geographical consideration.23

23Leola Pearl Beckett, et al. v. School Board of the
City of Norfolk, Va,, et al . , op c i t . , reprinted in Race
Relations Law Reporter 2: 2, (April, 1957), p.
338.
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Before the 1957-1958 school year ever began, however,
the Norfolk School Board began its first real experimenta
tion with applying its inherent powers of school administra
tion to block the court order.

As Judge Hoffman had indi

cated, the two elementary schools most threatened by courtordered integration were both in transition areas of the
city.

Patrick Henry Elementary was in the Atlantic City

area, a once proud working-class neighborhood that had
always maintained some Black housing near the cotton mill
and seafood packing houses.

In recent years, however,

Blacks had begun to move into other portions of the neigh
borhood.

By 1957 50 Black students would have been eligible

to attend Patrick Henry Elementary under the doctrine of
proximity24

Even though white students would have

outnumbered Blacks by better than four-to-one, the school
was closed, and the building converted to administrative
offices.

Although the School Board had been pressuring for

several years for additional administrative office space, it
had sought sites closer to the center of the city.25

Gatewood Elementary was situated in Berkley, another
working class neighborhood that was somewhat isolated by the
Elizabeth River from the rest of the city.

The Black

24Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 March 1957; Norfolk
Virginian-Pilot 13 February 1957.
25Letter from School Superintendent J. J. Brewbaker to
H. H. George, Norfolk City Manager, 2 July 1955; and letter
to Sherwood Reeder, Norfolk City Manager, 8 August 1955,
Norfolk Public Schools files.
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population, which had once been confined to areas around the
shipyards, had begun in the previous decade to expand into
other parts of the Berkley community.
remained the

last white school

Gatewood Elementary

in the area, but it,

too, was

threatened by desegregation, although Judge Hoffman indi
cated that the ratio of whites to Blacks would have been
only eight-to-one.

Just as it had with Patrick Henry, the

School Board

closed the school

to its white clientele,

transferring

it instead to the Black school

system.

Whites

in Berkley would have to commute to some other school across
the river.

In addition to Gatewood, the School Board also

transferred John Marshall Elementary on the edge of the
downtown area from the white to Black school systems, since
it, too, was too close to nearby Black housing to withstand
a legal challenge.

Since Judge Hoffman had already approved

a similar shift two years earlier when Blacks sought to en
roll in Thomas Jefferson Elementary in Newport News,26 the
Norfolk School Board had every reason to feel he would
approve the same tactic in the current instance.

Indeed,

Judge Hoffman all but suggested a repeat of the strategy to
the Newport News Board in an opinion written at the same
time that the fate of Patrick Henry and Gatewood Elementary
schools in Norfolk was being decided:
[The Walter Reed Elementary School] has
heretofore been reserved for white children, but

26Southern School News, October, 1955.
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its location [is] on the fringe of a rapidly
changing population area wherein the population
will soon become all colored . . . . This may
well resolve itself in the Walter Reed
Elementary School becoming substantially for
colored children.
I do not know of any
particular law that prevents the so-called
gerrymandering of the school areas.2-7
In addition to the power to determine the attendance
zone and the actual use of buildings, the Norfolk School
Board found that it also had discretionary authority over
the size, location, and grade composition of new schools as
well.

The most telling evidence that these powers were used

to forestall school segregation may be found in the creation
of the Rosemont and Coronado schools in the newly annexed
Norview area.

Rosemont, which was designed to serve as a

combination elementary/junior high school, the only such
combination school in the city, was hastily erected to serve
the Black population threatening to integrate Norview
Elementary and Junior High Schools.

Not only did newspaper

accounts of the era clearly discern that the purpose of the
school was to forestall school desegregation,28 the Black
community fiercely resisted both the project and fact that
the hastily constructed building would lack many of the
essential support facilities present in all of the "white"
schools recently constructed.29

A school in the Coronado

^ Southern School N e w s , March, 1957.
2SNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 8 July 1959.
29Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 July 1959.
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section was not planned until after the School Board had
been given the names and addresses of the Black litigants
seeking to integrate Norview Elementary.

After examining

the documents, the Board discovered that, in spite of the
Rosemont school, which was then under construction, the
color lines in the Norview section had continued to change,
and some of the litigants still lived closer to a white
school.

When first conceived, Coronado was nothing more

than six mobile classrooms pushed off the back of a truck
onto a vacant lot,30 that like, Rosemont, was designed
almost entirely to place a Black school in closer proximity
to Black litigants than the white school they sought to
attend.

Again, Blacks complained bitterly that this "vest

pocket" school lacked appropriate facilities, and was only
being built to counter their litigation.31

Although Judge

Hoffman discussed the situation at length in his review of
the progress of desegregation suit in Norfolk, he neverthe
less felt powerless to intervene as long as the School Board
could point to a sound pedagogical reason (overcrowding) for
creating the schools.32

Two other schools, Benmoreell and

Broad Creek Village Elementary, both of which served

3°Ibid.
31Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 20 August 1959.
32"District Judge’s [Walter E. Hoffman] Statement of
August 25, 1958," in the case of Leola Pearl Beckett, et a l . ,
versus the School Board of the City of Norfolk, et a l . ,
reprinted in Race Relations Law Reporter 3:
5 (October,
1958), pp. 953-954.
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integrated Navy housing projects, were similarly closed,
even though both schools were little more than a decade old.
One other school, Pineridge Elementary, also served the
Broad Creek Village project, and it also closed for a few
y e ars .
The strategy was even further defined, with the help
of the more political Mayor and City Council, in the spring
of 1959, just after the city's previously closed schools had
reopened.

At that time Mayor Duckworth proposed building

three-room school houses all across the city so that they
could better serve "the neighborhoods" in question.

Almost

all parties to the affair, including the newspapers,33 the
School Board,34 and the City Council,35 knew that the
ploy was simply to build and maintain single race schools.
Even though the School Board had strong pedagogical reasons
to oppose these mini-schools as impractical,35 it never
theless bowed to the dictates of the Mayor, and erected five
buildings that met his specifications (Easton, Fairlawn,
Poplar Halls, East Ocean View, and Pretty Lake) in the newly
annexed Eastern section of the city.

33Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 February 1959.
34Francis Crenshaw.
35Roy B. Martin, Jr.
3SW. E. Campbell, Assistant Superintendent of Schools,
"Report of the Committee Relegated By the School Board of the
City of Norfolk to Study the Proposal for Construction of
Small Primary Schools," undated (1959), Norfolk Public
Schools files.
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We had to build them. . . it was the only
way we could get any schools at all . . . they
weren't quite as small as the ones Fred
[Duckworth] wanted to build.37
Years later School Board member Francis Crenshaw commented
that these schools were in part responsible for the fact
that the Eastern portion of the city felt "under served" for
decades, a grievance that he sensed underlies much of the
pressure from that area for the current shift to a ward
system of elections.38
One other reasonable assumption is that city councils
and other local officials, just like their colleagues on the
school boards, state legislatures, and the Congress, used
the powers at their disposal to frustrate and delay court
ordered integration.

The mini-school controversy in the

spring of 1959 serves as a good introduction to the
application of municipal powers to dictate school policies.
The school system in Norfolk, like all of those in Virginia
and most of the systems in large cities elsewhere, was a
dependent school district which relied upon the city govern
ment for a portion of its taxing and spending powers.
Financing new construction is but one small element of that
financial power.

Although normally unwilling to risk the

political outcry of involving itself in school affairs, a
city council nevertheless has the power to appropriate

37Francis Crenshaw.

3SFrancis Crenshaw.
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funds, and thus dictate many of the spending policies of the
school district.

Because it feared independent action by

the more educationally— as opposed to politically— oriented
school boards, the state of Virginia passed special legis
lation that allowed municipal governments to cut off funds
to operate the schools on a 30-day notice.

Several school

boards, especially those in the rural areas of the state,
availed themselves of this power.39

The Norfolk City

Council applied the leverage of this tactic when it voted to
appropriate school funds on a 30-day basis in the midst of
the school closing crisis.40
Another aspect of financial control may be found in
the size of the local appropriation: after the school
closing controversy, the City Council intimated that it
would cut off local funding for schools because of the way
it had been opposed by the School Board and the teachers
during the crisis.41

Later the Council made good on at

least a portion of its threat by substantially reducing the
School Board's budget, thereby denying it the ability to
provide a raise to the teachers who had opposed Massive
Resistance.42

Finally, the Council sought permission from

the legislature to replace the incumbent Board members in a

39Southern School N e w s , August 1955.
4°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 November 1958.

41Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 February 1959.
42Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 October 1959.
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thinly veiled move to enlarge the membership and reduce the
term of office.43
In addition to the ability to directly influence the
operation of the schools through their powers of appoint
ment, financial control, and capital funding, local govern
ments also have considerable heretofore unrecognized author
ity to dictate the shape and size of school districts and
attendance zones through their powers of urban renewal.

The

Broad Creek Shores controversy provides an interesting case
in point:

by the time the area had been annexed into the

city (January 1, 1955), a group of Black developers had
already platted the Broad Creek Shores subdivision and had a
number of houses under construction.

Although faced with a

fait accompli, the city of Norfolk nevertheless moved
through its powers of eminent domain to seize a large tract
on the northern edge of the property, thereby isolating the
Black development from nearby white neighborhoods.

Although

the stated purpose of the purchase was to buy up land for a
park and possible school expansion, neither was ever built
on the site; the land was eventually used for the National
Guard armory and an industrial park.

Much later Councilman

(and later Mayor) Roy B. Martin, Jr. would indicate that the
armory was placed there "in order to block the Black
development,"44 a theory that confirms reports in the

43Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 April 1959.
44Roy B. Martin, Jr.
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Black press of the era.45

Even though there is no other

direct testimony to the fact, appearances at least suggest
that the city similarly used the placement of Old Dominion
University, Interstate 64 and 264, and other park, recrea
tional, and industrial parks as both a buffer zones between
racially diverse neighborhoods and as a natural barrier to
maintain separate race school districts.

Although confirma

tion of such a theory must be left to other researchers, use
of the powers of city planning and eminent domain to block
desegregation has long been hypothesized.46
Perhaps the most damning indictment of the use of
municipal powers to achieve de facto segregation comes from
the former head of Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) in
the 1950s, who accused Southern cities of using their powers
of urban renewal to break up integrated low-income neighbor
hoods in order to more clearly draw the color lines:
Where, in a few Southern cities, there had
been a protest against this, a compromise was
sometimes reached involving proposed re-use [of
the land] for other than residential purposes.
Thus a slum formerly housing both Negro and
white families was proposed as the location for
industry or a public institution.
Urban renewal
too often seemed to be an instrument for wiping
out racially integrated living.4-7

45Norfolk Journal and Guide, 6 August 1955.
4SWillie and Greenblatt, op c i t ., p. 189.
4-7Robert C. Weaver, "The Urban Complex," chap. in Jewel
Bellush and Murry Hausknecht, eds., Urban Renewal: People,
Politics, and Planning (Garden City, N . Y . : Doubleday, 1967),
p. 94.
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Although he did not mention any city by name, Mr.
Weaver could well have any number of projects undertaken in
Norfolk during its second phase of redevelopment.

Just as

N.R.H.A. Project One was carefully conceived, thoroughly
planned, and meticulously implemented, Norfolk's second
phase of redevelopment, begun after 1956, was rushed,
haphazard, and poorly planned.

Humanitarian concerns were

foremost in the minds of the planners of N.R.H.A. Project
One:

public housing in the form of modern garden apartments

in well designed neighborhoods replaced some of the worst
slums in the nation, and development was implemented in
carefully conceived stages so that residents were moved
first to public housing units away from the site during
demolition, and then moved back to their old neighborhood,
once it was reconstructed.

In spite of the size and scope

of the endeavor, the entire took project took only about
five years to complete from the time the bulldozers first
began to roll.
The Atlantic City, Downtown, Broad Creek, and Old
Dominion Projects stand in sharp contrast to the careful
planning and precision of N.R.H.A. Project One.

Under

either a remarkable coincidence, or as part of a much larger
deliberate plan of action, at almost exactly the same time
that federal Judge Walter Hoffman was ordering the desegre
gation of Patrick Henry Elementary School in the Atlantic
City portion of the city, the Norfolk Redevelopment and
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Housing Authority was announcing that it planned to demolish
the entire neighborhood.

The coincidence theory is hard to

swallow, especially since closing Patrick Henry Elementary,
an action already taken by the School Board, did not remove
the threat to segregated schools posed by the mixed-race
neighborhood:

13 of the 24 Black plaintiffs in the school

desegregation suit lived in Atlantic City.48

Even though

Patrick Henry Elementary was removed from the challenge,
these plaintiffs as well as other Blacks in the area still
lived closer to the white schools in the Ghent portion of
the city than to the Black institutions further downtown.
Although the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority
indicated that it had been planning the project since 1954,
formal announcements of the demolition did not come until
December 7, 1956,49 and the bulldozers began to roll seven
months later.

Former Mayor and Redevelopment and Housing

Commissioner Pretlow Darden indicated that the Atlantic City
project was initiated in part to "rid Ghent of the cancerous
growth approximate to it,1150 although there is little
evidence that the blighted housing conditions would have
spread beyond the natural geographic barriers that isolated
most of Atlantic City from the rest of Norfolk.

48Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 March 1957.
49Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 8 December 1956.
5°Pretlow Darden.
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At least in the eyes of those who had the most
professional knowledge of deterioration in the neighborhood,
Atlantic City was not a slum, in spite of the efforts of the
Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority to characterize
it as such.

The 1950 Census revealed that more than half of

the houses had central heat and indoor plumbing — both still
rarities in many parts of town— were in adequate repair, and
commanded moderate rents twice those of the areas demolished
in N.R.H.A. Project One and the Downtown Project.51

In

spite of the fact that some residents complained that
persistent rumors of redevelopment had driven down real
estate values and hastened the neighborhood's decline,52
the new Black families moving in were apparently willing to
pay even higher rents than the white residents because of
the crisis in adequate housing for the Black community.53
The Health Department's housing inspection division had just
completed a major code enforcement initiative in the area,
one of the first major attempts in the country to salvage a
neighborhood by concentrating enforcement efforts.

Federal

law required cities to rehabilitate one unit of housing for
each unit torn down under redevelopment.

The Health

Department chose Atlantic City precisely because it was

51U. S. Bureau of the Census, U. S. Census of
Population, 1950, v. Ill, Census Tract Studies, Chapter 38
(Washington, D.C.:
U. S. Government, 1952), p. 22.
52Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 1 July 1957.
53Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 March 1957.
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salvageable:

it was "not so good that we couldn't

rehabilitate it, and not so bad that we were wasting our
time."54
Because of the necessary link between the rehabilita
tion project and redevelopment, there was close cooperation
between the Health Department and the Housing Authority.
When queried about future plans for the area, N.R.H.A.
executive director Larry Cox reportedly indicated that it
would be at least "five to ten years" before the Housing
Authority would initiate a project in Atlantic City.

That

was why it was such a surprise for the Health Department
officials to read in the paper the sudden announcement of
the Atlantic City project; they had been present for months
at the cabinet meetings of the N.R.H.A., and there had been
no mention of such a project.

The Health Department was

doubly upset when it found that its own surveys were being
used by the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority to
declare the area a slum.
The code enforcement project had been a major success,
and almost every residential unit in the area had been
brought up to the standard of the city's minimum housing
code.

Although there was a two-block wide area of dilapi

dated buildings in a mixea-use area of commercial, residen
tial, and light industrial structures that ran along the

54G. D. Monola, former director of Environmental Health,
interview by author, Norfolk, 3 April 1991.
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present site of Brambleton Avenue, these structures could
have been demolished in the highway project, and the rest of
the neighborhood saved.

This is precisely the course urged

by the Health Department; Atlantic City was not a slum in
the eyes of the individuals who had the most intimate pro
fessional working knowledge of the area.

According to the

director of the code enforcement project, Atlantic City,
even in 1956, had a "surprisingly large number of owner
occupied dwellings" that should have never been included in
the redevelopment project.

Although a structure could pass

the city's minimum housing code and still have major
structural defects under federal redevelopment standards, a
number of blocks in Atlantic City had only one or two
defects.

These blocks could only have been included for

demolition by carefully designing the project boundaries so
that the overall project area could meet the federal
requirement of an average of five defects per dwelling.
This accounts for the odd shape of the project, and why it
zigged around some blocks and then zagged to pick up others
(see Figure 2, page 227).
The Health Department was so upset at how its services
and its surveys had been used to declare Atlantic City a
slum, that a major rift developed between it and the Norfolk
Redevelopment and Housing Authority, a division that can be
seen even today in the overlapping of housing inspection and
enforcement authorities between the city and the N.R.H.A.
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The perception that the Health Department was really trying
to help the Housing Authority find new slums dealt a severe
blow to the city's code enforcement efforts.

In spite of

its arguments and its expertise, the Health Department was
powerless to help the residents of Atlantic City, many of
whom were doubly bitter after realizing that the prices
being paid for the acquisition of their homes was less than
they had spent in bringing them up to the Health Depart
ment's code.55
In short, there was much that was worth saving in the
Atlantic City area:

many of the brownstones, row houses,

and turn-of-the-century dwellings were clearly salvageable,
and would have commanded a premium price when urban pioneers
rediscovered in-town neighborhoods a little more than a
decade later.

Although the parts of the area along the

present site of Brambleton Avenue were dilapidated, many of
the blocks closer to the downtown had a distinctively
"Greenwich Village flavor" and a "Bohemian and cosmopolitan
character."56
Neither was Broad Creek Village a slum.

Built during

World War II, all of the units were free-standing dwellings
with modern plumbing, electrical, and central heating
systems.

The 2,598 units each had two to three bedrooms,

hardwood floors, deep sash windows, and sturdy interior

S5Ibid.
5SNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 31 January 1959.
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constructions; many, in fact were moved by their owners
before they could be torn down, and still survive in other
parts of the city.

Moreover, residents were proud of the

community, and especially pointed to its warmth, friendship,
compassion, lack of crime, and sense of positive spirit,
hardly signs of deterioration.5-7

Nevertheless, the

Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority could not wait
to take possession of the property from the federal govern
ment so that it could be torn down.

Since the Authority

owned the housing as a result of the federal government's
gift, demolition of the project did not have to meet
redevelopment standards.

Although there was some discussion

of maintaining the area as residential, the City Council,
especially realtor Robert Ripley, was adamantly opposed to
having a low rent project in that area of the city.

Mayor

Fred Duckworth suggested using the land, which had rail
service as well as a prime location between Virginia Beach
Boulevard and Princess Anne Road, the two major thorough
fares into the downtown, as an industrial park, and its fate
was sealed.58

Once the Housing Authority took over

(November 1954), the area was doomed; the N.R.H.A. never
maintained the structures properly and had no interest in
renting the vacant units, so it was not long before neglect
and vandalism took their toll on both the structures and the

^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 July 1979.
5SRoy B. Martin, Jr.
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Broad Creek community.

By the time the bulldozers started

to roll, the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority had
been successful in creating a bona fide slum out of a once
proud and even modern, low-rent housing development.59
These two major redevelopment projects share another
common element:

both were rushed into the demolition phase

so quickly that portions of the cleared land sat vacant for
close to three decades.

The Atlantic City Project area,

especially, was poorly conceived as an industrial park:
although it encompassed just more than a 140 acres, it was
long and narrow, and badly cut up by Brambleton Avenue, the
new superhighway that crossed its spine.

Why would an

industry choose to be in this somewhat isolated spot on the
edge of the downtown when the city was also developing
almost 500 acres in the Broad Creek Project closer to major
thoroughfares and the population heart of the area?

Not

until the 1980s, when the Red Cross moved into the indus
trial park and the hospital complex eventually expanded to
fill the western corner, did the project looked like any
thing more than an urban desert.

Even today most of the

land in the project is dedicated to government use, either
by the U. S. Commerce Department, transportation facilities,
a largely unused waterfront park, the city health depart
ment, medical school, and hospital authority.

59G. D. Monola.
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If the project had been designed with more care, the
city would have seized the last two blocks to the waterfront
as well, and the area could have blossomed with highrise
housing developments, a use it is just now discovering
somewhat tenuously.

In fact, the area has much that would

recommend it to upscale apartment buildings, condos, and
highrise residences:

partly because it is cut off from the

rest of the city by both natural geographic barriers and
major transportation facilities, it is much more conducive
to residential than industrial uses.

The fact that it is

bounded on very nearly all four sides by waterfront makes
for spectacular vistas for an in-town neighborhood.

Still,

the planners seemed to do everything possible to destroy its
future use as a residential area.

Brambleton Avenue cuts

across it in such a way that only the two corner pieces of
property on Smith Creek (the H a gue), one of the c i t y 's
premiere real estate assets, could be used for highrise
apartment houses; the small commercial area, with its quaint
shops and artsy flavor, was demolished; and the failure to
seize its rotting wharves and crumbling factory district has
made it difficult for all but the most persistent developer
to realize any of the great potential of the site.
In 1957, when the two projects were planned and exe
cuted, the city appeared to be violently opposed to residen
tial use of either site.

There was no talk of demolition in

phases, as had been done in N.R.H.A. Project One, to mini
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mize hardships or plan for orderly expansion.

In spite of

the fact that Norfolk was also clearing almost 200 more
acres in the downtown business district and starting another
project near the present site of Old Dominion University, it
was just more than a year between the time the projects were
announced and most of the demolition had been completed.

In

just 16 months Norfolk appears to have torn down the homes
of almost 20,000 people— roughly ten percent of its popula
tion— and these were not the substandard dwellings of its
poorest residents.

Instead these were the homes of working-

class white families and a few Black residents attracted to
decent housing in safe neighborhoods.

It was these latter

residents, because of the threat they posed to school segre
gation, that the city wanted to remove, but in the process,
it embarked upon a terribly destructive course.
The Black families in Atlantic City and Broad Creek
Village posed more than just an academic threat to school
segregation.

Because they represented the upwardly mobile

portion of the Black middle-class, they held high aspira
tions for their children.

For this reason, many had taken

the lead in initiating the lawsuit (i.e., Leola Pearl
Beckett, et a l . . v. the School Board of the City of Norfolk,
et al . , op c i t . ) that challenged the status of de jure
segregation in the city.

Because the N.A.A.C.P. had wished

to follow the Brown precedent as closely as possible, the
original 24 plaintiffs, and other like them, were probably
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sought out precisely because they lived closer to white
schools than the Black institutions to which their children
were assigned.

Nevertheless, they were willing to enlist

and take a very prominent and somewhat risky role in the
effort.

Thirteen of the original plaintiffs lived in

Atlantic City; another five lived in Berkley section of the
city and had petitioned to go to the all-white Gatewood
Elementary.

This is one of

the institutions that the School

Board transferred to the Black school system, thereby
leaving the remaining whites in Berkley without a school of
their own.

Although the other six plaintiffs lived closer

to a Black school than a white, all lived in the Lamberts
Point section of Norfolk,60 on the edge of the city's
prestigious Edgewater and Larchmont neighborhoods.
Census shows

that the Black

just then in

the process

Edgewater and Larchmont.

The 1950

section of Lamberts Point was

ofexpanding further towards
Redevelopment activity and the

crisis in the Black housing market helped to push the
transition area a little more each year.

Even though

Smallwood Elementary (Black) stood in the center of the area
(the Old Dominion University Library now stands on the
site), the city initiated a small redevelopment project in
this area to provide land for expansion of the then twoyear Norfolk Division of the College of William and Mary and
Virginia Politechnical Institute, now Old Dominion

s°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 March 1957.
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University.

The project had the effect of bulldozing some

of the transition neighborhoods, stabilizing racial lines in
the area, and interposing a large barrier of public land,
i. e., Old Dominion University, between the Black Lamberts
Point section and the white neighborhoods of Larchmont and
Edgewater, an effect that is still obvious today.
Moreover, Atlantic City, Broad Creek, and Lambert's
Point were all integrating fairly peacefully,sx and ex
perienced none of the marches, bombings, threats, or intimi
dation found in the Brambleton of Coronado neighborhoods
when the color lines were first crossed there.

Instead, all

three of these redevelopment areas had supported a few
Blacks families for a number of years.

Because of the

critical housing shortage in the Black community, in part
created by the redevelopment activity in N.R.H.A Project
One, landlords could command higher rents from Blacks than
from whites, and this fact helped smooth the transition of
Black residents into additional parts of these communities.
Thus, just as school boards could tear down or close
schools directly threatened by court ordered integration,
cities had the power, through redevelopment, to tear down
mixed race or transition areas where the racial composition
of the neighborhood schools would have been equally mixed.
Parallel to the power to size the school to the capacity of
the neighborhood in order to maintain its single race

S1G. D. Monola.
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identity, is the authority, through redevelopment, to adjust
the size of the neighborhood to meet the racial designation
of the school.

School boards could change attendance zones,

but cities could achieve the same effect by seizing land,
demolishing the housing, or erecting barriers between
neighborhoods that would force resizing of the attendance
zones.
The evidence that Norfolk at least took this route and
directly intervened with its powers of school administration
and urban renewal to move the status of its segregated
school system from de jure to de facto is overwhelming:

one

of the two elementary schools most directly threatened by
court ordered integration, Patrick Henry, was closed and the
neighborhood around it demolished because Blacks still
threatened other nearby white schools; the other, Gatewood
Elementary in Berkley, was transferred from the white to the
Black school system.

These two actions removed the direct

threat posed by 18 of the original 24 plaintiffs in the
school desegregation suit.

The other 6 plaintiffs lived in

the Lamberts Point section of the city close to the
prestigious white neighborhoods of Larchmont and Edgewater;
although they posed no direct threat to the nearby Larchmont
Elementary School because Smallwood Elementary, a Black
school, was closer, neverthe-less Norfolk initiated a
redevelopment project that had the effect of providing land
for the expansion of Old Dominion University, then a
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two-year junior college, shoring up the color lines in the
area, and posing a formidable barrier of public land between
the Black and white school districts.

The John Marshall

School on the Eastern edge of East Ghent was transferred
from the white to the Black school system; two elementary
schools serving integrated Navy housing projects, Benmoreell
and Broad Creek Village, were torn down and a third,
Pineridge Elementary, was closed for a few years; two white
schools (Norview Elementary and Norview Junior High) in the
newly annexed portion of the city were spared by the quick
construction, first of the Rosemont combination elementary
and junior high school, and later by six portable classrooms
dumped on a 2.5 acre lot and dubbed Coronado Elementary; and
four other white schools (W. H. Taylor Elementary, Blair
Junior High, Maury High, and James Madison Elementary) were
partially rescued by the Atlantic City and Old Dominion
redevelopment projects (see Figure 6, page 265).
In spite of the monumental effort of its political
leaders to preserve segregation, the ploy worked for only a
single year.

The schools that would have been integrated in

the fall of 1957 were either torn down or removed from
service, and in many cases, the neighborhoods, too, were
demolished.

But for the quick use of urban renewal powers,

Norfolk may have joined Little Rock as the first major
battleground of court ordered school integration.

Judge

Hoffman was obviously cognizant that the city was working to
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counter his authority.

Writing before either the fate of

the school or the full boundaries of the Atlantic City
Project were known, he indicated that:
Additionally, as to the Patrick Henry
School, there is a redevelopment and housing
plan now in its early stages which, if carried
to completion, will substantially reduce the
number of children who would ordinarily be
assigned to Patrick Henry School.®2
Norfolk had both the motive and the opportunity to use
its powers of urban renewal to forestall school desegrega
tion.

That it did so, and with a vengeance, seems patently

obvious.

Even so, any such assessment of motive and munici

pal power would be incomplete without at least some discus
sion of possible rival hypotheses for the observed events.
Although several alternate explanations are offered by other
authors, the research supporting their conclusions comes
from the 1960s or even the 1970s, and not the era under
consideration.
Karl and Alma Taueber, in their major study of resi
dential segregation and neighborhood change, noted that in
Southern cities, in sharp contrast to most of the rest of
the country, residential segregation generally increased
between 1950 and 1960.

In their general comments on this

trend, they attribute this difference more to a number of
market forces than to deliberate government policy.

Before

62Leola Pearl Beckett, et al . , op c i t ., Race Relations
Law Reporter 2:
2 (April, 1957), p. 339.
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World War II, they noted, Blacks and whites in the South
lived in much closer proximity to one another because Blacks
needed access to white residential areas in order to serve
as domestic workers; thus there was much less segregation in
Southern cities than in the North or Midwest.

After the

war, however, this was less a factor, other job oppor
tunities developed outside of domestic service, and Blacks
were freer to choose their neighborhoods in closer associa
tion with each other.

Although the Tauebers indicate that

the racial exclusivity of new construction in the suburbs
and other factors associated with white population changes
were major reasons that the level of segregation increased
between 1940 and 1950, they did not appear significant in
the decade of the 1950s.

Instead more than half of the

variance in segregation measures of cities was attributed by
the Tauebers to non-white occupational and population
changes, that is, Blacks choosing to move into Black areas.
Partly because the supply of housing appears by the 1950s to
have caught up with the demand, they indicate that the
choice of housing was broad enough to permit such voluntary
segregation of the races, especially in the South, where
Blacks occupied a much higher percentage of new housing than
elsewhere.

In Northern cities Blacks tended to take over
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established neighborhoods, while whites moved in much larger
numbers to new housing on the suburban fringe.53
In their more detailed study of several selected
cities, however, the Tauebers note that governmental action
may have been a factor in maintaining segregated neighbor
hoods.

Charleston, South Carolina, for instance, deliber

ately used separate race public housing projects to maintain
segregated neighborhoods.

Also in that city, the pattern of

back yard residences for Black domestics in white neighbor
hoods that was evident before World War II, was almost non
existent by 1960, but whether this was caused by voluntary
housing changes or by official zoning and housing code
enforcement initiatives is not indicated.

The Tauebers do

note that in Memphis, the City Planning Commission blocked
expansion of Black housing into several white areas, a
pattern that they felt was quite prevalent:
In some Southern cities informal political
agreements permitting "zoning" portions of the
city for white or black occupancy may have
played a part in making available the requisite
land for building new housing for blacks.
Finally, they indicate that Southern cities were much
more aggressive in their annexation efforts in order to
"capture new areas of white population."

Although Norfolk

was not one of the cities selected for in-depth study, the

s3Karl E. and Alma F. Taueber, Negroes in Cities:
Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Change (Chicago:
Aldine Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 3-96.
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Taueber's index of racial segregation indicates that Norfolk
had one of the highest indexes of residential segregation in
the country in both 1950 and 1960.

By 1960 only Richmond,

two cities in Alabama (Monroe and Shreveport), and six
cities in Florida (Daytona Beach, Fort Lauderdale, Jackson
ville, Miami, St. Petersburg, West Palm Beach), out of more
than 200 studied, had a higher index.64
In his major work on the history of urban America,
Kenneth T. Jackson notes many of the same trends as the
Tauebers, but he points to deliberate government action as
one of the primary cause of the increasing segregation of
America’s cities.

The government he blames, however, is not

municipal, but rather federal.

In a chapter entitled

"Federal Subsidy and the American Dream:

How Washington

Changed the American Housing Market," Professor Jackson
provides a stunning indictment of how the federal Home
Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) of the 1930s invented red
lining of urban, Black, and racially mixed neighborhoods— a
practice that was later followed by the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) and the Veterans Administration (VA).
According to Jackson, the professional real estate community
knew that with these red-lining practices in effect, the
sale of homes in a white community to Black buyers meant
that the area would be red-lined and essentially placed
off-limits to future sales, and thus worked to steer buyers

64Ibid., pp. 49, 191, 124, 240, 33-41.
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into single race neighborhoods and away from transition
areas.

In addition, since the loan standards of these

various federal agencies specified minimum lot sizes, set
backs, widths, and other standards, they favored newer sub
urban housing over older in-town neighborhoods.

Because of

these rigid standards, it became difficult to sell inner
city housing, thereby hastening the decline of the central
cities.

Potential new property owners could not get

federally-backed loans in mixed race or declining neighbor
hoods, and this factor increased absentee ownership,
property abandonment, and the development of slums.

By the

time the federal government finally reversed its red-lining
practices (1966), the switch only helped the remaining white
homeowners escape to the suburbs, thereby furthering the
segregation of America's housing.65
The federal government's role in forcing housing
segregation was more, however, than just strict adherence to
discriminatory lending practices.

Professor Jackson also

documents how federal public housing policies pushed public
housing units into existing slum areas, thereby reinforcing
segregated housing patterns and leading to the further
decline of the surrounding neighborhoods.

Although public

housing had originally been intended for the "working poor"
and the "deserving poor," by 1960 the federal government's

6SKenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier; The
Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1987), pp. 190-218.
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policies had forced it into the role as housing of last
resort for welfare clients, thereby relegating it to ghetto
status— a permanent home for the nation's underclass.

Al

though the role of local governments is not entirely blame
less in the design and location of public housing, neverthe
less it appears that a whole host of national polices, from
subsidized highways, mortgage investment, and expansion of
military and government facilities also helped to isolate
Blacks in the cities, while their former white neighbors
moved to the suburbs.

The only direct role attributed to

municipalities is the use of zoning powers by Southern
cities to enforce racial segregation of neighborhoods.66
Although Professor Jackson's treatment does not deal
directly with the issue at hand, his thesis lends some
support to the premise that Norfolk's post-Brown redevelop
ment activity was prompted by racial as well as economic
considerations.

Atlantic City and Broad Creek Village were

not slums, but the fact that they were integrated communi
ties on the edge of the downtown meant that, according to
Jackson's research, they were red-lined and in great danger
of tipping rapidly into slums.

Thus, even though the

structures themselves were sound, the fact that they could
not be sold with government backed loans in a Navy town like
Norfolk was a fatal flaw that doomed them to continued
decline.

At the time of its demise, the Norfolk Redevelop

66Ibid., pp. 227, 216, 242.
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ment and Housing Authority labored mightily to prove to the
skeptics that Atlantic City was in danger of becoming a slum
because of its increasing incidence of tuberculosis,
venereal disease, juvenile delinquency, dilapidated housing,
racial unrest, crime, fires, rat infestation, and the
like.67

Later, the Authority would make the argument that

the project was initiated to give the medical center space
to grow.68

This justification is a little hard to accept,

especially since the entire medical complex even today
occupies only a corner of the sprawling project.

The idea

of a medical school in the project was not advanced until
well after the entire 145-acre area had been swept bare,69
and much of the land used for this and other medical pur
poses could have been acquired by eminent domain by the
various governmental agencies and authorities involved
without tearing down the rest of the community.

Redevelop

ment and Housing Commissioner Pretlow Darden, who was also
on the board of Norfolk General Hospital, indicated that
Atlantic City was torn down as much to protect Ghent as it
was to help the hospital;70 his response is cryptic enough
to accommodate either an economic interpretation (i.e., that

67Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 June 1957.
SBNorfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority, Report
(Norfolk: N.R.H.A., 1957), op c i t . ; Francis Crenshaw.
63Roy B. Martin.
7°Pretlow Darden.
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slums, if left standing, spread to surrounding areas) or a
more political explanation related to efforts to save the
white schools in Ghent from court ordered integration.
The "white flight" theory advanced by James Coleman'71and David Armour-72 is equally inadequate as an explanation
of events in Norfolk, especially when the facts show that
whites were pushed out of transition areas like Atlantic
City and Broad Creek Village by deliberate municipal
redevelopment activity.

Moreover, most of the research on

"white flight" was developed in the late 1960s and early
1970s, and shows that whites left areas when school
integration efforts were at their maximum, and most urban
communities faced extensive crosstown busing of whites and
Blacks to achieve fully integrated schools.

These same

concepts do not appear appropriate to an era in which
schools were not yet desegregated, unless one thinks in
terms of the economic theories already discussed.

"White

flight" may be an adequate description of the final stages
of decline of transition or mixed race neighborhoods, one
that has been red-lined by the mortgage industry so that it
is quickly becoming a dumping ground for the city's under

7 xJames S. Coleman, Sara P. Kelly, and John A. Moore,
Trends in School Segregation, 1968-1973 (Washington, D.C.:
Urban Institute, 1975).
72David J. Armour, "White Flight and the Future of
School Desegregation," chap. in Walter G. Stephan and Joe R.
Feagin, eds., School Desegregation:
Past, Present, and
Future (New York:
Plenum Press, 1980), pp. 187-225.
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class.

Although there were some preliminary indicators that

"white flight" may have started to some small degree in
Atlantic City,73 Norfolk's redevelopment projects appear
to have been initiated more to prevent "white flight" by
keeping the schools segregated, than because of it.
Similarly, the "tipping theory" advanced by Charles V.
Willie and Susan L. Greenblatt deals with events once large
scale integration had begun under federal court orders.

In

their study of ten school systems, only four of which were
in the South (Richmond, Corpus Christi, Dallas, and Mobile),
they found that if the percentage of white students in a
given school was much less than 50%, then the school and
neighborhood it served "tipped" precipitously from mixed
race to all Black.

Although their work parallels the

research of David Armour and James Coleman in both the era
studied and the effects determined, they did, however,
discern several instances where direct municipal actions had
an impact on efforts to preserve desegregated schools.

They

report that the federal courts found that the Boston School
Committee manipulated school district boundaries and
utilized student attendance patterns to reinforce patterns
of residential segregation in that city.

Similarly, the

federal district court in Wilmington, Delaware, found that
discriminatory actions by both the state government and the
real estate community contributed to residential segregation

73Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 March 1957.
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there.

In their examination of school desegregation in

Mobile, Alabama, the authors describe how that city appeared
to place its interstate highway so that it would serve as a
dividing line between the races, allowing it to zone the
school districts accordingly.

In Richmond, Virginia, which

faced some of the same harsh political restraints as
Norfolk, they discovered that the city entered into a
racially motivated merger with its surrounding counties in
order to redraw attendance zones for white schools.

There

was also in that city evidence of "block-busting" by the
local real estate community, especially in areas on the
north side of town.

The Richmond School Board also appears

to have established two distinct feeder system of schools
with different grade organizations in order to minimize
transfers between the majority Black and white schools:
white schools operated on a grades 1-5, 6-8, and 9-12
organization, while Black schools had grades 1-6, 7-9, and
10-12.74

Another researcher found that the Richmond

School Board, under the leadership of its chairman, Lewis F.
Powell, later a U. S. Supreme Court Justice, spearheaded
efforts to build new schools primarily to forestall school
desegregation.

Their building plan was apparently in

response to the advice of James J. Kilpatrick, editor of the

74Charles V. Willie and Susan L. Greenblatt, Community
Politics and Educational Change: Ten School Systems Under
Court Order (New York:
Longman, Inc., 1981), pp. 33, 101,
189, 220-231.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

492

Richmond News-Leader, that a great part of the desegregation
problem, "especially in the cities, could be handled by the
relocation of school buildings and the gerrymandering of
enrollment lines."75
One slight variation of the white flight and tipping
approaches is offered by the avoidance theory of Cataldo,
Giles, and Gatlan.

According to their research, the

resegregation of cities was based on more passive avoidance
choices than the overt actions described by white flight or
tipping.

Thus, when property became vacant in mixed race or

transition areas, potential white buyers merely avoided such
housing in favor of surer investments in more established
neighborhoods; their theory, which is based upon a 1962
study, is more contemporaneous to events in Norfolk, and
blends well with Professor Jackson's thesis that one reason
mixed race areas were shunned was that whites could not get
the same financing available in the suburbs.76
Gary Orfield, perhaps the premier researcher in the
field, offers an amalgam of all of these alternate explana
tions under the broader heading of the economics of segrega
tion.

His research, which was conducted mostly in the late

75James W. Ely, Jr., The Crisis of Conservative
Virginia:
The Byrd Organization and the Politics of Massive
Resistance, Twentieth Century America Series (Knoxville:
University of Tennessee, 1976), pp. 134, 36.
7SEverett F. Cataldo, Michael W. Giles, and Douglas S.
Gatlan, School Desegregation: Compliance, Avoidance, and the
Metropolitan Remedy (Lexington, Mass.:
D. C. Heath and
Company, 1978).
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1960s and early 1970s and focused more on Chicago and other
Northern cities, documents both the advent of "white flight"
and the rise of private and parochial schools in mixed race
neighborhoods as alternatives to extensive court-ordered
integration efforts.

He, too, lays much of the blame for

the failure of mixed race neighborhoods on the federal
government and its discriminatory lending practices.

His

indictment goes even farther than Professor Jackson's, how
ever, and accuses federal officials of permitting pervasive
segregation of residents in buildings constructed with
federal funds on segregated sites and employing discrimina
tory assignment policies.

He also blames federal urban

renewal policies, but feels that cities share some of the
responsibility for their own demise.

Unlike Norfolk,

Northern cities apparently used their redevelopment powers
to clear away vast tracks of Black housing from the downtown
area.

Also unlike Norfolk, very few public housing units

were built for the residents cleared out the redeveloped
areas.

Of the more than 400,000 units cleared in the cities

under study, less than three percent were actually replaced
with public housing units.

Orfield feels that this failure

to build replacement housing tended to accelerate the
ghettoization of the neighborhoods adjoining the renewal
areas.77

77Gary Orfield, Must We Bus? Segregated Schools and
National Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute,
1978), pp. 80-81.
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His thesis is particularly applicable when a city like
Norfolk, where there was both extensive urban renewal
activity and a large scale commitment to public housing, is
examined.

Unfortunately, the two developments were not

always coordinated.

In Norfolk's first phase of redevelop

ment, 1950 to 1955, begun under the leadership of the
People's reformers, urban renewal and public housing were
marvelously woven together as integral parts of the same
plan.

The city's business leaders worked closely with

Washington to convert many of its wartime housing projects
into public housing in the postwar period.

N.R.H.A. Project

One, which was the first redevelopment project in the
nation, was so carefully planned that residents of the
renewal area were relocated to offsite public housing units,
their neighborhood demolished, and new public housing units
built in the project area, so that the former residents
could be moved back before the next area was demolished.
Since Black areas were torn town and new public housing for
Blacks rebuilt on the same site, the action had little
impact upon the segregation of the city.
Norfolk's second phase of redevelopment,

1956 to 1959,

initiated under the leadership of Mayor Duckworth, stood in
sharp contrast to N.R.H.A. Project One.
the projects was enormous:

First, the scope of

the city proposed to bulldoze

more than 800 acres, destroying the homes of almost 20,000
people— approximately a tenth of its population and one
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eighth of its housing— in less than a year and a half.

Not

only were no new public housing units planned, none of the
areas being redeveloped would return to residential use.
Moreover, except for the tiny (44 acres) project around what
would eventually become Old Dominion University and a
portion of the Downtown Project, which was more commercial
and industrial than residential, most of the housing torn
down belonged to white working-class residents who would not
have been eligible for relocation to public housing.

This

second phase of redevelopment confirms part of Orfield's
theory on the expansion of slums, but with a twist.

Since

the private real estate market could not absorb this
enormous movement of people with any combination of new
construction or existing units, the sudden, mass migration
of residents out of the project areas put tremendous
pressure on the existing housing stock.

Private homes and

apartment buildings on the fringe of the downtown were badly
cut up and expanded to accommodate some of this influx.

The

end result was that the enormous scope of the four projects
(Atlantic City, Broad Creek Village, Downtown East, and Old
Dominion) and the speed of their demolition led to rapid
deterioration of East Ghent, Park Place, Colonial Place,
Riverview, Lafayette, Winona, Ballentine, and the other
street car suburbs that ringed the downtown area.

Because

the projects had also displaced Black residents and equally
burdened the Black real estate market, it was not long
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before many of these same neighborhoods, once they became
overcrowded, began to decline, integrate, and then "tip" as
whites sought housing choices in the suburbs.

This type of

"chain reaction effect," whereby destruction of one slum
only creates new slums, is more fully explained by other
critics of redevelopment;"78 the difference in Norfolk is
the realization that redevelopment, because it tore down
housing and neighborhoods that were still salvageable, only
created slums where pleasant neighborhoods once stood.
Although Orfield's work deals with a later era, well
after federal courts had ordered school desegregation in the
cities under study, he reports that federal courts in a
number of school desegregation cases found that the combina
tion of federal and municipal housing policies increased
school segregation in Charlotte, Wilmington, Cleveland, New
York and other cities, although the focus of these findings
was more on racially segregated public housing than other
redevelopment and planning activities of the cities.79
This finding is echoed by the research of Karl Taueber, who
similarly reports that federal courts all across the South
found that, once they were ordered to integrate schools,

"^Bernard J. Frieden and Robert Morris, Urban Planning
and Social Policy (New York:
Basic Books, 1968), p. 130;
Scott Greer, Urban Renewal and American Cities: The Dilemma
of Democratic Intervention (New York:
Bobbs-Merritt Co,,
1965), p. 56; Jerome Rothenberg, Economic Evaluation of Urban
Renewal:
Conceptual Foundation of Benefit-Cost Analysis
(Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1967), pp. 68-69.
79Gary Orfield, op c i t . , p. 84.
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Southern school boards used their powers to delay the impact
of the orders by closing school buildings directly threaten
ed by integration, building new "vest pocket" schools to
minimize integration, redrawing attendance zones, and
establishing liberal transfer policies.80

Although both

researchers deal with events that occurred in the 1960s,
nevertheless they form an important part of the framework
for the thesis of this work, namely that cities took similar
action in the 1950s, well before they actually faced the
threat of large scale school integration, to defer or delay
court-ordered desegregation.

The only twist in the current

work is the inference that in addition to relying upon
school administrative and housing policies to achieve de
facto segrega-tion, cities may also have used their
extensive powers of redevelopment and urban renewal to block
the encroachment of Blacks into white housing areas and to
remove mixed race neighborhoods that posed a threat to the
continuation of segregated schools.

The efforts of the

Norfolk School Board to close schools, redesignate their
racial composition, redraw attendance zones, and even
demolish buildings in an era in which enrollment was
expanding so rapidly that many schools were operating on
double shifts,83- seems to have had little to do with rapid

soKarl
Taueber,
"Desegregation
of
Public
School
Districts:
Resistance and Change," Phi Delta Kappa 21:
1
(September, 1990), pp. 18-24.
aiNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 February 1956.
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changes in the white population explained by these approach
es.

Thus, even though the "white flight," avoidance, or

tipping theories are difficult to accept, especially as they
relate to school desegregation before schools were actually
integrated, they may be useful in understanding the process
of neighborhood change that precipitated such dramatic
redevelopment activity.
Even though the advocates of redevelopment enterprises
have always claimed a purely economic motive for their ini
tiatives,82 the critics, and there have been many that
disapproved of the way urban renewal was handled by cities
in the 1950s, have indicated that the economies of rede
velopment have been false and even counterproductive.83
In essence, the argument of the critics is that redevelop
ment has been a concerted attack upon the poor, those least
able to cope with the hardship of relocation and loss of
neighborhood ties; that many of the areas torn down were
still salvageable and served a useful purpose by providing

82Paul Kantor, The Dependent City: The Changing
Political Economy of Urban America (Glenview, 111.:
Scott
Foresman and Company, 1988); L. Alfeld and D. Meadows,
"A Systems Approach to Urban Renewal, chap. in Mihajlo D.
Mesarovic and Arnold Reisman, eds., Systems Approach and the
City (Amsterdam:
North Holland Publishing Company, 1972),
pp. 43-67.
83James Q. Wilson, Urban Renewal: The Record and the
Controversy (Cambridge, Mass.:
M.I.T. Press, 1966);
Herbert J. Gans, "The Failure of Urban Renewal," chap. in
in James Q. Wilson, Urban Renewal:
The Record and the
Controversy, op c i t ., pp. 540-545; Bryton and Ella Barron,
The Inhumanity of Urban Renewal (Arlington, Va.:
Crestwood
Books, 1965).
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housing for the poor that was never replaced; and that much
of the land actually developed was put to uses that could
have been accomplished anyway without the wholesale
destruction of neighborhoods and massive clearance efforts.

Norfolk provides both a fascinating counter and over
whelming confirmation of these critical approaches:
N.R.H.A. Project One, because it tore down vast tracks of
what was generally recognized as some of the worst slum
housing in the country34 and replaced it with both well
designed public housing developments and badly needed
industrial space, represents a triumph of the planners'

art,

especially since the entire 127-acre area was cleared and
rebuilt in about five years.

On the other hand, the

Atlantic City, Broad Creek Village, and Old Dominion
Projects initiated suddenly in Norfolk's second phase of
redevelopment, provide confirmation of the worst nightmares
of the critics.

Not only did they clear away vast acres of

decent, even modern, homes, they left the city's workingclass poor without recourse in the housing market, thereby
creating the slums of the future by overburdening the
surrounding neighborhoods.

In their rebuilding phases, the

projects provided a rich subsidy to governmental agencies,
industries, and corporate developers who required no such
assistance.

Most of the uses for which the cleared land was

eventually developed— public universities, medical schools,

84Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 July 1961.
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hospitals, government buildings, highrise apartments,
highways, and industrial expansion— could have been achieved
gradually and without the awesome destruction of redevelop
ment and its attendant hardships.
Part of the tragedy of Norfolk's second phase of
redevelopment is that most of the land, once cleared, sat
vacant for so very long:

it took 20 to 30 years before

portions of Atlantic City and Broad Creek Village were
developed, and Norfolk's downtown still has 17 acres of
prime real estate for which, even now, well more than three
decades after it was cleared, there are no real prospects
for development.

Norfolk's second phase of redevelopment

provided the acid test of the "land bank" concept, whereby
vast tracts of urban land were cleared and "saved" in their
vacant state, ready for the day when a prospective developer
was ready to make a withdrawal.

Indeed, Larry Cox, Director

of the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority and later
Under-Secretary of the U. S. Housing and Urban Development
(H.U.D.) Department, was one of the nation's greatest pro
ponents of the land bank concept:
Delays and land lying idle are inevitable if
urban renewal is going to do what it should do
in downtown areas.
Projects involving great
investments do not spring full-blown upon the
scene in the average-size American community.
Delay counseled by realistic appraisal of land
potential is worthwhile delay.
So my thesis is
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have worthwhile delay introduced into urban
renewal, particularly in central city areas.35
Unfortunately, Norfolk's experience provides a
stunning rebuttal to Mr. Cox's thesis:

except for a strip

shopping center on the edge of the downtown area, a few
high-rise bank buildings and office towers that would have
been built anyway, and several small residential develop
ments that are still underway in the Freemason Harbor area,
almost all of the "full-blown" or major developments in
downtown Norfolk--the SCOPE arena and concert complex, the
municipal center. Waterside marina and urban marketplace,
Town Point Park, NAUTICUS maritime center, and the new
convention hotel center— have all been public, not private,
developments that could have been built without redevelop
ment.

Similarly, there was no need to "bank" away vast

tracts of land in the Atlantic City, Broad Creek Village,
and Old Dominion project areas; all of the public and
private investments there could have been achieved by timely
destruction and phased development of the project areas.
Except for the unstated purpose of achieving de facto school
segregation, the vast scope and destruction of these areas
was both unnecessary and ill-advised.

According to one

contemporary of Cox:

e5Lawrence M. Cox, address before the American Society
of Planning Officials, National Planning Conference, Miami
Beach, May 22-26, 1960, reprinted as "The Disposition
Problem in Urban Renewal," Journal of Law and Contemporary
Problems XXV:
4 (Autumn, 1960), p. 738.
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Technical skills relating to land use design
have today [1960] reached the point where it
matters little whether the land has been cleared
in advance of planning, so that existing
improvements need not be demolished before
replacement can proceed . . . .
usually in the
central city areas, even those structures bad
enough to be the subject of a clearance project
contribute significantly to the local tax
revenues.
The demolition of these structures
not only takes the value off of the tax roll,
but also burdens the tax structure with payment
of the city's share of the clearance cost,
together with interest on money borrowed in
order to accomplish this . . . . Analyzed in
terms of planning future land use, the prudent
course of action for the city is to plan first
and undertake the execution of urban renewal
projects only when it is apparent that the land
can be advantageously put to use immediately
upon completion of the clearance.
Therefore,
the only situation which would justify creation
of a "land bank" would be the one in which the
project area was so bad that the city would be
better off without it, even if nothing arose in
its place.36
All four of the projects initiated in Norfolk's second
phase of redevelopment have unquestionably contributed hand
somely to Norfolk's tax base.

The Medical Tower complex,

for instance, which occupies 2.5 acres of the 106-acre
Atlantic City Project returns more property taxes than
previously paid by the entire area.37

Also, prior to

redevelopment, the annual taxes paid on properties in the
200-acre Downtown East Project were only $165,650 per year,
less than that paid by any one of the highrise bank or

86Lyman Brownfield, Ibid.. p. 761.
37George M. Raymond, "Urban Renewal:
Controversy,"
chap. in Jewel Bellush and Murry Hausknecht, op c i t .,
p. 488.
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office buildings which now occupy the area.88

Similarly,

the industrial park development built on the site of the
former Broad Creek Village Navy Housing Project has provided
innumerable jobs and a major economic boost to both the city
and the entire surrounding area.

The economic assessment of

redevelopment is not whether it has been profitable and even
moderately successful in its stated aim of providing vacant
land for development, it is rather whether these successes,
most of which could have been achieved without the massive
scale of destruction, the disruption of human lives, and the
adverse impact on the rest of the city's housing stock, were
worth the trauma and the social cost.

In spite of the fact

that downtown Norfolk is undergoing a tremendous renaissance
(largely at public expense), the economic argument for major
portions of the other redevelopment projects pales,
especially when one considers that the second, unspoken
motive of preserving segregated schools was the prime reason
for the rush to demolish housing and "bank" the vacant land.
In spite of the pros and cons of the economic argu
ment, however, there has always been an undercurrent that
redevelopment activities have been guided more by political

saWilliam L. Slayton, Commissioner of the Urban Renewal
Administration of the U. S. Housing and Home Finance Agency,
"The Operation and Achievements of the Urban Renewal
Program," reprinted in James Q. Wilson, Urban Renewal:
The
Record and the Controversy, op c i t . , p. 233.
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than developmental considerations.s9

Martin Anderson

coined the phase "black removal" to characterize what he saw
as municipal efforts across the country to rid cities of
unwanted elements of the community; by "black," however, he
meant not a racial designation, but rather areas of blight,
crime infestation, and unprofitable business uses.90

It

is easy to show how Norfolk used its redevelopment powers to
remove some of the "black" spots of the community.

N.R.H.A.

Project One provides a prime example of black removal at its
best:

a horribly blighted section of housing, with its

massive attendant problems of crime, infestation, juvenile
delinquency, disease, and public health menace, was removed
and then replaced with modern public housing, designed in
the garden apartment fashion and arranged to provide a
continued sense of community.

Demolition of the city's

notorious East Main Street sin district, that brought such
ill repute to Norfolk during the war years, also represents
another element of black removal.

Cities may be able to

make a strong case for using redevelopment to clear such
extensive areas of blight, but there can be little

89Scott Greer and David W. Miner, "The Political Side of
Urban Development and Redevelopment," chap. in Jewel Bellush
and Murray Hausknecht, eds. , Urban Renewal: People, Politics,
and Planning, op c i t . , pp. 152-163.
9°Martin Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer:
A Critical
Analysis of Urban Renewal, 1949-1962 (Cambridge, Mass.:
M.I.T. Press, 1964).
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justification for demolishing the ’’gray areas"91— neigh
borhoods like Atlantic City and Broad Creek Village— which
were still viable and salvageable.

If Anderson's thesis of

black removal can be applied to these projects, and perhaps
to other similar redevelopment initiatives undertaken in the
South at the same time, one explanation is that the unwanted
elements in these projects were neighborhoods where Blacks
and whites lived too close together to be served by separate
race schools.
This is precisely what the plaintiffs in a number of
school desegregation suits have claimed, i.e. that cities
deliberately used their urban renewal powers to create
segregated neighborhoods, strictly enforce well defined
color barriers, isolate Black populations, relocate
integrated schools, and otherwise frustrate efforts to
desegregate the public school system.92

Although this

claim has been in part supported by demographic
researchers93 and other social scientists,94 they have

91Bernard Frieden, "Policies for Rebuilding," chap. in
James Q. Wilson, e d . , Urban Renewal:
The Record and the
Controversy (Cambridge, Mass.:
M.I.T. Press, 1966),
pp. 585-623.
92Karl
Taueber,
"Desegregation
of
Public
School
Districts:
Resistance and Change," Phi Delta Kappan 21:
1
(September, 1990), pp. 18-24.
93Gary Orfield, "Ghettoization and Its Alternatives,"
chap. in Paul E. Peterson, e d . , The New Urban Reality
(Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1985),
pp. 161-196.
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chosen to blame school boards, rather than redevelopment
authorities, planning commissions, or city councils, for
efforts to replace de jure with de facto segregation.
Although Norfolk provides the perfect case history of all of
these charges, far from being the villain, the School Board
in Norfolk played only a bit part in the effort to divide
the city into racially distinct school districts.

In fact,

it is only through the somewhat heroic actions of its School
Board that Norfolk still had some semblance of an opera
tional public school system left after its municipal leader
ship had finally given up their fight to preserve segregated
schools.
In Norfolk, at least, the fight to preserve segregated
education clearly went much farther than the School Board's
efforts to close effected schools, select racially "safe"
sites, redraw attendance zones, and manipulate the other
factors of school plant planning and student attendance,
transfer, and grade organization.

In several instances

(Atlantic City and Broad Creek Village), the School Board's
action to close a threatened school came after the city had
committed to the far more precipitate act of demolishing the
entire school zone.

In other cases (Easton, Fairlawn,

Poplar Halls, Pretty Lake, and East Ocean View), the School

94Karl E. Taueber, "Residence and Race:
1619 to 2019,"
chap. in Winston A. Van Horne, ed. Race:
Twentieth Century
Dilemmas--Twenty-First Century Prognoses (Milwaukee:
University of Wisconsin, 1989).
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Board went along with the Council's desire to build tiny
"vest pocket" schools, even though it had opposed the
structures; the financial control of the City Council,
especially over school capital expenditures, was such that,
because the city was desperately short of classroom space,
the School Board had to take whatever it could get.

in

several other areas of the city interstate highways
(Brambleton, Broad Creek Shores, Ingleside, Coronado), parks
(Titustown and Benmoreell), and other major public
facilities (Old Dominion University and the National Guard
Armory) were used, appear to have been used, along with
natural geographic barriers, to provide both a clear-cut
color line between school districts and a logical limitation
to the size of the attendance zone.

These same barriers

would make it even more difficult to provide racially
balanced neighborhood schools once the effort to preserve
segregation was finally abandoned.
Even though the actions in Norfolk to preserve segre
gated schools were dramatic, they do not appear to be
unique.

Norfolk as well as many other communities in the

South had a strong motive to preserve segregation:

public

reaction to the dictates of the U. S. Supreme Court were
overwhelmingly negative, and large portions of the populace
indicated that they may have been prepared to engage in
disruptive, even illegal, activity to block court-ordered
integration.

State political leaders all across the South
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were attempting to interpose the authority of the state
governments between the courts and the local schools in a
legal juryrig of hastily enacted legislation controlling
pupil assignment, transfer, and attendance policies.
Southern senators and congressmen had banded together to
urge their constituencies to use every legal means at their
disposal to oppose integration.

In addition to this element

of motive, which may actually have been tempered in Norfolk
by the leadership of the School Board, the editorial writers
of the Virginian-Pilot, and the Norfolk Committee for Public
Schools, an urgency of the situation also existed, caused in
part by the fact that so many areas of the city appeared to
run afoul of the Supreme Court's doctrine of proximity in
assigning school attendance zones.
Because it had extensive areas of Navy housing, which
were integrated, a few mixed-race neighborhoods in various
stages of transition, and several communities where there
were pockets of Black population too small to be served by
their own school, Norfolk faced the prospect that it would
be among the first cities in the South to face widespread
school integration.

In Virginia that meant political death,

and the fear of being cut off from funding or state
resources was very real; for two decades after it had
finally peacefully integrated its schools, local residents
referred to the Norfolk area as "Tollwater," an ironic
allusion to the fact that the state seemed to be punishing
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the city for killing Massive Resistance through it's
unwillingness to provide highway funds for the badly needed
bridge, tunnel, and highways so necessary for economic
growth.
Norfolk, as well as other communities all across the
South, had ample opportunity to bend the powers of school
administration, school plant planning, and urban renewal to
serve the cause of preserving segregation as well as
economic development.

Southern cities faced a rapid period

of growth in population, school enrollment, industry, land
area, and economic development.

This meant that they could

use the opportunity already available through building new
schools or changing school zones because of newly annexed
territories to make sure that new school districts would be
segregated, and therefore acceptable to the public.

This at

least was the course urged by James J. Kilpatrick, editor of
the Richmond News Leader and chief publicist for the
doctrine of interposition.93

They could go a step farther

and use the opportunity to close schools, redesignate their
use, or reallocate their grade composition as another way to
defer or delay integration in a couple of areas of the city.
Or they could go the final step proposed by this work and
make sure that the schools in threatened areas of the city
remained segregated by using their urban renewal and

95James W. Eley, The Crisis of Conservative Virginia:
The Byrd Organization and the Politics of Massive Resistance,
op cit . , p. 35.
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municipal planning powers to carefully position parks,
highways, or other public facilities so that they posed a
barrier to Blacks living near a white school; municipalities
could control land use policies so that Black housing could
move no closer to white schools; and cities could use their
powers of redevelopment to tear down mixed-race neighbor
hoods or other areas that proved threatening under the
court's doctrine of proximity.

Norfolk was not alone in

taking these extra steps; there is strong evidence to
suggest that Richmond, Mobile, Charleston (South Carolina),
Memphis, Boston, Wilmington (Delaware) and other cities used
at least some of these techniques.

Only in Norfolk is the

record so far complete enough to project an extensive and
concerted use of the powers to urban renewal to preserve
segregated schools.
This interpretation does not, however, entirely dis
credit the economic argument made for annexation, industrial
development, urban renewal and city planning.

For most of

these cities, growth in both land area and tax base was
absolutely essential for survival, and every element of
municipal government was concerned with the effort to plan
for and sustain that growth.

The suggestion that the effort

to preserve school segregation was also involved in these
planning, development, and redevelopment decisions is not
meant to denigrate the purely economic considerations of
such activities; it is only meant to infer that the
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municipal powers of urban renewal in many cities in the
1950s was meant to serve two masters, the public avowed one
of growth, and the privately held determination to stay the
same, at least as far as segregated schools were concerned.
Finally, some larger historical context is necessary
to fully understand the events and actions herein described.
Other contemporaneous researchers9*5 found that appointed
school boards were far more adept at handling the contro
versies surrounding school desegregation than their elected
counterparts.
Norfolk.

This definitely seems to be the case in

All seven members of the Norfolk School Board

responded to the crisis in admirable, even heroic, fashion,
and their calm and deliberate approach, coupled with their
overriding devotion to the concept of free public educa
tion, was largely responsible for the peaceful resumption of
classes, the sense of continuity and control, and the fact
that quality schools continued in Norfolk once the legal
issues were settled.

Their courage and devotion to duty

brought them into constant conflict with the elected leaders
of their day.

None of its members had sought appointment to

the Board,9-7 and, for the most part, they were not the
sort of individuals who seek election to office.

All had

been chosen because of their record of involvement in
volunteer, not political, community service, and it was this

9SRobert L. Crain, et al . , op cit.
9VFrancis Crenshaw.
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experience that served them well when the clamor of the
constituency of the day demanded short-term approaches.
There was unanimity on the Board, the kind of calm consensus
that rarely is seen in elected bodies in times of such
violent social upheaval and conflicting values.

The Norfolk

School Board had the long-term interest of public education
in mind throughout the controversy; their judgement was not
,clouded by political expediency or the need to seek reelection.

Their calm reaction to crisis and their devotion

to the future of quality public education in the city should
give pause to all those who think that urban school systems,
especially those beset with major problems and diverse
clientele, would be better served by elected, rather than
appointed, boards.
Although school boards all across the South were
vilified for their efforts to delay or defer court-ordered
desegregation efforts, in Norfolk, at least, the School
Board was clearly but one actor in a larger cast of
characters that included the Mayor, the Council, the Norfolk
Redevelopment and Housing Authority, and other municipal
officials responsible for the planning and development of
the city.

While this larger relationship has been the

source of some speculation, it is the major contribution of
this work that the interplay between school desegregation
and urban renewal in one community has been more completely
analyzed.

The response to court-ordered school
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desegregation did not begin with the first local court case,
the traditional starting date of other histories of the
process; instead it began with a realization in the South
that predates even the Brown decision,

that is, that in

order to pass court review, "separate"

school facilities for

the two races must be made more nearly

equal; later, when it

became clear that the courts would not

accept separate

facilities as equal when the pupils lived in close
geographic proximity to one another, a much larger cast of
characters than just Southern school boards followed the
dictates of their state and national political leaders, as
well as their voting constituencies, to do everything in
their power to prevent school integration.

The powers of

urban renewal, school plant planning, redevelopment, and
school administration appear to have been used liberally to
create separate race neighborhoods and school attendance
zones, thereby replacing segregation by law (de jure) with
the type of de facto separation of races already approved by
the courts in Northern and Midwestern cities.
Even though a temptation exists to affix blame or
criticism for actions that turn out now by modern standards
to be misdirected, judging the motives of the 1950s by the
mores of the 1990s is just as unfair as requiring the
citizens of the 1950s to share the same advantage of our own
more modern perspective in order to receive fair treatment
in any account of their own era.

Enough time has passed to
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gain both the advantage of historical hindsight and a
passionless examination of the events and issues, few cities
could withstand the judgement of a serious local history
' viewed from the high ground of both hindsight and moral
certainty.

Norfolk is no better or no worse than other

cities; if it is proud of its accomplishments, and the city
has every right to boast, then it should not be afraid to
learn lessons from its failures.
There are no villains to this piece.

Not only is

judgement not intended by this critical examination of the
era, one has to marvel at both the competence and the
devotion to principle exemplified here.

Mayor Duckworth and

the other members of the City Council, the School Board,
Redevelopment and Housing Authority, and other public
officials were responding to a tremendous public mandate to
do everything legally possible to preserve what was con
sidered by the city's voters to be a sacrosanct way of life.
Not only did they respond to this mandate with, vigor and
ingenuity, they received close counsel and guidance from
others in the state and national government who shared their
sentiment.

That all of these officials enjoyed the over

whelming support of their constituencies is evident in the
voting patterns of the era.

In a democratic society we must

be prepared to accept the fact that powerful and principled
elected leaders will do everything in their power to respond
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to such a mandate without condemning in any way their
actions or criticizing their motives.
Partly because Norfolk encountered its school desegre
gation crisis early and faced it so precipitously, the city
has been able to achieve and maintain a level of racial and
political harmony that exists in few other areas of the
country.

Norfolk emerged from the school closing crisis

with an intensity of support for public education that has
never diminished.

Even when it was faced with the prospect

of court-ordered crosstown busing that was more extensive
than almost anywhere else in the country, community support
remained strong.

Partly because of this support and because

it continued to offer quality inter-racial education,
Norfolk did not experience the level of white flight found
in a number of other central cities.

Almost two decades ago

the federal courts declared that Norfolk operated a truly
"unitary" school system, a step that paved the way for it to
be among the first major school systems in the country to
leave the phase of court-ordered busing behind and return to
neighborhood schools at the elementary level.

Today the

Norfolk Public Schools continue to win accolades as one the
nation's few truly effective urban school systems:

test

scores are up, white enrollment stable, dropout rates down,
and community support remains high.
The Norfolk story is not that of a deviant case;
instead the history of its school desegregation crisis
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exemplifies the level of the struggle that took place in
cities all across the South in the 1950s and then moved to
the Northern, Midwest, and Border States in the 1960s when
they, too, were faced with the prospect of massive courtordered school integration initiatives.

Although perhaps

more compelling than events in other cities, partly because
of the collapsed time frame and the fact that Norfolk was
among the first cities in the South to desegregate, the
actions of the public officials to preserve racially
identifiable schools were not unique.

Only the scale of the

battle in Norfolk was larger than elsewhere, but that is why
the story of this struggle is so instructive.
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